According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How (...) much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

Apperly and Butterfill's (2009) hold that there are two cognitive mind-reading systems. System 1(S1) is fast, automatic and inflexible, whereas system 2 (S2) is reflective, flexible and slow. This paper presents and discusses two central assumptions of this theory: the independence of S1 and S2 and the encapsulation of S1. It is argued that findings on longitudinal trajectories in infancy on the false belief test and visual perspective taking undermine the two-system theory in three respects: (1) S1 is not encapsulated, (...) (2) S1 is not entirely automatic processing, and (3) S2 cognitive processes can be fast and efficient. The paper concludes that mindreading operates through different socio-cognitive processes that are gradually and continuously enriched during development, which eliminates the need for a two-system characterization. (shrink)

In order to explain delusional beliefs, one must first consider what factors should be included in a theory of delusion. Unlike a one-factor theory, a two-factor theory of delusion argues that not only anomalous experience (the first factor) but also an impairment of the belief-evaluation system (the second factor) is required. Recently, two-factor theorists have adopted various Bayesian approaches in order to give a more accurate description of delusion formation. By reviewing the progression from a one-factor theory to a two-factor (...) theory, I argue that in light of the second factor’s requirements, different proposed impairments can be unified within a consistent belief-evaluation system. Under this interpretation of the second factor, I further argue that the role of a mechanism responsible for detecting bizarreness is wrongly neglected. I conclude that the second factor is a compound system which consists of differing functional parts, one of which functions to detect bizarreness in different stages of delusion; moreover, I hold that the impairment can be one or several of these functional parts. (shrink)

In this article, I address the question of what Developmental Systems Theory aims at explaining. I distinguish two lines of thought in DST, one that deals specifically with development and tries to explain the development of the individual organism, and the other that presents itself as a reconceptualization of evolution and tries to explain the evolution of populations of developmental systems. I emphasize that, despite the claim of the contrary by DST proponents, there are two very different definitions of the (...) “developmental system,” and therefore DST is not a unified theory of evolution and development. I show that DST loses the most interesting aspects of its reconceptualization of development when it tries to reconceptualize evolutionary theory. I suggest that DST is about development per se, and that it fails at offering a new view on evolution. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question of what the Developmental Systems Theory (DST) aims at explaining. I distinguish two lines of thought in DST, one which deals specifically with development, and tries to explain the development of the individual organism, and the other which presents itself as a reconceptualization of evolution, and tries to explain the evolution of populations of developmental systems (organism-environment units). I emphasize that, despite the claiming of the contrary by DST proponents, there are two very (...) different definitions of the ‘developmental system’, and therefore DST is not a unified theory of evolution and development. I show that the DST loses the most interesting aspects of its reconceptualization of development when it tries to reconceptualize evolutionary theory. I suggest that DST is about development per se, and that it fails at offering a new view on evolution. (shrink)

The article investigates the possibility of formation of creative competencies of students within the framework of scientific personnel training. It is noted that the available training courses within the framework of general training of scientific personnel allow to prepare a specialist who is able to use existing knowledge, but such a specialist is not trained in creativity. For the formation of creative competences it is necessary to take a training course of the general theory of systems, the purpose of which (...) is to create a universal methodology of reliable representation of models of objects, based on the similarity (isomorphism) of the forms and laws of the universe. A detailed argumentation of the connection between creativity and holistic representation of being, the empirical manifestation of which is isomorphism, is given. The mechanism of knowledge translation within the framework of the mechanism of multisystem integration of human being, the mechanism of knowledge borrowing by human being from sensually comprehended forms of reality is investigated. It is stated that in order to meet the set tasks of cognition, a version of the general theory of systems, extended by the metaphysical component, is required. Further, starting from the metaphysical description of the foundations of the phenomenon of isomorphism observed in the practice of cognition, it is possible to form complete collections of patterns - typical forms, templates of objects and their relations. At present, the work on such a version of the general theory of systems is being finalized. The article concludes with a discussion of the problematics of teaching general systems theory. It emphasizes two components: the issue of positioning the training course "General Theory of Systems" in relation to other courses, as well as taking into account the specifics of the subject area of students in different specialties (directions). (shrink)

