In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Road to RedemptionAnonymous TwoI “am Dr X.* and I am a trained and board certified neonatologist with some years of experience in a high volume NICU with complex pathologies. I have been dismissed from the care of your baby by the fetal surgeon who is not trained in what he’s attempting to do,” that was how I felt when I left the operating room (OR), after performing initial (...) resuscitation on a newborn with congenital diaphragmatic hernia (CDH) with very poor prenatal prognostic indices. CDH is a diaphragm abnormality that allows abdominal organs to move into the chest and restrict lung development. The better part of me knew not to make such a statement and chose not to do so, as this was about the family and a very sick baby, not the professional wrangling of two medical teams or the expression of frustration by a neonatologist who was morally conflicted.I work in a level four Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and a very large one by any standard. Staff turnover had been an almost nonexistent issue in previous years because of the very conducive work environment of the NICU. Every team member (physician, nurse, respiratory therapist, pharmacist, etc.) felt like a stakeholder in providing optimal outcomes for the vulnerable neonates in the NICU.As change is the only constant thing in life, the hospital management decided to explore new frontiers and open a center for fetal medicine, with the hope of being a referral center in the region. They brought in a surgeon who came highly recommended for clinical acumen, but not for interpersonal relationship skills (unbeknownst to me). This surgeon, Dr Y., was hired to oversee the fetal center and build it into a center of excellence. Since this had to be a collaborative effort, other specialties (and subspecialties) had to be involved to make this a success. A representative from each of these specialties, including bioethics, was assigned to the fetal center team.The first inkling of a major problem occurred with the very first patient. The team met for the weekly meeting, reviewed the patient’s history and made a tentative plan, which included multidisciplinary counseling. This would require either a joint meeting with the patient or individual consults with the patient at her convenience. The following week at the weekly meeting, Dr Y. informed the group that he had met with the patient and counseled her and she had agreed to an extraordinary procedure for an oral lesion. In my opinion (and that of others), this lesion was not obstructive and could be immediately dealt with at delivery by an Otolaryngologist (ENT) surgeon, without putting the mother at risk for complications arising from the procedure being offered. There was a long discussion about why this was inappropriate [End Page E1] and why further imaging, discussion between the subspecialties and counseling should have been done prior to making this delivery plan. All felt this delivery plan could be remedied prior to delivery. However the surgeon had made plans with the obstetric team (who were at his mercy for financial/ political reasons) to continue with this plan. On the day of delivery, the NICU resuscitation team was called to another operating room instead of the labor and delivery room. I was even more appalled when I realized that the oral lesion was the size of a peanut! I felt like I failed in my obligation of veracity by avoiding the mother’s questions regarding the necessity of the procedure. Every member of my team felt the same and on several occasions I had to reassure concerned nurses that this was an aberrant occurrence that would not repeat itself... so I thought.I informed my departmental chairperson, Dr Z., who had a conversation with the fetal surgeon, Dr. Y., to inform him of my concerns and the effect of Dr. Y.’s actions on my group (physician, nurse practitioner, nurses). This led to being labeled unsupportive of Dr Y.’s goals and caused a less than cordial relationship towards me and the entire NICU group. The next week a picture of Dr Y. and the parents with the baby was on the front page... (shrink)

The van Wijngaarden grammars are two-level grammars that present many interesting properties. In the present article I elaborate on six of these properties, to wit, (i) their being constituted by two grammars, (ii) their ability to generate (possibly infinitely many) strict languages and their own metalanguage, (iii) their context-sensitivity, (iv) their high descriptive power, (v) their productivity, or the ability to generate an infinite number of production rules, and (vi) their equivalence with the unrestricted, or Type-0, Chomsky grammars.

This paper proposes a two-level modeling perspective which combines intrinsic 'betterness' and reason-based extrinsic preference, and develops its static and dynamic logic in tandem. Our technical results extend, integrate, and re-interpret earlier theorems on preference representation and update in the literature on preference change.

