Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth‐table task, (...) and taking into account qualitative individual differences. This allows us to critically contrast philosophical and psychological approaches that make diverging predictions regarding the interpretation of these forms. The results strongly support the probabilistic Adams conditional and the “new paradigm” that takes this conditional as a starting point. (shrink)

Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth-table task, (...) and taking into account qualitative individual differences. This allows us to critically contrast philosophical and psychological approaches that make diverging predictions regarding the interpretation of these forms. The results strongly support the probabilistic Adams conditional and the “new paradigm” that takes this conditional as a starting point. (shrink)

Eric Killmonger is a power‐hungry villain and the new world order he wants to set up would be no less oppressive than the one he'd replace. Killmonger foresees a "Wakandan Empire" in which people of African descent are "on top" and the formerly powerful are slaughtered, along with their children and "anyone else who takes their side." "Civilizing barbarians" meant introducing them to Roman technology, administrative and legal systems, and, as the Romans saw it, the superior Roman culture and (...) way of life. Imagine a Wakandan who knows only the worship of the cat‐goddess Bast and ape‐god Hanuman, trying to mediate disputes between Christians, Muslims, and Jews, with no understanding of their traditions. In his post‐credits speech to the United Nations, T'Challa sees Wakanda as having a moral duty to share its knowledge and resources with the outside world. (shrink)

Although disproportionate housework and care responsibilities ascribed to mothers and wives have been found to greatly impact women’s self-employment, less is known about how family-level labor structures may shape daughters’ entrepreneurship. Family business scholarship has shed partial light on this question by showing that household hierarchies and gender norms impede daughters’ recognition and inheritance within family firms in the United States. Drawing on interviews with 32 women microenterprise owners in Zacatecas, Mexico, this article builds on previous research by suggesting that (...) gendered mechanisms and labor structures may in fact position daughters to inherit businesses or business-related resources such as skills, financial capital, and property from their parents. Daughters acquire these assets by virtue of contributing to their parents’ enterprises as part of their childhood chores and maintaining a continued attachment to these businesses into adulthood. Daughters’ job prospects aside from inheritance were found to further shape their perceptions of business succession and inform their decision about whether to take over the family enterprise. Such acquisitions can be said to comprise instances of “gendered inheritance,” in which gendered institutions largely understood as disadvantaging women also may position them to attain valuable assets. (shrink)

Body image and body schema refer to two different yet closely related systems. Whereas BI can be defined as a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body, BS is a system of sensory-motor capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring. Studies have demonstrated that applying the concepts of BI and BS enables us to conceptualize complex pathological phenomena such as anorexia, schizophrenia, and depersonalization. Likewise, it has further been argued that these concepts (...) play a crucial role in our ability to grasp our bodily experiences in the socio-cultural world according to various factors, such as gender, social class, and ethnicity. Referring to the insights of Frantz Fanon, the author of Black Skin, White Masks, this paper suggests that under certain conditions the BI can take over and reshape the BS. Based on an examination of Fanon’s writings, the paper suggests that not only the BI can truly remold the BS but that the gaze of the other can directly influence the BI. (shrink)

The framework of depicting put forward byClark (2016)offers a schematic vantage point from which to examine iconic language use. Confronting the framework with empirical data, we consider some of its key theoretical notions. Crucially, by reconceptualizing the typology of depictions, we identify an overlooked domain in the literature: “speech-embedded nonverbal depictions,” namely cases where meaning is communicated iconically, nonverbally, and without simultaneously co-occurring speech. In addition to contextualizing the phenomenon in relation to existing research, we demonstrate, with examples from American (...) TV talk shows, how such depictions function in real-life language use, offering a brief sketch of their complexities and arguing also for their theoretical significance. (shrink)

ParkWoosuk. _Philosophy’s Loss of Logic to Mathematics: An Inadequately Understood Take-Over _. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology, and Rational Ethics; 43. Springer, 2018. ISBN: 978-3-319-95146-1 ; 978-3-030-06984-1 978-3-319-95147-8. Pp. xii + 230. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-95147-8.

