We propose a theoretical model to explain the usage of time-inconsistent behavior as a strategy to exploit others when reputation and trust have secondary effects on the economic outcome. We consider two agents with time-consistent preferences exploiting common resources. Supposing that an agent is believed to have time-inconsistent preferences with probability p, we analyze whether she uses this misinformation when she has the opportunity to use it. Using the model originally provided by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J (...) Econ 11(1):322–334, 1980), we determine the optimal degree of present bias that the agent would like to have while pretending to have time-inconsistent preferences and we provide the range of present-bias parameter under which deceiving is optimal. Moreover, by allowing the constant relative risk aversion class of utility form, we characterize the distinction between pretending to be naive and sophisticated. (shrink)

Several studies on time preference have found time inconsistency in both gain and loss preferences. However, the relationship between the two within the same person remains unclear; that is, does an individual who demonstrates time inconsistency for gain outcomes do so for losses as well? This paper reports on individuals’ time inconsistency for gains and losses in a laboratory setting. To obtain a precise comparison of individuals’ time inconsistency for gains and (...) losses, we used Rohde’s “DI -index” :1700–1716, 2018) and measured the level of time inconsistency, rather than merely identifying whether TI was present. This index represents how strongly a person exhibits present bias, and easily extends to the comparison between gain and loss preferences within the same person. Further, it allows the experiment to test for so-called future bias, which has been a focus area in recent time inconsistency literature. It is elicited through a non-parametric method, which avoids any specification errors in the analysis. Our findings are as follows: first, we found future bias in preferences for not only gains but also losses, and we confirmed that this tendency is consistent with previous findings on preferences for gains. Second, a positive correlation between time inconsistency for gains and losses was found at the individual level. Indeed, we could not find a significant difference between the two in most cases. (shrink)

Branching time logics have been studied in computer science since the 1980s primarily to model the tree of computations for discrete transition systems. Inconsistency measures for propositional log...

Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunk – where some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subinterval – is at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given that – as I will argue – pluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if (...) they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possibility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false. Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad's inconsistency, then, has some interesting metaphysical implications. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of inconsistencies in the metaphorical conceptualizations of time that involve motion within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). It demonstrates that the TIME AS A PURSUER metaphor contrasts with the reverse variant TIME AS AN OBJECT OF PURSUIT, just as the MOVING TIME metaphor contrasts with the MOVING OBSERVER variant. Such metaphorical conceptualizations of time functioning as pairs of minimally differing variants based on Figure-Ground reversal are, strictly speaking, inconsistent (...) with one another. Looking at these inconsistencies from a wider perspective suggests that time may belong to a separate category of conceptual phenomena. This paper puts forward a proposal to approach time from the perspective of “phenomena of the third kind”, which according to Keller’s thesis include conceptual establishments resulting from human cognition, but not of human design. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or a (...) preference for systematic restriction. Overall, the analysis reconciles the decision–theoretic approach of choice over time with the game–theoretic multiple-selves approach. (shrink)

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are (...) drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less. (shrink)

Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein consider the possibility of a philosophical inquiry of an absolutely universal scope—an inquiry into the being of all beings, in Heidegger’s case, and into the logical form of everything that can be meaningfully said, in Wittgenstein’s. Moreover, they both raise the worry that the theoretical language by means of which we speak of particular beings and assert particular facts is not suited to this task. And yet their own philosophical work seems to include many assertions of (...) ordinary, theoretical language. Are they being inconsistent? Or are they hoping to use theoretical language in a way that conveys what cannot be said in that language? Much of the scholarship on each of these thinkers takes the form of one of the two horns of this dilemma. In the context of Wittgenstein scholarship, however, a third alternative has been proposed: the Resolute Reading of the Tractatus. My aim is to establish the availability of a similar solution to Heidegger’s predicament. It will emerge that Heidegger rejects the possibility of a theoretical account of being and pursues a project of a radically different sort, whose goal is to bring about a transformation of our fundamental relation to being. (shrink)

I argue that the following theses are both popular among evidentialists but also jointly inconsistent with evidentialism: 1) Time-Slice Mentalism: one’s justificational properties at t are grounded only by one’s mental properties at t; 2) Experience Ultimacy: all ultimate evidence is experiential; and 3) Sleep Justification: we have justified beliefs while we have dreamless, nonexperiential sleep. Although I intend for this paper to be a polemic against evidentialists, it can also be viewed as an opportunity for them to clarify (...) their views. Furthermore, the paper is not only relevant to evidentialists. For example, the arguments of this paper could give Time-Slice Mentalists a reason to deny evidentialism. (shrink)

There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry”, the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality of the (...) present, past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well. (shrink)