Bayes nets are formal representations of causal systems that many psychologists have claimed as plausible mental representations. One purported advantage of Bayes nets is that they may provide a theory of counterfactual conditionals, such as If Calvin had been at the party, Miriam would have left early. This article compares two proposed Bayes net theories as models of people's understanding of counterfactuals. Experiments 1-3 show that neither theory makes correct predictions about backtracking counterfactuals (in which the event of the (...) if-clause occurs after the event of the then-clause), and Experiment 4 shows the same is true of forward counterfactuals. An amended version of one of the approaches, however, can provide a more accurate account of these data. (shrink)

Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theories go further and assign these two types of process to two separate reasoning systems, System 1 (...) and System 2 – a view sometimes described as ‘the two minds hypothesis’. It is often claimed that System 2 is uniquely human and the source of our capacity for abstract and hypothetical thinking. This study is an introduction to dual-process and dual-system theories. It looks at some precursors, surveys key work in the fields of learning, reasoning, social cognition and decision making, and identifies some recent trends and philosophical applications. (shrink)

It is widely believed that mathematics carries a substantial part of the explanatory burden in science. However, mathematics can also play important heuristic roles of a different kind, being a source of new ideas and approaches, allowing us to build toy models, enhancing expressive power and providing fruitful conceptualizations. In this paper, we focus on the application of dynamical systems theory (DST) within the extended cognition (EC) field of cognitive science, considering this case study to be a good illustration of (...) a general phenomenon. In the paper, we justify both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that dynamical systems theory hardly plays any explanatory role in EC research. We justify our claim by analyzing several accounts of the explanatory role of mathematics and stressing the way mathematical arguments are used in explanations. Our positive claim is that even though, for now, DST has no explanatory power in many of the EC approaches, it still plays an important heuristic role there. In particular, using mathematical notions improves the expressive power of the language and gives a sense of understanding of the phenomena under investigation. The case study of EC allows us to identify and analyze this important role of mathematics, which seems to be neglected in contemporary discussions. (shrink)

The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...) Call & Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005). We interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. We propose that the success of infants and non-human animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans this capacity persists in parallel with later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory of mind abilities. (shrink)

Each of the two major approaches to Aristotle--the unitarian, which understands his work as forming a single, unified system, and the developmentalist, which seeks a sequence of developing ideas--has inherent limitations. This book proposes a synthetic view of Aristotle that sees development as a change between systematic theories. Setting theories of the so-called logical works beside theories of the physical and metaphysical treatises, Graham shows that Aristotle's doctrines fall into two distinct systems of philosophies that are genetically (...) related. This study--the first major alternative to the unitarian approach since Jaeger pioneered the developmentalist method in 1923--provides a sweeping reappraisal of Aristotle's science and metaphysics and a new approach to the problem of substance presented in the Metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper presents two systems of natural deduction for the rejection of non-tautologies of classical propositional logic. The first system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all non-tautologies, the second system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all contradictions. The second system is a subsystem of the first. Starting with Jan Łukasiewicz's work, we describe the historical development of theories of rejection for classical propositional logic. Subsequently, we present the two systems (...) of natural deduction and prove them to be sound and complete. We conclude with a ‘Theorem of Inversion’. (shrink)

The following article attempts to be a contribution to the reflection on the lines of continuity, proximity relations and possibles elements of differentiationon two theoretical fields of growing importance within the social sciences: theory of systems of Niklas Luhmann and the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Along with accounting for the extent of both theories for reflection on the foundations of the social sciences, this article tries to install some useful questions for self-observation of the epistemological foundations of this field (...) of knowledge. El siguiente artículo reflexiona en torno a las líneas de continuidad, relaciones de proximidad y elementos de diferenciación posibles de detectar en dos campos teóricos de creciente protagonismo al interior de las ciencias sociales: la teoría de sistemas de Niklas Luhmann y la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida. Junto con dar cuenta de los alcances de ambas teorías para la reflexión relativa a los fundamentos de las ciencias sociales, el artículo pretende instalar algunas interrogantes de utilidad para la auto-observación de los fundamentos epistemológicos de dicho campo del conocimiento. (shrink)

