Under [Formula: see text]-amalgamation, we obtain the canonical hyperdefinable group from the group configuration.

La meditación sobre la técnica parece haber sido la pregunta fundamental del siglo xx. En este artículo se comparan dos visiones de la técnica: la de O. Spengler y la de J. Ortega y Gasset. Estas meditaciones vienen a esbozar una antropología. La reflexión de Spengler es más determinista y está ligada al concepto de decadencia. La reflexión de Ortega está más abierta a las oportunidades y más ligada al concepto de circunstancia.

La Monadologie est au même temps une oeuvre du philosophe allemand G.W. Leibniz entitulée ainsi par un éditeur qui inventa le mot, et une théorie. Les essais réunis ici en concernent l'origine, l'histoire et l'enjeu philosophique. F. Piro analyse le développements de la conception de l'individuation chez le jeune Leibniz. M. Fichant étudie en détail la constitution du concept de monade. La nature limitée des monades créées est ramenée par G. Mormino à la doctrine leibnizienne de la contingence et (...) de la création. E. Pasini reconstitue la genèse de la Monadologie, prototype du traité monadologique, pour montrer que sa nature n'est pas dans son origine. La monadologie va même inviter les détournements matérialistes du jeune Feuerbach - l'essai de V. Morfino porte sur les insuffisances de sa reformulation purement transcendantale chez Husserl, face à la théorie du transindividuel. (shrink)

L’auteur traite de la question fondamentale qui est une personne et, plus spécifiquement, si tous les êtres humains sont des personnes ou s’il existe des êtres humains qui ne seraient pas des personnes et qui n’auraient donc pas les mêmes droits à la vie que celles-ci. Certains philosophes, tels que Peter Singer, Michael Tooley et Tristram Engelhardt, se sont proposés de résoudre bon nombre des délicats problèmes bioéthiques contemporains en distinguant, d’une part, la vie humaine biologique, propre à l’être (...) humain et, d’autre part, la vie humaine personnelle, qui est celle de la personne à laquelle est octroyé un droit à la vie. L’auteur soutient que tout être humain est fondamentalement une personne. The author discusses the fundamental question who is a person and more specifically if every human being is a person or if there exists some human beings who are not persons and who do not have the same rights to life as the human being. In an attempt to resolve a good number of delicate bioethical problems some philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley et Tristram Engelhardt, propose to distinguish between human biological life, belonging to all human beings, and human personal life, which belongs to a person to whom is accorded the right to life. The author maintains that every human being is fundamentally a person. (shrink)

COSTA, Alexandre da. Fundamentos da bioética: estudo sobre o pensamento de Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. FERREIRA, Amauri Carlos. O imaginário religioso e modos de vida urbana: experiência e memória da Juventude Católica em Belo Horizonte – MG, anos 80. GONÇALVES, Davidson Sepini. O Panóptico de Jeremy Bentham: por uma leitura utilitarista. GÓIS, Aurino José. Parque Municipal de Belo Horizonte: público, apropriações e significados. FARIA, Paulo Antônio Couto. Teologia no limiar da filosofia: a modernidade e o encontro fé e razão (...) na obra de Henrique Cláudio de Lima Vaz. (shrink)

This collection of essays, Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus, deals with the issue of the repeated failure of attempts to derive a universal set of ...

Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible (...) to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the continued potency of veillance theories to traverse beyond the taxonomies of surveillance inside liberal democracies. It provides a commentary on the ability of sousveillance to destabilise and disrupt suer/violence by shifting its focus from the centre to the periphery, where Big Data surveillance is tantamount to sur/violence. In these peripheral political spaces, surveillance is not framed by concerns over privacy, democracy and civil society; rather, it is a matter of life and death, a technique of (...) both biopolitical and thanatopolitical power. I argue that the universalist, and universalizing, debates over surveillance cannot be mapped through the anxieties of privileged middle classes as they would neither transcend nor make possible alternative ways of tackling the intersection of surveillance and violence so long as they are couched in the liberal concerns for democracy. I call this phenomenon “liberal luxury,” whereby debates over surveillance have over-emphasised liberal proclivities at the expense of disengaging those peripheral populations most severely affected by sur/violence. (shrink)

In his 1993 health-care reform proposal, Bill Clinton offered health care as a civil right. If his proposal had been accepted, all Americans would have been guaranteed a basic package of health care. At the same time, they would have been forbidden to provide or purchase better basic health care, as a cost of participating in a national system to which they were compelled to contribute. A welfare entitlement would have been created and an egalitarian ethos enforced. This essay will (...) address why such egalitarian proposals are morally unjustifiable, both in terms of the establishment of a uniform health-care welfare right, and in terms of the egalitarian constraints these proposals impose against the use of private resources in the purchase of better-quality basic health care, not to mention luxury care. (shrink)