In a previous article, we projected the future accumulation of profiles belonging to deceased users on Facebook. We concluded that a minimum of 1.4 billion users will pass away before 2100 if Facebook ceases to attract new users as of 2018. If the network continues expanding at current rates, on the other hand, this number will exceed 4.9 billion. Although these findings provided an important first step, one network alone remains insufficient to establish a quantitative foundation for further macro-level analysis (...) of the phenomenon of online death. Facebook is but one social media platform among many, and hardly the most representative in terms of their policy on deceased users. In this study, we use the same methodology to develop a complementary analysis of projected mortality on Instagram. Our models indicate that somewhere between 767 million and 4.2 billion Instagram users will die between 2019 and 2100, depending on the network’s future growth rate. Although the number of deceased Instagram profiles will likely be fewer than those on Facebook, we argue that they are nonetheless part of a shared digital cultural heritage, and should hence be curated with careful consideration. (shrink)

The generation in the United States who renewed interest in home birth is also returning to the tradition of funeral care at home. Caring for your own dead at home is legal in all 50 U.S. states.

The generation in the United States who renewed interest in home birth is also returning to the tradition of funeral care at home. Caring for your own dead at home is legal in all 50 U.S. states.

Summary I became the editor of this journal in 1974, under rather strange circumstances and with no prior warning. The circumstances and their background are described here.

We project the future accumulation of profiles belonging to deceased Facebook users. Our analysis suggests that a minimum of 1.4 billion users will pass away before 2100 if Facebook ceases to attract new users as of 2018. If the network continues expanding at current rates, however, this number will exceed 4.9 billion. In both cases, a majority of the profiles will belong to non-Western users. In discussing our findings, we draw on the emerging scholarship on digital preservation and stress the (...) challenges arising from curating the profiles of the deceased. We argue that an exclusively commercial approach to data preservation poses important ethical and political risks that demand urgent consideration. We call for a scalable, sustainable, and dignified curation model that incorporates the interests of multiple stakeholders. (shrink)

Those who claim, whether with fear or with hope, that algorithmic governance can control politics or the whole political process or that artificial intelligence is capable of taking charge of or wrecking democracy, recognize that this is not yet possible with our current technological capabilities but that it could come about in the future if we had better quality data or more powerful computational tools. Those who fear or desire this algorithmic suppression of democracy assume that something similar will be (...) possible someday and that it is only a question of technological progress. If that were the case, no limits would be insurmountable on principle. I want to challenge that conception with a limit that is less normative than epistemological; there are things that artificial intelligence cannot do, because it is unable to do them, not because it should not do them, and this is particularly apparent in politics, which is a peculiar decision-making realm. Machines and people take decisions in a very different fashion. Human beings are particularly gifted at one type of situation and very clumsy in others. The part of politics that is, strictly speaking, political is where this contrast and our greatest aptitude are most apparent. If that is the case, as I believe, then the possibility that democracy will one day be taken over by artificial intelligence is, as a fear or as a desire, manifestly exaggerated. The corresponding counterpart to this is: if the fear that democracy could disappear at the hands of artificial intelligence is not realistic, then we should not expect exorbitant benefits from it either. For epistemic reasons that I will explain, it does not seem likely that artificial intelligence is capable of taking over political logic. (shrink)

This book offers a historical explanation of important philosophical problems in logic and mathematics, which have been neglected by the official history of modern logic. It offers extensive information on Gottlob Frege’s logic, discussing which aspects of his logic can be considered truly innovative in its revolution against the Aristotelian logic. It presents the work of Hilbert and his associates and followers with the aim of understanding the revolutionary change in the axiomatic method. Moreover, it offers useful tools to understand (...) Tarski’s and Gödel’s work, explaining why the problems they discussed are still unsolved. Finally, the book reports on some of the most influential positions in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, i.e., Maddy’s mathematical naturalism and Shapiro’s mathematical structuralism. Last but not least, the book introduces Biancani’s Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics as this is considered important to understand current philosophical issue in the applications of mathematics. One of the main purposes of the book is to stimulate readers to reconsider the Aristotelian position, which disappeared almost completely from the scene in logic and mathematics in the early twentieth century. (shrink)

This is a translation of the review by Peter Gärdenfors of Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, Why Machines Will Never Rule the World (Routledge 2023).