About the book: This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and (...) slow. Within the former, processes the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. (shrink)

Two trends have emerged in recent work from the Frankfurt School: the first involves a reconsideration of immanent critique’s basic commitments and viability for critical social theory, while the second involves an effort to introduce temporal considerations for social interaction into critical theorizing to help make sense of the phenomenon of social acceleration. This article contributes to these ongoing discussions by investigating whether social systems theory, in which temporal relations play a primary role, can be integrated with immanent critique. If (...) such a synthesis were successful, it would promise to unify two distinct forms of social theorizing that have often been taken to be orthogonal or incommensurate since the debate between Luhmann and Habermas in the 1970s. The investigation proceeds in three parts: first, the article delineates immanent critique’s conditions of success; second, using these conditions, it identifies potential points of contact between social systems theorizing and immanent critical forms of analysis, while exemplifying these commonalities via a case study; finally, the article argues that, although immanent critique is not a strict method of analysis or investigation, its success conditions preclude social systems theory on the grounds that the latter approach cannot anchor itself within the context of analysis in the way ‘immanent critique’ requires. (shrink)

According to the two-systems account of mindreading, our mature perspective-taking abilities are subserved by two distinct mindreading systems: a fast but inflexible, “implicit” system, and a flexible but slow “explicit” one. However, the currently available evidence on adult perspective-taking does not support this account. Specifically, both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking show a combination of efficiency and flexibility that is deeply inconsistent with the two-systems architecture. This inconsistency also turns out to have serious consequences for the two-systems framework as a whole, (...) both as an account of our mature mindreading abilities and of the development of those abilities. What emerges from this critique is a conception of context-sensitive, spontaneous mindreading that may provide insight into how mindreading functions in complex social environments. This in turn offers a bulwark against skepticism about the role of mindreading in everyday social cognition. (shrink)

Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers 4 systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first-order propositional and predicate calculus. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations (...) are closely related in a canonical way. In a preceding paper, Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, 1993, we proved completeness of the two direct translations. In the present paper we prove completeness of the two indirect translations by showing that the corresponding illative systems are conservative over the two systems for the direct translations. In another version, DBB (1997), we shall give a more direct completeness proof. These papers fulfill the program of Church and Curry to base logic on a consistent system of $\lambda$ -terms or combinators. Hitherto this program had failed because systems of ICL were either too weak (to provide a sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes even inconsistent). (shrink)

The two contrasting theoretical approaches to visual perception, the constructivist and the ecological, are briefly presented and illustrated through their analyses of space and size perception. Earlier calls for their reconciliation and unification are reviewed. Neurophysiological, neuropsychological, and psychophysical evidence for the existence of two quite distinct visual systems, the ventral and the dorsal, is presented. These two perceptual systems differ in their functions; the ventral system's central function is that of identification, while the dorsal system is mainly engaged in (...) the visual control of motor behavior. The strong parallels between the ecological approach and the functioning of the dorsal system, and between the constructivist approach and the functioning of the ventral system are noted. It is also shown that the experimental paradigms used by the proponents of these two approaches match the functions of the respective visual systems. A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges from this analysis, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious. Some implications of this dual-process approach to visual-perceptual phenomena are presented, with emphasis on space perception. Key Words: constructivist; dual-process approach; ecological; size perception; space perception; two visual systems; visual perception theories. (shrink)

In philosophy of action, we typically aim to explain action by appealing to conative attitudes whose contents are either logically consistent propositions or can be rendered as such. Call this “the logical criterion.” This is especially difficult to do with clear-minded, intentional incontinence since we have to explain how two judgments can have non-contradicting contents yet still aim at contradictory outcomes. Davidson devises an innovative way of doing this but compromises his ability to explain how our better judgments can cause (...) our continent behaviors. In this essay, I preserve Davidson’s approach to the logical criterion but deviate from his broader theory of action by developing a default-interventionist dual systems theory of action. To do this, I focus on the dynamical relationship between System 1 and System 2: the logical construction of value judgments in System 2 from System 1 and the imaginative construction of non-propositional conative attitudes in System 1 from System 2. I draw on Street’s Humean constructivism and Peacocke’s theory of imagination for logical and imaginative construction, respectively. Within this framework, I provide a new definition of continence and incontinence that satisfies the logical criterion and explains how our better judgments can cause our continent behaviors. (shrink)

