This paper investigates how specific notions of gender and ethnicity are integrated into diversity discourses presented on 241 top European company websites. Large European companies increasingly disclose equality and diversity policies in statements on websites. Such statements may be used to promote an ethical image of the company in terms of how well it manages diversity and guards against discrimination. In this paper, we argue that diversity statement discourses are important as they play a key part in socially constructing how (...) diversity should be regarded in the company by minority and majority groups, as well as indicating corporate values to external stakeholders. Sometimes, the notions of gender or ethnic diversity are positioned as a liability in need of protection, whilst in others, as a source of competitive advantage. We find evidence of use of discursive tools such as problematisation, rationalisation, fixation, reframing and naturalisation of the notions of gender and ethnic diversity, reinforced by use of symbols, such as statistics, photographs, membership badges and awards. Few statements directly associate gender and ethnic diversity with enhanced corporate performance. We found that diversity statements sometimes appear to reinforce existing business stereotypes of women and people from ethnic minorities, and in a few discourses, create new ones, particularly evident in photographs illustrating the diversity web pages. (shrink)

This paper investigates how specific notions of gender and ethnicity are integrated into diversity discourses presented on 241 top European company websites. Large European companies increasingly disclose equality and diversity policies in statements on websites. Such statements may be used to promote an ethical image of the company in terms of how well it manages diversity and guards against discrimination. In this paper, we argue that diversity statement discourses are important as they play a key part in socially constructing how (...) diversity should be regarded in the company by minority and majority groups, as well as indicating corporate values to external stakeholders (investors, government, community, press etc.). Sometimes, the notions of gender or ethnic diversity are positioned as a liability in need of protection, whilst in others, as a source of competitive advantage. We find evidence of use of discursive tools such as problematisation, rationalisation, fixation, reframing and naturalisation of the notions of gender and ethnic diversity, reinforced by use of symbols, such as statistics, photographs, membership badges and awards. Few statements directly associate gender and ethnic diversity with enhanced corporate performance. We found that diversity statements sometimes appear to reinforce existing business stereotypes of women and people from ethnic minorities, and in a few discourses, create new ones, particularly evident in photographs illustrating the diversity web pages. (shrink)

Here we question the mechanisms underlying the emergence of the feeling of control that can be modulated even when the feeling of being the author of one’s own action is intact. With a haptic robot, participants made series of vertical pointing actions on a virtual surface, which was sometimes postponed by a small temporal delay (15 or 65 ms). Subjects then evaluated their subjective feeling of control. Results showed that after temporal distortions, the hand-trajectories were adapted effectively but that the (...) feeling of control decreased significantly. This was observed even in the case of subliminal distortions for which subjects did not consciously detect the presence of a distortion. Our findings suggest that both supraliminal and subliminal temporal distortions that occur within a healthy perceptual–motor system impact the conscious experience of the feeling of control of self-initiated motor actions. (shrink)

Williams and J. Fraser have recently argued that effective field theory methods enable scientific realists to make more reliable ontological commitments in quantum field theory than those commonly made. In this paper, I show that the interpretative relevance of these methods extends beyond the specific context of QFT by identifying common structural features shared by effective theories across physics. In particular, I argue that effective theories are best characterized by the fact that they contain intrinsic empirical limitations, and I extract (...) from their structure one central interpretative constraint for making more reliable ontological commitments in different subfields of physics. While this is in principle good news, this constraint still raises a challenge for scientific realists in some contexts, and I bring the point home by focusing on Williams’s and J. Fraser’s defense of selective realism in QFT. (shrink)

Il est commun, aujourd'hui, d'associer la démocratie au consensus, et ce d'une double manière : d'une part en admettant qu'elle est le meilleur régime politique possible, d'autre part en considérant que l'accord vaut intrinsèquement mieux que le désaccord, et l'entente que le conflit: La qualité de la démocratie tiendrait à ses débats publics, qui à la fois rendent possible la confrontation des points de vue, tout en y mettant fin par l'obtention de consensus éclairés et légitimés par la règle de (...) la majorité. Et si le conflit, au contraire, dans certaines conditions, devait servir de principe à la vie politique? Il ne suffit pas de vivre en démocratie pour rendre la démocratie vivante. La démocratie n'est pas un régime mais un questionnement. Elle exige des citoyens une interrogation continue sur le bien commun à suivre. Machiavel n'était pas un démocrate. Mais c'est étrangement en actualisant sa pensée, dans le sillage des travaux de Lefort, qu'il est possible d'associer le conflit civil avec l'imaginaire social pour redynamiser la démocratie par la tension conflictuelle entre l'idéologie et l'utopie. Penser la démocratie à partir de ce que donne à penser Machiavel : voilà ce que s'efforce de faire Sébastien Roman, pour proposer dans une perspective républicaine le modèle d'un espace public dissensuel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article traces the origins of Kenneth Wilson's conception of effective field theories (EFTs) in the 1960s. I argue that what really made the difference in Wilson's path to his first prototype of EFT are his long-standing pragmatic aspirations and methodological commitments. Wilson's primary interest was to work on mathematically interesting physical problems and he thought that progress could be made by treating them as if they could be analyzed in principle by a sufficiently powerful computer. The first point (...) explains why he had no qualms about twisting the structure of field theories; the second why he divided the state-space of a toy model field theory into continuous slices by following a standard divide-and-conquer algorithmic strategy instead of working directly with a fully discretized and finite theory. I also show how Wilson's prototype bears the mark of these aspirations and commitments and clear up a few striking ironies along the way. (shrink)

