An erotetic calculus for a given logic constitutes a sequent-style proof-theoretical formalization of the logic grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic ). In this paper, a new erotetic calculus for Classical Propositional Logic ), dual with respect to the existing ones, is given. We modify the calculus to obtain complete proof systems for the propositional part of paraconsistent logic CLuN and its extensions CLuNs and mbC. The method is based on dual resolution. Moreover, the resolution rule is non-clausal. According to the (...) authors knowledge, this is the first account of resolution for mbC. Last but not least, as the method is grounded in IEL, it constitutes an important tool for the so-called question-processing. (shrink)

In An Intimate Relation: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (presented to Robert E. Butts on his 60th Birthday).

The article begins by distinguishing a number of theses which, in the past, have sometimes been lumped together under the heading of 'anti-realism'. One of the theses is that there is something wrong with truth-conditional theories of meaning (what a truth-conditional theory of meaning is a matter discussed at some length), another is what I take to be the central thesis of anti-realism, that all truths are knowable. Several writers on the subject, such as Wright and Prawitz, have defended the (...) latter thesis while jettisoning the former. I argue that this position is exactly the wrong way around. Given the 'meaning is use' principle, which is also called the 'manifestation requirement', a very powerful case can be made that true theory of meaning cannot be truth-conditional. But I argue that, given the current state of our logical knowledge, there is no good reason for concluding from this that a true theory of meaning must be of the 'verificationist' type, as Dummett seems to think, and still less for thinking that anti-realism follows. I end by examining theories of meaning against Dummett's criticisms. (shrink)

Using “big data” from sensors worn continuously outside the lab, researchers have observed patterns of objective physiology that challenge some of the long-standing theoretical concepts of emotion and its measurement. One challenge is that emotional arousal, when measured as sympathetic nervous system activation through electrodermal activity, can sometimes differ significantly across the two halves of the upper body. We show that traditional measures on only one side may lead to misjudgment of arousal. This article presents daily life and controlled study (...) data, as well as existing evidence from neuroscience, supporting the influence of multiple emotional substrates in the brain causing innervation on different sides of the body. We describe how a theory of multiple arousals explains the asymmetric EDA findings. (shrink)

Stereotype accuracy is a contentious topic. Part of the problem is that typically stereotypes are generic statements whose truth status is unclear due to the fact that they are ill-defined quantitatively. The article focuses on the epistemic aspect of stereotypical beliefs. In the ongoing debate, I side with those who argue against stereotypes being wrong or inaccurate by virtue of definition alone. I propose that, when possible, stereotype accuracy should be assessed in probabilistic terms by inspecting how likely a generic (...) statement is to be true when applied to individual representative of the relevant group. This approach applies equally well to investigating the actual and the perceived accuracy of stereotypes. (shrink)

The contour of a family of filters along a filter is a set-theoretic lower limit. Topologicity and regularity of convergences can be characterized with the aid of the contour operation. Contour inversion is studied, in particular, for iterated contours of sequential cascades. A related problem of continuous extension of maps between maximal elements of sequential cascades to full subcascades is solved in full generality.

Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández propose two different versions of a transparency theory of self-knowledge. According to Byrne, we self-attribute beliefs by an inference from what we take to be facts about the world (following a rule he calls BEL). According to Fernández, we self-attribute the belief that p on the basis of a prior mental state, a state which constitutes our grounds for the belief that p (thereby realizing a procedure he calls Bypass). In this paper, I present the (...) two theories in outline and discuss various objections concerning their normative (Can the procedure give us knowledge?) and metaphysical aspects (Is the procedure functional?). I conclude that especially the metaphysical objections against Bypass are somewhat more difficult to counter than those against BEL and that the modifications required of Fernández’s theory make it very similar to Byrne’s. -/- Alex Byrne y Jordi Fernández proponen dos diferentes versiones de la teoría de la transparencia del autoconocimiento. Según Byrne, para autoatribuir creencias inferimos qué es lo que creemos a partir lo que tomamos como hechos sobre el mundo (siguiendo una regla que Byrne llama BEL). Según Fernández, autoatribuimos la creencia de que p con base en un estado anterior a esta creencia, un estado que fundamenta la creencia de que p (realizando un procedimiento que él llama Bypass). En este artículo expongo las dos teorías y discuto objeciones que conciernen su aspecto normativo (¿puede el procedimiento darnos conocimiento?) y metafísico (¿es funcional el procedimiento?). Concluyo que en especial las objeciones metafísicas son más graves en el caso de Bypass que en el de BEL y que las modificaciones requeridas de la teoría de Fernández la asemejan mucho a la de Byrne. (shrink)

