In ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, Lukács analyses the commodity-structure as ‘the universal category’ that frames society as a whole. Taking seriously the aspiration to follow Marx in going ‘to the root of the matter’, Lukács examines the ways and extent to which the commodity structure extends into and remoulds society, focusing on living individuals, their needs and relations to things as use values. We propose a reading drawing on the idea of concern-in-indifference, which addresses the complexity of (...) the practice of owning that underpins Lukács’s analysis. We argue that attention to this complexity enables us to shine a light on the commodity structure’s capacity to conceal, directing us away from Lukács’s focus to an appreciation of the significance of the universal category’s power to deny a future ethical substantiality of togetherness while giving rise to singular beings for whom this substantiality remains an orienting vision. (shrink)

This paper examines Castoriadis’ concept of time as ontological creation in relation to the activation of the project of autonomy. We argue that since Castoriadis presents as a practitioner of the creation of time as radical autonomous thinking, this is the standpoint from which to assess his claims. Through an examination of Castoriadis’ claim that the practice of autonomy depends upon it being activated by a willing singularity who accepts the Chaos of society and of the world, we argue that (...) Castoriadis’ position presupposes an effective contrast between the autonomy of significance that he advocates and the heteronomy of insignificance that he laments. If, as we suggest, both these orientations accept the Groundlessness of the world, then Castoriadis’ appeal to the awareness of a willing singularity is not sufficient to distinguish the practice of radical autonomy. To this extent, his elucidation of the radical imaginary time of ontological creation remains incomplete. (shrink)

This paper examines Castoriadis’ concept of time as ontological creation in relation to the activation of the project of autonomy. We argue that since Castoriadis presents as a practitioner of the creation of time as radical autonomous thinking, this is the standpoint from which to assess his claims. Through an examination of Castoriadis’ claim that the practice of autonomy depends upon it being activated by a willing singularity who accepts the Chaos of society and of the world, we argue that (...) Castoriadis’ position presupposes an effective contrast between the autonomy of significance that he advocates and the heteronomy of insignificance that he laments. If, as we suggest, both these orientations accept the Groundlessness of the world, then Castoriadis’ appeal to the awareness of a willing singularity is not sufficient to distinguish the practice of radical autonomy. To this extent, his elucidation of the radical imaginary time of ontological creation remains incomplete. (shrink)

Castoriadis explains racism as a mode of hatred of the other and as a feature of the self-institution of heteronomous societies built on ethnocentrism. At the level of the psychical human being he identifies two forms of racist fixation on others: hatred of the other as the flip-side of self-love and as the other side of self-hatred, which he analyses, respectively, as a mode of pseudo-reasoning and as unconscious desire. We argue that attention to the ontology that underpins the modern (...) European subject’s epistemological deployment of racism in the context of coloniality reveals the limits and a blindspot of Castoriadis’s analysis. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to give reasons for thinking that Badioursquo;s philosophy is not prepared to follow through all the consequences of the historical retreat of the political event. We want to suggest that it is important to come to terms with the implications of this retreat as no less a revolutionary aspect of the revolution. Whereas fidelity to the event demands that we not be selective in following the consequences of an event, fidelity to the eventrsquo;s retreat (...) points to a more direct relation of philosophy to the event than Badiou allows. In the first section of our paper we outline the philosophical orientation that informs our encounter with Badioursquo;s thought. In the second we examine the relationship between philosophy and the political event in order to set the context for the elaboration of our claim in the third section that fidelity to the event calls for attention not only to the demands of its emergence but also to those associated with the eventrsquo;s retreat. In the final section we indicate how the retreat of the political event might give rise to the philosophical subject and to the requirements of a philosophy of the event. (shrink)

Prior to engaging in the process of fully realizing the notion of speculative philosophy in Hegelrsquo;s system, the thinker must arrive at the appropriate reflective standpoint via two preliminary justificatory cycles. This paper examines the phenomenological and logical cycles of justification undertaken respectively in the emPhenomenology of Spirit/em and the Doctrines of Being and Essence of the emScience of Logic/em in order to offer an account of the meaning and demands of speculative justification. We argue that as enactments of the (...) self-determination characterizing speculative thinking, these justificatory cycles must be understood in terms of the role and position that the thinker occupies in Science. (shrink)