This article aims first at showing that Russell's general doctrine according to which all mathematics is deducible ‘by logical principles from logical principles’ does not require a preliminary reduction of all mathematics to arithmetic. In the Principles, mechanics (part VII), geometry (part VI), analysis (part IV–V) and magnitude theory (part III) are to be all directly derived from the theory of relations, without being first reduced to arithmetic (part II). The epistemological importance of this point cannot be overestimated: Russell's (...) logicism does not only contain the claim that mathematics is no more than logic, it also contains the claim that the differences between the various mathematical sciences can be logically justified—and thus, that, contrary to the arithmetization stance, analysis, geometry and mechanics are not merely outgrowths of arithmetic. The second aim of this article is to set out the neglected Russellian theory of quantity. The topic is obviously linked with the first, since the mere existence of a doctrine of magnitude, in a work dated from 1903, is a sign of a distrust vis-à-vis the arithmetization programme. After having shown that, despite the works of Cantor, Dedekind and Weierstrass, many mathematicians at the end of the 19th Century elaborated various axiomatic theories of the magnitude, I will try to define the peculiarity of the Russellian approach. I will lay stress on the continuity of the logicist's thought on this point: Whitehead, in the Principia, deepens and generalizes the first Russellian 1903 theory. (shrink)

The conceptual foundations, features, and scope of the notion of rationality are increasingly being affected by developments in embodied cognitive science. This article starts from the idea of embodied rationality, and aims to develop a frame in which a debate with the classical, possibly bounded, notion of rationality-as-consistency can take place. To this end, I develop a game theoretic description of a real time interaction setup in which participants' behaviors can be used to compare the enactive approach, which underlies embodied (...) rationality, with game theoretic approaches to human interaction. The Perceptual Crossing Paradigm is a minimal interaction interface where two participants each control an avatar on a shared virtual line, and are tasked with cooperatively finding each other among distractor objects. It is well known that the best performance on this task is obtained when both participants let their movements coordinate with the objects they encounter, which they do without any prior knowledge of efficient interaction strategies in the system. A game theoretic model of this paradigm shows that this task can be described as an Assurance game, which allows for comparing game theoretical approaches and the enactive approach on two main fronts. First, accounting for the ability of participants to interactively solve the Assurance game; second, accounting for the evolution of choice landscapes resulting from evolving normative realms in the task. Similarly to the series of paradoxes which have fueled debates in economics in the past century, this analysis aims to serve as an interpretation testbed which can fuel the current debate on rationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to BayleSébastien CharlesGianni Paganini, editor. The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. Pp. xxviii + 486. Cloth, $180.00.Cette édition des actes du congrès international « The Return of Scepticism », organisé par Gianni Paganini à l'Université du Piémont-Oriental de Vercelli en mai 2000, a pour ambition de faire le point sur l'état de (...) la recherche actuelle en cherchant à cerner au mieux les implications épistémologiques et les répercussions européennes du scepticisme à la période moderne. Placés sous le patronage de Richard H. Popkin, dont un essai ouvre l'ouvrage et pave la voie à de futures recherches sur la question, les textes rassemblés par Gianni Paganini ont pour trait commun d'insister sur la prégnance du scepticisme à l'époque moderne, tout en prenant garde au fait de bien replacer chaque stratégie sceptique dans l'environnement culturel et philosophique qui fut le sien. Divisé en sept sections, l'ouvrage fournit une vue d'ensemble de la question sceptique qui s'étale sur deux siècles, le XVIIe et le XVIIIe.Dans la première section, l'accent est mis sur un aspect délaissé de l'histoire du scepticisme moderne, à savoir le traitement particulier qui lui fut réservé dans la pensée anglaise des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Sont abordés ici les cas de Hobbes, dont le traitement du scepticisme est pensé en relation inversée avec celui de Descartes (G. Paganini), Locke, qui tend à faire sien le principe sceptique de la limitation du savoir (G. A. J. Rogers), et les Platoniciens de Cambridge, qui s'inspirent de la méthode sceptique pour compartimenter le champ du savoir (F. Tomasoni).Dans la deuxième section, c'est la pensée continentale qui est à l'honneur, avec des textes consacrés à Descartes spécifiquement ou à La Mothe le Vayer et Descartes, avec pour objectif commun de questionner l'originalité du travail cartésien en insistant notamment sur le rôle de l'epoché chez Charron comme source possible du cogito (J. R. Maia Neto) et sur une tradition sceptique non fidéiste présente dans les œuvres de La Mothe le Vayer comme de Descartes (J.-P. Cavaillé).La troisième section évoque la prise de conscience des enjeux sceptiques chez les sectateurs et les adversaires de Descartes, qui s'accordent tous à reconnaître l'insuffisance de la réfutation du scepticisme proposée par ce dernier. Ce point fait l'unanimité tant chez les opposants à Descartes—Martin Schoock (A. Del Prete), Pierre Villemandy (C. Borghero), Pierre-Daniel Huet (T. M. Lennon), et les philosophes italiens Fardella et Doria (M. T. Marcialis)—que chez ceux qui se sont inspirés de sa philosophie—Arnauld (G. Belgioioso), Malebranche, Foucher et Desgabets (E. Scribano).La prise en compte des enjeux sceptiques aux plans politique et religieux est intégrée dans la quatrième partie au sein de laquelle sont évoquées des thématiques plurielles comme la présence du probabilisme néo-académique chez Pascal (A. McKenna), l'interprétation sceptique, voire libertine, du pouvoir et de la liberté rattachée à la théorie hobbesienne de l'état de nature chez Samuel Sorbière (L. Bianchi), ou le rapport existant entre scepticisme et tolérance (L. Simonutti).La section suivante délaisse politique et religion pour aborder le cas de la science, et de l'effet du scepticisme au niveau épistémologique. Le cas de Martín Martínez témoigne du fait que le scepticisme peut être conciliable avec une vision empiriste de la science et qu'une physique sceptique reste possible (J. C. Laursen). De même, le rapport des savants italiens comme Redi, Magalotti ou Dati à l'égard du scepticisme est évocateur de la prise de conscience des dangers que le scepticisme pose pour le domaine du démontrable (M. Torrini), ce qui vaut également pour toute théorie de la signification, dont les implications sceptiques sont patentes (G. Hassler), ou pour toute approche historique minée par des considérations pyrrhoniennes (C. Grell... (shrink)

Leśniewski’s metalogic is often considered to be difficult to understand because it differs greatly from its standard formulation. In this paper I try to explain the reasons of these idiosyncrasies. I claim that they have mainly two sources. First of all there is Leśniewski’s conviction that a formal system should be conceived as a set of concrete marks that can always physically and syntactically be expanded by the addition of new theses. Secondly there is Leśniewski’s conviction that definitions should neither (...) be formulas belonging to the metalanguage, nor deduction rules, but formulas belonging to the object-language and expressed with the help of the biconditional functor. The realisation of the first point is linked to the second one in so far as the metalinguistic rule for the writing out of definitions has to be formulated in a way that makes it possible to build the formal system in agreement with Leśniewski’s conception. While explaining these points I give an overview of the main peculiarities of Leśniewski’s metalogic. (shrink)

In line with [2], [12, 13, 14] carefully studies the Leibnizian notion of suspensive condition—notion that Leibniz sometimes names moral condition. Thiercelin points out Leibniz’ will to provide a rigorous definition of that kind of condition. Leibniz not only establishes a link between the legal notion of condition and the logical notion of condition, but he also grasps the problematic of suspensive condition through its epistemic and dynamic features. In this paper we start from Thiercelin’s reflections about Leibniz’ suspensive condition. (...) Thiercelin’s work offers an inventory of different clauses that a logical conditional must fulfill to capture the legal meaning of suspensive condition. Our aim is to compare such a definition with the Public Announcement operator semantics ([16]) taking advantage of both its model theoretic semantics and its dialogical semantics (introduced for the first time in [5]). We show that the public announcement operator entails the same dynamic and epistemic features than the ones that Leibniz requires with its notion of suspensive condition. (shrink)

Autism has been widely covered by the medias, and studies analyzing this discourse have pointed out frequent and repetitive distortions of the biomedical knowledge. We conducted a systematic analysis of conceptions of autism in the french specialized social workers press between 1989 and 2014, and compared these results to a recent study on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in the same field. Analysis of discourse about autism, and more generally on mental and psychosocial disorders in the specialized social workers press (...) shows that social factors highly involved in these pathologies are never presented, as they are widely argued in the international literature, and can be subject to specific socio-educational policies and practices. Most ways of autism presented to french social workers belong to the therapeutic sphere, and reveal a growing medicalization of social work, allowing us to question the practice and training issues. (shrink)

Focusing on the history of prehistoric archaeology in the 20th century, this papers shows (1) that statistical multidimensional analyses were carried out by a new kind of actors who challenged the previous common language shared by prehistorians. This fundamental change was important, considering that (2) language is a fundamental point for the epistemology of archaeology. However, a comparison of multidimensional analyses applications over time shall make clear that (3) the differences are mostly a generational matter: the transmission processes between (...) them will be addressed. (shrink)

