At the centenary of Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), we explore the continuing relevance of Knightian uncertainty to the theory and practice of entrepreneurship. There are three challenges facing such assessment. First, RUP is complex and difficult to interpret. The key but neglected element of RUP is that Knight’s account is not solely about risk and uncertainty as states of nature, but about how an agent’s beliefs about uncertain outcomes and confidence in those beliefs guide their choices. (...) Second, RUP is Knight’s only effort in this area. His subsequent career led elsewhere, so he did not engage with subsequent interpretations of this work. Third, much of the current literature emphasizes that decisions must be different under the two states of nature with a consequent misunderstanding of entrepreneurial agency. This paper addresses each challenge in sequence. First, we explicate Knight’s (1921) approach and explain why that approach is murky. Second, as a complement to Knight’s interpretation, we examine Frank P. Ramsey’s approach to subjective probabilities to help clarify Knight’s murky approach. What links Knight and Ramsey is a shared pragmatism about entrepreneurial agency under uncertainty that depends upon the beliefs about, and confidence in, their judgments of possible outcomes. This Knight-Ramsey approach does not require actor’s behaviors to be determined by the class of uncertain environment (whether risk, uncertainty, or ambiguity) they face. We focus on the response by the entrepreneur to the existence of uncertainty in all its forms. We argue that this reductive account provides a foundation to examine common problems in management, including managerial hubris, the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and the need for experimentation (such as prototyping and market research) in advance of new product and venture launches. Third, we critique current literature that favors epistemic purism about the ontology of risk and uncertainty and ignores Knight-Ramsey pragmatism in meeting uncertainty, such as using formal and informal institutions for uncertainty mitigation. Our account locates Frank Knight’s subtleties in entrepreneurial behavior firmly in the literature on entrepreneurial agency a century later. (shrink)

The debate over the explanatory nature of cognitive models has been waged mostly between two factions: the mechanists and the dynamical systems theorists. The former hold that cognitive models are explanatory only if they satisfy a set of mapping criteria, particularly the 3M/3m* requirement. The latter have argued, pace the mechanists, that some cognitive models are both dynamical and constitute covering-law explanations. In this paper, I provide a minimal model interpretation of dynamical cognitive models, arguing that this both provides needed (...) clarity to the mechanist versus dynamicist divide in cognitive science and also paves the way towards further insights about scientific explanation generally. (shrink)

This paper advances the view that some explanations in cognitive science are extra-mathematical explanations. Demonstrating the plausibility of this interpretation centers around certain efficient coding cases which ineliminably enlist information theoretic laws, facts and theorems to identify in-principle, mathematical constraints on neuronal information processing capacities. The explanatory structure in these cases is shown to parallel other putative instances of mathematical explanation. The upshot for cognitive mathematical explanations is thus two-fold: first, the view capably rebuts standard mechanistic objections to non-mechanistic explanation; (...) second, this view serves to importantly widen the possibility space for non-mechanistic forms of explanation in cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper explores how, at the 1875 Royal Commission on Vivisection, the anaesthetised animal was construed as a boundary object around which “cooperation without consensus” Computer supported cooperative work: cooperation or conflict? Springer, London, 1993) could form, serving the interests of both scientists and animals. Advocates of anaesthesia presented it as benevolently intervening between the scientific agent and animal patient. Such articulations of ‘ethical’ vivisection through anaesthesia were then mandated in the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, and thus have had (...) significant downstream effects on the regulation of laboratory animals in Britain and beyond. Constructing this ‘consensus’ around the anaesthetised animal, however, required first excluding abolitionists and inhumane scientists, and secondly limiting the interests of experimental animals to the avoidance of pain through anaesthesia and euthanasia, thereby circumventing the issue of their possible interest in future life. This consensus also served to secure the interests of vivisecting scientists and to limit the influence of public opinion in the laboratory to administrative procedure and scheduled inspection. The focus on anaesthesia was connected with discussions of what supporting infrastructures were required to ensure proper ethical procedure was carried out by scientists. In contrast to the much studied polarisation in British society between pro- and antivivisectionists after 1876, we understand the 1875 Commission as a conflict amongst scientists themselves, while also being an intra-class conflict amongst the ruling class. (shrink)