George Orwell wondered why oppressed proletariats in the communist and capitalist worlds did not rise up and replace the governments that oppressed them with something better for them. This is a puzzle we still face today, wherever a majority faces exploitation. The chapter examines the question of why exploited peoples don’t replace exploitative governments in their own best interest, whether through revolution or through the ballot box. The question is examined through the lens of the political philosophy and political fiction (...) of George Orwell, with special attention to how his philosophy applies to the modern USA and the Trump administration. It is argued that in the modern US, there are many reasons why the masses are exploited, but the most important is that they don’t understand the nature of their exploitation. Citizens are often isolated in reality bubbles. Our basic human irrationality, hypocrisy, and willingness to rewrite the past, are harnessed and used against us. International conflicts stoke nationalism and prevent the masses from finding a common identity with the masses worldwide. Within the US, conflicts between different social groups pit the masses against one another, and prevent them from recognizing their common condition. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 2, Page 261-263, June 2022.

Classical pragmatism has often been branded as being primarily a new theory of truth. Using F.C.S. Schiller's response to an article written by F.H. Bradley, I show that, in fact, a certain theory of thought is the essential point of pragmatism according to Schiller as well as John Dewey and William James. I go on to argue that without taking this theory of thought into account we cannot properly understand the British reception of classical pragmatism in the early 1900s. I (...) illustrate the significance of this contention by criticizing the responses to pragmatism given by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. (shrink)

This article explores the ascetic tendencies of Naḥmanides as reflected in his oeuvre as a whole, including his halakhic, kabbalistic, exegetical, and philosophical output. A close examination of Naḥmanides’s kabbalistic commentary to a talmudic sugiya concerning the differences between oaths and vows uncovers the austere and ascetic ethos in his teaching and its central place in his religious world. This perspective is linked to the nature of human beings and the human soul, the relationship between body and psyche, the meaning (...) of life and the overcoming of death, and the status of the Torah and the connection between observance of the commandments and the voluntary hasidic ethos. (shrink)

The possibility for transnational democratic representation is a huge topic. This article is restricted to exploring two unconventional aspects. The first concerns ‘the representative claim’, extending one critical part of previous analysis of the assessment of such claims, especially by largely unelected transnational actors. The second, which strongly conditions the account of the first, concerns ‘slow theory’ as the way to approach building democratic models and, in particular, to approach transnational democratic representation. Keywords: slow politics; slow theory; transnational representation; democracy (...) and representation; slow movement. (shrink)

Chris Stewart’s account of his experiences after purchasing a farm in Andalusia, in an isolated farmhouse in the mountains adjacent to Granada, are far from the traditionally bucolic depictions of a pastoral landscape, in which the drawbacks of agricultural life become unquestionably compensated by the bliss of life in nature. Even though, as the title indicates, he seems to be a born romantic and optimist, undefeated by the inconveniences of a life without the everyday commodities of a First-World country in (...) the twenty-first century, his memoir narrative is soon balanced by his own testimony, which provides a realistic counterbalance to Stewart’s initial idealistic portrayal of life in rustic Alpujarras. Nonetheless, as this article intends to demonstrate, it is precisely this necessary demystification of the rural setting prevailing in certain areas in Andalusia that becomes crucial for the establishment of an essential complicity with the audience, thereby trained to appreciate—and even become enthralled by—the reality of the rural surroundings which the contemporary reader can no longer envision as merely a place of “vales and hills” softly covered by “a host of golden daffodils”. El relato que lleva a cabo Chris Stewart acerca de sus experiencias tras adquirir una finca en Andalucía, en un lugar apartado de la sierra lindante con Granada, se aleja de las descripciones bucólicas de paisajes pastorales en los que las desventajas de la vida agrícola quedaban incuestionablemente compensadas por el gozo de la vida en mitad de la naturaleza. Incluso pese a que, tal y como el título de su novela indica, Chris Stewart parece ser un romántico y un optimista de nacimiento, que no se deja vencer por los inconvenientes de una vida sin las comodidades cotidianas de un país del primer mundo en el siglo xxi, su memoria-narrativa se ve inmediatamente equilibrada por su propio testimonio, que proporciona un contrapunto realista al idealizado retrato inicial de la vida en las rústicas Alpujarras. No obstante, como el presente artículo pretende demostrar, es precisamente esta necesaria desmitificación del entorno rural de ciertas zonas de Andalucía lo que resulta crucial para poder establecer una esencial complicidad con el lector, que llega, de este modo, a valorar, e incluso, a sentirse fascinado, por la realidad del contexto agrario, el cual deja ya de percibir meramente como un lugar de «valles y colinas» delicadamente cubierto por «una cohorte de dorados narcisos». (shrink)