This note criticises an argument used by W. L. Craig against an actual infinity of past events. He argues that if Russell's use of the story of Tristram Shandy, who took a year to recount each day of his life, is extended into an infinite past, then Cantor's principle of correspondence leads to the absurd conclusion that Tristram Shandy has already written his last page. I show that no such conclusion can be drawn, and that a ‘past’ version (...) of the story which does allow this principle to be applied leads to no paradox. (shrink)

The prospect of germ-line genetic engineering, the ability to engineer genetic changes that can be passed on to subsequent generations, raises a wide range of moral and public policy questions. One of the most provocative questions is, simply put: Are there moral reasons that can be articulated in general secular terms for accepting human nature as we find it? Or, at least in terms of general secular moral restraints, may we reshape human nature better to meet our own interests, as (...) we define them? This question in turn raises the further question of whether human nature as it now exists has a moral standing akin to sacredness that can be understood in nonreligious terms. This essay will take as a given that it is not possible to show in general secular moral terms that human nature has a sanctity or special moral standing that should guide secular health-care policy. In addition, as this essay shows, it is not possible through appeals to considerations of authorizing consent or beneficence toward others to remedy this failure to establish a sanctity or special moral standing for human nature. Absent a religious or culturally normative understanding of human nature and given the availability of germline genetic engineering, there is a plurality of possibilities for refashioning our nature. The unavailability of substantive secular moral constraints on germ-line genetic engineering discloses a secularly licit plurality of possibilities for human nature. The likelihood that we will be able to refashion our human nature reveals how few general secular moral constraints there are to guide us. Paradoxically, the more we are able to reengineer our human nature, the less guidance is available. The plurality of possible conceptions of human well-being that can be pursued through germ-line genetic engineering challenges our self-understanding as humans. Given human freedom, and in the absence of taken-for-granted religious or cultural moral constraints, the likelihood of germ-line genetic engineering opens the possibility of human nature in the plural. (shrink)

El presente volumen incluye la edición crítica, acompañada de un completo estudio introductorio, del Arte de bien morir, texto en prosa sin autor declarado, y de La contienda del cuerpo y alma, una composición en verso firmada por Antón López de Meta. Ambas obras integraban un mismo libro destinado a preparar al hombre para enfrentar su tránsito final hacia la vida eterna y forman parte de la tradición del Memento mori.

This paper is a response to David Oderberg's discussion of the Tristram Shandy paradox. I defend the claim that the Tristram Shandy paradox does not support the claim that it is impossible that the past is infinite.

In Alfonso de Cartagena's 'Memoriale virtutum' María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance offer a new edition from the manuscripts of a compilation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics addressed by the major Castilian intellectual of the day, bishop Alfonso de Cartagena, to the heir to the throne of Portugal, crown prince Duarte. The work was a speculum principis, an education for the future king in the virtues suitable to a statesman; Cartagena's choice of Aristotle was thus a significant index of the advent of (...) new Renaissance ideas. This edition shows how the "memorial" throws light on the ideological transformation of society those ideas would bring, setting new ethical guidelines for the ruling class at the crossroads between medieval feudalism and Renaissance absolutism. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter (...) defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against nonnaturalism from supervenience is alive and well. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers ‘schmagency’-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help (...) realists, error theorist, and fictionalists address central challenges to their views. (shrink)

This edited collection examines the intersections between career guidance, social justice and neo-liberalism. Contributors offer an original and global discussion of the role of career guidance in the struggle for social justice and evaluate the field from a diverse range of theoretical positions. Through a series of chapters that positions career guidance within a neoliberal context and presents theories to inform an emancipatory direction for the field, this book raises questions, offers resources and provides some glimpses of an alternative future (...) for work. Drawing on education, sociology, and political science, this book addresses the theoretical basis of career guidance's involvement in social justice as well as the methodological consequences in relation to career guidance research. (shrink)

This paper argues for what I call modest ethical veganism: the view that it is typically wrong to use or eat products made from or by animals such as cows, pigs, or chickens. The argument has three central parts. First, I argue that a central explanation for the wrongness of causing suffering rests upon what it is like to experience such suffering, and that we have good reasons to think that animals suffer in ways that are relevantly analogous to humans. (...) Second, I argue that animals can have better and worse lives, and that a central explanation for the wrongness of killing is that it deprives the victim of the valuable life that they would otherwise have had. Third, I argue that it is wrong to cooperate with massive wrongdoing. By consuming animal products, we typically support institutions that engage in massive and systematic wrongful treatment of animals. We thus ought to become vegan. (shrink)

