To be logical is to be faithful to reasoning and trust the universality of reason. Given this, to be philosophically East Asian and to be fundamentally logical amount to the same attitude—this is the sole dictum of East Asian philosophy, which has been validated by both Kyoto School and New Confucian philosophers. I argue that this dictum does not contradict with their keen intuition or sensitivity for that which are not grasped by means of formal languages.

Mou Zongsan's notion of "Buddhistic ontology" is interpreted here in its fundamental difference from his own previous metaphysical scheme, in the light of the Kyoto School philosophers' similar attempts to resolve the Kantian antinomy of practical reason. This is an alternative both to the analysis provided by previous interpreters of Mou's Buddhistic philosophy, such as Hans-Rudolf Kantor and N. Serina Chan, and to the comparative studies of Mou's theories with Kyoto School philosophy by Ng Yu-kwan. Previous researchers considered Mou's Buddhist (...) philosophy in continuity with moral metaphysics. However, this idea of ontology, inspired by Tiantai perfect teaching, is essentially different from the Qixinlun-inspired scheme of "twofold ontology." The implications of this problematic idea, however, were not pursued by Mou himself, but by the next generation of philosophers, such as Wing-cheuk Chan and Ng Yu-kwan. A comparison with Kyoto School philosophy enables us to clarify how the idea of Buddhism-inspired ontology is a radical criticism against Kantian philosophy, and how it shows similarity to Nishitani's Heidegger-inspired interpretation of Buddhism, which seeks to affirm the being of all things without reserve. (shrink)

Contemporary research on East Asian philosophy is based on the discovery of common philosophical elements shared by apparently mutually irrelevant East Asian thinkers. One of such elements is the question of meaning or semantic dimension with special relevance to Buddhist inspiration, which is clearly seen in the philosophies of the Kyoto school and New Confucianism. Although the question of meaning is almost common to the whole 20th century philosophy, this paper shows that the East Asian theory of meaning has two (...) characteristic notions: self-awareness and bidirectionality. It is from this perspective that Mou Zongsan’s two-tier metaphysical scheme can be effectively compared to Nishida Kitarō’s theory of place. Drawing on Sinitic Buddhism, they explore the semantic dimension by means of the ever-deepening self-awareness; the same Buddhist inspiration points to another core notion, bidirectionality, which characterizes that which is neither corporeal or mental. Contrary to the widely accepted view, I interpret the so-called “logic” of soku or ji not as a type of logical system, but as a bidirectional expression peculiar to the “self-aware” theory of meaning. (shrink)

This paper shows the formative role of the question of meaning in Nishida's theory of place and examines its relation to Husserl's phenomenology.

In philosophy of language, contribution from continental philosophy is scarcely examined or acknowledged although Deleuze’s criticism against truth-conditional semantics is worth consideration. I examine his peculiar phenomenological theory of possible-world semantics that draws on analytic function. It contains a meta-semantic theory of emergence, which describes how individuality and personhood originate from the impersonal and pre-individual field. This is a type of meaning theory different from the truth-conditional ones, and I argue that it supplements the latter with the philosophy of mind.

This paper explains how Hegel's concept of "bending" of infinite series serves as a topological development of Spinoza's theory of infinity by closely examining Hegel's peculiar interpretation of calculus, thereby showing the historical importance of Spinoza's geometrical understanding of algebra.

