Fifteen philosophers turn their thoughts to international terrorism and the war that it has spawned, lending their expertise in law, ethics, politics, feminism, ...

Wretchedness and terrorism, and differences we make between them -- A theory of justice, an anarchism, and the obligation to obey the law -- The principle of humanity -- Our omissions and their terrorism -- On democratic terrorism -- Doctrines, commitments, and four conclusions about terrorism for humanity.

Terrorism, Security and Nationality shows how the concepts and methods of political philosophy can be applied to the practical problems of terrorism, state violence and national security. The book clarifies a wide range of issues in applied political philosophy, including the ethics of war, theories of state and nation, the relationship between communities and nationalisms, and the uneasy balance of human rights and national security. Ethnicity, national identity and the interests of the state, concepts commonly cited (...) to justify terrorist acts, all imply starkly contrasting notions of what constitutes a political community. Paul Gilbert examines the reasons for political violence and the plausibility of such justifications. He investigates notions of terrorism as unjust war and as political crime and concludes by considering the proper response of the state to political violence. (shrink)

This essay investigates the possibilities and limits of interdisciplinary research into terrorism. It is shown that approaches that combine philosophy and international law are necessary, and when such an approach needs to be adopted. However, it is also important not to underestimate how much of a challenge is posed by the absence of agreement concerning the definition of terrorism, and also by the structural differences in the way the two disciplines address the problem and formulate the issues. (...) Not least, the discussion enables us to reach conclusions as to how terrorism research that combines philosophy and international law in particular, and interdisciplinary research into terrorism in general, can be meaningfully implemented. The individual aspects are clarified on the basis of the discussion surrounding justified measures for combating terrorism and the justification of the targeted killing of terrorists. (shrink)

_Terrorism, Security and Nationality_ shows how the ideas and techniques of political philosophy can be applied to the practical problems of terrorism, State violence and national identity. In doing so it clarifies a wide range of issues in applied political philosophy including ethics of war; theories of state and nation; the relationship between communities and nationalisms; human rightss and national security. Paul Gilbert identifies conflicting conceptiona of civil strife by different political communities and investigates notions of (...) class='Hi'>terrorism both as unjust war and as political crime. He concludes by considering the proper response of the State to political violence. (shrink)

_Terrorism, Security and Nationality_ shows how the ideas and techniques of political philosophy can be applied to the practical problems of terrorism, State violence and national identity. In doing so it clarifies a wide range of issues in applied political philosophy including ethics of war; theories of state and nation; the relationship between communities and nationalisms; human rightss and national security. Paul Gilbert identifies conflicting conceptiona of civil strife by different political communities and investigates notions of (...) class='Hi'>terrorism both as unjust war and as political crime. He concludes by considering the proper response of the State to political violence. (shrink)

What is "terrorism"? Under what circumstances, if any, is terrorism morally acceptable? This course examines theories of just war and just warfare. The theories aim to specify under what circumstances and in what ways--in the context of waging war-- it is morally acceptable to kill people. One question that arises here is whether or not there are types of killings and threatened killings that are always wrong, whatever the consequences. Another question that arises is what it is morally (...) permissible to do when one is threatened by morally wrongful violence, by terrorism, for example. The aim of the course is to encourage your own thought and reflection on these difficult moral questions. (shrink)

The authors, each with their own independent history of study of fear and fearlessness have recently been in dialogue and are creating a synthesis of a growing movement called philosophy of fearism. This philosophy, an extension of existential philosophy, is shown in this technical paper....

Did the world change on September 11, 2001? For those who live outside of New York or Washington, life's familiar pace persists and families and jobs resume their routines. Yet everything seems different because of the dramatic disturbance in our sense of what our world means and how we exist within it. In A Delicate Balance , philosopher Trudy Govier writes that it is because our feelings and attitudes have altered so fundamentally that our world has changed. Govier believes that (...) there are ethical challenges we cannot ignore. From Plato and Aristotle on courage to Kant on revenge, to 20th Century philosopher John Rawls’s views on justice, Govier mines the world of philosophy to reflect on terrorism. Govier argues that moral complexities such as victimhood, evil, power and revenge, if properly understood, can provide a basis for hope– not despair. Govier walks the reader through this shift, challenging us to construct a new sense of the world and our place within it. (shrink)

