Order:
  1.  61
    Persons as Objects of Love.Ty Landrum - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):417-439.
    Recent attempts to view personal love as a response to value fail to capture the lover's distinctive compulsion to intimacy with the beloved. Their common mistake is to hold that the grounding value of love must be other than the beloved person herself. This view condemns theorists to describe an attachment comparatively impersonal and undiscerning. The present paper argues that the beloved person is the object of love, particularly when she is regarded in light of her virtues. Virtues are aspects (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  2. Brill Online Books and Journals.Ty Landrum - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  42
    Virtue Beyond Reason.Ty Landrum - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):1-17.
    In the wake of Aristotle, it is often thought that moral virtue is a matter of feeling and acting for the right reasons. This notion is not incorrect, but it obscures one of the most interesting dimensions of virtue. It overlooks the formative role that virtue can play in bringing forth the kinds of considerations that count as reasons. To illustrate this point, I discuss some instances of love and resentment that are not plausibly conceived as responses to reasons, but (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  31
    Akrasia and the Calculative View of Practical Reason.Ty Landrum - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):497-506.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  18
    The Education of Amour-Propre.Ty Landrum - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):320-339.
    In the First Discourse, Rousseau complains that modern morals encourage us to think of ourselves in an impersonal and hygienic manner, and to present ourselves in public space as dimensionless members of society. Submission to modern morals encourages conformism, Rousseau argues, and conformism precludes us from having selves of the sort upon which moral freedom depends. In this paper, I argue that Rousseau’s vision of the redemptive promise of amour-propre should be understood in light of his concern to reverse the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark