In the 20th century, genetic explanatory approaches became dominant in both developmental and evolutionary biological research. By contrast, physical approaches, which appeal to properties such as mechanical forces, were largely relegated to the margins, despite important advances in modeling. Recently, there have been renewed attempts to find balanced viewpoints that integrate both biological physics and molecular genetics into explanations of developmental and evolutionary phenomena. Here we introduce the 2017 SICB symposium “Physical and Genetic Mechanisms for Evolutionary Novelty” that was dedicated (...) to exploring empirical cases where both biological physics and developmental genetic considerations are crucial. To further contextualize these case studies, we offer two theoretical frameworks for integrating genetic and physical explanations: combining complementary perspectives and comprehensive unification. We conclude by arguing that intentional reflection on conceptual questions about investigation, explanation, and integration is critical to achieving significant empirical and theoretical advances in our understanding of how novel forms originate across the tree of life. (shrink)

As Hammond has argued, traditional explanations for disagreement among experts (incompetence, venality, and ideology) are inadequate. The character and fallibilities of the human judgement process itself lead to persistent disagreements even among competent, honest, and disinterested experts. Social Judgement Theory provides powerful methods for analysing such judgementally based disagreements when the experts' judgement processes can be represented by additive models involving the same cues. However, the validity and usefulness of such representations depend on several conditions: (a) experts must agree on (...) a problem definition, (b) experts must have access to the same information, and (c) experts must use the same organising principles. When these conditions are not met, methods for diagnosing and treating disagreement are poorly understood. As a start towards developing such an understanding, sources of expert disagreement are discussed and categorised. (shrink)

We elucidate the epistemological futility of using concepts such as unconscious thinking in research. Focusing on Newell & Shanks' use of the lens model as a framework, we clarify issues with regard to unconscious-thought theory and self-insight studies. We examine these key points: Brunswikian psychology is absent in UTT; research on self-insight did not emerge to explore the unconscious; the accuracy of judgments does not necessitate the unconscious; and the prescriptive claim of UTT is unfounded.