Abstract:Russellian incomplete symbols are usually conceived as an analytical residue—as what remains of the would-be entities when properly analyzed. This article aims to reverse the approach in raising another question: what, if any, does the incomplete symbol contribute to the completely analyzed language? I will first show that, from a technical point of view, there is no difference between the way Russell defines his denoting phrases in “On Denoting” and the way Frege defines his second-order concepts. But I will (...) secondly support that the two notions have two widely different conceptual meanings: the same logical procedures which are used by Frege to increase the deductive power of his system allow Russell to logically relate quantificational notation to ordinary language. Focusing on Russell’s treatment of OD’s puzzles, I will thirdly argue that this shift constitutes the source of a deep transformation in the way logic and language are related. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:January 28, 2009 (12:22 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 051red.wpd russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 28 (winter 2008–09): 171–90 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 eviews A RELATIONAL DISPUTE Sébastien Gandon iufz/zphier / U. Blaise Pascal 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France [email protected] Stewart Candlish. The Russell/Bradley Dispute and Its SigniWcance for TwentiethCentury Philosophy. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. xix, 235. isbn (...) 978-0-230-50685-5. £49.99; us$84.95 (hb). Candlish’s book aims at giving a “fair” description of the notorious Russell/ Bradley dispute, that is, a more balanced one than the version that is usually told. The standard account is the one given by Russell, and, as Russell was a party of the debate, it is no surprise that he seriously misconstrued Bradley’s arguments. Attempting to set the historical record straight, Candlish then opposes Russell’s description of the dispute. The author is quite clear, however, on the fact that he does not himself endorse the Idealistic point of view (p. xi). The two Wrst chapters of the book are introductory: the Wrst one is a presentation of the stereotypical picture that the author intends to demolish, while the second is an outline of Bradley’s metaphysics. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to a confrontation between Russell and Bradley’s theories of judgment and truth. Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated to a rehabilitation of Bradley’s writings about relation. In these four chapters, Candlish attempts to show that Russell’s arguments against Bradley were not as devastating as they are supposed to be, and that Bradley’s insights were quite powerful—so much so that they have been rediscovered by some later philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, for instance. The concluding chapter is an attempt to explain the decline of monistic idealism after Bradley. Candlish does not only aim at oTering a “fair” account of the Russell/Bradley dispute. This goal is extended by a more general plea for the introduction of an historical perspective in analytic philosophy. According to Candlish, “our implicit acceptance of a distorted version of philosophy’s recent past has serious consequences ” (p. 19): one of them is that, by misunderstanding our own history, we “misunderstand ourselves and the nature of what we are about” (ibid.); another is that, by being deprived of any way to connect what we do in philosophy January 28, 2009 (12:22 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 051red.wpd 172 Reviews with what some of the philosophers of the past have done, “we may, as a result, fall under the impression that only we, and those obviously like us, are really doing philosophy, at least as it ought to be done” (ibid.). From this perspective, Russell’s confrontation with Bradley seems to represent a rather good topic: not only does it epitomize a turning-point in Russell’s intellectual evolution and in the emergence of the new tradition, but it also shows how easily the new and victorious analytic philosophy has misconstrued its own history. If I entirely share Candlish’s conviction about the necessity of introducing an historical perspective in analytical philosophy, I am not convinced by Candlish’s own reconstruction of the dispute. In a nutshell, what I Wnd very useful in the book is all that concerns Bradley, and some of the parts devoted to Russell (especially, the analysis of his theory of judgment). What I do not agree with is, Wrst, Candlish’s way of doing history of philosophy; second, his treatment of Russell’s works; and third, his general conception of the use of logic in philosophy. Candlish really succeeds in expounding to the modern eye both the coherence of Bradley’s thought, and the diUculty of grasping it. His analysis of the role Bradley gave to “intellectual satisfaction” (pp. 26–7, 33) and to the “principles of suUcient reason” (pp. 46–7) is very enlightening—it explains why Bradley, while endorsing a kind of methodological scepticism, denied that ultimate contingencies were given in experience (p. 48). Candlish also does a great job of presenting... (shrink)

L’article vise à établir un lien entre les travaux de Russell sur les fondements de la géométrie et ses célèbres textes des années 1911-1914 sur la perception, la matière et les sense-data. Nous insistons d’abord sur le fait que la notion russellienne de donnée sensorielle n’est pas phénoménaliste : les sense-data des Problèmes de Philosophie sont des objets extérieurs aussi peu mentaux que les corps matériels. L’accent est ensuite mis sur l’article On Matter : Russell y introduit pour la première (...) fois l’idée que les sense-data n’ont pas une, mais deux positions — une position où ils sont vus et une position d’où ils sont vus. Cette manœuvre permet à Russell de considérer la donnée sensorielle comme le point d’intersection neutre de deux ensembles fondamentalement différents : une série « physique », matérielle, et une série de « perspectives », mentales. L’idée qu’une même chose peut être classée sous différentes catégories, donc que le mode de classification aristotélicien en espèce et en genre n’est pas le seul concevable, est à la fois la clé de voûte de la théorie des relations entre « sense-data » et « physical things » de 1914 et le nerf du ralliement ultérieur au « monisme neutre ». Nous défendons, dans une troisième partie, que ce canevas n’est lui-même qu’un lointain écho de la conception de la géométrie projective définie comme théorie générale des relations d’incidence développée par Russell dans The Principles of Mathematics (1903). (shrink)

L’article vise à établir un lien entre les travaux de Russell sur les fondements de la géométrie et ses célèbres textes des années 1911-1914 sur la perception, la matière et les sense-data. Nous insistons d’abord sur le fait que la notion russellienne de donnée sensorielle n’est pas phénoménaliste : les sense-data des Problèmes de Philosophie sont des objets extérieurs aussi peu mentaux que les corps matériels. L’accent est ensuite mis sur l’article On Matter : Russell y introduit pour la première (...) fois l’idée que les sense-data n’ont pas une, mais deux positions — une position où ils sont vus et une position d’où ils sont vus. Cette manœuvre permet à Russell de considérer la donnée sensorielle comme le point d’intersection neutre de deux ensembles fondamentalement différents : une série « physique », matérielle, et une série de « perspectives », mentales. L’idée qu’une même chose peut être classée sous différentes catégories, donc que le mode de classification aristotélicien en espèce et en genre n’est pas le seul concevable, est à la fois la clé de voûte de la théorie des relations entre « sense-data » et « physical things » de 1914 et le nerf du ralliement ultérieur au « monisme neutre ». Nous défendons, dans une troisième partie, que ce canevas n’est lui-même qu’un lointain écho de la conception de la géométrie projective définie comme théorie générale des relations d’incidence développée par Russell dans The Principles of Mathematics (1903). (shrink)