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only (...) one of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike other accounts, does justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) People can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy. (2) Morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering such reasons. (3) Philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are (...) not wasting their time when they search after highly general moral principles which could not be discovered or be justifiably accepted through non-philosophical thinking, and which specify the good reasons that virtuous people act on, as well as provide a criterion or criteria for determining what it is that people ought to do. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a new kind of nonprioritized operator which we call two level credibility-limited revision. When revising through a two level credibility-limited revision there are two levels of credibility and one of incredibility. When revising by a sentence at the highest level of credibility, the operator behaves as a standard revision, if the sentence is at the second level of credibility, then the outcome of the revision process coincides with a standard contraction by the negation of (...) that sentence. If the sentence is not credible, then the original belief set remains unchanged. In this article, we axiomatically characterize several classes of two level credibility-limited revision operators. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism has come under a lot of criticism for its apparent harshness towards negligent victims of voluntary actions (the harshness objection) and its inability to respond to morally-acceptable voluntary acts that lead to disadvantage (the discrimination objection). This paper surveys a series of responses in the luck egalitarian literature, showing that for the most part each one is unable to respond, on its own, to the crux of the objections. These responses often face a dilemma: Either they must bite (...) the bullet on the objections to retain their luck egalitarian commitments, or they must propose a reply to the objection that diverges from their core luck egalitarian principles. In this paper, I advance a preliminary framework for grounding luck egalitarian theories of justice based upon a two-level model and what I shall call the Fact of Inherent Normativity. Two-level luck egalitarianism makes fundamental rights and basic needs de facto insensitive to responsibility at the first level, while retaining the scope for responsibility for the distribution of second-level goods. The account remains distinctly luck egalitarian, while leaving scope for the consideration of rights, respect, and a host of other morally relevant considerations within the luck egalitarian framework. Luck egalitarianism, properly understood as a two-level theory, can successfully respond to objections against its harshness and propensity to discriminate. (shrink)

I present—in an extremely sketchy form—a model of two-level, open, plastic and multidimensional human nature. Due to the included attribute of multidimensionality this model opposes the reductive conceptions of man dominating in today’s philosophy. The main objective of the paper is the ontological status of man, especially the ontic foundation of multidimensional man. I demonstrate that this status remains a riddle; one only knows that from the ontological perspective man is a wholly exceptional object, not explainable by to-date ontological constructions. (...) -/- . (shrink)

Emotion recognition plays an important part in human-computer interaction. Currently, the main challenge in electroencephalogram -based emotion recognition is the non-stationarity of EEG signals, which causes performance of the trained model decreasing over time. In this paper, we propose a two-level domain adaptation neural network to construct a transfer model for EEG-based emotion recognition. Specifically, deep features from the topological graph, which preserve topological information from EEG signals, are extracted using a deep neural network. These features are then passed through (...) TDANN for two-level domain confusion. The first level uses the maximum mean discrepancy to reduce the distribution discrepancy of deep features between source domain and target domain, and the second uses the domain adversarial neural network to force the deep features closer to their corresponding class centers. We evaluated the domain-transfer performance of the model on both our self-built data set and the public data set SEED. In the cross-day transfer experiment, the ability to accurately discriminate joy from other emotions was high: sadness, anger, and fear on the self-built data set. The accuracy reached 74.93% on the SEED data set. In the cross-subject transfer experiment, the ability to accurately discriminate joy from other emotions was equally high: sadness, anger, and fear on the self-built data set. The average accuracy reached 87.9% on the SEED data set, which was higher than WGAN-DA. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed TDANN can effectively handle the domain transfer problem in EEG-based emotion recognition. (shrink)

This paper proposes a two-level metaheuristic consisting of lower- and upper-level algorithms for the job-shop scheduling problem with multipurpose machines. The lower-level algorithm is a local search algorithm used for finding an optimal solution. The upper-level algorithm is a population-based metaheuristic used to control the lower-level algorithm’s input parameters. With the upper-level algorithm, the lower-level algorithm can reach its best performance on every problem instance. Most changes of the proposed two-level metaheuristic from its original variants are in the lower-level algorithm. (...) A main purpose of these changes is to increase diversity into solution neighborhood structures. One of the changes is that the neighbor operators of the proposed lower-level algorithm are developed to be more adjustable. Another change is that the roulette-wheel technique is applied for selecting a neighbor operator and for generating a perturbation operator. In addition, the proposed lower-level algorithm uses an adjustable delay-time limit to select an optional machine for each operation. The performance of the proposed two-level metaheuristic was evaluated on well-known benchmark instances. The evaluation’s results indicated that the proposed two-level metaheuristic performs well on most benchmark instances. (shrink)

