The study compares Theognis’ and Socrates’ concept of love: there is an ambivalence of love present in both authors in the form of a connection between the pleasing and the unpleasing, that is, on the one hand, devotion to the educatory harshness of the lover, on the other to his skill and cunning. To what extent is the ambivalence in Socrates and Theognis similar or dissimilar? The answer discloses a comparison of ideas about the functioning, the aims, and the meaning (...) of love in the wider context of understanding the life and world of the two authors: such a context exposes the duplicity in Theognis, and the love of negation of unambiguous teaching about the proper life without painful testing. In Socrates, it is exposed to irony, to eternal ignorance and to openness to another and to god’s world. Next, we contrast Theognis’ limiting of another’s duplicity to a level between a loving and friendly relationship with Socrates’ expansion of the loving struggle into every sphere of life, above all into the relationship of the lover to himself and those close to him. We explain this contrast as a decision between trust in reason and trust in love as the fundamental forces conferring meaning on human life. We show, however, that with Socrates it is not blind love but rather love embracing reason and overlapping divine challenges, while with Theognis it is not pure reason that is involved, but rather reason directed by the socio-political situation. (shrink)

This paper traces the distinction between the claims of love and the claims of morality in the work of Raimond Gaita, and disputes it using examples from Gaita’s work – particularly his use of “decency” in place of morality – which I try to understand better through this scrutiny. I disclose in Gaita’s work the tension between highlighting love and praise of decency and I try to show that the tension between love and decency indeed remains present in his writing, (...) but not as a contrariness of claims from both departments. Though they constitute two different claims, their mixture is imaginable and valuable even if, by taking part in it, the sense of both love and decency changes, which, however, might be seen as an opportunity to open new horizons for working both of them into human life. (shrink)

Život -- Nepolitická politika -- Charta 77 -- Intelektual a politika -- Filosof a politika -- Politický realismus: pravda, reflexe a bída -- Morálka, slušnost a etika štědrosti -- Pravá politika -- Dodatek: Filosofie, víra a teologie.

Human life ends with death, but not necessarily in all its forms. In the paper, I recall two basic ways in which it does not end and discuss in detail one in particular which persists in the further development of the projects, ideas and events which the dead person was identified with during his lifetime. I then show how this possible form of afterlife is ambivalently present in Patočka’s thought: Patočka specifies that what we have after death is a metaphysical (...) quality of the dead, while on the other hand he calls for the interpretative decipherment of the life of the dead, that is, against an unchanging core of the deceased (a metaphysical essence), he acknowledges an interpretation that implies the possible change or development of the dead person. In the next section, I support the discussion of the form of postmortal life by mentioning a sketch of the concept of man in process philosophy and ancient Greek thought (using an interpretation advocated by Patočka himself). Finally, I revisit some death-related motifs in Patočka’s Heretical Essays, with the help of Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of these essays. (shrink)