English summary: Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-1956) was one of the most important members of the Lwow-Warsaw school of logic. The thirteen translated articles in this volume demonstrate the protean form of Lukasiewiczs work, from his texts on Aristotle and the principle of non-contradiction and syllogistics to modal logic, intuitionism, and multivalent logics. The articles show in particular his preoccupations with logical precision and the problem of human liberty. French description: Avec Kazimierz Twardowski, Stanislaw Lesniewski et Alfred Tarski, le logicien et philosophe (...) polonais Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-1956) est l'un des membres les plus importants de l'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie. Celebre pour ses ouvrages consacres a Aristote, notamment sur le principe de non-contradiction et sur la syllogistique, il a egalement publie des articles majeurs sur la logique propositionnelle, la logique modale, l'intuitionnisme et les logiques multivalentes, dont il fut l'un des fondateurs. Enfin, il a contribue a faire reconnaitre l'importance des travaux en logique de l'ecole megarico-stoicienne, trop longtemps eclipses par ceux d'Aristote sur la syllogistique. Mais Lukasiewicz ne fut pas seulement un logicien et un historien brillant, il s'engagea aussi dans les polemiques philosophiques de son temps. Il defendit ainsi la methode logique en philosophie. Proche sur ce point des membres du Cercle de Vienne, il ne rejetait pas pour autant les questions metaphysiques, commecelle du determinisme qui l'occupa toute sa vie. Les treize articles de ce recueil, fruit d'un travail collectif de traduction, ont pour ambition de montrer le caractere proteiforme de l'oeuvre de Lukasiewicz, preoccupe autant par la precision logique que par le probleme de la liberte humaine. (shrink)

Notre travail doctoral s'articule autour de deux questions: comment la pensee de Berkeley, qui semble en accord avec celle de la majorite des penseurs des Lumieres sur un certain nombre de points bien precis , a-t-elle ete percue par ceux-ci comme l'antithese meme de leur projet epistemologique? Pourquoi l'immaterialisme berkeleyen a-t-il ete confondu durablement avec une position solipsiste, que l'on qualifiait d'egciiste au XVIIIe siecle, l'egoisme revenant a se penser seul existant? Tres vite, nous nous sommes rendu compte que le (...) traitement de ces deux questions pouvait avoir une repercussion majeure sur l'image que nous nous faisons aujourd'hui des Lumieres et qu'il impliquait une relecture d'ensemble du XVIIIe siecle par le biais d'une mise en rapport serree avec le scepticisme, et plus particulierement avec l'immaterialisme qui, en tant que percu comme solipsisme, semblait fournir une clef d'interpretation feconde. Ce qui explique le plan d'ensemble suivi, organise autour d'une histoire du scepticisme, de la Renaissance au debut du XVIIIe siecle, suivie d'une histoire de l'immaterialisme, qui s'echelonne de la premiere reception de Berkeley a la fin du siecle des Lumieres, l'Academie de Berlin pour la Prusse et l'Ideologie pour la France marquant la fin de notre enquete. ;Au terme d'une telle etude, nous pensons etre parvenu a faire ressortir dans toute son etendue et sous ses differentes formes le scepticisme des Lumieres, qui se construit autour d'un refus du pyrrhonisme absolu qui denie toute existence au monde exterieur et d'une acceptation du scepticisme comme outil methodologique permettant aux penseurs des Lumieres de construire une science des phenomenes sans doute incertaine, mais neanmoins ayant tous les caracteres d'une forte probabilite et sujette a amelioration continuelle. Par la, une autre vision du XVIIIe siecle nous parait avoir ete acquise, sans doute moins flamboyante mais egalement plus objective. (shrink)

Selon Marcel Conche, le scepticisme est aujourd'hui l'horizon indépassable de toute philosophie. Cette opinion se justifie chez lui de diverges manieres et se présente sous différentes facettes. Mais il pense pouvoir échapper aux tentations relativistes ou nihilistes. Marcel Conche thinks that skepticism is nowadays the impassable philosophical horizon of every philosophy. Several reasons account for such a point of view, but Conche aims at eschewing both relativistic and nihilist temptations.

Parti d'une formulation maladroite de Rousseau laissant croire qu'il ne s'était rien fait sur le thème de l'éducation des Quelques pensées sur l'éducation de Locke à l'Émile, nous avons d'abord voulu montrer le côté fallacieux d'une telle proposition pour bien faire ressortir au contraire l'intérêt d'un tel sujet au siècle des Lumières, sujet qui mobilise toute l'attention des philosophes. Et cette importance accordée à l'éducation est nettement perceptible sur quatre points, qui sont au coeur de l'articulation logique de notre travail. (...) Ainsi, nous montrons d'abord que l'éducation est un topos philosophique par excellence depuis la mise en évidence cartésienne des préjugés attachés à l'enfance. Philosopher, c'est donc former l'individu à repérer et à dénoncer ces présupposés qu'on impose à sa conscience. Cela passe évidemment par une réforme du préceptorat. Ensuite, nous avons mis en valeur l'importance philosophique de l'éducation au siècle du sensualisme où tout part des sens et donc de l'enfance. Dans un troisième moment, nous nous sommes attaché à comprendre comment le siècle des Lumières envisageait l'importance de l'éducation non en termes d'individus mais d'espèce. Faisant intervenir Turgot et Condorcet, nous avons analysé les progrès de l'esprit humain de sa source ténébreuse à la lumière du siècle des philosophes et montré en quoi l'éducation est le socle même d'un tel processes. Enfin, nous terminons en pointant du doight le rôle indispensable de la raison dans toute tentative éducative. Nous inspirant alors de Kant, nous montrons les interactions entre raison et éducation tant au niveau privé que public. En conclusion, nous nous interrogeons sur la portée pratique de ces théories philosophiques. (shrink)