At various times, mathematicians have been forced to work with inconsistent mathematical theories. Sometimes the inconsistency of the theory in question was apparent (e.g. the early calculus), while at other times it was not (e.g. pre-paradox na¨ıve set theory). The way mathematicians confronted such difficulties is the subject of a great deal of interesting work in the history of mathematics but, apart from the crisis in set theory, there has been very little philosophical work on the topic of inconsistent (...) mathematics. In this paper I will address a couple of philosophical issues arising from the applications of inconsistent mathematics. The first is the issue of whether finding applications for inconsistent mathematics commits us to the existence of inconsistent objects. I then consider what we can learn about a general philosophical account of the applicability of mathematics from successful applications of inconsistent mathematics. (shrink)

I revisit my earlier arguments for the (trivial) inconsistency of natural languages, and take up the objection that no such argument can be established on the basis of surface usage. I respond with the evidential centrality of surface usage: the ways it can and can't be undercut by linguistic science. Then some important ramifications of having an inconsistent natural language are explored: (1) the temptation to engage in illegitimate reductio reasoning, (2) the breakdown of the knowledge idiom (because its (...) facticity isn't comfortable with every sentence being true and false). Restoring the utility of the knowledge idiom motivates regimentation - the consistentist reinterpretation of natural language inferences (as they occur in real time). It's then sketched how to give the semantics of a natural language despite its inconsistency: Necessary and sufficient truth conditions are dropped in favor of necessary truth conditions and sufficient truth conditions. (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that mere temporal proximity always and without exception strengthens certain moral duties, including the duty to save – call this view Robust Temporalism. Although almost all other moral philosophers dismiss Robust Temporalism out of hand, I argue that it is prima facie intuitively plausible, and that it is analogous to a view about special obligations that many philosophers already accept. I also defend Robust Temporalism against several common objections, and I highlight its relevance to a (...) number of practical policy debates, including longtermism. My conclusion is that Robust Temporalism is a moral live option, that deserves to be taken much more seriously in the future. (shrink)

I revisit my earlier arguments for the (trivial) inconsistency of natural languages, and take up the objection that no such argument can be established on the basis of surface usage. I respond with the evidential centrality of surface usage: the ways it can and can't be undercut by linguistic science. Then some important ramifications of having an inconsistent natural language are explored: (1) the temptation to engage in illegitimate reductio reasoning, (2) the breakdown of the knowledge idiom (because its (...) facticity isn't comfortable with every sentence being true and false). Restoring the utility of the knowledge idiom motivates regimentation—the consistentist reinterpretation of natural language inferences (as they occur in real time). It's then sketched how to give the semantics of a natural language despite its inconsistency: Necessary and sufficient truth conditions are dropped in favor of necessary truth conditions and sufficient truth conditions. (shrink)

The first mention of the concept of an inconsistency measure for sets of formulas in first-order logic was given in 1978, but that paper presented only classifications for them. The first actual inconsistency measure with a numerical value was given in 2002 for sets of formulas in propositional logic. Since that time, researchers in logic and AI have developed a substantial theory of inconsistency measures. While this is an interesting topic from the point of view of (...) logic, an important motivation for this work is also that some intelligent systems may encounter inconsistencies in their operation. This research deals primarily with propositional knowledge bases, that is, finite sets of propositional logic formulas. The goal of this paper is to extend the concept of inconsistency measure in a formal way to sets of formulas with the modal operators “necessarily” and “possibly” applied to propositional logic formulas. We use frames for the semantics, but in a way that is different from the way that frames are commonly used in modal logics, in order to facilitate measuring inconsistency. As a set of formulas may have different inconsistency measures for different frames, we define the concept of a standard frame that can be used for all finite sets of formulas in the language. We do this for two languages. The first language, AMPL, contains formulas where a prefix of operators is applied to a propositional logic formula. The second language, CMPL, adds connectives that can be applied to AMPL formulas in a limited way. We show how to extend propositional logic inconsistency measures to such sets of formulas. Finally, we define a new concept, weak inconsistency measure, and show how to compute it. (shrink)

Baumard proposes a model to explain the dramatic rise in innovation that occurred during the Industrial Revolution, whereby rising living standards led to slower life history strategies, which, in turn, fostered innovation. We test his model explicitly using time series data, finding limited support for these proposed linkages. Instead, we find evidence that rising living standards appear to have a time-lagged bidirectional relationship with increasing innovation.

This paper starts the systematic study of inconsistency measures for propositional logics enriched with operators involving time. We use Prior’s operators for tense logic: H, G, P, and F; however, we apply different semantics to them. We define two logics. The first one, ATPL, allows formulas with the application of any of the four operators any number of times to propositional logic formulas. The semantics is given in terms of TPL structures. We then show how to measure the (...) inconsistency of a set of ATPL formulas using appropriately modified versions of standard inconsistency measures for propositional logic. Additionally, these new measures are checked for the satisfaction of various properties. We also investigate a new concept of inconsistency that cannot be defined for propositional logic. Then, ATPL is extended to CTPL by applying the propositional connectives to ATPL formulas and measuring inconsistency is extended to sets of CTPL formulas. (shrink)