This is a spin-off paper to [3, 4] in which we carried out an extensive analysis of Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology from [5]. In [1] Loredana Biacino and Giangiacomo Gerla presented an axiomatization which was inspired by the Grzegorczyk’s system, and which is its variation. Our aim is to compare the two approaches and show that they are slightly different. Except for pointing to dissimilarities, we also demonstrate that the theories coincide in presence of axiom stipulating non-existence of atoms.

Many scientists and philosophers of science are troubled by the relative isolation of developmental from evolutionary biology. Reconciling the science of development with the science of heredity preoccupied a minority of biologists for much of the twentieth century, but these efforts were not corporately successful. Mainly in the past fifteen years, however, these previously dispersed integrating programmes have been themselves synthesized and so reinvigorated. Two of these more recent synthesizing endeavours are evolutionary developmental biology and developmental systems theory. While the (...) former is a bourgeoning and scientifically well-respected biological discipline, the same cannot be said of DST, which is virtually unknown among biologists. In this review, we provide overviews of DST and EDB, summarize their key tenets, examine how they relate to one another and to the study of epigenetics, and survey the impact that DST and EDB have had on biological theory and practice. (shrink)

We argue that the propositional and link-based approaches to human contingency learning represent different levels of analysis because propositional reasoning requires a basis, which is plausibly provided by a link-based architecture. Moreover, in their attempt to compare two general classes of models (link-based and propositional), Mitchell et al. refer to only two generic models and ignore the large variety of different models within each class.

The scientific investigation of consciousness generates new findings at a rapid pace. We argue that we need a novel theoretical framework, which we call the ALARM theory of consciousness, in order to account for all central observations. According to this theory, we need to distinguish two levels of consciousness, namely basic arousal and general alertness. Basic arousal functions as a specific alarm system, keeping a biological organism alive under sudden intense threats, and general alertness enables flexible learning and behavioural strategies. (...) This two-level theory of consciousness helps us to account for (i) recent discoveries of subcortical brain activities with a central role of thalamic processes, (ii) observations of differences in the behavioural repertoire of non-human animals indicating two types of conscious experiences. Furthermore, the framework enables us (iii) to unify the neural evidence for the relevance of subcortical processes, on the one hand, and of cortico-cortical loops, on the other, and finally (iv) to clarify the evolutionary and actual functional role of conscious experiences. (shrink)

The relativistic Schrödinger theory (RST) for N-fermion systems is further elaborated with respect to three fundamental problems which must emerge in any relativistic theory of quantum matter: (i) emergence/suppression of exchange forces between identical/non-identical particles, (ii) self-interactions, (iii) non-relativistic approximation. These questions are studied in detail for two- and three-particle systems but the results do apply to a general N-particle system. As a concrete demonstration, the singlet and triplet configurations of the positronium groundstate are considered within the RST framework, including (...) a discussion of the corresponding hyperfine splitting. (shrink)

We develop the theory of symmetry for a two-level quantum system in oder to illustrate the main ideas of the general theory of symmetry in quantum theory. It is based on the diffeomorphism of the two-dimensional sphere S 2 onto the space of states ℂP 1 and the isomorphism between the groups Pℳ(2) and SO 3 (ℝ). In particular, rotational invariance leads to the appearance of the spin1/2 in a natural way.

Dynamic systems theory (DS) provides tools for exploring how simpler elements can interact to produce complex psychological configurations. It may, as Lewis demonstrates, provide means for explicating relationships between two reductionist approaches to overlapping sets of phenomena. The result is a description of psychological phenomena at a level that begins to achieve the richness we would hope to achieve in examining psychological life as it is experienced and explored in psychoanalysis.