Taking Kierkegaard Personally: First Person Responses is a one-of-a-kind volume in which scholars from the world over address personal, existential lessons that Kierkegaard has taught them. Papers were selected from the June 2018 International Kierkegaard Conference, sponsored by the Howard V. and Edna H. Hong Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College. The Conference's prompt-The Wisdom of Kierkegaard: What Existential Lessons Have You Learned from Him?-compelled scholars to drop their guards and write primarily in first person narrative instead of standard (...) third person scholarly/professorial narrative. Papers range from a preacher in Texas discussing how this white nineteenth-century Dane's thought speaks to black issues, to a university development director wondering what Kierkegaard can teach Silicon Valley executives, to a Danish scholar struggling with human autonomy versus dependence on God, to a Jewish scholar finding hope in this Danish Protestant's works in which existential alienation from the world is the norm, to a Nigerian scholar introducing Kierkegaard's "single individual" into his Ndi Igbo community (a tribe predicated not on the individual but the collective), to a Slovak scholar surviving a bad divorce, to an Hispanic scholar's passion to teach Kierkegaard along the U.S.-Mexico border to Hispanic students, to an American scholar fielding his father's questions about suicide, to other scholars suffering from and coping with deaths of parents, raising children, working in trauma units, finding the need for self-denial in flourishing countries, preaching valuable sermons, dealing with college campus/department politics, and living perfectly quotidian lives. (shrink)

When and why is it right to kill? When and why is it wrong? Torbjörn Tännsjö examines three theories on the ethics of killing in this book: deontology, a libertarian moral rights theory, and utilitarianism. The implications of each theory are worked out for different kinds of killing: trolley-cases, murder, capital punishment, suicide, assisted death, abortion, killing in war, and the killing of animals. These implications are confronted with our intuitions in relation to them, and our moral intuitions are examined (...) in turn. Only those intuitions that survive an understanding of how we have come to hold them are seen as 'considered' intuitions. The idea is that the theory that can best explain the content of our considered intuitions gains inductive support from them. We must transcend our narrow cultural horizons and avoid certain cognitive mistakes in order to hold considered intuitions. In this volume, suitable for courses in ethics and applied ethics, Tännsjö argues that in the final analysis utilitarianism can best account for, and explain, our considered intuitions about all these kinds of killing. (shrink)

We are told the academic ideal is that all voices have equal claim to attention. But this excludes the voices of the poor and marginalized, who lack theresources to be heard. They are the victims of historical forces over which they have no control, while a kind of “economic fundamentalism” infects first-worldattitudes toward markets and free trade, widely viewed as capable of automatically solving the problems of the Third World. But the earth does not possess theresources to allow everyone (...) to enjoy a first-world standard of living. We can help only those with whom we share moral community. The issue is the recognition ofthe other as a fellow human. Taking the victims’ side, modeling the world from the perspective of the reality that daily oppresses them, transforms both the victimsand ourselves. This change in perspective will not be easy. The movement from observer to participant in the struggle of the poor cannot help changing the waywe relate to our students and what we understand by “education.”. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that victims of unjust harm should take priority over victims of other forms of harm. We explore four arguments for this view: that victims of unjust harm experience greater suffering; that prioritizing victims of unjust harm would help prevent unjust harm in the future; that it is good for perpetrators that their victims be prioritized; and that it is impersonally better that victims of unjust harm are prioritized. We argue that the first three arguments fail (...) but that the fourth argument succeeds. Moral agents have a reason to prioritize victims of wrongdoing because this secures the impersonal value of corrective justice. However, this reason can be activated differently for different agents depending on how they are situated relative to the wrongdoing, and it may be outweighed by other factors, such as the extent of the harm that could be alleviated. (shrink)