Defining terrorism -- State terrorism and counterterrorism -- Complicity of the victims -- The consequences of terrorism -- Terrorism, rights, and justice -- Terrorism, supreme emergency, and moral disaster -- Is terrorism morally distinctive? -- Case study : terror bombing of German cities -- Case study : terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This is the first comprehensive discussion of all the main philosophical issues raised by terrorism against the background of its past and recent developments. Prominent philosophers discuss definitions of terrorism, approaches to its moral evaluation, and the contentious subject of state terrorism. Also included are four case studies, showing how the concepts and arguments philosophers deploy in discussing violence, war and terrorism apply to particular instances of both insurgent and state terrorism, ranging from World War (...) II to September 11, 2001. (shrink)

This book engages with the most urgent philosophical questions pertaining to the problem of terrorism. What is terrorism? Could it ever be justified? Assuming that terrorism is just one of many kinds of political violence, the book denies that it is necessarily wrong and worse than war. In fact, it may be justifiable under certain circumstances.

In the immediate aftermath of 9‐11, Michael Walzer, notable theorist of warfare, reminded us that while terrorism is complex, it's not inscrutable. Implicit in the characterization is the idea that terrorism involves a wider variety of parties than the two conventionally cited, the terrorist and their victims. Terrorists don't harm their victims because they hate them, though in fact they may. The terrorist could, as Walzer counters, choose nonviolent movement‐building instead. The development of The Expanse's terrorism storyline (...) gives us hope that our future may be less sordid than our past. Marco provides a welcome clarification of the terrorist's dilemma. (shrink)

“Imaginationland” is an Emmy winning, three‐part story from South Park's eleventh season that was later reissued as a movie with all of the deleted scenes included. This chapter talks about the connection between imagination and something philosophers like to call critical thinking‐that is, being able to cut through the crap and see things clearly‐something that seems to be in short supply these days, especially when it comes to thinking about terrorist threats. The chapter deals with unimaginative leadership by discussing a (...) scene from South Park that cuts to a debriefing room at the Pentagon. In more recent times, the use of the term “Terrorism” has broadened. In Bruce Hoffman's book, Inside Terrorism, he has identified several elements common among terrorist acts, as they are thought of today. (shrink)

section 1. Reason, language, and the self -- section 2. Law, emergency, and exception -- section 3. Terrorism as a paradigm of (in)security -- section 4. Terrorism and the crisis of the political.

Terrorism is commonly viewed as a form of war, and as a form of war, the morality of terrorism seems to turn on the usual arguments regarding the furtherance of political objectives through coercive means. The terrorist argues that his options for armed struggle are limited, and that the use of force against civilians is the only way he can advance his cause. But this argument is subject to a powerful response. There is the argument from consequences, which (...) asserts that terrorism is almost always counterproductive, even assuming the terrorist’s political objectives are legitimate. There is the argument from rights, which claims that terrorism violates the basic human rights of (at least) its civilian victims, and is therefore morally objectionable regardless of its consequences. And there is the argument from virtue, which notes that slaughtering civilians requires no skill or courage and therefore generates no honor or glory, making the terrorist not a virtuous warrior but a vicious one. But terrorism is not only a means of political coercion. It is also, in the view of many terrorists, a means of retribution. It is a means of exacting punishment on a political community the terrorist believes is collectively responsible for grievous wrongs certain members of that community have committed. And viewed as a means of retribution, the usual arguments made against terrorism-as-coercion have no moral force. To explain why terrorism-as-retribution is morally wrong, we must attack the notion of collective responsibility on which the terrorist relies. (shrink)

There are different kinds of terrorism as there are of war. It is unpersuasive to make the deliberate targeting of civilians a defining feature of terrorism, and states as well as non-state groups can engage in terrorism. In a democracy, voters responsible for a government’s unjustifiable policies are not necessarily innocent, while conscripts are legitimate targets. Rather than being uniquely atrocious, terrorism most resembles small war. It is not always or necessarily more morally unjustifiable than war. (...) All war should be avoided, but some war is more unjustifiable than other war. Comparable judgments should be made about terrorism. It is appropriate to compare civilians killed by those seeking political change and those using violence to prevent such change. Sometimes the debate should focus on the justifiability or lack of it of the aims sought. While violence should always be used as little as possible, those in power are responsible for making other means than violence effective in achieving justifiable political change. When considering the likely causes of violence, one that has received inadequate attention is humiliation. Humiliation is not the same as shame. Causing humiliation can and should be avoided. (shrink)

