Machine generated contents note: 1 The Cartesian legacy -- The dominant paradigm -- Cartesian dualism -- The secret life of the body -- The Cartesian theatre -- The domain of reason -- The causal relevance of the mind -- Conclusion -- Further reading --2 Reductionism and the road to functionalism -- Causation, scientific realism, and physicalism -- Reductionism and central state materialism -- Problems with central state materialism -- Modified ontological physicalism: supervenience -- Modified explanatory physicalism: the disunity of -- (...) science picture -- Supervenient causation -- Functionalism -- Further reading --3 Computational models of mind -- Intentionality -- Rationality: the calculative account -- The computational model of mind -- Objections to the language of thought (1) -- Objections to the language of thought (2) -- Conclusion -- Further reading --4 The content of thought -- The internalist picture -- Externalism -- Singular thoughts -- Dual component theories -- Naturalistic externalism -- Teleological theories -- Conclusion -- Further reading --5 Anti-reductionist alternatives -- Interpretationalism -- Real patterns -- Direct interpretationalism -- Psychological causalism -- Modified psychological causalism -- Third-personalism and perspectivity -- The world from the point of view of the subject -- Context and culture -- Conclusion -- Further reading --6 The content of experience -- Consciousness -- The knowledge argument -- Absent qualia and inverted spectra -- Functionalist responses -- Internal monitoring -- Intentionalism -- Form and content -- The private language argument -- Further reading -- 7 Subjects of experience -- Subjectivity -- The subjective viewpoint -- Intersubjectivity -- Simulation theory -- Normativity and normality -- Expression -- Self-knowledge -- Conclusion -- Further reading --8 The embodied subject -- Mentality -- Desire -- Beyond the Cartesian body -- Metaphysical questions: multiple narratives -- Further reading -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

Les Burwood, Carol Brady; Changing and Explaining Behaviour by Reward, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–113, https.

ABSTRACT John Wilson argued, in a recent paper, that equality of opportunity is neither coherent nor reasonable. It seems that we can better understand Wilson's points If we distinguish between what one might call perfect equality of opportunity and greater equality of opportunity. Further, the familiar notions of formal opportunity and substantive opportunity still seem crucial to an understanding of the issues.

It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one’s body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play “a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism” as they “seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body”. In this paper I argue that as dualism does not capture (...) the character of such experiences there is not even an apparent separation of self and body revealed here and that one’s body is experienced as uncanny rather than alien. The general relationship between our philosophical theorizing and the phenomenology of lived experience is also considered. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that recent developments in higher education presuppose a conceptual framework that fails plausibly to account for indispensable aspects of educational experience—in particular that a university education is fundamentally a project of personal transformation within a particular social order. It fails, I suggest, primarily because it consists of mutually supporting but erroneous conceptualisations of knowledge and the human subject. In pursuit of transparency and codification we have seemingly forgotten education's existential dimension: that education is closely tied (...) to questions of personal identity and the formation of character and that this is an embodied project. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers argued that academics must be prepared to accept, perhaps even to welcome, the fact that most students 'will learn next to nothing' from a university education. In this paper I shall argue that, while Jaspers' model is unpersuasive as an ideal and inaccurate as a description, there is an uncomfortable truth lurking behind his forthright but gloomy conclusion; viz., that university teaching pays little direct attention to the needs of the student in the wider world (i.e. to the (...) needs of the student qua employee or qua citizen or even qua rounded human being) and pays even less attention, or perhaps none at all, to the needs and expectations of third parties such as employers. In terms of the political context universities now find themselves in, this is an uncomfortable and embarrassing truth for faculty to admit, for it appears to epitomise a self-regarding and inward looking academy. Yet, despite this, perhaps it is a truth that academics should be prepared to accept, even to welcome. At least, in starting any serious discussion on the nature of a university education, it should be a truth we are prepared to admit. (shrink)

The current quality assurance culture demands the explicit articulation, by means of publication, of what have been hitherto tacit norms and conventions underlying disciplinary genres. The justification is that publication aids student performance and guarantees transparency and accountability. This requirement makes a number of questionable assumptions predicated upon what we will argue is an erroneous epistemology. It is not always possible to articulate in a publishable form a detailed description of disciplinary practices such as assessment. As a result publication cannot (...) achieve its stated goals. There are always elements of our knowledge that cannot be linguistically articulated. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...) part of the whole living human being. If the minded individual is embodied, this must mean more than being embrained. (shrink)

How should state schools respond to the plurality of values in a multicultural society? The liberal response has been that it is unacceptable to promote only the traditional, mainstream values of dominant groups and impose them on others. During the 1980s this response gradually evolved into an ideology of extreme subjectivism, commonly referred to as cultural relativism. This ideology is rejected and it is argued that the school must make crucial judgements about which values should be promoted, tolerated or condemned.