Contre Regis Débray qui ne voit en Tocqueville qu’une figure emblématique de la démocratie et non un républicain, cet article cherche à réhabiliter le républicanisme tocquevillien. Cela implique d’emblée de comprendre, il est vrai, I’importance réelle accordée par Tocqueville à I’analyse de la démocratie, mais ceci non pas dans le but de l’encenser mais parce que tout indique - et même la Providence divine - qu’elle est amenée à s’imposer en Europe tout comme elle I‘a fait prioritairement aux États-Unis. Après (...) avoir étudié en détail cette analyse de la démocratie, nous montrerons que Tocqueville cherche aussi bien à en vanter les merites qu’à en relever les défauts, qu’il ne dissimule guère. Il s’agira dès lors pour lui de faire triompher I’esprit républicain sur I’esprit égalitariste, ce qui nous amènera à mettre en valeur son attachement réel aux valeurs républicaines, attachement qui, bien qu’exigeant et profond, ne pourra néanmoins transcender les bornes idéologiques de son siècle.In this paper I argue, against Regis Debray who sees in Tocqueville someone who is merely representative of democracy, that Tocqueville was indeed a true republican. This presupposes an adequate understanding of Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy; indeed democracy is important for Tocqueville not so much because it is the best regime but one which is destined to impose itself across Europeas it had already done in the United States. After examining Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy, I will show that he is as keen to point out its merits as to underscore its faults. It will be a matter for him to show the superiority of republicanism over egalitarianism. We will thus see that Tocqueville’s attachment to republican ideals is sincere even though it cannot transcend the ideological limits of his time. (shrink)

Contre Regis Débray qui ne voit en Tocqueville qu’une figure emblématique de la démocratie et non un républicain, cet article cherche à réhabiliter le républicanisme tocquevillien. Cela implique d’emblée de comprendre, il est vrai, I’importance réelle accordée par Tocqueville à I’analyse de la démocratie, mais ceci non pas dans le but de l’encenser mais parce que tout indique - et même la Providence divine - qu’elle est amenée à s’imposer en Europe tout comme elle I‘a fait prioritairement aux États-Unis. Après (...) avoir étudié en détail cette analyse de la démocratie, nous montrerons que Tocqueville cherche aussi bien à en vanter les merites qu’à en relever les défauts, qu’il ne dissimule guère. Il s’agira dès lors pour lui de faire triompher I’esprit républicain sur I’esprit égalitariste, ce qui nous amènera à mettre en valeur son attachement réel aux valeurs républicaines, attachement qui, bien qu’exigeant et profond, ne pourra néanmoins transcender les bornes idéologiques de son siècle.In this paper I argue, against Regis Debray who sees in Tocqueville someone who is merely representative of democracy, that Tocqueville was indeed a true republican. This presupposes an adequate understanding of Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy; indeed democracy is important for Tocqueville not so much because it is the best regime but one which is destined to impose itself across Europeas it had already done in the United States. After examining Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy, I will show that he is as keen to point out its merits as to underscore its faults. It will be a matter for him to show the superiority of republicanism over egalitarianism. We will thus see that Tocqueville’s attachment to republican ideals is sincere even though it cannot transcend the ideological limits of his time. (shrink)

" Au bas de la statue d'Auguste Comte, place de la Sorbonne, à Paris, on pouvait lire récemment - et peut-être le peut-on encore : "Ni Comte ni Sponville". Ce graffiti exprime à sa manière l'un des grands défis de la philosophie française de cette fin de siècle, à savoir celui de sa popularité. Car la philosophie est désormais au centre de la vie publique : elle trône dans les cafés, se fait une place dans l'entreprise et s'installe même dans (...) les cabinets privés. Mais ce qui ne laisse pas d'étonner, c'est l'écho qu'elle rencontre auprès d'un grand public avide de lectures philosophiques. Il convient de s'interroger sur cet engouement, ou plutôt d'interroger les philosophes à ce sujet, eux qui sont sans doute les mieux placés pour y répondre. " Précédés d'une introduction à l'œuvre des auteurs interviewés, les six entretiens réunis dans ce livre font le point à la fois sur la pensée de chacun d'eux et sur la situation générale de la philosophie française actuelle. Bien qu'on n'ait dans aucun sens affaire ici ni à une école ni à une improbable " pensée 98 ", il se dégage quand même de ces rencontres l'image d'une philosophie qui a renoué avec la vie, qui est arrivée à reformuler, à nouveaux frais, les questions de la philosophia perennis et qui a rétabli le dialogue avec son temps. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Potochnik (Biol Philos 24(2):183–197, 2009) analyses some uses of optimality modelling in light of the anti-adaptationism criticism. She distinguishes two broad classes of such uses (weak and strong) on the basis of assumptions held by biologists about the role and the importance of natural selection. This is an interesting proposal that could help in the epistemological characterisation of some biological practices. However, Potochnik’s distinction also rests on the assumption that all optimality modelling represent the selection dynamic (...) involved in the system of phenomena being considered. Since this assumption does not hold for models belonging to optimal foraging theory (OFT)—one of behavioural ecology’s important modelling traditions—Potochnik’s proposal has to be critically reappraised. In this paper, we briefly discuss what is optimality modelling and what it means for a model to represent a dynamic of selection or of evolution. Then, we demonstrate that OFT modelling is unable to represent either past or contemporary selection dynamics. In order to make this point, we carefully delineate the theory’s rationale. This allows us to identify and analyse the assumptions on which the theory is built, and to circumscribe precisely the role that natural selection plays in it. Next, we show that the distinction of weak and strong uses of optimality modelling is seriously weakened when OFT modelling is taken into account. More precisely, the distinction is either irrelevant (if the assumption that selection dynamics are represented in all optimality modelling is held) or of a modest utility (if the assumption is dropped). However, we suggest that Potochnik’s original proposal could be saved, and that it even constitutes a tool to appraise the marks left in the literature by the evolution of optimality modelling practices in the last four decades, provided that it is made into a tripartite distinction. (shrink)

