The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of (...) physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of “new experimentalists”. The book constitutes fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. (shrink)

This is the second of a pair of papers, of which the first showed how each of the main late phlogistic theories effectively reached impasses due to internal problems or included features which made them unacceptable even to other phlogistians. This paper deals with theory comparison and theory change. It gives an unprecedentedly detailed comparison between the available theories in 1790–1791, and shows that this was overwhelmingly in favour of the new chemistry. This time period correlates (...) well with many chemists changing to the new theory. There was a plurality of views held by individuals and there was freedom of individual choice concerning theories, yet there was also a widespread and rational change to the new chemistry. (shrink)

This paper assembles a unifying framework encompassing a wide variety of mathematical instruments used to compare different theories. The main theme will be the idea that theory comparison techniques are most easily grasped and organized through the lens of category theory. The paper develops a table of different equivalence relations between theories and then answers many of the questions about how those equivalence relations are themselves related to each other. We show that Morita equivalence fits into this (...) framework and provide answers to questions left open in Barrett and Halvorson [4]. We conclude by setting up a diagram of known relationships and leave open some questions for future work. (shrink)

Incommensurability of scientific theories, as conceived by Thomas Kuhnand Paul Feyerabend, is thought to be a major or even insurmountable obstacletothe empirical comparison of these theories. I examine this problem in light ofaconcrete case from the history of experimental biology, namely the oxidativephosphorylation controversy in biochemistry (ca. 1961-1977). After a briefhistorical exposition, I show that the two main competing theories which werethe subject of the ox-phos controversy instantiate some of the characteristicfeatures of incommensurable theories, namely translation failure,non-corresponding predictions, and (...) different claims about what kinds ofentitiesexist in the world. By examining how the controversy was eventually resolved, Ithen show that at least this pair of incommensurable theories couldneverthelessbe empirically compared. (shrink)

SummaryIn this essay I critically discuss the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend on the succession of scientific theories. I argue that, if Karl Popper's desiderata for theory succession are properly explicated, they constitute a basis for refuting the “incommensurability“ thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Popper's claim that a new theory must constitute an “improvement” over the old implies that the new theory must be able to be interpreted as referring to most of the phenomena as (...) its predecessor.RésuméDans cet essai, je discute les vues de Thomas Kuhn et de Paul Feyerabend sur la succession des théories scientifiques. Je montre que si les desiderata de Karl Popper pour la succession des théories sont correctement explicités, ils constituent une base pour réfuter la thèse ?incommen‐surabilité de Kuhn et de Feyerabend. Ľexigence de Popper selon laquelle une nouvelle théorie doit améliorer la précédente implique que la nouvelle théorie doit pouvoir être interprétée comme se référant à une plus grande part des phénoménes que ses prédécesseurs.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit werden Thomas Kuhns und Paul Feyerabends Auffassungen über die Frage, wie wissenschaftliche Theorien sich ablösen und folgen, erörtert. Ich zeige, dass Karl Poppers Forderungen für einen rationalen Theorienwechsel, wenn einmal richtig erläutert, eine Grundlage fiir die Widerlegung der Inkommensurabilitätsthese von Kuhn und Feyerabend lie‐fern. Proppers Forderung, dass eine neue Theorie gegenüber der alten eine Verbesserung darstellen müsse, impliziert, dass die neue Theorie so interpretiert werden kann, dass sie sich auf die meisten Phänomene bezieht, von denen auch in der Vorgängerin die Rede war. (shrink)

Contemporary political theory (CPT) has approached questions of plurality and diversity by drawing rather implicitly on anthropological accounts of difference. This was the case with the ‘cultural turn’, which significantly shaped theories of multiculturalism. Similarly, the current ‘ontological turn’ is gaining influence and leaving a marked impact on CPT. I examine the recent turn and assess both the possibilities it offers and the challenges it poses for decentering CPT and opening radical, decolonial avenues for thinking difference otherwise. I take (...) Paul Nadasdy's critique of the ontological turn as an invitation to reflect on the methodological precepts that inform how the field frames the scope and limits of comparison. In pursuit of this, I examine the Zapatistas’ notion of a ‘world of many worlds’, which provides a way of approaching difference that captures the generative aspects of the ontological turn while avoiding the pitfalls of relativism and political inertia. I argue that the Zapatistas’ insights offer ethical guidance towards social and ecological thriving. Ultimately, my goal is to move CPT towards a more capacious form of making sense of what is out there in the world, and thus make room for better ways of inhabiting the Earth. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of key themes of twentieth century philosophical treatment of the language of science, with special emphasis on the meaning variance of scientific terms and the comparison of alternative theories. These themes are dealt with via discussion of the topics of: (a) the logical positivist principle of verifiability and the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms, (b) the postpositivist thesis of semantic incommensurability, and (c) the scientific realist response to incommensurability based on the causal (...) theory of reference. (shrink)