Humans have faced urgent crises over the past two years, and in the midst of those we still have the threat of climate change and other big, systemic problems facing our world. In this time of chaos and crisis, how do activists find the strength to carry on? In answer to this question, environmental philosopher Kathleen Dean Moore has assembled a collection of short essays that offer courage, hope, and even some laughter to the people who have for years (...) been working for environmental sanity and social justice. Earth's weary lovers, as Moore calls them, are tired, perplexed, and battered from all directions. Their hearts have so often been broken; it's hard to go on, but it is morally impossible to quit. To these weary activists, Moore brings encouragement to join or keep on with the struggle-not entertaining distractions, but deep and honest reasons to remember that the struggle matters, now and in the future. Moore's essays are matched with drawings by Canadian artist Bob Haverluck; together, they invite readers to take heart. Taking heart is not hope exactly, but maybe it's courage. Not reassurance, but reason to persevere. Not the promise of good results-it does not depend on winning odds-but a call to integrity. Not strength, but stubbornness, which might be just as good. Not solutions to the planetary crisis, but some modest advice for the inevitable crisis of the heart. Not good cheer entirely, but a chance to grin, and gladness to be part of this strange and necessary work for the endangered Earth. (shrink)

I investigate what we mean when we hold people responsible for beliefs. I begin by outlining a puzzle concerning our ordinary judgments about beliefs and briefly survey and critique some common responses to the puzzle. I then present my response where I argue a sense needs to be articulated in which we do have a kind of control over our beliefs if our practice of attributing responsibility for beliefs is appropriate. In developing this notion of doxastic control, I draw (...) from John Fischer's discussions of “guidance control”. A central feature of this kind of control is the idea of “ownership”. I argue that we can own our beliefs and that we expect each other to do so. We take responsibility for our beliefs and taking responsibility includes taking control of them. I end by considering objections to my view as well as some implications of it. (shrink)

Despite its long history of investigating sociality, phenomenology has, to date, said little about online sociality. The phenomenological tradition typically claims that empathy is the fundamental way in which we experience others and their experiences. While empathy is discussed almost exclusively in the context of face-to-face interaction, I claim that we can empathetically perceive others and their experiences in certain online situations. Drawing upon the phenomenological distinction between the physical, objective body and the expressive, lived body, I: (i) highlight that (...) empathy involves perceiving the other’s expressive, lived body, (ii) show that the lived body is not tied to the physical body and that empathy can take place outside of face-to-face interactions, and (iii) argue that the lived body can enter online space and is empathetically available to others there. I explore two ways in which the other’s lived body enters online space and can be empathetically perceived: first, in cases where our face-to-face encounter is technologically-mediated over video link and, second, by showing how the other’s texts, as speech, can form part of the other’s lived body. Investigating empathy online not only furthers our understanding of online encounters but also leads to a refined conception of empathy more generally. (shrink)

Life Takes Place argues that, even in our mobile, hypermodern world, human life is impossible without place. Seamon asks the question: why does life take place? He draws on examples of specific places and place experiences to understand place more broadly. Advocating for a holistic way of understanding that he calls "synergistic relationality," Seamon defines places as spatial fields that gather, activate, sustain, identify, and interconnect things, human beings, experiences, meanings, and events. Throughout his phenomenological explication, Seamon recognizes that (...) places are multivalent in their constitution and sophisticated in their dynamics. Drawing on British philosopher J. G. Bennett's method of progressive approximation, he considers place and place experience in terms of their holistic, dialectical, and processual dimensions. Recognizing that places always change over time, Seamon examines their processual dimension by identifying six generative processes that he labels interaction, identity, release, realization, intensification, and creation. Drawing on practical examples from architecture, planning, and urban design, he argues that an understanding of these six place processes might contribute to a more rigorous place making that produces robust places and propels vibrant environmental experiences. This book is a significant contribution to the growing research literature in "place and place making studies.". (shrink)