The increasing preponderance of opinion that some natural phenomena can be explained mathematically has inspired a search for a viable account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Among the desiderata for an adequate account is that it should solve the problem of directionality and the reversals of distinctively mathematical explanations should not count as members among the explanatory fold but any solution must also avoid the exclusion of genuine explanations. In what follows, I introduce and defend what I refer to as a (...) quasi-erotetic solution which provides a remedy to the problem in the form of an additional necessary condition on explanation. (shrink)

At the centenary of Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, we explore the continuing relevance of Knightian uncertainty to the theory and practice of entrepreneurship. There are three challenges facing such assessment. First, RUP is complex and difficult to interpret. The key but neglected element of RUP is that Knight’s account is not solely about risk and uncertainty as states of nature, but about how an agent’s beliefs about uncertain outcomes and confidence in those beliefs guide their choices. Second, (...) RUP is Knight’s only effort in this area. His subsequent career led elsewhere, so he did not engage with subsequent interpretations of this work. Third, much of the current literature emphasizes that decisions must be different under the two states of nature with a consequent misunderstanding of entrepreneurial agency. This paper addresses each challenge in sequence. First, we explicate Knight’s approach and explain why that approach is murky. Second, as a complement to Knight’s interpretation, we examine Frank P. Ramsey’s approach to subjective probabilities to help clarify Knight’s murky approach. What links Knight and Ramsey is a shared pragmatism about entrepreneurial agency under uncertainty that depends upon the beliefs about, and confidence in, their judgments of possible outcomes. This Knight-Ramsey approach does not require actor’s behaviors to be determined by the class of uncertain environment they face. We focus on the response by the entrepreneur to the existence of uncertainty in all its forms. We argue that this reductive account provides a foundation to examine common problems in management, including managerial hubris, the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and the need for experimentation in advance of new product and venture launches. Third, we critique current literature that favors epistemic purism about the ontology of risk and uncertainty and ignores Knight-Ramsey pragmatism in meeting uncertainty, such as using formal and informal institutions for uncertainty mitigation. Our account locates Frank Knight’s subtleties in entrepreneurial behavior firmly in the literature on entrepreneurial agency a century later. (shrink)

The question of how to frame agential preferences in economics finds one caught between Scylla and Charybdis. If preferences are framed in as minimal and deflationary a manner as revealed preference theory recommends, the theory falls prey to objections about its predictiveness and explanatory power. Alternatively, if too many cognitive and causal intricacies are incorporated into the preference concept, revealed preference models will violate pragmatic norms of model construction, surrendering model simplicity and generality. This paper charts a middle course, arguing (...) that the path to salvation lies through an understanding of revealed preference models as program explanations. (shrink)

Codex Louaniensis, or L, the best MS. of Caesar in the British Museum , which is assigned to the eleventh century, has been collated by Alfred Holder for his edition of the Bellum ciuile and by Mr. R. L. A. Du Pontet for his edition of the Bellum Alexandrinum and the Bellum Africanum; but for the Bellum Gallicum no collation has hitherto been available. Last year I made one, which I sent to Dr. Meusel. He urged me to publish it, (...) remarking that it would be very useful, as ‘wir haben nun ein sichereres Urteil über die Familie φ.’ Relying upon Holder's collation, he had described L in his own edition of the Bellum ciuile as ‘a twin-brother of Ashburnhamianus’ ; and so it is in the Bellum ciuile, but, as he acknowledged after reading my collation, not in the Bellum Gallicum. The first folio, comprising i, I–6, §3 , is by a later hand. The MS. is described in the Catalogue thus: ‘c. Jvlii Caesaris commentariorum libri. Desinit cum verbis “res eis suppeteret” in libro de Bello Africano, cap. 33. Codex membranaceus, sec. XL, sed folium primum a manu recentiori suppletum est. Folio [10,084.].’. (shrink)

