This paper deals with the problem of the Pramāṇavārttika’s tenet affiliation and the related question of its final philosophical view within the framework of Buddhist philosophical schools. There are contrasting views and positions on this issue in Tibetan interpretations of the text. Some claim that the Pramāṇavārttika is a text advocating the other-emptiness doctrine, while other scholars argue that it is a Sautrāntika–Vijñānavāda or Vijñānavāda treatise. By contrast, Padma dkar po holds view that it is a Svātantrika-Madhyamaka text, while believing (...) that it explicates the epistemological theories of Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda. The present paper shows why Padma dkar po does not agree with other Tibetan interpretations on this issue, and why he deals with this problem by attributing a Svātantrika-Madhyamaka affiliation to the Pramāṇavārttika. This paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the reason why the Pramāṇavārttika is not a text written from the perspective of the doctrine of other-emptiness. The second section deals with the question of whether it is a Sautrāntika–Vijñānavāda work or a Vijñānavāda text. It will be shown that for Padma dkar po it is none of them. The third and the last section show the reasons why Padma dkar po interprets the Pramāṇavārttika as a text written from the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka perspective. (shrink)

The concept of reflexive awareness (Sanskrit svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti, Tibetan rang rig) is considered an important epistemological notion in the Dignāga tradition of Buddhist pramāṇa theory. The traditionally accepted view is that Dignāga advocates Yogācāra’s notion of reflexive awareness in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Candrakīrti rejects it altogether. By contrast, the present paper revisits Dignāga and Candrakīrti in the context of svasaṃvedana and argues that Dignāga endorses the antarjñeyavādic notion of svasaṃvedana and Candrakīrti does not negate it at the conventional level. (...) Candrakīrti attacks Dignāga by attributing him as an exponent of Sautrāntrika-Yogācāra notion of reflexive awareness, but his critique does not fundamentally affect Dignāga’s notion of reflexive awareness propounded in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The submission of the paper is that the fundamental epistemic agenda of reflexive awareness in Dignāga and Candrakīrti is identical, though they diverge methodologically, and it is shown by reexamining Padma dkar po’s interpretation. (shrink)

Candrakīrti deals with epistemological problems in his works, but he has not propounded a systematic theory of knowledge. Candrakīrti thoroughly discusses Madhyamaka’s ontological view in his explication of Nāgārjuna’s view on two truths (_dve satye_). Most of his Tibetan commentators and contemporary interpreters engage in explaining Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka ontology. However, Jamyang Zhepa reconstructs Candrakīrti’s theory of knowledge in his _magnum opus_, _Tshig gsal stong thun gyi tshad ma’i rnam bshad_ (A commentary on epistemological exposition in _Prasannapadā_). Although Jamyang Zhepa’s work (...) is a novel contribution to Candrakīrti’s scholarship, there are some issues in his interpretation in terms of philosophical portrayal of Candrakīrti’s thought. In the present paper, the author reexamines Jamyang Zhepa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s epistemology and submits that his interpretation faces some textual inconsistencies and philosophical problems in depicting Candrakīrti’s epistemological views. The paper is divided into five sections, and the first section or the introductory section discusses whether Candrakīrti holds his own philosophical position or not. The second section deals with the origin of Tibetan doxographical debates on Candrakīrti’s epistemology. The third section discusses the problem of _pramāṇa_ in Candrakīrti’s philosophy. The fourth section revisits Candrakīrti’s theory of perception. The last section or the concluding section shows the textual inconsistencies and philosophical tensions between Candrakīrti’s philosophical corpus and Jamyang Zhepa’s interpretation through at least five arguments. (shrink)