abstract Much of the literature on torture in recent years takes the position of denouncing the barbarity of torture, while allowing for exceptions to this veto in extreme circumstances. The ticking‐bomb argument, where a terrorist is tortured in order to extract information of a primed bomb located in a civilian area, is often invoked as one of those extreme circumstances where torture becomes justified. As the War on Terrorism intensifies, the ticking‐bomb argument has become the dominant line of reasoning (...) used by both academics and policy advisers to justify a legalized, state‐sponsored program of torture. This paper argues for the unconditional refutation of any attempt to justify torture, without exceptions. We argue against the consequentialist reasoning of the ticking‐bomb argument not from a deontological position, but on consequentialist grounds. Empirical evidence suggests that the institutionalization of torture practices creates serious problems. Torture interrogation fails to fulfil its initial purpose as a low‐cost life saver, while its long‐term potential is the devastation of democratic institutions. (shrink)

This paper argues that philosophers require a strict canonical definition of terrorism if they are to be of any use in morally evaluating the changing character war. This definition ought to be a narrow, critical one, articulating precisely what is wrong with terrorism and strictly specifying which incidents fall into this derogatory category and which do not. I argue against those who avoid definitions or adopt wide and apologetic ones. The latter claim neutrality for themselves and accuse those (...) who define terrorism strictly of political bias. The apologetics of terrorism often allege that stringent, critical, definitions of terrorism beg important questions of justification, rendering terrorism unjustifiable by definition. The apologetics of terrorism however, have an obvious political agenda. Those who deliberately blur the distinctions between terrorism and other forms of violence cannot claim academic ?neutrality? or ?objectivity? for their wide, defensive definitions, which are in fact deliberately designed to advance particular political views. (shrink)

Bernard Williams once said that doing moral philosophy could be hazardous because there, presumably unlike in other areas of philosophy, we may run the risk of misleading people on important matters.1 This risk seems to be particularly present when considering the topic of terrorism. I would like to discuss what seems to be a most striking feature of contemporary terrorism, a feature that, as far as I know, has not been noted. This has implications concerning the (...) way that we should view terrorism (and counterterrorism) and shows the force of a number of neglected illusions surrounding the issue of terrorism, as well as its justification. (shrink)

The primary thesis of Terrorism and the Ethics of War is that terrorist acts are always wrong. I begin this paper by describing two views that I criticize in the book The first condemns all terrorism but applies the term in a biased way; the second defends some terrorist acts. I then respond to issues raised by the commentators. I discuss Joan McGregor’s concerns about the definition of terrorism and about how terrorism differs from other forms (...) of violence againstinnocent people. I respond to Sally Scholz’s challenges to my interpretation of innocence. She argues that soldiers can be innocent victims of terrorism and that both relationships and vulnerability are important to understanding innocence. Matthew Silliman questions my defense of utilitarianism and challenges two views that I defend: that all terrorist acts are wrong and that war can sometimes be right. I sketch brief responses to these important points. (shrink)

This paper critically addresses two central aspects of Frances Kamm’s account of conceptual and evaluative issues of terrorism in ‘Terrorism and Intending Evil’, Ethics for Enemies (oup 2011), chapter 2. The paper engages with what Kamm says about cases in which an act done from a morally bad intention or motive overtly exactly mimics a justifiable act. I argue that in such a case, an actor’s intention to terrorise is more significant to the question of whether what he (...) or she does is a terrorist act than Kamm allows. I also press considerations that run counter to Kamm’s view that in such cases an actor’s intention or motive is not directly relevant to the moral permissibility of actions that harm other people who are not otherwise liable to receive that type and degree of harm. (shrink)

Infusing contemporary critical terrorism studies (CTS) with concepts and methodologies from philosophy and critical theory via a Baradian posthumanist agential realist perspective and (counter)terrorist cases and vignettes, this chapter argues for a retheorisation of (counter)terrorism. It does so, firstly, by reconceptualising terrorism and counterterrorism as complex assemblages consisting not only of discursive-material components – an entanglement now largely accepted within CTS and critical security studies (CSS) – but also of affective layers and more-than-human phenomena. Secondly, by (...) analysing European urban (counter)terrorist cases from the UK, Germany, France, and Spain, together with these cases’ surprising spacetime-jumping interlinkages underwriting what we here conceptualise as queer(ing) spacetimematterings, this chapter zooms in on the intra-actions taking place between human and more-than-human agential phenomena and their risk-managed urban environments. Lastly, extra analytical attention is paid to how, in this neoliberal day and age – here rephrased as control society-driven ‘situationscaping times’ – very specific macro- and micropolitical violence-preventing measures and efforts are employed in the fight against various manifestations of urban terror and terrorism. (shrink)

We introduce the concept of “organizational terrorism” to describe dysfunctional leaders who are abusive and who treat organizational members with contempt and disregard. After identifying the moral duties of leaders in organizations, we explain how organization members respond to their dissatisfaction with organizations through Exit, Voice, Loyalty, or Neglect. We explain why exercising voice is the most effective moral choice in dealing with dysfunctional leaders.