As students of Roman chronology are aware, all dates between February 24, 700 —if not also between 691, the year of Cicero's consulship—and the last day of 708 can be referred with absolute certainty to the corresponding days of the Julian calendar, with a possible error of one day. The possibility of this minute error lies in the fact that it is not quite certain whether the Kalends of January, 709—the first year of the Julian calendar—corresponded with January 1, 45 (...) B.C., or with January. In Ancient Britain, after examining all the relevant literature, I gave reasons for believing that Kal. Ian. 709 fell upon January 1, 45 B.C. One book, however—the third volume of the revised edition of Drumann's Geschichte Roms, which appeared in 1906, just before the manuscript of Ancient Britain went to the printer—was then unknown to me. I will now examine the reasons which the learned editor, Paul Groebe, has given for accepting the view that the first day of 709 was January 2, 45. (shrink)

When Caesar sailed to Britain in 55 b.c. he was obliged to leave behind eighteen transports which had his cavalry on board and had been prevented by adverse winds from joining the rest of the fleet. These vessels, like those which carried the infantry, were of native Gallic build, and were doubtless sailed by Gallic seamen, who were familiar with the conditions of navigation in the Channel. On the fourth day after Caesar landed in Britain they set sail with a (...) light breeze. All went well until they were approaching the British coast and were descried from the Roman camp when, as Caesar says,‘such a violent storm suddenly arose that none of them could keep their course, but some were carried back to the point from which they had started, while the others were swept down in great peril to the lower and more westerly part of the island. They anchored notwithstanding, but as they were becoming waterlogged, were forced to stand out to sea in the face of night, and make for the continent.’. (shrink)

The object of this article is to ascertain as nearly as possible the dates of the conference at Luca and of Cicero's speech on the consular provinces; to identify the composition which he called his ‘palinode’; and to fix the chronological order of certain letters which relate to these points. Writing on April 8, 698 , Cicero tells his brother that on the 5th there was a debate in the Senate on the Campanian land; that on the 7th he visited (...) Pompey, who intended to start on the IIth for Sardinia and to embark at Labro or Pisa; and that he himself is on the point of leaving Rome, but intends, after staying successively at Anagnia, Arpinum, Pompeii, and Cumae, to return on May 6. Two years later he wrote to Lentulus Spinther that in the debate of April 5, 56, it had been resolved ‘that the question of the Campanian land should be referred to a full meeting of the Senate on the 15th of May.’ ‘After this decree,’ he continued, had passed in accordance with my motion, Pompey, without showing the least sign of being offended with me, started for Sardinia and Africa, and on the way visited Caesar at Luca. Caesar complained a great deal about my motion, for he had already seen Crassus at Ravenna, and had been irritated by him against me. Everyone knew that Pompey was much annoyed about it—so I heard from others and afterwards learned definitely from my brother. When Pompey met him in Sardinia a few days after he left Luca, he said, “You are the very man I want to see… You went bail for your brother Marcus; unless you speak strongly to him, you'll have to pay up”… He spoke of his own services to me; recalled what he had often said to my brother about Caesar's measures [in his consulship] and the pledge which my brother had given for my conduct; called my brother to witness that what he had done to secure my recall [from exile] he had done with the consent of Caesar; and asked him to commend to me Caesar's policy and aims and persuade me not to attack, even if I would not or could not support them. (shrink)

In what follows, I consider two influential views about distributive justice: democratic equality and luck egalitarianism. In examining and criticizing these views, I attempt to extract elements from each of them for what I take to be important to building a complete conception of distributive justice. I then present and defend my own view, deliberative democratic equality, a view that can be described as a hybrid account of luck egalitarianism and democratic equality.

