The present work is a study of the method of contemporary Soviet philosophy. By "Soviet philosophy" we mean philosophy as published in the Soviet Union. For practical purposes we have limited our attention to Soviet sources in Russian in spite of the fact that Soviet philosophical works are also published in other languages (see B 2029(21)(38». The term "method" is taken in the sense usual in Western books on methodology .1 In view of the content of the first chapter it (...) will be useful to explain the last term a little more fully. By method we mean a procedure and it is obvious that the principles according to which a procedure is carried out are rules, i.e. imperatives, which tell us not what is but what should be done. Such imperatives mayor may not be connected with and founded on certain descriptive statements (the fact that every rule of formal logic is based on a corresponding law has been well-known since Husserl's "Logische Unter suchungen" and is generally accepted in contemporary logic), but such a foundation is irrelevant to a methodological study. The object of such a study is to find out what these rules are, why they are accepted and how they are inter-connected and applied. This is how methodology - the science of method - is conceived in Western treatises on the subject and this is also the standpoint assumed here. (shrink)

On February 24-25, 1956, in a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev made his now famous speech on the crimes of the Stalin era. That speech marked a break with the past and it marked the end of what J.M. Bochenski dubbed the "dead period" of Soviet philosophy. Soviet philosophy changed abruptly after 1956, especially in the area of dialectical materialism. Yet most philosophers in the West neither noticed nor (...) cared. For them, the resurrection of Soviet philosophy, even if believable, was of little interest. The reasons for the lack of belief and interest were multiple. Soviet philosophy had been dull for so long that subtle differences made little difference. The Cold War was in a frigid period and reinforced the attitude of avoiding anything Soviet. Phenomenology and exis tentialism were booming in Europe and analytic philosophy was king on the Anglo-American philosophical scene. Moreover, not many philosophers in the West knew or could read Russian or were motivated to learn it to be able to read Soviet philosophical works. The launching of Sputnik awakened the West from its self complacent slumbers. Academic interest in the Soviet Union grew. (shrink)

The main object of Marxist-Leninist 'scientific atheism' consists in the discovery and assimilation of 'scientific' data and its use in the 'atheistic' destruction of religion and all its appurtenances. The first task is to show — using the data mainly of the natural sciences — the non-existence of the object of religion, i.e. God. Second, it is necessary to explain how a theory without an object came to be and continues to show signs of vitality, i.e. to find the causes (...) or 'roots' of religion: and this in terms of historical materialism. (shrink)

We can, in view of what we have said, ask if Tugarinov is doing a sort of structuralism; and, however we answer that question, one will want to know if he is doing something that can succeed, at least better than other moderns who have attempted a similar enterprise.The answer is that Tugarinov is doing a sort of (quasi-Aristotelian) structuralism — at least in the sense of refusing any absolute fixity to history, and of asserting a multi-level poly-directionality to the (...) historical flow — an approach that suffers from most of the weaknesses of other such structuralisms.If Tugarinov succeeds better than other moderns — and we think that he does — this is because he refuses to make of historicism a relativism, maintaining a certain “categorial integrity” that is within history but not historical. In this he identifies with the best in the philosophic tradition; but it is not at all clear how he remains “Marxist”. (shrink)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS MAIN REPRESENTATIVES By definition the philosophical treatment of knowledge is an integral part of the ...

The Soviet philosophical scene has experienced remarkable growth since the innovations of the 50's and the renovations of the 60's. This volume of Sovietica is intended by the editors as a finger on the pulse of the Marxist-Leninist corpus philosophicum as we enter the 1970's. Published in the years between 1960 and 1970, the Filosofskaja en ciklopedija (FE) has replaced the Kratkij filosofskij slovar' (Short Philo sophic Dictionary: 1939, 1941, 1951 and 1954) and the Filosofskij slovar' (Philosophic Dictionary: 1963). It (...) is an impressive work - 2994 pages in five volumes (I, 1960, 504 pp.; II, 1962, 575 pp.; III, 1964, 584 pp.; IV, 1967, 591 pp.; V, 1970, 740 pp.), with the editors and authors representing all the contemporary Soviet philosophers of note. The FE has been extensively reviewed in Kommunist (1972, 5, 119-127) and in Studies in Soviet Thought [beginning with SST 12 (1972) 4]. Restrictions of space have forced us to omit much that was originally to be included. The same limitations have obliged us to deviate from the initial methodological rule which was 'to include only complete, un abridged articles' - in order to avoid distortion by selection. Only two articles have been shortened: only the basic portion of 'science' has been included; we have dropped 'natural science', 'sciences on man and society', and 'classification of sciences' (a total of thirteen pages in Russian) - this last with regret and with apologies to Professor Kedrov. (shrink)

In this year of bicentennial celebration, there will no doubt take place several cultural analyses of the American tradition. This is only as it should be, for without an extensive, broad-based inquiry into where we have come from, we shall surely not foresee where we might go. Nonetheless, most cultural analyses of the American context suffer from a common fault - the lack of a different context to use for purposes of comparison. True, American values and ideals were partly inherited (...) from the European tradition. But that tradition is in many ways an inadequate mode of comparison. Without going too far afield, let us note two points: first, European culture was the proud inheritor of the Renaissance tradition, and, going back still further, of classical culture; second, the European countries are compact. Their land masses are such that the notion of "frontier" simply would not have arisen in the same way as it did in America. On the other side of the globe, however, there does exist a country capable of serving as a suitable mirror. We speak, of course, of Russia. That country also came relatively late onto the cultural horizon, and was not privy to the Renaissance tradition. Furthermore, her land mass is such as to be "experi mentally infmite" in character - not unlike the American frontier. It is hoped that much can be leamed about the present cultural context by com paring the two countries in their youthful stages. (shrink)