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  1. Preference and urgency.T. M. Scanlon - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.
  2.  32
    The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    These essays in political philosophy by T. M. Scanlon, written between 1969 and 1999, examine the standards by which social and political institutions should be justified and appraised. Scanlon explains how the powers of just institutions are limited by rights such as freedom of expression, and considers why these limits should be respected even when it seems that better results could be achieved by violating them. Other topics which are explored include voluntariness and consent, freedom of expression, tolerance, punishment, and (...)
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  3. Contractualism and Utilitarianism.T. M. Scanlon - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. 3 Rawls on Justification.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - In Samuel Richard Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge University Press. pp. 139.
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  5. The Significance of Choice.T. M. Scanlon - 1988 - In Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Vol. 8, pp. 149-216). University of Utah Press.
     
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  6. Metaphysics and morals.T. M. Scanlon - 2010 - In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Columbia University Press. pp. 7 - 22.
    This essay argues that normative judgments, in general, and moral judgments, in particular, are "truth apt" and can be objects of belief. Other main claims are: judgments about reasons, if interpreted as true, do not have metaphysical implications that are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. Two kinds of normative claims should be distinguished: substantive claims about what reasons people have and structural claims about what attitudes people must have insofar as they are rational. Employing this distinction, the (...)
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  7. The Diversity of Objections to Inequality.T. M. Scanlon - unknown
    This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1996, given by T.M. Scanlon, an American philosopher.
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  8.  4
    Index.T. M. Scanlon - 2008 - In Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press. pp. 243-247.
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  9. The Significance of Choice.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  10.  40
    Metaphysics and Morals.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):7-22.
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  11. Reasons: A Puzzling Duality?T. M. Scanlon - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press.
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  12. Replies.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):424–439.
  13. Rights, goals, and fairness.T. M. Scanlon - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):81 - 95.
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  14. Reply to Zofia Stemplowska.T. M. Scanlon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):508-514.
    Describes the author’s value of choice account of responsibility and examines a response by Stemplowska to an objection to this account, raised by Alex Voorhoeve. Argues that the problem raised by Voorhoeve’s example concerns the way in which risk is taken into account in contractualism rather than the value of choice account of responsibility. Departs from the author’s earlier work in arguing that the risk of harm should sometimes be taken into account on an ex ante rather than an ex (...)
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  15. Intention and permissibility, I.T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...)
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  16.  68
    Replies.T. M. Scanlon - 2002 - Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):337-358.
  17. Reasons, responsibility, and reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh.T. M. Scanlon - 2002 - Ethics 112 (3):507-528.
  18.  50
    Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.T. M. Scanlon - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):312.
  19. The unity of the normative. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):443-450.
    From the issue entitled "With Book Symposium on Judith Thomson's Normativity".
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  20. Reply to Leif Wenar.T. M. Scanlon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):400-405.
    Explains how a contractualist moral theory can explain the moral phenomena commonly called rights, although it does not appeal to the notion of a right as a basic element of moral thinking, or explain the difference between rights violations and wrongs of other kinds. Argues that the latter failure is not an important fault.
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  21. Equality of resources and equality of welfare: A forced marriage?T. M. Scanlon - 1986 - Ethics 97 (1):111-118.
  22.  25
    Intention and Permissibility.T. M. Scanlon & Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:301-338.
    It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an (...)
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  23. Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination.T. M. Scanlon - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Clarendon Press.
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  24. Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson.T. M. Scanlon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):877-897.
    In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.
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  25.  17
    Intention and Permissibility.T. M. Scanlon & Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:301-338.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...)
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  26.  42
    I_– _T. M. Scanlon.T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301-317.
  27. Responsibility and the value of choice.T. M. Scanlon - 2013 - Think 12 (33):9-16.
    ExtractImagine that you are struggling to finish a project, with the deadline fast approaching. Nearly done, you are about to print out what you have finished when a dialog box appears on your computer screen telling you that you must download and install an update for some piece of software. Frustrated, you try to make it go away, but it keeps reappearing. So you relent and click on ‘Install’, and your screen is filled with small print listing ‘Terms and Conditions’. (...)
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  28. Moral Theory: Understanding and Disagreement. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):343.
  29. The appeal and limits of constructivism.T. M. Scanlon - 2012 - In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
     