Theory‐of‐mind (ToM) is an integral part of social cognition, but how it develops remains a critical question. There is evidence that children can gain insight into ToM through experience, including language training and explanatory interactions. But this still leaves open the question of how children gain these insights—what processes drive this learning? We propose that analogical comparison is a key mechanism in the development of ToM. In Experiment 1, children were shown true‐ and false‐belief scenarios and prompted to (...) engage in multiple comparisons (e.g., belief vs. world). In Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3, children saw a series of true‐ and false‐belief events, varying in order and in their alignability. Across these experiments, we found that providing support for comparing true‐ and false‐belief scenarios led to increased performance on false‐belief tests. These findings show that analogical comparison can support ToM learning. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

Comparisons, and by that I mean the hunt for essential similarities or at least serious family resemblances, between the ethical views of Western and non-Western thinkers have been a staple of comparative philosophy for quite some time now. Some of these comparisons, such as between the views of Aristotle and Confucius, seem especially apt and revealing. However, I’ve often wondered whether Western “ethical theory”—virtue ethics, deontology, or consequentialism—is always the best lens through which to approach non-Western ethical thought. Particularly (...) when the discussion has turned to Buddhism and Buddhist ethics, theories of this sort at best seem to have an uncertain application. This is not to say that .. (shrink)

This paper discusses some of the ways in which Martin-Löf type theory differs from set theory. The discussion concentrates on conceptual, rather than technical, differences. It revolves around four topics: sets versus types; syntax; functions; and identity. The difference between sets and types is spelt out as the difference between unified pluralities and kinds, or sorts. A detailed comparison is then offered of the syntax of the two languages. Emphasis is placed on the distinction between proposition and (...) judgement, drawn by type theory, but not by set theory. Unlike set theory, type theory treats the notion of function as primitive. It is shown that certain inconveniences pertaining to function application that afflicts the set- theoretical account of functions are thus avoided. Finally, the distinction, drawn in type theory, between judgemental and propositional identity is discussed. It is argued that the criterion of identity for a domain cannot be formulated in terms of propositional identity. It follows that the axiom of extensionality cannot be taken as a statement of the criterion of identity for sets. (shrink)

This paper discusses some of the ways in which Martin-Löf type theory differs from set theory. The discussion concentrates on conceptual, rather than technical, differences. It revolves around four topics: sets versus types; syntax; functions; and identity. The difference between sets and types is spelt out as the difference between unified pluralities and kinds, or sorts. A detailed comparison is then offered of the syntax of the two languages. Emphasis is put on the distinction between proposition and (...) judgement, drawn by type theory, but not by set theory. Unlike set theory, type theory treats the notion of function as primitive. It is shown that certain inconveniences pertaining to function application that afflicts the set-theoretical account of functions are thus avoided. Finally, the distinction, drawn in type theory, between judgemental and propositional identity is discussed. It is argued that the criterion of identity for a domain cannot be formulated in terms of propositional identity. It follows that the axiom of extensionality cannot be taken as a statement of the criterion of identity for sets. (shrink)

One of the exciting developments in political theory in the last decades is that the boundaries of the discipline gradually but vigorously expanded beyond “the West,” as evident in the rise of work that is often labeled “comparative.” Basic to this shift is the recognition that various thinkers, ideas, and contexts—usually marked as “non-Western”—have been peripheral to, and remain marginalized in, the discipline of political theory. However, the discipline’s framing of the “comparative” as the study of “non-Western political (...) thought” tends to take for granted the boundary between “West” and “non-West.” The primacy of this assumed correspondence between “comparative” and “non-Western” is most visible and problematic in the ongoing institutionalization of the “comparative turn.” I understand comparative political theory as an immanent critique of political theory: the discipline presents itself as global, but in practice it is too often confined to studying a few places, histories, and bodies of knowledge. The “comparative” calls for political theorists to more reliably study politics and power anywhere. To take “comparative” to mean the study of equivalent, coherent forms of “non-Western” otherness is to elide the historicity of “the Western” and the ways in which it has been made in relation to non-Europeans. (shrink)

The article examines the theories of decolonization that have originated in the north of the Americas and Oceania and Latin America. It compares settler colonial theories developed by Australian historians Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini with the theory of the coloniality of power of the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano. The author argues that Wolfe’s and Veracini’s theory of settler colonialism creates a conceptual distancing from what they call exploitation colonialism that is not only theoretically unsound, but also historically (...) inaccurate. The land/labor binary that they build in their theory of settler colonialism holds up only if it excludes Latin America from the analysis. This becomes evident in their analyses of the state, race, and miscegenation. Both theories, however, largely ignore gender in the description of colonization, a gap that Latin American decolonial theorists and feminist indigenous theorists of the north must fill. The differences between the theories determines also the ways they imagine decolonization. (shrink)