Before the year 1857, when Mommsen published his celebrated treatise Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat, most scholars believed that Caesar's provincial command legally expired at the end of 49 B.C.; but Mommsen demonstrated the falsity of this opinion, and for nearly half a century it was an article of faith that the date fixed was the 1st of March. I may remark parenthetically that, although this date is usually quoted, it would be more correct to say the 28th (...) of February. In 1904, however, Otto Hirschfeld gave reasons for believing that Caesar's command was not expressly secured beyond March 1, 50; and although Ludwig Holzapfel vigorously defended the orthodox view, Hirschfeld remained for several years in possession of the field. In 1913 Walther Judeich, while admitting that Hirschfeld had worsted Mommsen, argued, ‘convincingly’ as Mr. F. E. Adcock thinks, that the date was December 29, 50. The writers of the article on Latin Literature in The Year's Work in Classical Studies , noticing the reissue of the third volume of The Correspondence of Cicero, remark that ‘the authors [Tyrrell and Purser] still hold the pious faith that Caesar's command in Gaul was to run out on the 1st of March in 49; it is a pity,’ they add, ‘in view of Hirschfeld and the rest, that they have not shown the English reader their grounds for that belief.’ I propose in this article to give mine for sharing it. (shrink)

Octogesa.—Those who have read the First Commentary of Caesar's Civil War will remember that the theatre of the campaign which he conducted against Afranius and Petreius extended from a point on the Segre twenty-two Roman miles above Ilerda to the mountains which close on the north the valley of the Ebro. The earlier operations took place in the neighbourhood of Ilerda and on either side of the upper reaches of the Segre; the later in the country between Ilerda and the (...) mountains. Thanks to Stoffel, the topography of the earlier operations is determined fairly well: that of the later, especially the position of Octogesa, is still uncertain. Caesar's camp was about five furlongs west of Ilerda; the Pompeian camp was on a ridge half a mile south of his. (shrink)

In scientific modeling, continuum idealizations bridge scales but at the cost of fundamentally misrepresenting the microstructure of the system. This engenders a mystery. If continuum idealizations are dispensable in principle, this de-problematizes their representational inaccuracy, since continuum properties reduce to lower-scale properties, but the mystery of how this reduction could be carried out endures. Alternatively, if continuum idealizations are indispensable in principle, this is consistent with their explanatory and predictive success but renders their representational inaccuracy mysterious. I argue for a (...) deflationary solution, enlisting the applied scientific method of upscaling as demonstrated in a case from soil hydrology. (shrink)

Signor Ferrero has courteously replied to the article in the Classical Quarterly of July, 1909, in which I gave reasons for preferring Caesar's First Commentary to his reconstruction. He thinks that I failed to seize his main point, which, he says, is represented by this question: Why did Caesar conclude an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 b.c. and break it in the following year? Any one who may have read my article with care will have seen that I recognized that (...) this point was capital. (shrink)

The credibility of Caesar's account of his campaigns against the Helvetii and Ariovistus has recently been attacked anew by Signor Ferrero, whose fame, rapidly acquired, is not only European but Transatlantic, and who has conducted his case with more ability than his predecessors and on entirely new lines. I do not think that it will be a waste of time to analyse the article in which he has set it forth.

Suetonius says that Augustus was born on the ninth day before the Kalends of October , in the year when Cicero and Antonius were consuls , a little before sunrise,1 and also that he was born under Capricorn.2 Mr. H. W. Garrod, in his recent edition of Manilius,3 maintains that the date which Suetonius gives belonged to the pre- Julian calendar, and corresponded with December 20 of the Julian. Remarking that, ‘ according to our present reckonings,’ the sun enters Capricorn (...) on December 22, he adds that ‘the astronomers of Cicero's time placed the beginnings of the sign some 7 degrees in advance of our reckonings. If, therefore,’ he concludes, ‘ Augustus was born on Sept. 22 paulo ante solis exortum, Capricorn was his natal sign.’. (shrink)

Among the problems of ancient history of which no solution has yet been generally recognized as definitive is that of the battle-field where the struggle between Pompey and Caesar was decided. Colonel Leake's exposition was rejected by von Göler and Sir William Napier; and the paper in which he endeavoured to vindicate it produced little effect. Napier and von Göler constructed theories which were vitiated by the misleading maps on which they worked. M. Léon Heuzey, the chief of the Macedonian (...) mission which collected information for the contemplated final volume of Napoleon the Third's Histoire de Jules César, performed a valuable service by preparing, with the aid of an engineer officer, M. Laloy, the first trustworthy survey of the Pharsalian region; but his dissertation on the battle, published in 1886, was bitterly derided by Colonel Stoffel, who, however, appropriated his predecessor's maps without acknowledgment. About the same time Mr. Perrin published in the American Journal of Philology a valuable article, which, although it convinced many that the battle had been fought, as von Göler, Napier, and Long maintained, on the northern bank of the Enipeus, was necessarily written without any knowledge of the works of Heuzey and Stoffel. (shrink)