Punishing groups raises a difficult question, namely, how their punishment can be justified at all. Some have argued that punishing groups is morally problematic because of the effects that the punishment entails for their members. In this paper we argue against this view. We distinguish the question of internal justice—how punishment-effects are distributed—from the question of external justice—whether the punishment is justified. We argue that issues of internal justice do not in general undermine the permissibility of punishment. We also defend (...) the permissibility of what some call “random punishment.” We argue that, for some kinds of collectives, there is no general obligation to internally distribute the punishment-effects equally or in proportion to individual contribution. (shrink)

"Reason is not passion's slave." Rather, the author argues, reason appraises the cultural appropriateness of passion, thus directing our attitudinal behaviour. He refutes those theories of value which correspond philosophically to societies described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: societies of "honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, pleasure without happiness." His argument, which takes into account traditional philosophic positions, is divided into five parts: Attitudes, Evaluation, Characterization, Culture, Morality.

The dramatic rise in inequality in the United States over the past generation has occasioned considerable attention from economists, but strikingly little from students of American politics. This has started to change: in recent years, a small but growing body of political science research on rising inequality has challenged standard economic accounts that emphasize apolitical processes of economic change. For all the sophistication of this new scholarship, however, it too fails to provide a compelling account of the political sources (...) and effects of rising inequality. In particular, these studies share with dominant economic accounts three weaknesses: they downplay the distinctive feature of American inequality —namely, the extreme concentration of income gains at the top of the economic ladder; they miss the profound role of government policy in creating this “winner-take-all” pattern; and they give little attention or weight to the dramatic long-term transformation of the organizational landscape of American politics that lies behind these changes in policy. These weaknesses are interrelated, stemming ultimately from a conception of politics that emphasizes the sway of the “median voter” in electoral politics, rather than the influence of organized interests in the process of policy making. A perspective centered on organizational and policy change —one that identifies the major policy shifts that have bolstered the economic standing of those at the top and then links those shifts to concrete organizational efforts by resourceful private interests —fares much better at explaining why the American political economy has become distinctively winner-take-all. (shrink)

Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I (...) argue that pain's unpleasantness does indeed have noninstrumental disvalue; against the latter I argue both that my critics’ own desire-theoretic accounts of pain's unpleasantness cannot accommodate such disvalue, and that my evaluativist view can—either by appealing to “anti-unpleasantness” desires or by exploiting pain's perceptuality. (shrink)

The proportion of business ethics literature devoted to accounting and the proportion of academic accounting literature devoted to ethical issues are both small, yet over the past two decades there has been a steady accumulation of research devoted to ethical issues in accounting. Based on a database of more than 500 articles gathered from a wide range of accounting and business ethics academic journals, this paper describes and analyses the characteristics of what has been published in the past 20 (...) years or so. It identifies and explores patterns and trends in publication outlets and the type of research conducted. Furthermore, through a comparison with issues that have been raised in the general business ethics literature, it offers guidance to researchers who intend to take the field of accounting ethics forward using empirical methods. (shrink)

A typical approach to semantics for relevance (and other) logics: specify a class of algebraic structures and take amodelto be one of these structures, α, together with some function or relation which associates with every formulaAa subset ofα. (This is the approach of, among others, Urquhart, Routley and Meyer and Fine.) In some cases there are restrictions on the class of subsets of α with which a formula can be associated: for example, in the semantics of Routley and Meyer [1973], (...) a formula can only be associated with subsets which are closed upwards. It is natural to take apropositionof α to be such a subset of α, and, further, to take the propositional quantifiers to range over these propositions. (Routley and Meyer [1973] explicitly consider this interpretation.) Given such an algebraic semantics, we call (following Routley and Meyer [1973], who follow Henkin [1950]) the above-described interpretation of the quantifiers theprimaryinterpretation associated with the semantics. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the diachronic fittingness conditions of admiration – that is, what it takes for a person to continue or cease to be admirable over time. We present a series of cases that elicit judgements that suggest different understandings of admiration over time. In some cases, admirability seems to last forever. In other cases, it seems that it can cease within a person’s lifetime if she changes sufficiently. Taken together, these cases highlight what we (...) call the puzzle of admiration over time. We then present a potential solution to this puzzle. (shrink)