7 found
  1.  94
    Law and language.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 2002 - In Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 935-968.
    The author argues that philosophers' attempts to use philosophy of language to solve problems of jurisprudence have often failed- the most dramatic failure being that of Jeremy Bentham. H.L.A.Hart made some related mistakes in his creative use of philosophy of language, yet his focus on language still yields some very significant insights for jurisprudence: the context principle (that the correct application of linguistic expressions typically depends on context in ways that are important for jurisprudence), the diversity principle (that grounds of (...)
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  2.  90
    Putting interpretation in its place.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 1994 - Law and Philosophy 13 (4):451 - 479.
    What can a philosophical analysis of the concept of interpretation contribute to legal theory? In his recent book,Interpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor proposes a complex and ambitious analysis as groundwork for his positivist assault on “interpretive” theories of law and of language. I argue (i) that the crucial element in Marmor's analysis of interpretation is his treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules, and (ii) that a less ambitious analysis of interpretation than Marmor's can take better advantage of (...)
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  3. Law and Language.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 2002 - In Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
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  4.  94
    The impossibility of the rule of law.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 1999 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 (1):1-18.
    No community fully achieves the ideal of the rule of law. Puzzles about the content of the ideal seem to make it necessarily unattainable (and, therefore, an incoherent ideal). Legal systems necessarily contain vague laws. They typically allow for change in the law, they typically provide for unreviewable official decisions, and they never regulate every aspect of the life of a community. It may seem that the ideal can never be achieved because of these features of legal practice. But I (...)
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  5. Vagueness and Legal Theory.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 1997 - Legal Theory 3 (1):37-63.
    The use of vague language in law has important implications for legal theory. Legal philosophers have occasionally grappled with those implications, but they have not come to grips with the characteristic phenomenon of vagueness: the sorites paradox. I discuss the paradox, and claim that it poses problems for some legal theorists (David Lyons, Hans Kelsen, and, especially, Ronald Dworkin). I propose that a good account of vagueness will have three consequences for legal theory: (i) Theories that deny that vagueness in (...)
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  6. 'International meaning': Comity in fundamental rights adjudication.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 2002 - International Journal of Refugee Studies 13:280-292.
    In fundamental rights adjudication, should judges defer to the judgment of other decision makers? How can they defer, without betraying the respect that judges ought to accord those rights? How can they refuse to defer, without betraying the respect that judges ought to accord to other decision makers? I argue that only principles of comity justify deference, and their reach is limited. Comity never forbids the judges to take and to act upon a different view of fundamental rights from that (...)
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  7.  75
    How to Speak the Truth.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 2001 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 46 (1):229-248.
    Argues that some important problems in the theory of legal interpretation can be resolved with three techniques that John Finnis used in Natural Law and Natural Rights to address a methodological problem in jurisprudence: (1) The analogy principle: The application of a word such as “friendship” or “law” is not based on a set of features shared by each instance, but is based on similarities of a variety of kinds, seen by the people who use the words as justifying the (...)
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