Xunzi is a Confucian scholar well known for his theory that no human nature is innately good. However, because it is in human nature to be greedy, it is possible to train the people through promise of reward and punishment. Xunzi has long been considered to have taught Han Feizi who has a similar notion of human nature and uses it as basis for his Legalist theories. In this paper, I compare the two philosophers based on their system of (...) reward and punishment in order to analyze the difference and the similarities between the two. Although the two philosophers share an understanding of human nature, and a system of reward and punishment based on such theories, whereas Xunzi has a belief in the possibility of edification through good influence, Han Feizi does not. Xunzi asserts that mercy is more efficient than punishment in case of petty thefts among the poor, and also that even the severest punishment cannot push a soldier to risk one’s life in battle. This goes directly against Han Feizi’s strong belief in the absoluteness of the rule of law, where no mercy is possible even for the poor, and a rigid system of punishment and reward is seen as sufficient to push the people toward risking their lives for their king. On the other hand, although Han Feizi is often criticized for his lack of regard for the people’s lives in pursuit of power for the absolute monarch, it may be seen that such unforgiving application of the law results in an orderly society which benefits the people in the long run. Therefore, it may be argued that both Xunzi and Han Feizi’s long term goal for the legal system is to bring order to society. A comparison between the two scholars proves that no one-dimensional analysis is valid, and renders it possible to understand their philosophies in a much more colorful light. (shrink)

This article addresses both philosophers of science and process philosophers. It shows that the acceptance of Einstein's general theory of relativity by British physicists in the early 1920s, and their rejection of Whitehead's experimentally indistinguishable theory of gravity, was a matter not only of empirical evaluation but also of aesthetic preference. To philosophers of science it offers a historical case study illustrating the entangled roles of empirical and aesthetic criteria in theory evaluation. To process philosophers it offers (...) an answer to the question of why Whitehead's alternative rendering of Einstein's general relativity has been neglected both by the majority of physicists, and by the majority of philosophers. (shrink)

Popper's definition of verisimilitude was criticized for its paradoxical consequences in the case of false theories. The aim of this paper is to show that paradoxes disappear if the falsity content of a theory is defined with help of dCn or Cn –1.

Normative political theorists frequently compare hypothetical scenarios for the purpose of identifying reasons to prefer one kind of institution to alternatives. We examine three types of "unfair" comparisons and the reasoning errors associated with each. A theorist makes an _obscure comparison_ when one (or more) of the alternatives under consideration is underspecified; a theorist makes a _mismatched comparison_ when they fail to hold fixed the relevant contextual factors while comparing alternatives; and a theorist makes an _irrelevant comparison_ when they compare (...) alternatives assuming contextual factors that differ in important respects from those they "should" assume given their theoretical aims. We then introduce the notion of a modeling mindset and show how this mindset can help theorists detect and avoid the three types of error. We conclude with a reconstruction of Cohen's (2009) camping trip thought experiment to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

I present a diversity of theories of freedom which I compare and contrast. I begin with a brief summary of my own recently published theory, which I show to be superior to the other theories considered. I find that there are various weaknesses or errors in the other theories and that my own theory is the only one that gives an adequate explanation of why freedom, or a free society, is desirable.

In this article we consider the theories of utility developed by Rothbard and Kirzner in their respective treatises on economic theory . We argue that while both authors were strongly influenced by Mises’ ordinalist conception of utility and in fact both authors affirm this conception in their initial expositions of utility theory, their subsequent developments diverge quite sharply. In particular, Kirzner adopts an approach that is neoclassicist in its essentials, and we discuss how this approach conflicts with the (...) approach developed by Mises . We thus give further support to Salerno’s contention that there exists a tension within Austrian price theory today, falling between two camps: Rothbard’s furtherance of the Mengerian “causal-realist” tradition, and Kirzner’s “dynamic” version of the standard Hicksian indifference-based framework. (shrink)

A standard problem in empirical inquiry is how to adjudicate between contending theories when they work from different fundamental assumptions. In the field of political sociology, several strategies are adopted, from metatheoretical and comparative historical approaches to the recent formal models of scientific growth proposed by Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan. After considering the limitations of these approaches, I develop an alternative strategy—"second—order empiricism"—based on the idea that successor theories have an onus to explain the apparent success of their rivals, (...) not only their own and their rivals' anomalies. Such a strategy, I argue, underscores some of the most effective analysis and argument in political sociology, yet is obscured by the appeal to other methodologies. (shrink)