Journal Name: The Law & Ethics of Human Rights Issue: Ahead of print.

Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt are associated with a conservative reaction to the 'progressive' forces of the twentieth century. Each was an acute analyst of the juristic form of the modern state and the relationship of that form to the idea of liberty under a system of public, general law. Hayek had the highest regard for Schmitt's understanding of the rule of law state despite Schmitt's hostility to it, and he owed the distinction he drew in his own work between a (...) purpose-governed form of state and a law-governed form to Oakeshott. However, the three have until now rarely been considered together, something which will be ever more apparent as political theorists, lawyers and theorists of international relations turn to the foundational texts of twentieth-century thought at a time when debate about liberal democratic theory might appear to have run out of steam. (shrink)

This article presents the findings of an empirical investigation into the role of third party interventions in the House of Lords. It examines all the judgments in that court from 1994 to 2009 and tests four hypotheses concerning the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 upon the incidence of interventions and their influence on the decision-making of the Law Lords.

Essays devoted to the legal thought of Thomas Hobbes, arguably the greatest political philosopher to write in English.

This collection explores some of the many ways in which constitutional orders engage with, and are shaped by, their exteriors. Constitutional and legal theory often marginalize 'foreign' elements, such as norms originating in other legal systems, the movement of individuals across borders, or the application of domestic law to foreign affairs. In The Double-Facing Constitution, these instances of boundary crossing lie at the heart of an alternative understanding of constitutions as permeable membranes, through which norms can and sometimes must travel. (...) Constitutional orders are facing both inwards and outwards - and the outside world influences their interiors just as much as their internal orders help shape their surroundings. Different essays discuss the theoretical and historical foundations of this view, and its contemporary relevance for areas as diverse as migration law, the conflict of laws, and foreign relations law. (shrink)

This article charts the rise of a new, and increasingly influential, theory of public law: common law constitutionalism. The theory can best be seen as a response to a ‘crisis’ within contemporary public law thought produced by an array of different pressures: Thatcherite reformation of the state; the growing prominence (and potential politicization) of judicial review; constitutionalization of the EU; and trends towards globalization. The core of argument underlying the theory is elucidated by means of an analysis of the work (...) of a number of leading public law scholars. The essence of the theory is the reconfiguration of public law as a species of constitutional politics centred on the common law court. The theory constitutes, it is suggested, an attempt to turn inwards, in the face of change, towards the familiar form of the common law, reinvigorated as a burgeoning site of normativity. (shrink)

This paper considers the character of moral peoplehood, our life as a people, and the rules and principles through which that life is expressed. In so far as those rules and principles take legal form, as determining the ground rules of association and denoting political rights and duties, this moral community is also a jural community. The paper engages with Bernard Williams’s thought with a view to resolving the tension between two conceptions of the constitution that differ in their account (...) of the relationship between norms and time. Williams offers the prospect of a non-Kantian liberalism that grows out of the habits and minds of persons but which does not collapse into relativism. I argue that Williams’s account of moral personhood devotes insufficient attention to the dynamics of moral deliberation, essential to the growth of personhood. I argue that Williams’s account of moral peoplehood is similarly deficient in that it overlooks the role constitutional deliberation plays in constructing the jural community. Plural politics requires accepted ground rules and the sense that we are a unity of plural associates, and this is what constitutional deliberation aims to provide. (shrink)