Many physicists regard the flow of time as an illusion. There is an upper level flow of time, the phenomenon of past/present/future; and there is a lower level flow of time which is really a flow of events. Perceptual completion accounts for the lower level flow of time in a few ways: apparent movement; amodal completion; and dynamic change as exemplified by a newly described modal completion that we called happening. It acts like an illusory percept connecting discrete stimuli in (...) all sensory modalities. The past/present/future distinction cannot exist unless an object is perceived to be the same now as it is then. This cognition requires object persistence. Experiments with object persistence suggest the circumstances when that, too, is an illusory percept. The illusory percepts of object persistence and perceptual completion can account for the entire flow of time. Our findings and conclusions are congruent with a few time theories and cosmologies that suggest that the flow of time is an illusion. (shrink)

This communication is part I of a series of papers which explore the theoretical possibility of generalizing quantum dynamics in such a way that the predicted motions of an isolated system would include the irreversible (entropy-increasing) state evolutions that seem essential if the second law of thermodynamics is ever to become a theorem of mechanics. In this first paper, the general mathematical framework for describing linear but not necessarily Hamiltonian mappings of the statistical operator is reviewed, with particular attention to (...) detailed representations of the Kossakowski conditions for the case of a two-level system. (shrink)

In “Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints,” Mark LeBar claims to have discovered a two-level eudaimonist position that coheres with the claim that moral obligations are “real” and have “nonderivative normative authority.” In this article, I raise worries about how “real” second-personal reasons are on LeBar’s account, and then argue that second-personal reasons ramify up from the first to the second level in a way that LeBar denies. My argument is meant to encourage philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition to question the (...) existence of second-personal reasons of the sort Darwall elucidates. (shrink)

A theorem is derived that enables a systematic enumeration of all the linear superoperators ℒ (associated with a two-level quantum system) that generate, via the law of motion ℒρ= $\dot \rho$ , mappings ρ(0) → ρ(t) restricted to the domain of statistical operators. Such dynamical evolutions include the usual Hamiltonian motion as a special case, but they also encompass more general motions, which are noncyclic and feature a destination state ρ(t → ∞) that is in some cases independent of ρ(0).

This paper explores the role of phenomenology in the understanding of the cognitive processes of coupling/decoupling, defending the Wittgensteinian idea that phenomenology can play a crucial role as a description of immediate (social) experience. We argue that epistemic feelings can provide a phenomenological description of the development of a subject's everyday experience, tracking the transition from the processes of coupling/decoupling and recoupling with the world. In particular, the feeling of familiarity, whose key features can be considered the core of epistemic (...) feelings, signals a novelty in the flow of experience that makes sense and is worthy of remarking on or even articulating. By describing the primary features and sources of the feeling of familiarity, we highlight a conceptual tension related to its sources, which could be based on processing both fluency and discrepancy. We proposed a solution to the conceptual tension by introducing two levels of the feeling of familiarity: epistemic and experiential. (shrink)

This paper suggests that within Aristotle’s well-known contribution to the history of ontology two different levels should be kept apart, an analytic-critical and a constructive level. On the first level Aristotle mainly provides analytic-critical tools for overcoming the main problems of all dealings with the notions of being and to be, while the second level consists in Aristotle’s ambitious project of conducting first philosophy (i.e. the specific part of his philosophy that is meant to continue the old and time-honoured (...) project of identifying what Aristotle calls ‘first principles and causes’) as ontology, i.e. as an inquiry into being qua being. (shrink)