Modern East Asian philosophy faced a difficulty in endowing objective knowledge with its adequate location in the traditional Eastern view of mind. This led some philosophers to reconsider intellectual intuition and the relevant question of things themselves from an Eastern perspective, and among them most notably are Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan. Although these philosophers have recently been comparatively studied, their core concepts such as ＂absolute nothing＂ and ＂infinite mind＂ have not been sufficiently discussed from the perspective of objective knowledge. (...) This paper examines the question of grasping things themselves or facts themselves by reconsidering two philosophers' middle works on the theory of knowledge. The result is the synthetic view of their seemingly divergent theories, based on the pursuit of self-awareness and the principle of bidirectional transcendence; according to this principle, the outward transcendence is correlated to the inward or immanent transcendence, so that the knowledge of facts themselves are epistemologically correlated to absolute nothing or infinite mind, which gives foundation to objective knowledge. This view not only explains the meaning of the ＂knowledge＂ of facts themselves, but also strongly implies the epistemic value of the two philosophers' seemingly esoteric concepts of mind and nothingness. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show the characteristics of Tiantai’s perfect teaching (yuanjiao) in Nishida’s philosophy of basho. This is an alternative to a certain type of Nishida interpretation that emphasizes influences from Huayan Buddhism and the Awakening of Faith in Nishida’s metaphysics, especially in his later notion of absolutely contradictory identity. These Buddhist doctrines as well as Yogācāra Buddhism are classified by Tiantai Buddhism as distinctive teaching (biejiao), not perfect teaching. This paper clarifies that the characteristics of the theory of (...) basho cannot be found in distinctive teaching although Nishida’s theory of cognitive act indeed shows similarities to Yogacara Buddhism. Following Mou Zongsan’s (1909―95) and Ando Toshio’s (1909―73) interpretation, I argue that Tiantai Buddhism, in its elucidation of the ontological stratum as the envelopment of cognitive act, has the same metaphysical structure as that found in Nishida’s logic of basho, which further crystallizes into the principle of contradictory identity. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) in his later years explored the so-called "dialectical" interpretation of complex analysis, an important part of his philosophy of mathematics that has previously been criticized as lacking mathematical accuracy and philosophical importance. I interpret his elaboration on complex analysis as an attempt to develop Leibniz's theory of individual notion and to supplement Hegel's view of higher analysis with the development in mathematics such as the theory of analytic continuation and Riemann surface. This interpretation shows the previously underrated (...) philosophico-mathematical significance of Tanabe's argument. (shrink)

There have been two major approaches to Nishida’s logical thought, one is logical analysis using formal logic, the other is historical elucidation that mostly draws on dialectical logic. These have previously been considered to be completely incompatible in Nishida studies. Here I explore the complementary relation between the two camps and focus on the way Nishida pursues meanings of language with his theory of self-awareness. I elucidate how the concept of bidirectionality, formerly not considered relevant to logic, gives foundation to (...) his so-called logic of place. This result, substantially different from the previous ones, suggests the invalidity of the previous two approaches. (shrink)

Japanese philosophy can be viewed as consisting of three historical phases. In the first and classical phase, theoretical speculation in Japan is usually seen as a variation of East Asian intellectual tradition, which basically consists of Confucianism and Sinicized Buddhism. Some thinkers nevertheless start to depart from this framework by drawing either on the indigenous culture or on the knowledge of occidental civilization, which eventually leads to the Westernization of Japanese society. In the second, or modern, phase of Japanese philosophy, (...) there arises a theoretical task to synthesize Eastern and Western frameworks, and many pioneering works of modern East Asian philosophy are produced in the first half of the 20th century. The third and contemporary phase of Japanese philosophy spans from the postwar reconstruction of Japan to the present, when eminent researchers lead philosophical studies under the framework either of analytic or continental context. Recent philosophical research in Japan is increasingly getting free from such academic frameworks, producing some remarkable results-- although most of these contemporary works remain unknown overseas. (shrink)

This paper tries to clarify the theory of difference in terms of ji or soku ("即") that is developed by Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan, comparing it with contemporary occidental Metaphysics of difference. It is known that Nishida's argument for basho or place shows a kind of hesitation between identity and difference; several Kyoto philosophers, along with recent researchers, interpret Nishida's philosophy of "absolutely contradictory identity" in terms of soku as an ontology of not identity but of difference. A similar (...) hesitation is seen in Mou Zongsan's metaphysical argument for the difference between the act- and being- strata, which leads him to affirm the "identical" completeness of yuanjiao in terms of ji. I argue that these arguments become fully intelligible only as the result of their ontology of difference that strikingly resembles Deleuze's post-Heideggerian metaphysical attempt. This interpretation also shows how far their ontological speculation in terms of ji/ soku owes to the heritage of East Asian Buddhism because the contradiction between identity and difference is most seriously explored in the Tiantai tradition. (shrink)