During his prolific career, Reinhart Koselleck left his mark on a myriad of topics beyond the history of concepts: iconology, memory, and temporality. The first part of this piece is a never before published English translation of one of Koselleck’s numerous public interventions. Second, taking as a starting point his reflection about the end of the war and the impossibility to collectivize certain memories, this article links his considerations about the unsayable with his work on images and political sensuality. (...) Going beyond a simple analysis of Koselleck’s writings, the article opens a dialogue between the history of concepts and affective memories, offering news ways to link experiences, emotions, and practices while underlining the limits of communication and collective memory. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage commun a l’indéniable mérite d’être une réflexion duale sur des problèmes philosophiques majeurs. Si là est son intention, sa finalité ne se borne pas à un échange argumenté de points de vue puisqu’il s’agit aussi, comme l’indique l’introduction, de s’interroger sur la possibilité d’une sagesse moderne pour notre fin de siècle. Les lecteurs du Mythe d’Icare d’André Comte-Sponville ne s’y tromperont d’ailleurs pas. Mais le ralliement de Luc Ferry à une telle question, si étonnant qu’il puisse paraître, découle (...) à bien y réfléchir du processus engagé dans son précédent ouvrage sur le sens de la vie. Le propos est donc clair: «Si nous avons voulu renouer avec l’idéal ancien de sagesse, c’est moins par nostalgie que par impatience. La vie est trop brève, trop précieuse, trop difficile, pour qu’on se résigne à la vivre n’importe comment. Et trop intéressante pour qu’on ne prenne pas le temps d’y réfléchir et d’en débattre». Leur souci est donc de rejoindre une préoccupation philosophique originaire tout en la dépassant, c’est-à-dire en comprenant et en assumant que les réponses grecques ne sont plus les nôtres puisque notre monde n’est plus le leur. «Notre problème? Il tient en une question: quelle sagesse après la religion et au-delà de la morale? Nous ne sommes sûrs ni l’un ni l’autre de nos réponses. Mais nous sommes certains, l’un et l’autre, de la pertinence de la question». (shrink)

Que l’appartenance soit l’enjeu des Lumières n’empêche pas Philip Knee de concevoir qu’une telle notion reste aujourd’hui essentielle à penser. Selon l’auteur, il est toujours nécessaire d’articuler entre elles les notions d’autonomie et d’appartenance, car seule leur interaction nous sauve du relativisme absolu et d’une dépossession possible qui soumettrait l’individu corps et âme au grand Tout social. Mais cette articulation, on s’en doute, n’est devenue nécessaire qu’avec l’émergence du concept d’autonomie au siècle des Lumières, qui a pu dès lors faire (...) contrepoids à celui d’appartenance, allant même parfois jusqu’à l’effacer. Philip Knee nous propose ici une généalogie de ce concept en prenant le siècle des Philosophes pour point de départ et le début du XIXe siècle pour point d’arrivée. De là trois enjeux — la morale, la politique et la religion —, qui correspondent aux chapitres théoriques de l’ouvrage, et qui représentent, pour l’auteur, les lieux par excellence où se déploie le sentiment d’appartenance. (shrink)

The bells tolling on 9 May 1945 were heralding peace. The question remained: what kind of peace and for whom? Thousands of us marched on a trail for many kilometers, from Mährish-Ostrau eastward, like a silent accordion, sometimes extended, sometimes compressed, chased, not knowing where we were going. The voices of the bells echoed over our column and raised hopes from whose nonfulfillment countless people would perish, not being able to bear the disappointments of the new forthcoming peace. However, it (...) was all unknown to us, we did not even know where we were going. Yet we knew where we were coming from, from the cauldron that had continuously tightened over four weeks, and from which we had definitely failed to escape on 1 May. With a wounded soldier on my back, I laid down my gun. At that point, we didn’t know yet that the Americans would hand all the prisoners that had reached the redemptive West from Bohemia and Moravia back to the Russians. So this fight had been futile and every death in vain. The dead were still lying around in countless numbers. (shrink)

This chapter examines two ways in which liberal thinkers have appealed to claims about disagreement in order to defend a principle of free speech. One argument, from Mill, says that free speech is a necessary condition for healthy disagreement, and that healthy disagreement is conducive to human flourishing. The other argument says that in a community of people who disagree about questions of value, free speech is a necessary condition of legitimate democratic government. We argue that both of these arguments, (...) in their standard guises, are premised upon contestable views about the realpolitik of disagreement in a liberal society. (shrink)

This book explores a pivotal dimension of Mou Zongsan’s philosophy—that is, his project of reconstructing a moral metaphysics based largely on a dialogue between reinterpreted Chinese thought and Kantism—and thoroughly analyzes a ...

Whether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime. When the SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long , primes congruent with the task (...) set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition , no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the conscious decision. (shrink)

Research on corporate sustainability has started to acknowledge the role of temporality in creating more sustainable organizations. Yet, these advances tend to treat firms as monolithic and we have little understanding of how different temporal patterns throughout an organization shape perceptions of and actions toward sustainability. Building on studies highlighting how the temporal structures of work shape employee engagement with different organizational processes and issues, we seek to answer: How does the temporality of work practices structure perceptions of corporate sustainability (...) throughout the firm? Using data from an ethnography of a small European sustainable bank, we provide an account of the variety of ways in which employees in different departments perceive the bank and how they engage with sustainability. We then go on to show how the temporal structures of work practices within different departments help explain some divergence in perceptions of sustainability. Our study highlights the variegation of temporal structures in organizational processes of meaning-making and its role for a better understanding of the efforts to make corporations more sustainable. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to connect Rota's discussion of the Husserlian notion of Fundierung with Rota's project of giving combinatorics a foundation in his 1964 paper ‘On the foundations of combinatorial theory I’. Section 2 gives the basic tenets of this seminal paper. Sections 3 and 4 spell out the connections made there between Rota's philosophical writings and his mathematical achievements. Section 5 shows how these two developments fit into Rota's analysis of the place of combinatorics in mathematics.

