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  1.  51
    Plato's Semantics and Plato's "Cratylus".Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1980 - Phronesis 25 (3):306-330.
  2.  41
    Plato's Semantics and Plato's "Parmenides".Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1980 - Phronesis 25 (1):38-75.
  3.  50
    Plato's One/Many Problem and the Question "What is a Referential Theory of Meaning?".Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1981 - Philosophical Investigations 4 (2):1-31.
  4.  48
    Analogy and the Concept of Behaviour.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1978 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):3-20.
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  5.  4
    Analogy and the Concept of Behaviour.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1978 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):3-20.
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  6.  44
    ‘Naturalizing Semantics’: New Insight or Old Folly?Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (3-4):285-310.
    Those who naturalize semantics concentrate on avoiding difficulties in getting the right sort of cause for the biological item which is to possess semantic properties (to be ?true of or to be ?about? some physical item). Using an analogy with sense?data, I argue that the real difficulties will be trying to get any proposed neural representation to be the right sort of effect of natural processes. The idea of a biological item which can be a semantic ?primitive? is as bankrupt (...)
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  7.  48
    Plato on Language and Falsehood.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1978 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):23-37.
  8.  86
    Plato's Phaedo and Plato's 'Essentialism'.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):26 – 51.
    A new story is abroad that plato possessed two redundant devices in the "phaedo" to explain why some sensible "f" (a drift of snow, say) is "g" but never not-"g" (cold, say): (i) "f" participates in a special way in the (upper world) forms "f" and "g"; (ii) "f" is essentially "g" in its own (lower world) right. Were there such genuinely redundant devices, this would tidily explain both plato's coming to reject essential properties for sensibles in the "republic" and (...)
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  9. Plato's Semantics and Plato's Cave.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1996 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14:33-82.
  10. The Things People Do: Solipsism and Behavior.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1973 - Dissertation, University of Oregon
     
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