Stephen Nathanson argues that we cannot have morally credible views about terrorism if we focus on terrorism alone and neglect broader issues about the ethics ...

After the events of 9/11, the concept of torture has emerged as one that is both pertinent and provoking. National polls have shown that some Americans support torture in some situations, though the majority still stand opposed. Torture has not received a tremendous amount of discussion in the philosophical literature, though I suspect that the leftward slant of academia would, for the most part, ensure limited support for torture. In this paper, I would like to first discuss why torture is (...) an important issue and then advance an argument that supports torture in limited cases. (shrink)

This paper discusses international terrorism and the diagnosis of terrorism that is found in Baudrillard, Habermas, and Derrida. The paper suggests a way of responding to terrorism based upon Gadanler’s understanding of Bildung. Terrorism is analyzed as arising out of an encounter between singularities that are experienced as otherness and alterity. Gadamer’s distinction between the humanities and the natural and social sciences reveals two fundamentally different epistemological orientations. Philosophical understanding is essentially hermeneutic and treats the phenomenon (...) of terrorism symbolicaIly, in contrast to the fact-oriented positivistic sciences. (shrink)

This paper investigates the moral permissibility of torture. After briefly considering some empirical evidence, it discusses the conflict between deontological and consequentialist approaches to torture. It is argued that, even if we are to take rights seriously, torture should at least be allowed if some conditions are satisfied. Finally, the paper discusses what those conditions should be and what sorts of torture are morally permissible.

Pacifism and terrorism are at opposite ends of one spectrum: pacifists have too many friends; terrorists have too many enemies. The indiscriminacy robs both of any credibility. Both fail to distinguish between aggressors and their victims. Discussion of terrorism, however, is complicated by insufficient attention to the distinction between noncombatants and innocents. Just War theory relies heavily on that distinction, providing protections to noncombatants as such, without going into the further question of innocence. Terrorism thus violates the (...) restrictions on justice within combat, as well as those on just cause. And in the end, it invites retaliation in kind, which is tantamount, nearly, to moving battle back to the Hobbesian State of nature. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of different definitions of “terrorism” and endorses one version of a tactical definition, so-called because it treats terrorism as involving the use of a quite specific tactic in the pursuit of political ends, namely, violent attacks upon the innocent. This contrasts with a political status definition in which “terrorism” is defined as any form of sub-state political violence against the state. Some consequences of the tactical definition are explored, notably the fact (...) that it allows for the possibility of state terrorism against individuals, sub-state groups and other states. But a major problem for the tactical definition is the account to be given of “the innocent.” In line with justwar thinking, the idea of “the innocent” is unpacked in terms of the concept of non-combatants and this in turn is treated as the category of those who are not prosecuting the harm that allows for a legitimate violent response. Problems with this approach are explored, with particular reference to criticisms made by Gregory Kavka. The recent drive to expand the class of those who may be legitimately attacked is subjected to scrutiny. Particular attention is paid to the role of “collective responsibility” and “deserving your government” in these arguments. (shrink)

For the sake of developing and evaluating public policy decisions aimed at combating terrorism, we need a precise public definition of terrorism that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence. Ordinary usage does not provide a basis for such a definition, and so it must be stipulative. I propose essentially pragmatic criteria for developing such a stipulative public definition. After noting that definitions previously proposed in the philosophical literature are inadequate based on these criteria, I propose an (...) alternative, which I call the 'group-target' definition and which distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence by the distinctive principle of discrimination used by terrorists to identify legitimate targets. I argue that this definition meets the criteria for a satisfactory public definition, and suggest that based on it there is good reason to suspect the adequacy of anti-terrorism policies that rely predominantly on forceful interdiction of terrorists. (shrink)

