In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the traditional position that Cod created with absolute freedom. The first set features several variations of Leibniz’s basic proof that Cod must create the best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the claim that Cod must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is essentially self-diffusive. We argue that neither the Leibnizian nor the Dionysian arguments are successful.

To discern the contours of a Berkeleian moral philosophy the article has been divided into four sections: the first introduces the moral importance of Berkeley’s new principle; in the second section the inter-dependence of morality and sociality is discussed; the third section identifies perennial moral problems and Berkeley’s success or failure in dealing with them; the fourth occupies itself with a notion of the common good that is socio-historical. Berkeley’s moral pragmatism is placed in relief in this way.

Does philosophy have a timeless essence? Are the writings that have come down to us over the centuries from philosophers of genius mere souvenirs from a bygone era? Or are their thoughts still eminently worth examining with care? Modern Challenges to Past Philosophy argues pondering past philosophy with modern problems in mind is worth the effort, even though earlier works are uninformed by modern science and lack some of tools of modern analysis. The great texts defamiliarize our world and offer (...) solutions to crucial questions often forgotten as we fixate on current philosophical trends. Modern Challenges is no appeal to a return to a golden past but a study designed to show how and why understanding earlier works of some of the most penetrating minds ever to ponder eternally valid questions can contribute to a renewal of our own culture. (shrink)

Is religion “noxious rubbish to be buried as deeply, as thoroughly, and as quickly as possible”? Philip Kitcher tells us that’s the dominant idea among atheists. In this paper I take a step back from the minutiae of standard journal articles to dispute the broad atheistic claim, and in the process suggest there is in fact a great deal to be said for religious belief. I argue that: (1) It’s not highly implausible that there is a cause of the universe (...) distinct from the universe—a World-Maker; (2) Because the act of cognizing instantiables is not purely a physical action, Christian teachings on the nature and status of humans are defensible against common claims to the contrary based on neo-Darwinism, and there’s reason to think the World-Maker is a Mind-Maker; (3) Kitcher’s case that there is no true religion is vulnerable to myriad objections, and since it’s been lauded as the best attack on the credibility of religion to date, it’s entirely reasonable not to abandon all religion, and in particular Christianity: there’s good reason for thinking the World-Maker and Mind-Maker is also a Revealer. (shrink)

As the author explains, this work began as an attempt to answer the question: "Is there such a thing as mystical experience?" Deciding that the question, loaded with unexamined presuppositions, was perhaps not a good one to begin with, Turner redirected his investigation to the use of some key metaphors in the Christian neoplatonic tradition--light, darkness, inwardness, ascent, and union. The result is a carefully crafted and illuminating essay in medieval apophatic theology and apophatic anthropology.