Results for 'Toni R��nnow-Rasmussen'

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  1.  61
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value.Mark Alfano - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (1):166-170.
    In her critique of Moore’s (1903, p. 55) suggestion that one might answer the question “What is good?” with “Books are good,” Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997, p. 276) asks what it could mean to say that books are “just plain” good or bad. Aren’t they rather good to read, or in teaching philosophy, or for weighing down papers? This point is apropos in a review of Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value in two ways. One might worry, first, about his (...)
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  2. Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Personal Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 185 pp., US$ 75 , ISBN 9780199603787. [REVIEW]Olivier Massin - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):221-231.
    Personal Values is a delightful and enlightening read. It is teeming with novel insights, ground-breaking distinctions, rich examples, new delineations of the field, refreshing historical reminders, inventive arguments, unprecedented connections, identifications of neglected difficulties, and pioneering proposals. I shall focus here on three of these insights, which are illustrative of the pervasive scrupulousness and inventiveness of the book. The first is that there is a distinction between the supervenience base of values and their constitutive grounds. The second is that FA (...)
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  3.  8
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value, Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2011, 185 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-960,378-7 € 59,99. [REVIEW]Peter Kirschenmann - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):1061-1063.
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  4.  42
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value , pp. xv + 185.Kevin Mulligan - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):221-223.
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  5.  82
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value. [REVIEW]Christian Coons - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):183-188.
  6.  76
    Personal Value – By Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen.Karl Ekendahl - 2012 - Theoria 78 (3):268-272.
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  7.  76
    Love, Value and Supervenience.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):495-508.
    People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non?fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, (...)
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  8.  14
    Introduction to Recent Work on Intrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer.
  9.  94
    On-Conditionalism: On the verge of a new metaethical theory.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):88-107.
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen | : This paper explores a novel metaethical theory according to which value judgments express conditional beliefs held by those who make them. Each value judgment expresses the belief that something is the case on condition that something else is the case. The paper aims to reach a better understanding of this view and to highlight some of the challenges that lie ahead. The most pressing of these revolves around the correct understanding of the nature of (...)
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  10.  68
    Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a stimulating and vivid area of philosophical research, but it has tended to monopolize the notion of 'good-for', linking it necessarily to welfare or ...
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  11.  30
    Reasons and two kinds of fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Rysiek Sliwinski - 2011 - Neither/nor-Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday 58:243 - 257.
    The much endorsed idea that reasons are facts, gives raise to several issues, not least when it is applied to the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. The paper distinguish in broad terms between two important views on the nature of facts. Given in particular a view that conceives of facts as abstract entities, the dichotomy is not particularly problematic. We might run into problems when it comes to identifying which facts are reasons and which are not, but the very (...)
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  12. Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation (...)
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  13.  46
    Motivation and Motivating Reason.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 464--485.
    For quite some time now philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to strike the reader or listener, at least at the outset, as incomprehensible. The story of Abraham on Mount Moriah, who decided to sacrifice his son, Isaac, illustrates this pattern. Killing one’s own child is a horrific thing to do, and it is hard to understand (...)
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  14.  77
    Recent Work on Intrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.) - 2005 - Springer.
    Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the (...)
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  15.  15
    The Value Gap.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is (...)
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  16.  99
    Analysing Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405-435.
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake. One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than (...)
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  17. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA.
    Section 2.1 identifies three notions of intrinsic value: the finality sense understands it as value for its own sake, the supervenience sense identifies it with value that depends exclusively on the bearer’s internal properties, and the nonderivative sense describes intrinsic value as value that provides justification for other values and is not justified by any other value. A distinction between final intrinsic and final extrinsic value in terms of supervenience is subsequently introduced. Section 2.2 contains a discussion of the debate (...)
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  18. Good and Good for.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
  19. On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-152.
    The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and (...)
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  20.  45
    Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it (...)
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  21.  88
    Instrumental values – strong and weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it (...)
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  22.  6
    On an Apparent Asymmetry in Attitude Desert.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Björn Petersson - 2007 - In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
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  23. Locating Value in Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-52.