Proekthesē -- To viaio sympan -- Hoi stivades tēs hylēs -- Thysanos pyros -- Sparaktikē diarchia -- Emphilosophos nous -- To aetōma -- Hē zōphoros tōn ontōn -- To astathes sympan.

Penser une histoire du hasard est se demander comment le hasard est perçu par les sociétés au fil des âges. Toutes n'ont pas la même sensation du phénomène ; l'Orient et l'Occident, les peuples d'Afrique ou d'Amérique du Sud, les différentes religions, entretiennent avec le hasard des relations spécifiques. De plus, le voyageur, dans cet univers étrange, est habité lui-même par ses sentiments et conceptions. Quatre époques scandent les siècles où se déploie cette histoire ; elles sont ossature et fil (...) conducteur, de la préhistoire à nos jours. Homme hasardeux. Impossible de fixer la date originelle mais à un moment de la préhistoire l'être humain découvre le tirage avec un instrument : fruit dissymétrique, écorce, coquillage... Est-ce le signal qui le distingue de l'animalité? Il perçoit le fortuit, l'aléa des jeux, le sort des espérances, les manifestations des divinités en bonheurs et malheurs. Homme de destin. Les religions subliment le hasard et ses manifestations. Le christianisme permet la découverte de la Providence et de la Grâce. La croix fixe est irréductible au cercle mobile. Mes codes et les règles tentent de circonscrire les vertiges des hasards. Homme improbable. Paradoxe étrange qui voit le développement du calcul des probabilités, à partir de la Renaissance, coïncider avec la perte des repères anciens, engendrant incertitudes et troubles contradictoires. Homme téméraire. Né au mois d'août 1945 dans l'explosion des bombes atomiques à Hiroshima et Nagasaki. Age de tous les risques et de tous les excès, nourri de spéculations, de paris, de jeux et de tricheries. Fondé sur une documentation étendue, cet ouvrage propose une vision globale de l'histoire des sociétés occidentales. Vision qui ne manquera pas d'être discutée si l'on sait que l'origine du mot téméraire renvoie à ténèbres. Sommes-nous aujourd'hui dans les ténèbres? L'auteur a publié Bizarre, anthologie, le symbolisme des jeux, la Tarot de Court de Gébélin (Berg International), Histoire des jeux de société (Flammarion). (shrink)

Engagement with stakeholders and civil society is increasingly important for new scientific and technological developments. Preparation of such engagements sets the stage for engagement activities and thus contributes to their outcomes. Preparation is a demanding task, particularly if the facilitating agent aims for timely engagement related to emerging technologies. Requirements for such preparation include understanding of the emerging science & technology and its dynamics. Multi-level analysis and socio-technical scenarios are two complementary tools for constructing productive engagement. Examination of the emergence (...) of nanotechnologies in the food packaging sector demonstrates how these tools work. In light of recent policy demands for responsible innovation, but also more generally, the role of organizers of engagement activities is one that deserves reflection insofar as it can extend beyond that of preparation and facilitation. (shrink)

What is philosophy? How should we do it? Why should we bother to? These are the kinds of questions addressed by metaphilosophy - the philosophical study of the nature of philosophy itself. Students of philosophy today are faced with a confusing and daunting array of philosophical methods, approaches and styles and also deep divisions such as the notorious rift between analytic and Continental philosophy. This book takes readers through a full range of approaches - analytic versus Continental, scientistic versus humanistic, (...) 'pure' versus applied - enabling them to locate and understand these different ways of doing philosophy. Clearly and accessibly written, it will stimulate reflection on philosophical practice and will be invaluable for students of philosophy and other philosophically inclined readers. (shrink)