E. T. A. Hoffmann is one of the most famous representatives of early German horror literature. He has been both, inspired by its predecessors, as well as having influenced the work of many of his successors, and hence the development of the whole genre. The present article examines a story by E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Vampirismus” from the collection of short stories “Serapions Brüder”. Emphases are, on the one hand, on the mechanisms that cause readers’ fear and uncertainty and, on (...) the other hand, the peculiarity of the vampire or Nachzehrer figure and their function in the story. Firstly, it will be shown that the vampire depicted in the work is not actually a vampire. We find here a ghoul; that is a demon from Arab culture. However, the ghoul has more to do with the monster outlined by Antoine Galland in his translation of the “One Thousand and One Nights” than with traditional folk beliefs. Secondly, the author comes to the conclusion that Hoffmann has functionalized the Horrible. This element does not work by itself, but serves the author as the background of the action. And he is using this background to let the characters reveal all their weaknesses and dark sides. The violation of the order ruling in the world as it is represented engages the reader and at the same time raises his fear. The resulting excited feelings and general alienation are further reinforced for the figure of the Nachzehrer that occurs instead of a formerly innocent, graceful girl. The emergence of the supernatural – the final confirmation of the breach of order – is responsible for the effect just described. (shrink)

In this paper we are applying certain strategy described by Negri and Von Plato :418–435, 1998), allowing construction of sequent calculi for axiomatic theories, to Suszko’s Sentential calculus with identity. We describe two calculi obtained in this way, prove that the cut rule, as well as the other structural rules, are admissible in one of them, and we also present an example which suggests that the cut rule is not admissible in the other.

In this paper we are applying certain strategy described by Negri and Von Plato :418–435, 1998), allowing construction of sequent calculi for axiomatic theories, to Suszko’s Sentential calculus with identity. We describe two calculi obtained in this way, prove that the cut rule, as well as the other structural rules, are admissible in one of them, and we also present an example which suggests that the cut rule is not admissible in the other.

We define Kripke semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic with Suszko’s identity. We propose sequent calculus for ISCI along with cut-elimination theorem. We sketch a constructive interpretation of Suszko’s propositional identity connective.

We introduce a notion of ideal type such that any two ideals with the same ideal type are isomorphic. From this we infer, under the axiom t = h, that each ideal which consists of all nowhere Ramsey sets contained in some family of infinite subsets of natural numbers is isomorphic with the ideal of all nowhere Ramsey sets.

The article aims to present issues arising out of differences in the way that the terms chimera and hybrid are defined in legal systems and by natural sciences in the context of mixing human and animal DNA. The author analyses the different approaches to defining these terms used in various legal systems, dividing them into groups in light of conclusions reached from examining definitions used in natural sciences. The distinction is used to answer the question of which approach to definitions (...) applied by legislators is the best way to handle the subject of human-animal organisms, given the need to balance their impact on medicine and the ethical concerns that arise. (shrink)

In the article the author rejects traditional, logical interpretation of the famous “Is-Ought Paragraph” from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. He argues that most of the interpreters failed to grasp the wide philosophical background of the IsOP, which is, generally speaking, a passionate discussion between ethical rationalists and ethical anti-rationalists in the 17th and 18th century British philosophy. The author shows that the Hume’s main aim in the IsOP is to strengthen his previous arguments against ethical rationalism and (...) to reinforce the common-sense systems of morality, likewise he did in the first book of the Treatise… in case of the theory of knowledge. The author argues that there is no putative thesis of logic in the IsOP, which some scholars call “Hume’s Law”. (shrink)

We argue that the size of the human population needs to be controlled whether or not people should be vegetarians. We than describe some of the varieties of human flesh eating round the world.