If the ordinary quantal Liouville equation ℒρ= $\dot \rho $ is generalized by discarding the customary stricture that ℒ be of the standard Hamiltonian commutator form, the new quantum dynamics that emerges has sufficient theoretical fertility to permit description even of a thermodynamically irreversible process in an isolated system, i.e., a motion ρ(t) in which entropy increases but energy is conserved. For a two-level quantum system, the complete family of time-independent linear superoperators ℒ that generate such motions is derived; and (...) a physically interesting example is presented in detail. (shrink)

Emotion is an essential component of human nature, and therefore it is necessary to explore the issue of a desirable emotional state if we want to properly discuss human well-being. This article examines the issue by advocating a new understanding of the Zhuangzi’s 莊子 ideas on emotion. In terms of the Zhuangzi’s ideas on the desirable emotional state, scholars have presented various interpretations to date, even arguing that the ideas themselves are mutually contradictory or inconsistent. This article shows that the (...) Zhuangzi’s ideas about emotions are in fact consistent by dividing emotions into two types: “conventional knowledge-dependent emotions” and “true knowledge-dependent emotions.” It then examines the characteristics of a desirable emotional state and the conditions necessary to reach it and explores the implications of the Zhuangzi’s ideas for discussions on well-being in modern times. (shrink)

The chief aim of the paper is to argue for a two-level theory of trust consisting of basic and intentional trust. The paper sets out by comparing the concepts of trust and justice to highlight the double meaning of trust as a descriptive social phenomenon and an evaluative normative term. It is subsequently argued that the conceptions of trust known from political science and recent philosophical debates of trust do not capture this double meaning of trust as the former focuses (...) on trust as a social phenomenon while the latter focuses on the normative aspect. As an alternative I develop a two-level theory of trust where basic trust, understood in accordance with sociologist Harold Garfinkel’s conception of trust, is combined with a conception of intentional trust as a willed response to breaches in the social expectancies. Finally, the social philosophical consequences of the two-level theory of trust are indicated in a brief recapitulation of the comparison of trust and justice. (shrink)

Central parts of the natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf assume that persons by nature have individual realms of their own, violations of which constitute a wrong. This is the basis for their accounts of promises, ownership and reactions against wrongs. These accounts are significantly independent of any assumption that a superior being imposes obligations: rather, the individuals themselves create obligations by their own acts of will. The translator's introducton draws attention to the author's relation to Hägerström, and remarks (...) briefly on related points in Ames, Köhler and Georges Davy. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Korean society has sought to vaccinate most of its population. Consequently, the Korean government has attempted to make vaccination compulsory by promoting awareness of its benefits. The administration has pushed for mandatory vaccination by claiming that vaccination is more beneficial than harmful, based on a utilitarian view. However, this view is difficult to justify based on the two levels of utilitarianism presented by R. M. Hare. Compulsory vaccination cannot satisfy the universalizability, nor the (...) satisfaction of preference, and exposes the difficulties of utilitarianism. In addition, mandatory vaccination is difficult to justify based on the perspective of fairness theory, that is, “justice as the fairness” of John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart’s principle of fairness. From the point of view of Hare’s utilitarianism and fairness theory, it has been shown that mandatory vaccination is not easily justified. In reality, the power of the state continues to strengthen, and we should examine this situation from a critical point of view. (shrink)

The suite of secretive national security programs initiated in the US since 9/11 has created debate not only about the merits of targeted killing, torture, secret detention, cyberwar, global signals intercepts, and data-mining, but about the very secrecy in which these programs were conceived, debated by government officials, and implemented. Law must be revealed to those who are expected to comply with its demands. Law is a mere pretext for coercion if the laws permitting the government to coerce people for (...) non-compliance are concealed. The purpose of this essay is to determine whether inhabitants of a liberal state—a type of state tracing the legitimacy of its coercive actions to the consent of the governed—also need to know the internal protocols and legal findings of the government agencies ostensibly serving them. To put this question another way, what, if anything, may government agencies in liberal states keep secret? (shrink)