Skepticism described by Sextus Empiricus faces the persistent charge that it is an inconsistent, self-refuting view. However, recently its consistency hasbeen defended in three important ways: it is a thesis with weak assertion, it is a practice without any assertion, and it is a process developing over time.The first option is not well supported by Sextus’ texts, where even a weak assertion is not allowed. The second option cannot explain the rationality of skeptical arguments. The third option reveals two (...) levels of Sextan skepticism; however, the developing skeptic has to accept the self-refutation charge, and the mature skeptic takes flight from the charge without any rational answer. I claim that Sextus embraces the self-refutation charge. The mature skeptic’s speech acts are pragmatically inconsistent: their content cannot be asserted without contradiction. As a result, the charge of inconsistency is not answered. (shrink)

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer (...) to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects. (shrink)

As consistency is such an important topic in logic, researchers have for a long time investigated how to attain and maintain it. But consistency can also be studied from the point of view of its opposite, inconsistency. The problem with inconsistency in classical logic is that by the principle of explosion a single inconsistency leads to triviality. Paraconsistent logics were introduced to get around this problem by defining logics in such a way that the explosion principle (...) does not apply to them. Another approach stays in the classical framework and evaluates the amount of inconsistency in a set of formulas. The great bulk of this work has been done for propositional logic and presents many interesting issues about inconsistency. A previous paper introduced the concept of generalized propositional logic (GPL) to provide a uniform method for measuring inconsistency in logics that allow the application of unary operator pairs, such as for modality, time, and space, to propositional logic formulas. The universality of GPL manifests itself in the fact that such an operator pair is evaluated in a uniform manner across all such logics. The difference lies solely in the choice of a frame for each logic. But some logics also contain nonunary operators. For example, temporal logics typically contain a binary Until operator. The purpose of this paper is to show how to extend generalized propositional logic to extended generalized propositional logic (EGPL) by adding nonunary operator pairs and measure inconsistency in such logics. The universality of EGPL manifests itself in the fact that once the evaluation of the nonunary operators is given, it carries over to all such logics. For example, the temporal Until operator becomes applicable to modal logic. Furthermore, while relative inconsistency measures were previously considered for GPL, they are now extended to EGPL and a new approach removes an undesirable feature from the previous version. Also, this paper provides results about various properties of the new inconsistency measures. Many examples and explanations are given to illustrate the issues involving this extension. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 509 covered and interpreted. Depending on their interests and their theories of causation, historians may have any variety of single-facetcd or multi-faceted interpretations. Social history of ideas is one variety. Practitioners of each of the above willnotice omissions of subdivisions and may differ with my definition of their field. Such a reaction would further indicate that indeed there is a plethora of approaches. Such abundance is (...) needed to meet the spectrum of concerns of historically-minded scholars. In each approach the focus is different; an idea, a general topic, the transmission of ideas, a discipline, a specific social environment, an intellectual community, the spirit of an era, a whole society and culture, an event, the life and times of a writer. Ideas do in fact have meaning and function along this full spectrum of contexts. A methodology is chosen which will throw light on a particular kind of context; some of the best scholarship results from the utilization by one individual of complementary methodologies. Fortunately, to compensate for the limitations of individual scholars, we have other scholars! The tensions between the horiz0ntalists and verticalists and between the externalists and intemalists are healthy tensions. Only through communicationamong scholars utilizing differentmethodologies and through attempts by individual scholars to approach their subject from several perspectives can we hope to gain a multi-faceted comprehension of man's past. MARYANNE CLINE HOROWITZ Occidental College DESCARTES' INCONSISTENCY: A REPLY* In my paper, "Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency,''1 I point out that Descartes claims on one occasion that he could have a faculty which is unknown to him (Claim A), but on a second occasion, within the same Meditation, claims the contrary (Claim B). I then try to show that nothing which Descartes achieves or says between A and B justifies this volte face on his part, and subsequently conclude that he is inconsistent in Meditation III, and that this inconsistency is in fact essential to his argument. Professors Brewster and Humphrey have raised objections to my view that Descartes is inconsistent.2 Here I wish to reply to these objections because I think they fail, though sometimesin quite subtle ways, and because I believe I can in this way clarity my earlier contentions. Brewster and Humphrey, as I understand them, have raised three major objections to my paper. These objections, in the order in which I shall take them up, are: I. That I do not have a prima facie case for my claim that Descartes is inconsistent, for * I wish to thank my colleague, Professor Jonathan Robinson, and Professor Donald Livingston of Northern Illinois University for their helpful comments on a draft of this reply. i "Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency," Journal of the History of Philosophy, VI, 3 (July, 1968), 244-256. 2 Leonard E. Brewster, "How to Know Enough about Unknown Faculties," Journal o! the History of Philosophy, XII, 3 (July, 1974), 366--371, and Ted B. Humphrey, "How Descartes Avoids the Hidden Faculties Trap," ibid., 371-377. 510 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Claim A can be demonstrated to be false, and hence Descartes is justified in maldng Claim B. (Brewster)8 Ii. That I fail to note that Claim A is made in a limited context, namely, a discussion of the origin of only those ideas which are adventitious, while Claim B is made in a signilicantly different context, and hence the two claims are not inconsistent. (Humphrey) III. That I have failed to see that for Descartes Jacultiesare always dependent modes of substances, and hence that no faculty could have a power exceeding the substance of which it is a mode, which is to say that I have missed a crucial metaphysical distinction which accounts for the apparent differences in the two claims, and permits both to be made without inconsistency. (Humphrey) I. Professor Brewster argues that I do not have a prima fade case for the claim that Descartes is inconsistent. The "pivotal issue," he suggests, "is whether the possibility of the unknown faculty invalidates Descartes' first proof for the existence of God." He then suggests that this proof consists of three premises: (1) "Descartes' assertion that he possesses an... (shrink)