I argue that it is time for many feminists to rethink their attitudes towards evolutionary biology, not because feminists have been wrong to be deeply sceptical about many of its claims, both explicit and implicit, but because biology itself has changed. A new appreciation for the importance of development in biology has become mainstream and a new ontology, associated with developmental systems theory, has been introduced over the last two decades. This turn challenges some of the features of evolutionary biology (...) that have most troubled feminists. DST undermines the idea of biologicales sence and challenges both nature / nurture and nature/ culture distinctions. Freed from these conceptual constraints, evolutionary biology no longer poses the problems that have justified feminist scepticism. Indeed, feminists have already found useful applications for DST and I argue that they should expand their use of DST to support more radical and wide-ranging political theories. Si les féministes n’ont pas eu tort d’être profondément sceptiques face aux nombreuses revendications de la biologie, leur attitude face à cette science doit être remise en question car la biologie s’est transformée au courant des dernières décennies. La «théorie des systèmes de développement» est une théorie qui s’est considérablement développée et qui a pris beaucoup d’ampleur. Cette théorie n’accepte pas le concept d’essence biologique ce qui pose un défi important à la distinction nature/ culture. Une des conséquences de cet apport théorique est que le scepticisme des féministes face à la biologie de l’évolution n’est plus justifié car la biologie ne comporte plus les contraintes essentialistes qui s’avéraient contentieuses. En effet, certaines féministes ont déjà trouvé des applications utiles pour la TDS et nous avançons que les féministes doivent maintenant élargir l’utilisation de la TDS car la porté de celle-ci pourrait être significative dans d’autres domaines tel celui de la théorie politique. (shrink)

Despite many points of divergence, social scientists and social theorists seem united by one primary concern: to identify what it is people are doing. The thought that this might count as not only a viable but centrally important concern is grounded in a scepticism about the ability of societies’ ordinary members to reliably correctly identify their own and others’ actions. In this scepticism, such social scientists and social theorists usually situate themselves in opposition to ethnomethodologists and Peter Winch. This scepticism (...) is grounded in a belief that ordinary or competent members of societies are unreliable authorities on the identity of their own and others’ actions because they are subject to systems of sociological refraction. The idea being that ordinary members of society are systematically misled as to the identity of their actions and those of their peers because they — or their perceptions of actions — are subject to the refractive properties of ideology, or folk theories of action, and so on. In this paper, I subject to analysis this core commitment of much social science and social theory. (shrink)

The parallel drawn by Norman between the dorsal and ventral systems and direct and indirect approaches is based on two misrepresentations of the direct approach – that it is concerned only with the unconscious control of action, and that it cannot explain learning. We propose a way of understanding the visual system differences from within the direct approach.

Appreciating the undeniable value of General Systems Theory, Alfred Locker considers the question whether or not GST is able to go beyond a mere scientific point of view. Locker’s own systems theoretical approach, Trans-Classical Systems Theory, proposes not only to include usual observations into a systems view, but likewise their theoretical presuppositions. Locker hereby creates two levels of observation; an ortho- and a meta-level, where otherwise incommensurable viewpoints are united into whole. In this way, Locker is able to articulate a (...) holistic systems theory of seeming opposites, like, for example, creation and evolution. (shrink)

This article addresses the relationship between the structuralism, especially the anthropological version of the latter in Levi-Strauss and Luhmann’s theory of social systems. The analysis is done through two guiding hypotheses. It reviews the historical background relating structuralism with systems theory and discusses the fundamental concepts that appear in this relationship. Luhmann's systems thinking are contrasted in some of its central concepts with Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist perspective. The paper concludes with a review of the hypotheses presented and some proposals about the (...) perspective of the social systems. El presente artículo aborda las relaciones entre el pensamiento estructuralista, especialmente la variante antropológica de éste en Lévi-Strauss y la teoría de sistemas sociales de Luhmann. El análisis se hace a través de dos hipótesis que guían el desarrollo del texto. Se revisan los antecedentes históricos que relacionan al estructuralismo con la teoría de sistemas y se analizan los conceptos fundamentales que aparecen en esta relación. Posteriormente el pensamiento sistémico de Luhmann se contrasta a partir de algunos de sus conceptos centrales con la perspectiva estructuralista de Lévi-Strauss. El trabajo concluye con una revisión de las hipótesis presentadas y con reflexiones globales acerca de la perspectiva de los sistemas sociales. (shrink)

