This article offers arefutation of the corrective justiceinterpretation of tort law – the view that itis essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary andsecondary tort duties and claims that tort lawis best understood as the union of its primaryand secondary duties. It then advances twoindependent criticisms of the correctivejustice interpretation. The article firstargues that primary tort duties have nothingfundamentally to do with corrective justice andthat, if one understands what is meant by``primary (...) tort duties,'' one is compelledto regard this fact as a decisive objection tothe corrective justice interpretation. Second,it argues that, whatever relation thereis between secondary tort duties and correctivejustice, that relation also holds betweencorrective justice and secondary duties ofother legal branches. In sum, the concept ofcorrective justice is neither capable ofunifying tort law nor of demarcating it fromother legal branches.The article also offers a general alternativeinterpretation of tort law. Rather thanbeing essentially corrective, tort law isessentially protective. Under this picture, iftort law has a most important point, it is theprotection of legal subjects and valuablesocial interests from harm. This is theoverarching ambition that unifies primary andsecondary tort duties. It does not, however,demarcate tort law from other legal branches. (shrink)

Background Euthanasia is a controversial practice in many countries. Since Spain’s Euthanasia Law came into effect on March 24, 2021, healthcare providers have faced a new challenge since they must inform patients, provide care, accompany them, and implement the law. It also represents a new stumbling block at universities, which must adapt to regulatory changes and educate future professionals accordingly. Little is known about the attitude of nursing students in Spain toward euthanasia since this law was implemented. Objective This study (...) aims to answer the following research questions: What is the attitude of nursing students toward euthanasia? What factors influence this attitude? Research design A cross-sectional study was conducted using an online questionnaire. Participants and research context The study population comprised all nursing students at a public university in Barcelona ( n = 444), Spain, during the 2022–2023 academic year. The validated Spanish version of the Euthanasia Attitude Scale was employed. A bivariate analysis was performed. Ethical considerations The university Ethics Committee (CEEAH 6247) approved this study. All participating students signed an informed consent form. Participation was voluntary, and data anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed. Results Two hundred and forty-four nursing students responded to the questionnaire. The mean total score was 79.64. Participants with religious beliefs presented lower scores, indicating a more negative attitude toward euthanasia. Participants in their second, third, or fourth year of the nursing degree scored higher, demonstrating a more positive attitude. Conclusions The attitude of nursing students toward euthanasia was remarkably positive. Working on ethical content during the degree course and clinical practice are factors that help to develop a more positive attitude. In addition, nursing education should encourage professional aspects to prevail over religious beliefs in euthanasia situations. (shrink)

Tort law and liability insurance have a complex interaction in which each shapes the evolution and effects of the other. This interaction and its many forms and facets in different international contexts must be comprehended to understand fully the ethical responsibilities of liability insurers. This essay builds on previous scholarship on the tort law–liability insurance interaction through a series of observations from the perspective of a global reinsurer. It seeks in part to extend previous analyses of this interaction (...) by also considering issues in the developing world. It seeks to make some normative questions and stances explicit concerning this interaction, as well as to identify some empirical questions that still need to be answered. The responsibility of liability insurers includes ethically shaping the responsibility of others in interaction with tort law in countless diverse situations. (shrink)

According to the established orthodoxy, the law of private wrongs—especially common law torts—fails to map onto our moral universe. Four objections in particular have caught the imagination of skeptics about the moral foundations of tort law: They purport to cast doubt over the moral appeal of the duty of care element; they target the seemingly inegalitarian objective standard of care; they object to the morally arbitrary elements of factual causation and harm; and they complain about the unnecessary extension of (...) liability under the guise of the proximate cause element. Analyzing these four prevailing arguments concerning the a-moral (and, with regard to some interpretations, anti-moral) character of tort law, I shall seek to show that the normative structure of tort law can, nonetheless, be reconstructed so as to reflect, to an important extent, our considered judgments about basic moral principles. (shrink)

This article offers arefutation of the corrective justiceinterpretation of tort law – the view that itis essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary andsecondary tort duties and claims that tort lawis best understood as the union of its primaryand secondary duties. It then advances twoindependent criticisms of the correctivejustice interpretation. The article firstargues that primary tort duties have nothingfundamentally to do with corrective justice andthat, if one understands what is meant by``primary (...) tort duties,'' one is compelledto regard this fact as a decisive objection tothe corrective justice interpretation. Second,it argues that, whatever relation thereis between secondary tort duties and correctivejustice, that relation also holds betweencorrective justice and secondary duties ofother legal branches. In sum, the concept ofcorrective justice is neither capable ofunifying tort law nor of demarcating it fromother legal branches.The article also offers a general alternativeinterpretation of tort law. Rather thanbeing essentially corrective, tort law isessentially protective. Under this picture, iftort law has a most important point, it is theprotection of legal subjects and valuablesocial interests from harm. This is theoverarching ambition that unifies primary andsecondary tort duties. It does not, however,demarcate tort law from other legal branches. (shrink)