This chapter introduces time travel into the Star Wars lore. Time travel stories in which the past is changed are in danger of being inconsistent or plagued by paradoxes. In famous time travel stories such as Back to the Future, the protagonist travels to the past, changes the past, and then returns to a present quite different from the one they left. In contemporary philosophy of time, there are three main approaches to this question: presentism, eternalism, (...) and the growing block universe. Time travel works by entering a place, the World Between Worlds, that connects different points in time and space. In terms of modern physics, the portals in the World Between Worlds may be understood as traversable wormholes. The nature of time and the possibility of time travel have attracted and captivated humanity for centuries. (shrink)

Time travel has been a staple of science fiction. With the advent of general relativity it has been entertained by serious physicists. But, especially in the philosophy literature, there have been arguments that time travel is inherently paradoxical. The most famous paradox is the grandfather paradox: you travel back in time and kill your grandfather, thereby preventing your own existence. To avoid inconsistency some circumstance will have to occur which makes you fail in this attempt to (...) kill your grandfather. Doesn't this require some implausible constraint on otherwise unrelated circumstances? We examine such worries in the context of modern physics. (shrink)

This paper aims to show the logical consistency between the subjective and the intersubjective constitution of meaning in Alfred Schutz by revealing his insight into the dynamic character of reality. In reconstructing what is implied by the proposition “the problem of meaning is a time problem,” this paper reveals that the interrelationship between the past and the present, namely “becoming,” is fundamental to meaning-constitution. By critically introducing the Bergsonian view of the tension between the durée and its symbolization, Schutz (...) thematizes our meaningful reality in the fluidity. From this perspective, the intersubjective world is characterized as a continuous dynamic reality taken for granted by the actors. While subjectivity, as a function of articulating experiences in becoming, is a condition of the intersubjective world, the intersubjective process enables the taken-for-grantedness of subjective reality. Schutzian phenomenology may lead to a theory of the complexity and uncertainty of social reality. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open futureobjective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present (...) models which we might, prima facie, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility. (shrink)

This paper offers an inconsistent model of motion perception. It was prompted by work on inconsistent motion due to Hegel and, following him, Priest. But the paper skirts Hegel's full scale idealism, by proposing that the inconsistency is with the cognitive contents of motion perception. The paper draws on work in the psychology of perception, and in the theory of inconsistency. I begin by noting the prima facie argument that temporal change threatens inconsistency, and canvassing ways in (...) which this might be avoided. The orthodox reply to the prima facie argument is that one and the same thing can have different incompatible properties at different times. This is plausible when applied to motion in the physical world. However, applied to cognition, it can be seen that the phenomenon of phi or beta, combined with the mechanism of a Reichardt detector, lends support to one key step in the prima facie argument, namely re-identification over time. The inconsistency of the model is then seen to follow from application of the Fade Principle. Advantages of the model are stressed: including a simple explanation of the debilitating condition of akinetopsia, that is, motion blindness; and a suggestion as to how to account for the “moving now.”. (shrink)

Contemporary mathematical theories are generally thought to be consistent. But it hasn’t always been this way; there have been times in the history of mathematics when the consistency of various mathematical theories has been called into question. And some theories, such as naïve set theory and (arguably) the early calculus, were shown to be inconsistent. In this paper I will consider some of the philosophical issues arising from inconsistent mathematical theories.

This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament (1995) has shown that Newtonian cosmology *is* not inconsistent, to date there has been no analysis of Norton’s claim (1995) that Newtonian cosmology *was* inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger’s seminal paper of 1895. In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are (...) inconsistent. But there are some important corrections to make to Norton’s account. Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies—four in total—in all their detail. Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for two hundred years. (shrink)

This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament has shown that Newtonian cosmology *is* not inconsistent, to date there has been no analysis of Norton’s claim that Newtonian cosmology *was* inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger’s seminal paper of 1895. In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are inconsistent. But (...) there are some important corrections to make to Norton’s account. Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies—four in total—in all their detail. Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for two hundred years. (shrink)