    The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and (...)
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  24.  6
    Tropic of value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of ethics and applied philosophy. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 213-228.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  25.  31
    Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2011 - In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. pp. 95 - 113.
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider rather (...)
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  26.  13
    R.M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3).
  27.  94
    Hedonism, preferentialism, and value bearers.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):463-472.
    While hedonism has been subjected to much criticism over the years, it is still a widely endorsed axiological view. One objection that appears to be generally recognised as especially troublesome to hedonists is that their central claim, that final value accrues only to experiences of pleasure gives us a narrow view of value. Much more than pleasure is valuable for its own sake. A competing theory, preferentialism, is another widespread theory about value. According to one version of preferentialism, only the (...)
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  28.  10
    Love, Value and Supervenience.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Humana Mente 16 (4):495-508.
    People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non-fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, (...)
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  29. On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so- called for-someone's-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone's-sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued (...)
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  30.  1
    Tropic of value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - In Erik Carlson & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Omnium-Gatherum. Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Jan Österberg on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday. pp. 263-277.
    In Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, we defended the following claims: Not only states of affairs, or facts, but also concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value ; The final value of a concrete object need not be intrinsic, i.e., it need not be exclusively based on the internal properties of its bearer; The final value of a concrete object is not reducible to the value of some states of affairs that involve the object in question. Our (...)
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  31. Dislodging Butterflies from the Supervenient.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the value of an object and some of the natural properties of the object; the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It is argued that the influential (...)
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  32. Då-för-nu preferenser och preferensutilitarism.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1999 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1.
  33. Preference-utilitarianism and Past Preferences.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 40:106-116.
    A well-known problem for preference-utilitarianism is to what extent it should exclude from consideration certain preferences. In this paper I focus on past preferences. I outline three general and some particular positions that a preference-utilitarian reasonably would want to take with regard to past preferences and why I think that endorsing each of these positions create new problems for the preference-utilitarian. At the end I sketch on a possible solution to the axiological problems here presented. However, although the pluralistic approach (...)
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  34. The strike of the demon: On fitting pro‐attitudes and value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
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  35.  23
    Review of Herlinde Pauer-Studer's Justifying Injustice : Legal Theory in Nazi Germany.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
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  36.  51
    Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):560-579.
    A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an (...)
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  37.  60
    Dislodging Butterflies from the Supervenient.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It (...)
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  38.  23
    L.W. Sumner’s account of Welfare.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2001 - In Juan José Acero, Francesc Camós Abril & Neftalí Villanueva Fernández (eds.), Actas del III Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica, Granada.
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  39.  14
    Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Justifying Injustice; Legal Theory in Nazi Germany, 2020. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):393-394.
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  40.  20
    Personal and Impersonal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
    nvited talk at the Philosophy Club April 14th at University of St Andrews in which I Outline three positions regarding the distinction between good (period) and good-for and I then discuss Richard Kraut’s recent attack on Good, period and my own approach to the distinction. Eventually, this discussion develioped into the book The Value Gap (OUP 2021).
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  41.  56
    Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour (...)
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  42. Homage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (ed.) - 2007
     
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  43.  13
    Hommage à Wlodek; 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz - published as web resource only.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson & Dan Egonsson (eds.) - 2007 - Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
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  44.  15
    Favouring and Motivating Reasons.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - manuscript
  45.  15
    Making many kinds of moral progress: Allan Buchanan and Russell Powell: The evolution of moral progress: A biocultural theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, xiv + 422 pp, 325.99 HB.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2019 - Metascience 28 (3):397-400.
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  46.  24
    Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 268 pp., GBP 38.99 , ISBN 9780199793532. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):609-614.
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  47.  22
    In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):609-614.
  48.  9
    Dual-reason analyses revisited.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
    in UndeterminedClassical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; (...)
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  49.  8
    On Schroeder's chapter 10 in Slaves of the Passion.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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  50.  8
    Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
    Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore is that normative reasons are facts (...)
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