This article offers a refutation of the corrective justice interpretation of tort law – the view that it is essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary and secondary tort duties and claims that tort law is best understood as the union of its primary and secondary duties. It then advances two independent criticisms of the corrective justice interpretation. The article first argues that primary tort duties have nothing fundamentally to do with (...) corrective justice and that, if one understands what is meant by ``primary tort duties,'' one is compelled to regard this fact as a decisive objection to the corrective justice interpretation. Second, it argues that, whatever relation there is between secondary tort duties and corrective justice, that relation also holds between corrective justice and secondary duties of other legal branches. In sum, the concept of corrective justice is neither capable of unifying tort law nor of demarcating it from other legal branches.The article also offers a general alternative interpretation of tort law. Rather than being essentially corrective, tort law is essentially protective. Under this picture, if tort law has a most important point, it is the protection of legal subjects and valuable social interests from harm. This is the overarching ambition that unifies primary and secondary tort duties. It does not, however, demarcate tort law from other legal branches. (shrink)

How can tort law be justified? There are well-known difficulties with the three traditional theories of tort law dominating the literature (namely, economic theory, corrective justice theory, and civil recourse theory). Recently, some have turned to moral contractualism in search of tort law’s foundation. One of the most prominent attempts was made by Gregory Keating. Keating’s account, however, has been subjected to powerful objections. In a recent paper, John Oberdiek, through a sympathetic critique of Keating’s account, develops (...) a new version of contractualist tort theory that is alleged to be at once superior to the three traditional theories of tort law and immune to the objections to Keating’s account. The aim of my paper is to critically assess Oberdiek’s account; I will argue that, while Oberdiek’s account does improve upon Keating’s in some important respects, it is ultimately unsatisfactory. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Economic Theories: Internalization Economic Theories: Deterrence Economic Theories: Loss Spreading Rights‐Based Theories and Distributive Justice Rights‐Based Theories and Corrective Justice References.

This book develops a theory of tort law that integrates deontic and consequential approaches by applying justificational analysis to identify the factors, circumstances, and values that shape tort law. Drawing on Kantian and Rawlsian philosophy, and on the insights of game theorist Ken Binmore, this book refocuses tort law on a single theory of responsibility that explains and justifies the broad range of tort doctrine and concepts. Under this theory, tort law asks people to appropriately (...) incorporate the well-being of others into the decisions they make, explains when that duty applies, and explains the scope and limits of that duty. The theory also incorporates a theory of the evolutionary development of social values that people use, and ought to use, in meeting that duty and explains how decision-making from behind the veil of ignorance allows us to evaluate the is in light of the ought. (shrink)

This paper deals with the role of tort in the field of chemical air pollution regulation during the period 1863, when the first statutory intervention occurred, and 1881, when reforms to both the common law and statute were enacted. It compares the prominence of tort in this context with its significance in the field of injury to factory workers. The implications of tort's relevance in these contexts are then examined, having particular regard to those historiographies of Victorian (...) government growth in which the part played by tort is neglected. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part (...) of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one’s wrongs, including one’s torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that ‘corrective justice’ cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for. (shrink)

This exceptional collection of twenty-two essays on the philosophical fundamentals of tort law assembles many of the world's leading commentators on this particularly fascinating conjunction of law and philosophy. The contributions range broadly, from inquiries into how tort law derives from Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant to the latest economic and rights-based theories of legal responsibility. This is truly a multi-national production, with contributions from several distinguished Oxford scholars of law and philosophy and many prominent scholars from the United (...) States, Canada, and Israel. A provocative closing essay by one of the world's leading moral philosophers illuminates how tort law enables philosophers to observe the abstract theories of their discipline put to the concrete test in the legal resolution of real-world controversies based on principles of right and wrong. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Pushed by Problems in Law and Policy The Nature of the Criminal Law Jurisprudence and Legal Theory Moral and Political Philosophy Conclusion References.