I examine the two-level utilitarian case for humane animal agriculture (by R. M. Hare and Gary Varner) and argue that it fails on its own terms. The case states that, at the ‘intuitive level’ of moral thinking, we can justify raising and killing animals for food, regarding them as replaceable, while treating them with respect. I show that two-level utilitarianism supports, instead, alternatives to animal agriculture. First, the case for humane animal agriculture does not follow from a commitment to two-level (...) utilitarianism combined with a commitment to respecting animal lives. Secondly, the two-level utilitarian case falls prey to a compartmentalization problem and cannot uphold both respect and replaceability. What I call ‘humane lives’ are not appropriately valued by the lights of two-level utilitarianism itself. (shrink)

We present a two-level theory to formalize constructive mathematics as advocated in a previous paper with G. Sambin.One level is given by an intensional type theory, called Minimal type theory. This theory extends a previous version with collections.The other level is given by an extensional set theory that is interpreted in the first one by means of a quotient model.This two-level theory has two main features: it is minimal among the most relevant foundations for constructive mathematics; it is constructive thanks (...) to the way the extensional level is linked to the intensional one which fulfills the “proofs-as-programs” paradigm and acts as a programming language. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; One-level versus two-level identity criteria, Analysis, Volume 51, Issue 4, 1 October 1991, Pages 192–194, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.4.192.

Moral repair is an important way for firms to heal moral relationships with stakeholders following a transgression. The concept is rooted in recognition theory, which is often used to develop normative perspectives and prescriptions, but the same theory has also propelled a view of moral repair as premised on negotiation between offender and victim(s), which involves the complex social construction of the transgression and the appropriate amends. The tension between normative principles and socioconstructivist implementation begs the question how offending firms (...) should approach moral repair. Addressing this question, we develop a two-level conceptualization of moral repair, distinguishing between procedural and substantive levels of practice, which accommodate normativity and socioconstructivism, respectively. In so doing, we enrich the literature by 1) promoting conceptual clarity, 2) refining understanding of the moral repair process, and 3) suggesting the use of a unified, configurational approach to studying (nonlinear) relations between amends and moral outcomes. (shrink)

Axel Honneth makes initial and promising steps towards what could be called a two-level account of recognition, according to which the normatively substantial forms of recognition represent various manners in which the primordial acquaintedness with others is expressed. It will be argued that Honneth's promising approach must be revised in regard to the issue of intentionality, which may be achieved by reference to earlier critical theorists such as Adorno and Arendt. With such a foundation, critical theory can enter into new (...) fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

[About the book]: Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. (...) The book examines numerous cognitive neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging and the use of neuropsychological models, in the context of a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, dependence syndrome, and personality disorders. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience includes chapters on the nature of psychiatry as a science; the compatibility of the accounts of mental illness derived from neuroscience, information-processing, and folk psychology; the nature of mental illness; the impact of methods such as fMRI, neuropsychology, and neurochemistry, on psychiatry; the relationship between phenomenological accounts of mental illness and those provided by naturalistic explanations; the status of delusions and the continuity between delusions and ordinary beliefs; the interplay between clinical and empirical findings in psychopathology and issues in moral psychology and ethics. With contributions from world class experts in philosophy and cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for those who have an interest in the importance and the limitations of cognitive neuroscience as an aid to understanding mental illness. (shrink)

The most commonly encountered and most serious objection against consequentialist theories of punishment is that they could sometimes endorse punishing innocent people. Two-level consequentialists...

We develop the theory of symmetry for a two-level quantum system in oder to illustrate the main ideas of the general theory of symmetry in quantum theory. It is based on the diffeomorphism of the two-dimensional sphere S 2 onto the space of states ℂP 1 and the isomorphism between the groups Pℳ(2) and SO 3 (ℝ). In particular, rotational invariance leads to the appearance of the spin1/2 in a natural way.