Buddhism has gradually reclaimed its place as the most important spiritual tradition to the extent that modern Japanese philosophers no longer even mention Confucian thought, especially since the birth of a Japanese style of philosophy represented by the Kyoto School. Against this historical background, it may seem questionable if anything like an effective interaction between Japanese Buddhist-inspired philosophy and Confucianism ever existed. This essay concentrate on the two occasions in the history of modern Japanese philosophy when the problem of morality (...) gained crucial importance. The first concerns the issue of morality among the second generation of Kyoto School philosophers, culminating in the theme of “overcoming modernity,” and its discussion of how to go beyond modernity, thereby transforming society and the world. This discussion is clearly inspired by Confucian ideas. Since this theme is based on the evaluation of past philosophies and thoughts, it is inseparable from a modern version of doctrinal classification conceived by KŌYAMA Iwao 高山岩男. The second occasion we will examine in this essay is the postwar Marxist critique of this theme. Inheriting this theme of the Kyoto School, HIROMATSU Wataru 廣松渉 proceeds to criticize modern Japanese Buddhist philosophy and Buddhism itself from a practical point of view in order to surpass their shortcomings. In both cases, the question is how such notions as morality and morals are problematized in modern Japanese philosophy, or, more specifically, what the place of morality and practice in Buddhist philosophy is? This is the question that will enable us to see the modern version of interaction between Buddhism and Confucianism. (shrink)

This paper attempts to interpret the theory of personhood in the works of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in a way that refutes a certain type of Nishida interpretation that Critical Buddhism offers. According to this type of interpretation, the logic of basho is a modern version of the Qixinlun system. Based on this interpretation, Critical Buddhism denounces Kyoto School philosophy as "topical Buddhism." This paper shows how Nishida himself consciously differentiates his philosophy from the idealistic and monistic system with which the (...) earlier version of the logic of basho can easily be confused. To show that his theory of personhood opposes the Qixinlun-like system, I argue that Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Tiantai theory of personhood is analogous to Nishida's and explore the common nature of their philosophies. (shrink)

Recent research both on the Kyoto School and on the contemporary New Confucians suggests significant similarities between these two modern East Asian philosophies. Still missing is, however, an explanation of the shared philosophical ideas that serve as the foundation for comparative studies. For this reason, I analyze the basic theories of the two distinctly East Asian philosophies of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) and Mou Zongsan (1909-95) so as to identify and extract the same type of argument. This is an alternative to (...) the analyses provided by the previous studies of their philosophies, which inevitably regard their theories as an East Asian assimilation of modern European philosophy in the Kantian, Neo-Kantian, or phenomenological tradition, or else as the traditional tenets under the guise of philosophical speculation, without being able to clarify how these theories contribute to philosophy. My analysis shows that both the logic of basho and the theory of perfect teaching formulate the same type of theory, the ontological or topological-onto-topological-turn from the act of consciousness to its basho or its vertical enfolding, which constitutes the bedrock of East Asian philosophy. (shrink)

Doctrinal classification or the panjiao 判教 system of Chinese Buddhism has been rediscovered and renewed in modern East Asian philosophy since both the Kyoto School and New Confucianism clarified the philosophical meaning of this intellectual tradition. The theoretical relation between these two modern reconsiderations, however, has not yet been studied. I analyze the theory of panjiao in Kōyama Iwao 高山岩男 and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 so as to identify and extract, despite their apparent irrelevance, the same type of philosophical argument concerning (...) the ontological character of yuanjiao 圓教. My analysis shows that Mou’s distinction between the “two-door mind” paradigm and Buddhistic ontology in his interpretation of Tiantai 天台 Buddhism corresponds to Kōyama’s distinction between an idealistic system and the existential turn in his generalized panjiao system. (shrink)