I AM glad that Dr. Fotheringham in the interesting paper which appeared in the Classical Quarterly adhered to the view that ‘Caesar calculated the new moon for January 1 [45 B.C]…and that this calculation determined the inaugural day of the Julian calendar.’ As the object of my brief note, on which he commented, was merely to show that Groebe had failed to prove that the day in question was January 2, I have only a few questions to ask. But first, (...) in justice to Judeich, I ought to say that his calculations, which Dr. Fotheringham notices, were made with the help of the assistant-astronomer attached to the observatory of the University of Strassburg. While Dr. Fotheringham admits that I was right in maintaining that the new moon of January 2, 45 B.C. was not visible on the evening of that day, he holds that Groebe was ‘fairly entitled to say’ that the new moon of March 24, 58 B.C. , was visible on March 25. Dr. Fotheringham may be justified in saying that it ought ‘in normal [or abnormally fine ?] weather to have been visible that evening’; but, as I observed in my note, Groebe affirmed that in calculating the time of visibility of the crescent we should accept the mean of the Babylonian estimates, 36 hours—less, I should have added, in the early spring and the winter, more in the summer and autumn. Was he entitled to deduct 9 hours from the mean for an observation made not in the clear atmosphere of the East, but in Switzerland? Dr. Fotheringham tells us that ‘the shortest interval between a new moon and the observation of the moon by Schmidt's naked eye comes’ not, as Groebe said, to 29, but ‘to 25.7 hours.’ But forty-eight of Schmidt's forty-nine observations were made at Athens, where the atmosphere is clearer than in Switzerland. The great difference in visibility which a clear atmosphere makes must strike everyone who goes from this country or from Switzerland to the East or to Northern Africa. I realized it for the first time when I was exploring in Tunisia before the war. Has Dr. Fotheringham or any other trustworthy observer ever seen with the naked eye in an atmosphere no clearer than that of Geneva a moon not more than 27 hours old? If so, is it not remarkable that, as Dr. Fotheringham has said, ‘Hitherto it has been the practice to assume that [in the early spring or the winter and in favourable weather ?] the moon becomes visible on the first evening when she is more than 30 hours old at sunset’? (shrink)

Every one who has used Dr. Meusel's excellent edition of Caesar's Bellum Ciuile will welcome the first volume, comprising Commentaries I.–IV., of his final edition of the Bellum Gallicum. Nominally, each of the two books is a revision of the work of other men,–in the former case of Kraner and Hofmann, in the latter of Kraner and Dittenberger; really each, especially the latter, contains the fruit of so much independent research that the personalities of the older editors are obscured. That (...) part of the joint work of Kraner and Dittenberger which corresponds with the revision consisted of 199 pages ; the revision extends to 464. As Meusel remarks in the Preface, it is no longer intended for the use of schools, but of teachers and classical scholars. The historical introduction and the section on the Roman army, which retain much of Kraner's work, have been carefully retouched; many of the footnotes have been corrected or rewritten; many, both on linguistic points and on the subject-matter, have been added. (shrink)

A subarea of the debate over the nature of evolutionary theory addresses what the nature of the explanations yielded by evolutionary theory are. The statisticalist line is that the general principles of evolutionary theory are not only amenable to a mathematical interpretation but that they need not invoke causes to furnish explanations. Causalists object that construction of these general principles involves crucial causal assumptions. A recent view claims that some biological explanations are statistically autonomous explanations (SAEs) whereby phenomena are accounted (...) for statistically and which prescind from micro-causal details. I raise three major problems for this account and then advance a view which unifies SAEs as mathematical explanations: the MSAE view. The MSAE view not only resolves the issues bedeviling the original SAE account but serves to importantly broaden the class of non-causal explanations in population biology. (shrink)