This chapter contains sections titled: Introductory Remarks The ‘Construction Principles’of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature The Content of Hegel's “Mechanics” and “Physics” in Outline 31 Problems Inherent in the Sciences According to Hegel Conclusions References.

(2005). Hegel's Anti-Reductionism. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 61-76.

The persisting conception of Hegel's criticism of Newton's physics as an irrational or at least hopelessly exaggerated one partly has its roots mainly in Hegel's terminology and in his style. This does not mean that a mere translation of Hegel's arguments into any contemporary philosophical language be sufficient to immediately convince every Newtonian scientist. However, a non-Hegelian way of rephrasing the core of Hegel's anti-Newtonian philosophy of nature can help to understand to which extent the latter does satisfy any scientist's (...) criteria for a rational and self-consistent theory. To demonstrate this is the central aim of my talk, which is structured as follows: In the first part, I'm trying to highlight basic features of Hegel's criticism of Newton's optics and celestial mechanics, eventually focussing on his concept of a "sense of nature". This part has the character of a review. Second -­ and that is supposed to be the "reconsideration" part of my paper -­ I'll try to highlight the fundamental difference between Newton's and Hegel's ideas of natural laws and of the relation between mathematics and physics. Third, the metaphysical background of this difference will be analyzed. It is by the analysis of this metaphysical background that I hope to render Hegel's criticism of Newton's scientific revolution more understandable. (shrink)

(2009). Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–26. Vol. II: Greek Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 218-221.