Tort law does many things—it determines substantive rights, decides what counts as violating these rights, recognizes rights of repair, and grants rights of redress. Two non-instrumentalist conceptions of tort law appear to dominate how we are supposed to understand and discharge these tasks. One conception takes tort law to be the law of wrongs, whereas the other conception identifies tort law with the law of victim recourse. I argue that both conceptions (including a combination of both) (...) mischaracterize what tort law does and what it should be doing. By contrast, the conception I shall defend—viz., the conflict theory of tort law—takes the basic task of tort law to be identifying the value of the conflict to which it responds (or which it shapes). In fact, there are three types of conflicts: inherently valuable, tolerably valuable, and valueless. Each type of conflict calls for a qualitatively different response by the law of torts. The conflict theory, I argue, changes the way we understand and determine the rights, duties, liabilities, and remedies that arise in and around tort law. I demonstrate this claim in connection with the tort of battery and then extend the analysis to capture the tort law of workplace and, in particular, trespass law as it applies to nonconsensual access to the workplace by organizers and by workers. (shrink)

The union of contemporary philosophy and tort law has never been better. Perhaps the most dynamic current in contemporary tort theory concerns the increasingly sophisticated inquires into the doctrinal elements of the law of torts, with the tort of negligence in particular garnering the most attention from theorists. In this article, I examine philosophically rich issues revolving around each of the elements constituting the tort of negligence: compensable injury, duty, breach, actual cause, and proximate cause.

Tort law is an important tool in enforcing a minimal level of good behavior. But what is appropriate for law is not necessarily appropriate for ethics or for norms of professional practice.

This article considers the way in which injunctions have generally been made more freely available in tort in connection with the protection of property and property-like interests. It argues that this prioritization of property can be viewed as undermining the generally accepted hierarchy of protected interests. It then argues that if negligence law were seen as a tort that embraces not just careless, but also deliberate and reckless conduct, it could be used as a basis for granting injunctions (...) in a number of important circumstances that would help to restore the right to bodily integrity to its rightful place at the top of the hierarchy of protected interests in tort law. (shrink)

In ethical terms, intention is widely felt to be the strongest basis for the attribution of personal responsibility for conduct and outcomes. By contrast, in tort law intention is a much less important ground of liability than negligence. This article analyses the meaning of intention in tort law and its relationship to other concepts such as voluntariness, recklessness, motive, and belief. It also discusses difficulties associated with proving intention and other mental states, and the idea of a general (...) principle of tort liability for intention. The key to explaining the relatively minor role of mens rea in tort law is found to lie in the emphasis tort law gives to the interests of victims, and to social values, in constructing its concept of responsibility. This approach also helps to explain the greater importance of mens rea in criminal law. (shrink)

Many recent decisions in tort law attempt to combine two conceptually incommensurable features: a traditional 'but for' test of factual causation, and the scientific or medical evidence that is required to explain how some injury occurred. Even when applied to macroscopic objects, the 'but for' test fails to identify causes, because it merely rephrases in the language of possible worlds what may be inferred from what is inductively known about the actual world. Since scientific theories explain the occurrence of (...) events without reference to causes, this test of causation is not only ineffectual but also inapplicable to scientific or medical evidence. Tort law, therefore, should abandon the 'but for' test; when scientific or medical evidence is required in a tort case, the courts should rely on the explanatory strategies that function within the theories from which they borrow such evidence. (shrink)

Through a comprehensive analysis of sixteen European legal systems, based on an assessment of national answers to a factual questionnaire, Causation in European Tort Law sheds light on the operative rules applied in each jurisdiction to factual and legal causation problems. It highlights how legal systems' features impact on the practical role that causation is called upon to play, as well as the arguments of professional lawyers. Issues covered include the conditions under which a causal link can be established, (...) rules on contribution and apportionment, the treatment of supervening, alternative and uncertain causes, the understanding of loss-of-a-chance cases, and the standard and the burden of proving causation. This is a book for scholars, students and legal professionals alike. (shrink)

It takes courage to characterize feminist writings on tort law as "thin." Indeed, Professor Schwartz in his provocative and challenging article examines feminist writings in a unique and innovative way. In his analysis of a number of such writings, he attempts to demonstrate that they either have not done enough or could have done better. His provocative analysis of many issues invites vigorous discussion. One could write a separate comment on each and every one of the issues he raises; (...) however, I will limit my comment to two: the tension between the "reasonable man" and the "reasonable woman" standard and the duty to rescue rule. It takes courage to characterize feminist writings on tort law as "thin." Indeed, Professor Schwartz in his provocative and challenging article examines feminist writings in a unique and innovative way. In his analysis of a number of such writings, he attempts to demonstrate that they either have not done enough or could have done better. His provocative analysis of many issues invites vigorous discussion. One could write a separate comment on each and every one of the issues he raises; however, I will limit my comment to two: the tension between the "reasonable man" and the "reasonable woman" standard and the duty to rescue rule. (shrink)

The traditional, intuitively appealing, test for causation in tort law, known as 'the but-for test' has been subjected to what are widely believed to be devastating criticisms by Tony Honore, and Richard Wright, amongst others. I argue that the but-for test can withstand these criticisms. Contrary to what is now widely believed. there is no inconsistency between the but-for test and ordinary language, commonsense, or sound legal principle.