There is growing evidence demonstrating that nursing students encounter unsafe and poor clinical practice when on clinical placement. The impact on nursing students remains relatively under‐explored, especially in the Australian context. This two‐phased qualitative study used Interpretive Description to explore 53 pre‐registration nursing students’ perceptions and experiences of speaking up for patient safety. Results of the study identified students believe speaking up is the right thing to do, and their professional responsibility. The study results add to previous research by describing (...) the dissonance students experience due to the inconsistencies between what is taught at university and performed in practice. Student's distress arises when observing nurses taking short cuts, justifying such actions and making excuses about poor practice. Students report experiencing dissonance, bewilderment and confusion and at times, anger when observing poor practice. The clinical environment culture influences students’ decisions to speak up or remain silent. Understanding students’ perceptions and responses will promote awareness and discussion essential to the future development of curricula and clinical support strategies that will enable students to speak up. (shrink)

Time travel has been a staple of science fiction. With the advent of general relativity it has been entertained by serious physicists. But, especially in the philosophy literature, there have been arguments that time travel is inherently paradoxical. The most famous paradox is the grandfather paradox: you travel back in time and kill your grandfather, thereby preventing your own existence. To avoid inconsistency some circumstance will have to occur which makes you fail in this attempt to (...) kill your grandfather. Doesn't this require some implausible constraint on otherwise unrelated circumstances? We examine such worries in the context of modern physics. (shrink)

In everyday language, we can call someone ‘consistent’ to say that they’re reliable, that they don’t change over time. Someone who’s consistently on time is always on time. Similarly, we can call someone ‘inconsistent’ to say the opposite: that they’re changeable, mercurial. A student who receives inconsistent grades on her tests throughout a semester has performed better on some than on others. With our philosophy hats on, though, we mean something quite different by ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’. Something (...) consistent is simply something that’s not contradictory. There’s nothing contradictory about being on time, so anyone who’s on time at all is consistently on time, in this sense of ‘consistent’. And only a student with an unusual teacher can receive inconsistent grades on her tests throughout a semester, in this sense of ‘inconsistent’. In this paper, I’ll use ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ in their usual philosophical sense: to mark the second distinction. By contrast, I’ll use ‘constant’ and ‘inconstant’ to mark the first distinction. And although we can, should, and do sharply distinguish the two distinctions, they are related. In particular, they have both been used to account for some otherwise puzzling phenomena surrounding vague language. According to some theorists, vague language is inconstant. According to others, it is inconsistent. I do not propose here to settle these differences; only to get a bit clearer about what the differences amount to, and to show what it would take to settle.. (shrink)

This paper studies the question: How should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare several approaches. The adaptive logics defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others in this respect. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises. Yet, the systems based on CLuN seem to introduce an asymmetry betweennegated and (...) non-negated formulas, and this seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the asymmetry, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all logical symbols. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the properties of these systems. While the resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN. (shrink)

There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth – viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be": with these words of the Metaphysics, Aristotle introduced the Law of Non-Contradiction, which was to become the most authoritative principle in the history of Western thought. However, things have recently changed, and nowadays various philosophers, called dialetheists, claim that this Law does (...) not hold unrestrictedly – that in peculiar circumstances the same thing may at the same time be and not be, and contradictions may obtain in the world. This book opens with an examination of the famous logical paradoxes that appear to speak on behalf of contradictions (e.g., the Liar paradox, the set-theoretic paradoxes such as Cantor’s and Russell’s), and of the reasons for the failure of the standard attempts to solve them. It provides, then, an introduction to paraconsistent logics – non-classical logics in which the admission of contradictions does not lead to logical chaos –, and their astonishing applications, going from inconsistent data base management to contradictory arithmetics capable of circumventing Gödel’s celebrated Incompleteness Theorem. The final part of the book discusses the philosophical motivations and difficulties of dialetheism, and shows how to extract from Aristotle’s ancient words a possible reply to the dialetheic challenge. How to Sell a Contradiction will appeal to anyone interested in non-classical logics, analytic metaphysics, and philosophy of mathematics, and especially to those who consider challenging our most entrenched beliefs the main duty of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Throughout this century many philosophers and physicists have gone for thc ‘big ki11’ regarding tenses. They have tried to show via McTaggart’s paradox and special relativity that tcnscs arc logically and physically impossible, rcspcctivcly. Ncithcr attempt succccds, though as I argue, both lcavc their mark. In thc iirst two sections of thc paper I introduce some conceptual difficulties for the tensed theory of time. The next section then discusses the standing 0f tenses in light of special relativity, cspccially rcccnt (...) work by Stcin on thc topic. I argue that, Stcin’s possibility thcorcm notwithstanding, special relativity is inconsistent with any philosophicully interesting conception of tense. Finally, I search for help for tenses in the broader context of quantum theory, Lorcntzian interpretations 0f time dilation/length contraction, and gcncral relativistic spacctimcs. I suggest that these avenues d0 not provide tenses the home for which some have hoped. (shrink)