Spinoza’s geometric method is supposed to pursue crystal-clear argumentation and universal understanding, whereas past philosophers repeatedly claimed that his system failed to comprehend human conditions. If Spinoza’s intention is really to show the way to well-being, his geometric formalization must point to concrete singular existence and conditions. This obvious contradiction comes from the fact that his theory of singularity was yet under construction, while its prototype gives foundation to his Ethics. I reconstruct the theory of singularity that Spinoza conceived but (...) could not finish, which historically precedes but fundamentally differs from Leibniz’s theory of individual concept. (shrink)

East Asia has nurtured an intellectual tradition that includes Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, whose richness is arguably compared with ancient Greek. Yet, this region has repeatedly been said to have "no philosophy”—by occidental philosophers whose name value surpasses any of the eastern thinkers. Is this because of the deficiency of East Asian tradition? Or is it due to “our” ignorance? My answer is: both. I argue that modern East Asian philosophy was an attempt to recognize the deficiency and develop the (...) insight of intellectual tradition in order to make philosophical contribution with a focus on the onto-topological constitution of metaphysics. Exemplary are the Kyoto school and the New Confucians, but I show how their attempt has been misunderstood due to the lack of communication among contemporary East Asian philosophers. (shrink)

This work explores the hidden role of the Axiom 2 in Part 1 of Spinoza's Ethics, which is known for never being used or referred in the book from the perspective of the development of Spinoza's metaphysical system.

Words are changing their meanings in natural language. A word can change its referent, and even when its extension remains the same, its connotation or intension may evolve. Similarly, a sentence can alter its meaning without changing the meanings of its individual words. These are curious but common phenomena that have been attracting the attention of both linguists and philosophers. However, meaning change is something more than a mere linguistic phenomenon because it sometimes reflects the transformation of the “world” itself (...) – at least for us. Furthermore, it is highly relevant to what happens to those who use language to think and live. In this book, I explore the change of meaning in a broad context, not only from the perspective of language but also from an analysis of what is happening in our minds. Although the semantic dimension has historically provided the foundation of contemporary philosophy, the objectivity of meaning is contradicted to some degree by its sheer changeability. It is therefore necessary to observe how the change of meaning is compatible with the objectivity of the semantic dimension – an observation that is inseparable from the question of what “meaning” is, as well as from the problems concerning the self, events, and facts. Chapters 1 and 2 clarify the problem of meaning changes by exploring the concept of meaning in a broad context. According to the standard contextualist explanation, a sentence’s content is determined by its context of utterance, and its truth value is further determined by its circumstance of evaluation. This standard framework, notably with its focus on indexicals, cannot smoothly explain many cases of meaning change, such as the change in meaning in a predicate or the alteration that occurs in the inferential nexus. To understand these phenomena, I expand the perspective of the modern philosophy of language to merge it with the theory of emptiness in the East Asian Buddhist tradition. This must be considered as one of the original aspects of the book. Based on this preparation, the following two chapters explain the meaning change through an analysis of the self. It has been shown that a thought expressed in a sentence undergoes substantial transformation whenever the meaning of its predicate changes, or when the inferential nexus itself is altered; however, this is a time when the world in which we live correspondingly changes. To illustrate this, I developed a theory of semantic determination to describe and explain how our selves and the world simultaneously change – a theory that consists of such elements as perspective extension, epistemic restriction by our “mental walls,” and role-playing volition, all of which jointly constitute a multi-layered standpoint. In short, the constitution of a multi-layered standpoint allows for—and brings about—changes in meaning. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how the notion of idea rei singularis is at the heart of Spinoza's criticism against the Cartesian metaphysics.