China is located in the intersection area of two seismic zones. Due to this special geographical location, earthquake disasters occur frequently in China. Earthquake emergency rescue work is one of the key construction works of disaster prevention and mitigation in China. This paper mainly studies the earthquake disaster rescue model based on the complex adaptive system theory and establishes the earthquake disaster rescue model by analyzing the complex adaptive system theory and combining the earthquake rescue process. In this paper, through (...) the task allocation mechanism task, the disaster rescue task is divided into simple task and complex task, and the executive task subject is divided into single task subject and multitask subject. On the basis of considering the shortest emergency rescue time goal and the goal of maximizing the deployment utility of rescue team, the reasonable deployment of a rescue team is realized through a complex adaptive system, that is, the deployment utility of the rescue team is maximized. In this paper, the simulation experiment and comparison of the earthquake disaster rescue model based on the complex adaptive system theory are carried out. The experimental results show that the model used in this paper is better than the other two models in terms of algorithm convergence, rescue number, and overall score; in different scenarios, the relative survival probability of the model in this paper is 58.92%, 67.85%, and 77.46%, and the proportion of the wounded rescued is 66.31%, 76.45%, and 83.06%, which were higher than those of the other two models. The earthquake disaster rescue model based on the complex adaptive system theory proposed in this paper provides an effective theoretical basis and method system for postdisaster emergency rescue decision making and enhances and improves the emergency response ability to deal with large-scale geological disaster events. (shrink)

In this article, we assess the generalizability of the feminist agrifood systems model developed by Sachs et al.. We ask to what extent might these findings generated from the study of Pennsylvania women farmers be generalized to other regions of the U.S. We define and situate the FAST theory to the Michigan, U.S. context in order to better understand how the shifts in agriculture and women’s roles in the U.S. based on our data, align or depart with that experienced by (...) women farmers in the northeast. We find that there are many similarities in the experiences of these two populations, but there are also some differences. Five primary differences in the two populations are articulated. Michigan women farmers appear to struggle to assert the identity of a farmer; struggle to access land via inheritance; are income dependent on males; often work in value-added production that does not challenge traditionally-coded ‘women’s work’; and perpetuate on-farm education/networks based on nostalgia which may further the distance between producers and consumers. We conclude with a brief discussion of what may account for these differences. (shrink)

This article reports on a study that took a Dynamic Systems Theory perspective to second language motivational self system. More specifically, it investigated the influence of an Intensive English Reading course based on the Production-Oriented Approach upon the L2MSS of Chinese university English majorsfrom the DST perspective. To this end, two intact classes composed of 50 students were assigned into experimental group and control group, who responded to an L2MSS scale before and after the one-semester intervention. Eight and five students (...) were respectively selected using the purposive sampling method from the experimental and control groups for follow-up semi-structured interviews. The quantitative results revealed that the overall and dimensional levels of L2MSS were significantly strengthened over time in the EG while kept stable in the CG. The qualitative results suggested that the enhanced Ideal L2 Self of the participants stemmed from an attractor basin that was deepened by a number of attractors encompassing Output Tasks and Peer Performance. The interview results also showed that the increased L2 Learning Experience of the participants pertained to an attractor basin that was consolidated by an array of attractors containing Output Tasks, Teacher Guidance, Group Discussion, and Peer Assessment. The findings indicated that the attractors at the subjective and social dimensions in the POA-based course collectively worked together to cause changes in L2MSS among the participants. The implications for intervening L2 motivation from a POA approach in English as a Foreign Language classrooms were discussed. (shrink)