This article observes that one of the most interesting developments in tort scholarship during recent years has been the emergence of a literature analyzing tort problems from feminist perspectives. The article looks at three of the areas that feminist writers have explored: the possibility of a "reasonable woman" standard as an alternative to the "reasonable man"; the possible recognition of a duty to rescue, which allegedly would be in harmony with feminist ethics; and the issue of how the (...) tort system should respond to types of harms that are disproportionately suffered by women. The article concludes that the feminist discussions of these topics have enriched the discourse of tort. Still, those discussions have been, in significant respects, inadequate. They have failed, for example, to take advantage of the relevant empirical information; and certain key issues relating to legal history and legal theory have remained underdeveloped. (shrink)

This article explores different dimensions of the concept of negligence in the law. The first sections focus on the fundamental distinction between conduct negligence, a conception that dominates tort law; and cognitive negligence, a conception that is much more important in criminal law. The last major section identifies five significant institutional functions served by a legal negligence standard: expressing a legal norm in the form of a standard rather than a rule; personifying fault; empowering the trier of fact to (...) give content to the standard; creating a secondary legal norm parasitic on a primary legal norm; and distinguishing grades of fault. These functions reveal the distinctive significance of negligence, but also disclose numerous problems that the use of such a legal standard can pose. Careful analysis of these different dimensions of negligence clarifies certain misconceptions and has important implications. For example, the question whether "negligence" is an appropriate minimum standard of liability is unanswerable until we identify the type of negligence at issue and its role in norm-definition. Similarly, comparing negligenceto supposedly "more serious" forms of fault, such as recklessness, knowledge, and purpose, is treacherous and sometimes amounts to comparing apples and oranges. A better understanding of the different conceptions of negligence and of the distinctive institutional functions of a legal negligence standard can facilitate the development of more coherent, and more justifiable, fault criteria in criminal law, torts, and other legal domains. (shrink)

This book explores how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may affect today's legal systems and, more particularly, matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law, contractual obligations, and torts. By distinguishing between the behaviour of robots as tools of human interaction, and robots as proper agents in the legal arena, jurists will have to address a new generation of "hard cases." General disagreement may concern immunity in criminal law (e.g., the employment of robot soldiers in battle), personal (...) accountability for certain robots in contracts (e.g., robo-traders), much as clauses of strict liability and negligence-based responsibility in extra-contractual obligations (e.g., service robots in tort law). Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual relationships. (shrink)

This paper shows that the law, in subtle ways, may set hitherto unrecognized incentives for the adoption of explainable machine learning applications. In doing so, we make two novel contributions. First, on the legal side, we show that to avoid liability, professional actors, such as doctors and managers, may soon be legally compelled to use explainable ML models. We argue that the importance of explainability reaches far beyond data protection law, and crucially influences questions of contractual and tort liability (...) for the use of ML models. To this effect, we conduct two legal case studies, in medical and corporate merger applications of ML. As a second contribution, we discuss the trade-off between accuracy and explainability and demonstrate the effect in a technical case study in the context of spam classification. (shrink)

In tort law, including Lithuanian tort law, damage usually is divided into two types: pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The concept of non-pecuniary damage has recently become a focus of attention of Lithuanian legal researchers. However, it has to be noted that the issues related to the concept of pecuniary damage remain scarcely analysed. As a result, the unique type of pecuniary damage, i.e. the damage of purely economic character, has received no attention whatsoever in Lithuanian tort law. (...) It is usually believed that the defence of the values of purely material character fall into the sphere of contractual law, while tort law is not concerned with the protection of these values. However, in the course of the development of social relations it has become apparent that in the present-day society personal financial losses have become equally important to the cases of actual damage to a person or a property. On the other hand, the fear to overextend the limits of tort law and, thus, limit the persons’ freedom to act, coupled with the different nature of the values protected by tort law provide grounds for the position that relatively abstract financial interests and absolute values or relative personal values should be protected in different ways. Referring to the doctrine and practice of foreign countries as well as the results of the analysis of Lithuanian positive law and court practices, in this article we aim at giving an answer to the question of where and how the ambit of protection under the tort law in the cases of damage of purely economic character should be defined. (shrink)

Tort law depends on three key concepts: causation, responsibility, and fault. However, I argue that the three key concepts are neither necessary, nor sufficient, for tort.