Without attempting a full-scale definition of “terrorism,” I assume that terrorist acts are politically motivated, that the political goals of terrorists are both diverse and a “mixed bag,” that terrorist acts inflict deliberate harm on innocent civilians, and that they are therefore to be condemned even when the goals they ostensibly serve are defensible goals. The various versions of the “root causes” argument seek to explain the phenomenon of terrorism, not to justify it. Nevertheless, anti-terrorism strategists must (...) take these explanations seriously and be prepared to adopta suitably broad view of the causal factors that may be involved. Exclusive concentration on the motives of terrorists is a mistake. Also important, for example, are the attitudes of members of populations in which there is sympathy for the goals of terrorists without any endorsement of their methods. (shrink)

Without attempting a full-scale definition of “terrorism,” I assume (for the purposes of the argument of the paper) (1) that terrorist acts are politically motivated, (2) that the political goals of terrorists are both diverse and (morally) a “mixed bag,” (3) that terrorist acts inflict deliberate harm on innocent civilians, and (4) that they are therefore to be condemned even when the goals they ostensibly serve are defensible goals. The various versions of the “root causes” argument seek to explain (...) the phenomenon of terrorism, not to justify it. Nevertheless, anti-terrorism strategists must take these explanations seriously and be prepared to adopta suitably broad view of the causal factors that may be involved. Exclusive concentration on the motives of terrorists is a mistake. Also important, for example, are the attitudes of (nonterrorist) members of populations in which there is sympathy for the goals of terrorists without any endorsement of their methods. (shrink)

Kia kaha Aotearoa, be strong New ZealandTo bear witness to the aftermath of a terrorist atrocity as a national outpouring of grief and a memorialising of those who have passed away is a very touchi...

In my article I defend the claim that terrorism is morally indefensible, irrespective of the religious or political circumstances and motives behind the actions of its agents and sponsors. My argument is based on the indefeasible presupposition of modern civilization and our human rights culture that, like the prohibition against murder in the law of crimes, the deliberate killing of innocent civilian non-combatants—the principle target of terrorists—destroys the cardinal value of the sacrosanctity of all individual human life by making (...) a dignified or rights-respecting, flourishing social life impossible. In my view the Islamist terrorist network of Al Qaeda (and some Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad) offers a paradigm case of modern terrorism due to the success of their attack on the American homeland on 9/11 (2001).Accordingly, I suggest the outlines of a philosophical critique of some common contemporary views which often thwart a common defense against terrorism because they blur the moral clarity of those who ordinarily respect the dignity and basic rights of persons as well as the rule of law. The views I target include a type of moral relativism, a postmodernist perspectivism, and the “Blowback” thesis currently circulating in some official military and political precincts. In addition, I explain why terrorism so deeply offends the law of war and its correlative Just War tradition; and also I reflect on why rights-based democracies must confront terrorism without subverting their own foundations. (shrink)

The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for fictional immoral behavior. The difficulty (...) with accepting the existence of an explanation for an immoral action is based on the difficulty we have identifying with the immoral person. Fiction gives us the narrative required to engage in this imagination, and thus facilitates the construction of explanations. I conclude that rather than being immoral to construct an explanation for the terrorist attacks, it is the first step toward fighting terrorism. (shrink)

The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for fictional immoral behavior. The difficulty (...) with accepting the existence of an explanation for an immoral action is based on the difficulty we have identifying with the immoral person. Fiction gives us the narrative required to engage in this imagination, and thus facilitates the construction of explanations. I conclude that rather than being immoral to construct an explanation for the terrorist attacks, it is the first step toward fighting terrorism. (shrink)

The moral problems of violence or terrorism arise in actual contexts. Addressing them may be thought to be a task for “applied ethics.” But only if we would have adequate normative theories suitable for the diverse contexts of human experience would we be in a position to make valid “applications” of ethical theory. Along with many others, I doubt that we now have such theories. But I think that the moral views and judgments we can come to in exploring (...) particular actual problems can help us to improve our moral theories and to “test” them in experience. (shrink)

I begin by examining the logic of autoimmunity as characterized by Jacques Derrida, ‘that strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, ‘‘itself’’ works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its own immunity’ (Borradori, 2003: 94). According to Derrida, religion, democracy, terrorism and recent responses to the trauma of terrorism can be understood in terms of this logic. Responses to terrorism are ‘autoimmune’ and increase the trauma of terrorism as well as risking (...) democratic values. I argue that the risks of autoimmunity can be negotiated in better ways if we see how autoimmunity relates to another important Derridean concept, hospitality. (shrink)

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification (...) of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum. (shrink)