Every scientific or intellectual movement rests on central premises and assumptions that shape its philosophy. The purpose of this study is to review a brief account of the main philosophical bases of grey systems theory (GST) and the paradigm governing its principles. So, the recent studies on the philosophical foundations of GST have been reviewed and tried to pay attention to some key ambiguities in the previous studies and give more and clearer explanations in this paper. Also, this paper tries (...) to fill the gap among the previous studies and to provide a purposeful connection between them by expressing two key concepts: complete information and imbalance knowledge. Primarily, the study addresses the theoretical foundations of uncertainty and the concept of greyness. Next, it focuses on the notion of “complete information” and challenges to it. Then, it reviews such processes as perception, cognition, and understanding, as well as their dynamic nature. It explains how knowledge is produced through understanding and interpreting information/data and the dynamics governing the whole process. Also, the study describes any dataset, no matter how large it may be, will remain incomplete, imperfect, and grey, so humans only rely on incomplete datasets to interpret the world. As such, information and knowledge are always grey and uncertain because they are basically contingent on subjective understandings and interpretations and imperfect inputs and data. Finally, as a key development, this study also demonstrates that human grey knowledge remains imbalanced across different disciplines and spheres. In the end, a brief overview of the philosophical paradigm of GST is also provided. GST is depicted as an anti-realistic, anti-positivistic, and non-deterministic approach, which is inherently pluralistic and ideographic. According to GST principles, dynamicity and change are essential parts of human narratives of the world and systems, and human knowledge is constantly reproduced through collecting new information. As a result, knowledge, theories, narratives, and scientific laws dynamically change. Given this premise, one could argue that GST is considerably compatible with the postulates of post-modern thinking. (shrink)

The evolution of the technology standard alliance is examined using complex adaptive system theory. Taking TSA as a dynamic CAS, an echo model is constructed to depict the mechanism of its evolution, and a model is simulated on the NetLogo platform. The echo model includes a basic model, an extended model, and a three-layer echo model. The adhesive aggregation of agents is explained, and the three evolutionary stages of agents’ entry, migration, and exit are analyzed. Moreover, the adaptability of agents (...) in TSA is quantified. The results of simulation show the evolution of the TSA in relation to the two aspects of agent adhesion aggregation and agent resource interaction, and they demonstrate the dynamic and complex hierarchical structure of the TSA system. It is proposed that greater matching ability, moderate behavior income, and lower behavior cost are more conducive to the evolution and development of TSA. Additionally, the echo model is reconstructed to expand the range of application of CAS theory. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what (...) is constitutive of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and what is represented. (shrink)

The origination of General Systems Theory is credited to Ludwig von Bertalanffy who, two years after receiving his doctorate from the University of Vienna, published a work in 1932 entitled Theorie der Formbildung. Despite, by his own account, an exposure to and familiarity with the positivism of the Vienna circle, von Bertalanffy was dissatisfied with the reductionist and atomistic forms of explanation which this group asserted is characteristic of scientific explanation. He was particularly unhappy with attempts to pattern explanations of (...) biological phenomena after the model of classical Newtonian physics. In this early work, Models Theories of Development, von Bertalanffy maintained both that the main problem for biology is to discover patterns (laws) which are typical of biological systems and that the discovery of such patterns would produce a major change in the way the world is viewed in general. Von Bertalanffy worked out his proposed model for biological explanation in such subsequent books as Theoretische Biologie and Problems of Life and then in his later years in such works as Robots, Man and Minds and Organismic Psychology and Systems Theory, went on to apply his concepts in a cross-disciplinary way to psychology. Again, by his own account, at a somewhat later period, others, for example the economist Kenneth Boulding and the bio-mathematician A. Rapport, had arrived at, for parallel reasons, certain similar ideas relative to their own disciplines. These individuals together with others formed a joint enterprise which was to result in the interdisciplinary systems movement. Von Bertalanffy stressed the multi-dimension possibilities for fruitful research in a large number of conceptual areas, including the humanities, in his final major work, General Systems Theory Foundation, Development and Applications. (shrink)

This commentary construes the relation between the two systems of temporal updating and temporal reasoning as a bifurcation and tracks it across three time scales: phylogeny, ontogeny, and microgeny. In taking a dynamic systems approach, flexibility, as mentioned by Hoerl & McCormack, is revealed as the key characteristic of human temporal cognition.