Verbs likeloadorsprayare known to alternate between two variants (John sprayed paint onto the wall / John sprayed the wall with paint ). Both Rappaport and Levin (1988) and Pinker (1989) derive one variant from the other, but these lexical rule approaches have a number of problems. This paper argues for a form-meaning correspondence model which distinguishes between two levels of verb meaning: that of a lexical headsprayon the one hand and that of a phrasal constituentspray paint onto the wallorspray (...) the wall with painton the other. Locative alternation stems from the fact that a frame semantic scene encoded byspraycan be construed in two alternate ways. This proposed model allows us to account for the data straightforwardly without suffering from the problems created by lexical rule approaches. This proposed analysis is fundamentally the same as Goldberg’s (1995) in being a version of Construction Grammar approach. But unlike Goldberg’s Correspondence Principle-based account, my analysis makes the most of the semantic compatibility between verbs and constructions, thereby giving a more straightforward account of locative alternation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Plato's Two-Level ModelIan MuellerHolger Thesleff. Studies in Plato's Two-Level Model. Helsinki: Societas Scientarum Fennica, 1999. Pp. vi + 143. N. P.After some 30 years of incisive intervention in Platonic scholarship, Holger Thesleff here offers us "an attempt to elaborate and ground more firmly some basic theses which I have propounded in various contexts before," (1) a rather modest description of what he also describes as an (...) attempt to contribute toward "a more general agreement on how to read and interpret Plato" (5). The richness of this book makes it impossible to describe in any detail, and I shall content myself with indicating some of what I take to be its principal points of view.Thesleff"s concern for agreement arises from his perception of the vastly discrepant schools of Plato interpretation, of which the most important for him might be labeled esotericist, analytic, and "literary." The last, which can hardly be called a school at all, includes a variety of scholars who downplay "literal" interpretation and emphasize such things as "dramatic artistry, the structure of the dialogues, the characterization of settings and persons, shifts of style, allusions, play, and irony" (3). Thesleff's sympathies clearly lie with these people, perhaps to an extent which, as I shall suggest, will limit the effectiveness of his attempt to move toward a consensus.As the title indicates Thesleff builds his reading around what he calls Plato's two-level model. This two-level model is not, as one might suppose, what has been called Plato's two worlds view, the belief in a world of pure being beyond the perceived world we inhabit. Indeed, it is not a doctrine or set of doctrines at all. Rather "it is an intuitive 'vision' which offers only crude basic patterns and frames for the structures of Plato's thinking, feelings, intuitions, and intentions, from his youth to his old age, and for our understanding of them" (123). Clearly one cannot expect a full and precise articulation of this vision. Thesleff proceeds by discussing in terms of their role in the earlier dialogues ten hierarchic pairs which form part of Plato's vision: divine/human, soul/body, leading/being led (particularly important in the conduct of a Socratic discussion), truth/appearance, knowledge/opinion, intellect/senses, defined/undefined, stability/change, one/many, same/different. These hierarchic or asymmetric pairs are contrasted by Thesleff with what he calls polar opposites like large/small and light/dark. He also stresses that the hierarchic pairs of Plato's two-level model involve no separation (chorismos), but rather a communion (koinônia).As the words "from his youth to his old age" in the quotation of the previous paragraph indicate, Thesleff is a "unitarian" in his approach to Plato. His Plato is not a philosopher whose positions changed through time as a result of reasoned argument. What many scholars take to be doctrines later given up, e.g., the view that learning is being reminded (anamnêsis), are "thought experiments," which are not followed up, thought experiments made within the context of the unchanging two-level vision.Although Thesleff is a unitarian in the sense I have indicated, he does believe that a kind of order of composition can be constructed for the dialogues. I say "kind of" because Thesleff's chronology involves assumptions of revisions over time, multiple authorship, and even dialogues "written down" by people other than Plato. The resulting chronology is complex, and I here only indicate it in rough form in a way which [End Page 272] brings out what I take to be its major points. Leaving out of account those Socratic" dialogues which Thesleff takes to be latish and the posthumously completed Laws, we can say that a series of late dialogues starts with the Parmenides and includes the Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. All other dialogues, including the Theaetetus, were written prior to the Parmenides with the exception of the Republic, which Thesleff proposes is in its ultimate shape a late work, representing "only and purely Plato's 'own' and personal philosophy" (115). As for the other late dialogues, which have played an important... (shrink)

Drawing heavily on recent empirical research to update R.M. Hare's two-level utilitarianism and expand Hare's treatment of "intuitive level rules," Gary Varner considers in detail the theory's application to animals while arguing that Hare should have recognized a hierarchy of persons, near-persons, & the merely sentient.