Time discounting is the phenomenon that a desired result in the future is perceived as less valuable than the same result now. Economic theories can take this psychological fact into account in several ways. In the economic literature the most widely used type of additive time discounting is exponential discounting. In exponential discounting, the fall of valuation depends by a constant factor on the length of the delay period. It is well known, however, that exponential time discounting (...) often does not describe well how people actually behave. Most people are averse to short delays in gratification now, while their future selves may not mind a bit of extra waiting. This behaviour can be described well by non-exponential discounting functions such as hyperbolic discounting. In hyperbolic discounting, valuations fall rapidly for small delay periods, but the fall gets slower for longer delay periods. Hyperbolic discounting captures phenomena such as procrastination, addiction and in general inconsistency over time. This chapter investigates whether forms of non-exponential discounting, in particular close to the so called Quasi-Hyperbolic model, could also be characterized in terms of dynamically consistent choices when individuals discount the welfare of future selves as well as their payoffs. (shrink)

Famously, David Lewis argued that we can avoid the apparent paradoxes of time travel by introducing a notion of personal time, which by and large follows the causal flow of the time traveler's life history. This paper argues that a related approach can be adapted for use by three-dimensionalists in response to Ted Sider's claim that three-dimensionalism is inconsistent with time travel. In contrast to Lewis (and others who follow him on this point), however, this paper (...) argues that the order of events captured by so-called "personal time" should be thought of as causal, rather than temporal. (shrink)

This paper explores whether people recognise inconsistency in their own and others’ judgments when they are explicitly prompted to review them. It reports two pre-registered experimental online studies with samples broadly representative of the UK population (N = 814 and N = 1,623). In Study 1, people are more likely to recognise inconsistency in others’ moral (and non-moral) judgments than in their own (positive OTHER-OWN difference). Study 2 replicates this finding and test three explanations of the observed effect (...) offered by previous literature: motivated reasoning, selective cognitive effort, and limited insight into others’ reasoning. It finds that the effect is not moderated by social accountability, which implies that if there is motivated reasoning at play, it must operate outside of a person’s awareness. While a small part of the effect is mediated by the time spent on the consistency assessment task (a proxy for cognitive effort), the study finds no support for the limited insight hypothesis. The core finding that people are better at recognizing inconsistency in others’ moral judgments aligns with interactionist accounts of reasoning; more research is needed to fully uncover the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect. (shrink)

Many traditional theists have said that God is propositionally omniscient, i.e. knows all truths. Many traditional theists also hold that God is timeless. That is, these theists hold that though God exists, there is no time at which He exists, and He does not exist earlier or later than anything. Some recent philosophers, among them Arthor Prior, Robert Coburn, Norman Kretz mann, Nicholas Wolterstorfl Richard Gale and Patrick Grim, have argued that There are truths to whose expression ‘now’ is (...) essential, and that – compose an inconsistent set of propositions. These writers argue that due to the semantics of ‘now’, a timeless God cannot know truths to whose expression ‘now’ is essential. To know a truth, it is claimed, one must be able to mentally token a proposition expressing what one knows. To token a truth to whose expression ‘now’ is essential, one must token ‘now’. ‘Now’ and relevantly similar terms inter alia locate those who use them in time: if one says truly that it is now 3 p.m., it follows that one exists at 3 p.m. So a timeless being cannot use ‘now’ and relevantly similar terms, and so cannot know truths for whose expression ‘now’ and its ilk are required. (shrink)

Augustine was undeniably a dogmatic thinker, but he also had an “aporetic side” which makes him more relevant to Christian philosophers today than isgenerally recognized. Augustine’s first experience of reading philosophy came from Cicero’s Hortensius, from which Augustine gained an appreciation for philosophical scepticism which he never lost. Thus, in all of his works and in all periods of his life, Augustine’s characteristic way of doing philosophy is aporetic, rather than either systematic or speculative. Paradoxically, Augustine’s faith in the truth (...) of Holy Scripture and Church Doctrine gave him a freedom to explore theological and philosophical conundra and, if he could not resolve them, admit frankly that he could not do so. Like Socrates, Augustine was wise partly because he admitted to being puzzled about things that others took for granted. Some of the perplexities which occupied him are: (a) the nature of time; (b) whether it is possible to show someone (without using words) what walking is if one is already walking; (c) whether one is responsible for what one does in one’s dreams; (d) whether one can think about sadness or pleasure by having an image of it in one’s mind, but without experiencing any sadness or pleasure in the thought, and (e) (perhaps most famously, in the Confessions) how one can want something that he does not believe to be good. (shrink)