One of the great challenges of the modern world is the control and management of complexity. After the infinitely large and the infinitely small, we once again find ourselves confronting an unfathomable infinite?the infinitely complex. With its capability for simulation, the computer has become a macroscope. It helps us understand complexity and act on it more effectively to build and manage the large systems of which we are the cells?companies, cities, economies, societies, ecosystems. Thanks to this macroscope, a new vision (...) of the world is emerging, based on a unified approach to the self-organization and evolution of complex systems. On the basis of this comprehensive vision, it becomes possible to describe the origin of a new form of life on Earth, a planetary macro-organism made up of human beings and machines, networks, and nations?a still-embryonic macro-organism that is trying to live in symbiosis with the planetary ecosystem. This new vision of the world brings together two complementary modes of analysis and action: the analytic method and the systemic approach. It can be called the unified theory of the self-organization and dynamics of complex systems. More concisely, one can propose the term symbionomics to describe the range of phenomena covered by this unified theory. Symbionomics can be defined as the study of the emergence of complex systems through self-organization, self-selection, coevolution, and symbiosis. Symbiotic relationships form through coevolution with other organisms or organizations, and collective properties emerge. This information is transmitted to succeeding generations through the memorization of structures and reproductive and evolutionary mechanisms by means of chemical or electronic coding or by the culture. A complex organization is born. From a symbionomic perspective, it is then possible to trace the essential phases of the emergence of a new form of life on Earth, a macrolife, of which humanity, this time, is not the evolutionary end point, but the starting point and catalyst. (shrink)

This study tested the two main neurocognitive models of dreaming by using cognitive data elicited from REM sleep in normals and narcoleptics. The two models were the ''activation-only'' view which holds that, in the context of sleep, overall activation of the brain is sufficient for consciousness to proceed in the manner of dreaming (e.g., Antrobus, 1991; Foulkes, 1993; Vogel, 1978); and the Activation, Input source, Modulation (AIM model), which predicts that not only brain activation level but also neurochemical modulatory systems (...) exert widespread effects upon dreaming (Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000). Mental activity was studied in nocturnal REM in 15 narcoleptics and 9 normal healthy persons and in REM at the onset of daytime naps and nighttime sleep (SOREM) in narcoleptics. The study was performed in the subjects' homes, using instrumental awakenings and ambulatory polysomnographic techniques, and focused upon visual vividness, mentation report length, improbable and discontinuous bizarre features, and reflective consciousness. Within each subject group, most cognitive variables tended to fluctuate in line with expected variations in circadian activation level. When comparing the cognitive variables between the two groups, reflective consciousness was clearly highest in narcoleptics, whereas improbabilities and discontinuities were lower, with mentation report length and visual vividness differing less between the groups. These findings are consistent with the AIM model of sleep mentation, but not with the activation-only model. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Circularity and the Micro-Macro-Difference” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: The target article defends the fundamental role of circularity for systems sciences and the necessity to develop a conceptual and methodological approach to it. The concept of circularity, however, is multifarious, and two of the main challenges in this respect are to provide distinctions between different forms of circularities and explore in detail the roles they play in organizations. This commentary provides some suggestions in this direction (...) with the aim to supplement the perspective presented in the target article with some insights from theoretical biology. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems and its Criticisms” by Hugo Cadenas & Marcelo Arnold. Upshot: Cadenas and Arnold contribute towards a better understanding of what is at stake in the long debate concerning the applicability of Maturana’s autopoiesis concept to social systems. However, their target article has two shortcomings: it does not provide a deeper understanding of the reasons why Luhmann’s adoption of the autopoiesis concept has proved to be sterile after decades of debate; (...) and their historic account does not integrate recent developments that need to be highlighted to improve interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Given that theoretical analysis and empirical validation is fundamental to any model, whether conceptual or formal, it is surprising that these two tools of scientific discovery are so often ignored in contemporary studies of communication. In this paper, we pursued the ideas of a) correcting and expanding the modeling approaches of linguistics, which are otherwise inapplicable, to the general case of hypermedia-based communication, and b) developing techniques for empirical validation of semiotic models, which are nowadays routinely used to explore internal (...) mechanisms of complex systems, yet on a purely speculative basis. This study thus offers two experimentally tested substantive contributions: the formal representation of communication as the mutually-orienting behavior of coupled autonomous systems, and the mathematical interpretation of the semiosis of communication, which together offer a concrete and parsimonious understanding of diverse communication phenomena. (shrink)