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  30.  33
    A consequentialist perspective on contractualism. Author's reply.Philip Pettit & T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):228-245.
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  31. Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):176–189.
    I am pleased by the degree of agreement about reasons between the three of us, which is much greater than I might have guessed. I have no objection whatever to the project of giving the kind of psychological description of deliberation about reasons that Gibbard proposes. I agree that “weighing X in favor of A isn’t mysterious,” but I do confess to some doubt about how a psychological description of this process of weighing “explains, indirectly, X’s counting in favor of (...)
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  32. Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination.T. M. Scanlon - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:5-20.
     
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  33. A Contractualist Reply.T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):237-245.
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  34. Symposium on Amartya Sen's philosophy: 3 Sen and consequentialism.T. M. Scanlon - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):39-50.
    It is a particular pleasure to be able to participate in this symposium in honor of Amartya Sen. We agree on a wide range of topics, but I will focus here on an area of relative disagreement. Sen is much more attracted to consequentialism than I am, and the main topic of my paper will be the particular version of consequentialism that he has articulated and the reasons why he is drawn to this view.
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  35. 10. William A. Edmundson, ed., The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings William A. Edmundson, ed., The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings (pp. 614-616). [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace, Gerald Dworkin, John Deigh, T. M. Scanlon, Peter Vallentyne & Alan Patten - 2002 - Ethics 112 (3).
  36. Two Construals of Scanlon’s Contractualism.Philip Pettit & T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):148-164.
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  37. Justice, Responsibility, and the Demands of Equality.T. M. Scanlon - 2006 - In Christine Sypnowich (ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen. Oxford University Press.
  38. Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination.T. M. Scanlon - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  39.  19
    Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):176-189.
    I am pleased by the degree of agreement about reasons between the three of us, which is much greater than I might have guessed. I have no objection whatever to the project of giving the kind of psychological description of deliberation about reasons that Gibbard proposes. I agree that “weighing X in favor of A isn’t mysterious,” but I do confess to some doubt about how a psychological description of this process of weighing “explains, indirectly, X’s counting in favor of (...)
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  40. Précis of Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):459-463.
  41. Reasons and Decisions. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):722 - 728.
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  42.  14
    The Appeal and Limits of.T. M. Scanlon - 2012 - In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 226.
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  43. Précis of what we owe to each other. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):159–161.
    1. The idea of a reason should be taken as the central notion for understanding desire, motivation, value, and morality. The argument of the book takes the idea of a reason as primitive. Nothing I go on to claim depends on the thesis that this notion cannot be explained in other terms, but I do not see how this could be done. It is often held that in all, or at least most, cases in which a person has a reason (...)
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  44.  76
    Précis of What We Owe to Each Other.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):159-161.
    1. The idea of a reason should be taken as the central notion for understanding desire, motivation, value, and morality. The argument of the book takes the idea of a reason as primitive. Nothing I go on to claim depends on the thesis that this notion cannot be explained in other terms, but I do not see how this could be done. It is often held that in all, or at least most, cases in which a person has a reason (...)
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  45.  30
    Thinkers, lies, and freedom of speech.T. M. Scanlon - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (2):132-140.
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  46.  57
    Reply to Hill, Mason and Wedgwood. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):490-505.
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  47. The consistency of number theory via herbrand's theorem.T. M. Scanlon - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (1):29-58.
  48. Justification and legitimation: Comments on Sebastiano Maffettone’s Rawls: An Introduction. [REVIEW]T. M. Scanlon - 2012 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (9):887-892.
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  49. Rights and Interests.T. M. Scanlon - 2008 - In Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development. Oxford University Press.
     
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  50.  7
    Notes.T. M. Scanlon - 2008 - In Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press. pp. 217-238.
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