Augustine was undeniably a dogmatic thinker, but he also had an “aporetic side” which makes him more relevant to Christian philosophers today than isgenerally recognized. Augustine’s first experience of reading philosophy came from Cicero’s Hortensius, from which Augustine gained an appreciation for philosophical scepticism which he never lost. Thus, in all of his works and in all periods of his life, Augustine’s characteristic way of doing philosophy is aporetic, rather than either systematic or speculative. Paradoxically, Augustine’s faith in the truth (...) of Holy Scripture and Church Doctrine gave him a freedom to explore theological and philosophical conundra and, if he could not resolve them, admit frankly that he could not do so. Like Socrates, Augustine was wise partly because he admitted to being puzzled about things that others took for granted. Some of the perplexities which occupied him are: (a) the nature of time; (b) whether it is possible to show someone (without using words) what walking is if one is already walking; (c) whether one is responsible for what one does in one’s dreams; (d) whether one can think about sadness or pleasure by having an image of it in one’s mind, but without experiencing any sadness or pleasure in the thought, and (e) (perhaps most famously, in the Confessions) how one can want something that he does not believe to be good. (shrink)

In recent years, the EU legislation on genetically modified crops has come under severe criticism. Among the arguments are that the present legislation is inconsistent, disproportionate, obsolete from a scientific point of view, and vague in terms of its scope. In this paper, the EU GM legislation is analysed based on five proposed criteria: legal certainty, non-discrimination, proportionality, scientific adaptability, and inclusion of non-safety considerations. It is argued that the European regulatory framework does not at present satisfy the criteria of (...) legal certainty, non-discrimination, and scientific adaptability. Two ways of reforming the present legislation toward greater accommodation of the values expressed through the proposed criteria are briefly introduced and discussed. (shrink)

I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if (...) I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that you should not want to travel back to the past. Finally, I conclude by considering a puzzle that arises for those who believe that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible: What exactly are we thinking about when we seem to be thinking about traveling back in time? For it certainly does not feel like we are thinking about something that is metaphysically impossible. (shrink)

The article shows that the postulate of a space-time continuum is not a logical necessity, since it is possible to construct a theory, where the ultimate limit for the smallest measurable distance a is finite. This quantum of length is a universal constant, like the light velocity c and Planck's constant h. The generalized theory implies that the total energy content of our Universe Eu = hc/2a and that velocities v > c are possible for material bodies, when their (...) energy is approaching E w That's surprising, but there are no logical inconsistencies. On the contrary, this theory removes a basic contradiction between relativity and quantum mechanics: the EPR paradox. It accounts also for the mysterious "internal degrees of freedom" of elementary particles, by relating them to possible results of space-time measurements, when the quantum of length a is finite. /// O presente artigo visa demonstrar que o postulado de um espaço-tempo contínuo não constitui uma necessidade lógica, pois é possível construir uma teoria em que o derradeiro limite para a mais pequena distância mensurável a é finito. Este quantum de distância é uma constante universal, tal como a velocidade da luz c e a constante de Planck h. A teoria generalizada implica que a energia total contida no nosso Universo Eu = hc/2a e que velocidades v > c são possíveis para corpos materials, sempre que a sua energia se aproxima de Eu Segundo o autor do artigo, isto é algo surpreendente, mas pretende-se contudo demonstrar que não há aqui inconsistências lógicas. Pelo contrário, esta teoria remove uma contradição básica entre relatividade e mecânica quântica: o paradoxo EPR. Mostra-se ainda que a teoria dá também conta desses misteriosos graus internos de liberdade que as partículas elementares demonstram possuir, o que acontece precisamente mediante o estabelecimento de uma relação entre elas e os possíveis resultados de medições do espaço-tempo, sempre que o quantum de distância a é finito. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.1 (2000) 49-77 [Access article in PDF] The Time of the King Gift and Exchange in Zorrilla's Don Juan Tenorio Joan Ramon Resina There is something paradoxical about José Zorrilla's revision of the Don Juan legend, a certain contradiction between the play's structure and the logic of the action. The character of the protagonist, the form and implications of Don Juan's salvation, the strategies and temporality of (...) seduction, even the play's generic status--all come under the law of self-cancellation. And so does the historical time in which the play is set: the time of absolute monarchy. The proportionality between terrestrial and eschatological time, organic to the play's Golden Age precursor, 1 is strangely neutralized in Zorrilla's work through an expanding temporality without equivalent in the afterlife; and the same is true of the king's dramatic role through his removal from the scene, which he regulates nonetheless as deus ex machina of the social edifice.A nineteenth-century reader, Francesc Pi i Margall, remarked that "Zorrilla hace a Don Juan escéptico o creyente según lo van exigiendo las peripecias de su drama, y merced a esa indeterminación del carácter, le pone repetidamente en contradicción consigo mismo" (Zorrilla makes Don Juan a skeptic or a believer depending on the drama's events, and by virtue of this indeterminacy, he brings his character repeatedly into contradiction with himself) [204]. This indeterminacy affects not only the libertine's relation to religion but also the doctrinal coherence of the play, which has been the object of debate [see Mazzeo; Abrams; Wang; Romero]. Others, curiously, detect a contradiction between the play's sound theological conception and the author, who "quizá no sabe apenas nada de teología" (perhaps knows next to nothing about theology) [Alberich 16]. Yet not only Don Juan's piety but also his seductions appear self-annulling. For Luis Fernández Cifuentes, Zorrilla's most original and thus most revealing decision is "presentar el acto de seducción engañosa en el momento mismo en que deja de serlo: la carta con que comienza el drama participa de una tradición que también cancela. En el curso de la obra, es y no es un instrumento de seducción; sin cambiar de palabras, es a la vez falsa y verdadera... " (to present the act of deceitful seduction at the very moment in which it stops being deceitful: the letter with which the play starts participates in a tradition which it also cancels. Throughout the play the letter is and is not a tool of seduction; its words are at once true and false...) [83]. In the same line of structural contradictions must be included the play's temporality, which runs counter to the causal logic of the action. As Gustavo Pérez Firmat points out: "In Juan's verses normal temporal and causal sequence collapses, for future events are always catching up and outstripping the present, as if time were circular and past, present, and future travelled the circle at different speeds" [7]. Even the play's representativeness as a privileged [End Page 49] instance of Spanish romanticism has been flatly denied in light of its inconsistencies with the patterns of that movement [Gies, "José Zorrilla"]. 2 But perhaps the most telling contradiction is the one between the play's undiminished popularity for almost a century and its author's sedulous efforts to undermine its prestige. 3Author's second thoughts? A repentant artist in ascetic revulsion against mundane acclaim? It seems reasonable to assume a link between the play's popularity and the contradictions to which it gives expression. Thus, taking at face value the tired notion that Don Juan presents a fundamentally Spanish profile, 4 I will inquire whether the play's manifest contradictions are culturally efficient. 5 To this end, I will need to consider a possible incongruity between nineteenth-century forms of consciousness and the objective historical conditions. Joaquín Casalduero already pointed out a discrepancy between historical changes and... (shrink)