This chapter examines the ethical case that can be mounted for veganism. Because there has been comparatively little discussion in ethics focused directly on veganism, the central aim of this chapter is threefold: to orient readers to (some of) the most important philosophical literature relevant to the topic, to provide a clear explanation of the current state of the ethical case for veganism, and to focus attention on the most important outstanding or underexplored questions in this domain. The chapter examines (...) the range of positions that deserve to be called ethical veganism, and some of the types of reasons that philosophers can potentially appeal to in arguing for veganism. It then spells out the core of the most promising case for veganism, which argues directly for the wrongness of making animals suffer and die. The chapter then considers three ways of arguing from this conclusion to an ethical defense of the vegan lifestyle, which appeal respectively to the ethical significance of the effects of individual use of animal products, of group efficacy, and of complicity with wrongdoing. The chapter concludes by examining several neglected complications facing the ethical case for veganism. (shrink)

A l'instar de ses confrères des années 1250-1260 à l'Université de Paris, Siger de Brabant prit activement part à un mouvement de prise de conscience et de revendication intellectuelle, d'émancipation de la raison contre l'autorité du dogme et le dogmatisme en général, et joua un rôle essentiel dans l'émergence d'un nouveau style, d'une nouvelle morale, d'une nouvelle forme d'existence : en un mot, à la vie philosophique. Il proposa une nouvelle éthique, établie à partir de la lecture d'Aristote, mais une (...) lecture essentiellement rationaliste qui, aux yeux des autorités, s'écartait en tous points de la sagesse chrétienne - affirmant notamment que c'est en cette vie que l'on peut trouver le. bonheur, et non dans l'autre. Siger de Brabant contribua ainsi à une renaissance de la philosophie, qui commence par la Logique qui ordonne la pensée et le discours du philosophe, lui donne aussi son style, au sens littéraire du terme - ce dont le Traité de l'éternité du monde est une bonne illustration. (shrink)

This volume introduces a wide range of important views, questions, and controversies in and about contemporary metaethics. It is natural to ask: What, if anything, connects this extraordinary range of discussions? This introductory chapter aims to answer this question by giving an account of metaethics that shows it to be a unified theoretical activ- ity. According to this account, metaethics is a theoretical activity characterized by an explanatory goal. This goal is to explain how actual ethical thought and talk—and what (...) (if anything) that thought and talk is distinctively about—fits into reality. We begin by introducing and developing this account, and illustrating it via discus- sion of a simple illustrative metaethical theory: Simple Subjectivism. We then explain important upshots of the characterization. Our account is novel and controversial, as is the status of metaethics as a theoretically fruitful project. We thus compare our account to competing characterizations of the field, and explain how our account permits us to address certain challenges to the theoretical significance of a distinctively metaethical project. In the conclusion, we explain why, given our account, one might think that meta- ethics matters, and explain how we understand the history and future of self-conscious metaethical theorizing. As we will emphasize, we should expect new ways of approaching the explanatory project at the heart of metaethics to emerge in the coming years, as the tools and resources we have for tackling that project expand. Our hope is that by empha- sizing the centrality of the explanatory project itself, rather than just focusing narrowly on the views that have been developed so far by those engaged in that project, we can help encourage and facilitate the development of new questions, arguments, and views that help move the field forward. (shrink)

John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics.This paper argues that this influence is undeserved, for two reasons. First, reflective equilibrium fails to accomplish two tasks that give us reason to care about methodology. On the one hand, it fails to explain how (or whether) moral knowledge is possible.This is because the method is explicitly oriented towards the distinct (and less interesting) task of characterizing our moral sensibilities. On the other hand, the method fails (...) to provide an informative way of adjudicating central methodological debates in ethics. Second, where Rawls’ method –and the background methodology he uses to motivate it –do have substance, that substance is implausible. The role of dispositions in the method entails that it endorses obviously irrational inferences. Further, the method makes substantively implausible distinctions between the dispositions that are allowed to play a methodological role. Rawls' background methodology appeals to the idea of a psychology in ‘wide reflective equilibrium’. However, both formal and empirical path-dependence considerations strongly suggest that there is nothing even minimally determinate that is someone’s psychology in ‘wide reflective equilibrium’. I close by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit of reflective equilibrium by abandoning elements of Rawls’ approach. I argue that none of these attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method of reflective equilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological questions in ethics. In a slogan, reflective equilibrium is methodologically irrelevant. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about (...) normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon’s view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards. (shrink)

This chapter offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. It argues that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to, while also explaining why a clear statement of what such authority amounts to has been so elusive in the recent literature. The account given is contrasted with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly shows how (...) it answers “schmagency”-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, the chapter explains how the account offered here can help realists, error theorist, and fictionalists address central challenges to their views. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 163-166.