Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s :753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State issued (...) regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement. (shrink)

We discuss a simple logic to describe one of our favourite games from childhood, hide and seek, and show how a simple addition of an equality constant to describe the winning condition of the seeker makes our logic undecidable. There are certain decidable fragments of first-order logic which behave in a similar fashion and we add a new modal variant to that class of logics. We also discuss the relative expressive power of the proposed logic in comparison to the (...) standard modal counterparts. (shrink)

We discuss a simple logic to describe one of our favourite games from childhood, hide and seek, and show how a simple addition of an equality constant to describe the winning condition of the seeker makes our logic undecidable. There are certain decidable fragments of first-order logic which behave in a similar fashion with respect to such a language extension, and we add a new modal variant to that class. We discuss the relative expressive power of the proposed logic (...) in comparison to the standard modal counterparts. We prove that the model checking problem for the resulting logic is \(\textsf{P}\) -complete. In addition, by exploring the connection with related product logics, we gain more insight towards having a better understanding of the subtleties of the proposed framework. (shrink)

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The (...) first establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and (...) fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and (...) fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

A new class of values combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of values such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. We propose a strategic implementation of our class of values in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole (...) class of values, and one of each of its extreme points. (shrink)

A solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value. The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value. We provide characterizations of the two (...) classes of solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties. (shrink)

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance. Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

Inspired by Scarf, Zhao, Sandholm and Yang and Zhang, we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in (...) terms of game semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed. (shrink)

The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for TU games. The Maschler–Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known extensions of the Shapley value to NTU games. A hyperplane game is an NTU game in which the feasible set for each coalition is a hyperplane. On the domain of monotonic hyperplane games, the Maschler–Owen value is axiomatized. Although the domain of hyperplane game is a very interesting class of games to study, unfortunately, on (...) this domain, the NTU Shapley value is not well-defined, namely, it assigns an empty set to some hyperplane games. A prize game is an NTU game that can be obtained by “truncating” a hyperplane game. As such, a prize game describes essentially the same situation as the corresponding hyperplane game. It turns out that, on the domain of monotonic prize games, the NTU Shapley value is well-defined. Thus, one can define a value which is well-defined on the domain of monotonic hyperplane games as follows: given a monotonic hyperplane game, first, transform it into a prize game, and then apply the NTU Shapley value to it. We refer to the resulting value as the “generalized Shapley value” and compare the axiomatic properties of it with those of the Maschler–Owen value on the union of the class of monotonic hyperplane games and that of monotonic prize games. We also provide axiomatizations of the Maschler–Owen value and the generalized Shapley value on that domain. (shrink)

A cooperative game with transferable utility–or simply a TU-game– describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value function for these games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. Well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley and the Banzhaf value. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share function, which assigns to every player in a TU-game its share in the worth of the grand coalition. In this (...) paper we consider TU-games in which the players are organized into a coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players. The Shapley value has been generalized by Owen to TU-games in coalition structure. We redefine this value function as a share function and show that this solution satisfies the multiplication property that the share of a player in some coalition is equal to the product of the Shapley share of the coalition in a game between the coalitions and the Shapley share of the player in a game between the players within the coalition. Analogously we introduce a Banzhaf coalition structure share function. Application of these share functions to simple majority games show some appealing properties. (shrink)

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in (...) terms of game semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed. (shrink)

It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree. In this paper we first argue that some known results on solutions for peer group games hold more general for digraph games. Second, we generalize both (...) digraph games as well as games with a permission structure into a model called games with a local permission structure, where every player needs permission from its predecessors only to generate worth, but does not need its predecessors to give permission to its own successors. We introduce and axiomatize a Shapley value-type solution for these games, generalizing the conjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure and the β\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}-measure for weighted digraphs. (shrink)

Cet article interroge l’originalité ludique du dispositif sociotechnique conçu par les réseaux socionumériques autour du profil pour organiser les différentes activités en ligne. Alors que les jeux constituent une des activités les plus prisées par les membres du réseau à laquelle ils consacrent un temps important, peu de recherches se sont focalisées sur l’analyse des activités ludiques sur les réseaux socionumériques. Par l’application de cadres conceptuels éprouvés pour analyser les jeux et activités ludiques, il est possible d’interroger la spécificité des (...) modalités de jeux qui sont proposées sur les réseaux socionumériques. Une analyse centrée sur les fonctionnalités offertes par Facebook conduit à interroger de façon critique la nature même de l’activité ludique menée dans le contexte particulier des réseaux socionumériques.This article looks into the distinctively “playful” nature of the socio-technical system that social networking sites construct around user profiles in order to organize different online activities. Although games some of the most popular activities among network members, to which they devote a considerable amount of time, there have been few analyses to date of game-playing on social networking sites. A number of proven conceptual frameworks can be used to analyze online games and game-playing and to examine the particular patterns found on the social networking sites. Based on an analysis of Facebook features, we offer an in-depth discussion of the nature of the game-playing that takes place in the particular context of social networking sites. (shrink)

We introduce values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games axiomatically and provide their explicit formula representation. These values may be considered as natural extensions of the lower equivalent and upper equivalent solutions for line-graph games studied in van den Brink et al. (Econ Theory 33:349–349, 2007). We study the distribution of Harsanyi dividends. We show that the problem of sharing a river with a delta or with multiple sources among different agents located at different levels along the riverbed (...) can be embedded into the framework of a rooted-tree or sink-tree digraph game correspondingly. (shrink)

We introduce a new allocation rule, called the sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for this allocation rule. The first one uses the classical property of component efficiency plus an edge deletion property. The second characterization uses standardness, an edge deletion property applied to specific rooted trees, a consistency property, and an amalgamation property. We also provide an extension of the sequential equal surplus division applied to the problem of sharing a river (...) with bifurcations. (shrink)

90 nian dai, Du Weiming xian sheng de geng duo jing li zai yu kai zhan "wen hua Zhongguo" de lun yu."Wen hua Zhongguo" zhuo mo zui duo de shi ru jia de ren wen jing shen, yi jiu zheng jiang ru jia ru shi de jia zhi qu xiang he fan su ren wen zhu yi hun wei yi tan de yin xiang, tu xian ru jia yi mai xiang cheng de pi pan jing shen.

This paper summarizes the author’s view and research on the concept of ‘Spiritual Humanism’ as a cross-cultural, historical heritage and theoretical framework for contemporary research in philosophy. It builds on comprehensive scholarship conducted over the last decades within a plurality of leading academic communities. It reflects the author’s commitment to include Chinese Philosophy and intellectual history within the international scholarly canon.

On Islamic philosophy with special reference to logic in Islamic philosophy.