It is a commonplace in the foundations of physics, attributed to Kretschmann, that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics and mathematics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky (...) and Polubarinov constructed spinors in coordinates in 1965, enhancing the unity of physics and helping to spawn particle physicists' concept of nonlinear group representations. Roughly and locally, OP spinors resemble the orthonormal basis or tetrad formalism in the symmetric gauge, but they are conceptually self-sufficient and more economical. The typical tetrad formalism is thus de-Ockhamized, with six extra field components and six compensating gauge symmetries to cancel them out. As developed nonperturbatively by Bilyalov, OP spinors admit any coordinates at a point, but `time' must be listed first; `time' is defined in terms of an eigenvalue problem involving the metric components and the matrix $diag$, the product of which must have no negative eigenvalues. Thus even formal general covariance requires reconsideration; the atlas of admissible coordinate charts should be sensitive to the types and \emph{values} of the fields involved. Apart from coordinate order and the usual spinorial two-valuedness, Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors form, with the metric, a nonlinear geometric object. Important results on Lie and covariant differentiation are recalled and applied. The rather mild consequences of the coordinate order restriction are explored in two examples: the question of the conventionality of simultaneity in Special Relativity, and the Schwarzschild solution in General Relativity. (shrink)

Temporally extended experiences, experiential holists have it, are not reducible to successions of their temporal parts because some whole experiences determine their parts (in some way). This paper suggests, first, that some forms of experiential holism are in fact consistent with the rival atomist view (that experiences are successions of their parts) and, second, that the main reasons advanced for experiential holism are compatible with atomism too. The paper then looks at how holistic determination of its parts by a whole (...) experience might take place in time, arguing that it is either inconsistent or undermines widespread assumptions regarding the mechanisms underlying experiences. (shrink)

It will be argued that Minkowski's implementation of distances is inconsistent. An alternative implementation will be proposed. In the new model the proper time of an object is taken as its fourth coordinate. Distances will be measured according to a four dimensional Euclidean metric. In the present approach mass is a constant of motion. A mass can therefore be ascribed to photons and neutrinos. Mechanics and dynamics will be reformulated in close correspondence with classical physics. Of particular interest is (...) the equation of motion for the proper time momentum. In the classical limit it reduces to the classical law of conservation of (kinetic+potential) energy. In the relativistic limit it is similar to the conservation of energy of the theory of relativity. The conservation of proper time momentum allows for an alternative explanation for Compton scattering and pair annihilation. On the basis of the proper time formulation of electrodynamics also an alternative explanation will be offered for the spectra of hydrogenic atoms. The proper time formulation of gravitational dynamics leads to the correct predictions of gravitational time dilation, the deflection of light and the precession of the perihelia of planets. For this no curvature will be needed. That is, spacetime is flat everywhere, even in the presence of sources of gravitation. Some cosmological consequences will be discussed. The present approach gives a new notion to energy, antiparticles and the structure of spacetime. The contents of the present paper will have important implications for the foundations of physics in general. (shrink)

One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge," Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a four-dimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge (...) and human freedom is inconsistent with the A-theory of time she propounds. (shrink)