Belief merging aims at combining several pieces of information coming from different sources. In this paper we review the works on belief merging of propositional bases. We discuss the relationship between merging, revision, update and confluence, and some links between belief merging and social choice theory. Finally we mention the main generalizations of these works in other logical frameworks.

In a globalizing world, governments are not always able or willing to regulate the social and environmental externalities of global business activities. Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI), defined as global institutions involving mainly corporations and civil society organizations, are one type of regulatory mechanism that tries to fill this gap by issuing soft law regulation. This conceptual paper examines the conditions of a legitimate transfer of regulatory power from traditional democratic nation-state processes to private regulatory schemes, such as MSIs. Democratic legitimacy is (...) typically concerned with input legitimacy (rule credibility, or the extent to which the regulations are perceived as justified) and output legitimacy (rule effectiveness, or the extent to which the rules effectively solve the issues). In this study, we identify MSI input legitimacy criteria (inclusion, procedural fairness, consensual orientation, and transparency) and those of MSI output legitimacy (rule coverage, efficacy, and enforcement), and discuss their implications for MSI democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

If research devoted to the clandestine literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is today enjoying considerable expansion in the scholarly world, it tends, nonetheless, to be restricted to materialist considerations. However, other themes are open to exploration, such as the immaterialist one which is explicitly mentioned in two manuscripts (theRéflections morales et métaphisiques sur les religions et sur les connoissances de l'hommeand theJordanus Brunus Redivivus). After presenting and analyzing these two texts, we argue that this clandestine account of immaterialism (...) could explain both the evolution of this theory during the Enlightenment and the misunderstanding of Berkeley's philosophy. (shrink)

In a globalizing world, governments are not always able or willing to regulate the social and environmental externalities of global business activities. Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI), defined as global institutions involving mainly corporations and civil society organizations, are one type of regulatory mechanism that tries to fill this gap by issuing soft law regulation. This conceptual paper examines the conditions of a legitimate transfer of regulatory power from traditional democratic nation-state processes to private regulatory schemes, such as MSIs. Democratic legitimacy is (...) typically concerned with input legitimacy (rule credibility, or the extent to which the regulations are perceived as justified) and output legitimacy (rule effectiveness, or the extent to which the rules effectively solve the issues). In this study, we identify MSI input legitimacy criteria (inclusion, procedural fairness, consensual orientation, and transparency) and those of MSI output legitimacy (rule coverage, efficacy, and enforcement), and discuss their implications for MSI democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We consider in this work the problem of iterated belief revision. We propose a family of belief revision operators called revision with memory operators and we give a logical (both syntactical and semantical) characterization of these operators. They obey what we call the principle of strong primacy of update: when one revises his beliefs by a new evidence, then all possible worlds that satisfy this new evidence become more reliable than those that do not. We show that those operators (...) have a satisfying behaviour concerning the iteration of the revision process. Then we provide four particular operators of this family. (shrink)

Psychopathy is a personality disorder frequently associated with immoral behaviors. Previous behavioral studies on the influence of psychopathy on moral decision have yielded contradictory results, possibly because they focused either on judgment (abstract evaluation) or on choice of hypothetical action, two processes that may rely on different mechanisms. In this study, we explored the influence of the level of psychopathic traits on judgment and choice of hypothetical action during moral dilemma evaluation. A population of 102 students completed a questionnaire with (...) ten moral dilemmas and nine non-moral dilemmas. The task included questions targeting both judgment (“Is it acceptable to … in order to …?”) and choice of hypothetical action (“Would you … in order to …?”). The level of psychopathic traits of each participant was evaluated with the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP) scale. Logistic regression fitted with the generalized estimating equations method analyses were conducted using responses to the judgment and choice tasks as the dependent variables and psychopathy scores as predictor. Results show that a high level of psychopathic traits, and more specifically those related to affective deficit, predicted a greater proportion of utilitarian responses for the choice but not for the judgment question. There was no first-order interaction between the level of psychopathic traits and other potential predictors. The relation between a high level of psychopathic traits and increased utilitarianism in choice of action but not in moral judgment may explain the contradictory results of previous studies where these two processes were not contrasted. It also gives further support to the hypothesis that choice of action endorsement and abstract judgment during moral dilemma evaluation are partially distinct neural and psychological processes. We propose that this distinction should be better taken into account in the evaluation of psychopathic behaviors. (shrink)

This survey covers some of the main philosophical debates raised by the framework of effective field theories during the last decades. It is centered on three issues: whether effective field theories underpin a specific realist picture of the world, whether they support an anti-reductionist picture of physics, and whether they provide reasons to give up the ultimate aspiration of formulating a final and complete physical theory. Reviewing the past and current literature, we argue that effective field theories do not give (...) convincing reasons to adopt a particular stance towards these speculative issues. They hold good prospects for asking ontologically perspicuous and sensible questions about currently accessible domains. With respect to more fundamental questions, however, the only certainty is provisional and instrumental: effective theories are currently indispensable for conducting fruitful scientific research. (shrink)