Wittgenstein introduced his claim about colour incompatibility originally in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , where he stated that there could be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism when he realized the consequences of this claim. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. I will focus on two works of great significance for the claim: Some (...) Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks . These two works were written between 1929 and 1930, which is the beginning of the “middle period” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will focus not only on Wittgenstein’s formulation of the colour incompatibility claim, but also on how this claim was justified. The explanation of Wittgenstein’s justification of this claim will help to understand his phenomenology and theory of philosophical grammar. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to compare the role played by logical analysis in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Russell’s On Denoting. Whereas in Russell’s work it is an important element of his argument in support of description theory, in his pupil’s it does not function this way. Russell, while analysing various propositions, including descriptions translates them into formal language, indicating that those propositions, despite the appearances, in fact do not denote. Logical analysis shall be a tool decisive in favour (...) of Russell’s thesis. Wittgenstein similarly analyses some troublesome propositions and claims that they are meaningless. The difference is that Russell’s final conclusion is derived from logical analysis, whereas Wittgenstein’s from pure speculation. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus logical analysis is not a method thanks to which the author gets certain result, just as it was the case with his teacher and his On Denoting. In Wittgenstein’s early philosophy logical analysis concerns just a few technical problems connected only to some ideas from Principia mathematica, and not to the main subject of his work, which is the analysis of philosophical theses. (shrink)

In one of his papers, Moti Mizrahi argues that arguments from an expert opinion are weak arguments. His thesis may seem controversial due to the consensus on this topic in the field of informal logic. I argue that its controversy is framework-dependent, and if translated into a different framework, it appears to be a correct, however trivial, claim. I will use a framework based on Douglas Walton’s argumentation scheme theory and his conception of examination dialogue to demonstrate that it is (...) so. It appears that Mizrahi’s idiosyncratic framework provides an excessively restrictive conception of an argument from expert opinion than Walton’s scheme does. There is no quarrel between both frameworks, as they yield analogous, almost identical, outcomes of argument evaluation. The actual and crucial disagreement is on the topic of argument classification. Mizrahi’s conception of arguments from an expert opinion imposes exact conditions that such argument must fulfil: an expert’s opinion o truth-value must be unknown; o must be unsupported by any evidence; an expert’s peers neither accept o nor reject it. These exclude, by definition, every possible strong, in Walton’s terms, variant of such an argument. Therefore, if rephrased with the notions of the examination dialogue framework, Mizrahi’s thesis sounds as follows: weak arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. (shrink)

The paper discusses the relation of philosophy and meta-philosophy. With the use of Jerzy Perzanowski’s notion of characteristics of science and Jan Woleński’s meta-methodological typology, the author aims at presenting meta-philosophy as part of philosophy itself. Seen along such lines, meta-philosophy is part of methodology of philosophy which relates classical problems of epistemology to philosophy, just as philosophy of science does it for science. The author argues that the problems of meta-philosophy are in fact philosophical problems and sketches possible meta-philosophical (...) positions analogous to the standpoints in methodology already given. Obviously, this way of presenting meta-philosophy is only one of its possible programs. Yet, the benefit of it is an already given conceptual framework taken from philosophy of science. (shrink)

In my paper I present David Hume's philosophy from the perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of signs. I argue that by interpreting impressions and ideas as iconic signs it is possible to avoid many inconsistencies in Hume's philosophy. Apart from that it makes possible to avoid Hume's scepticism about the existence of the external world by introducing Peirce's concept of the dynamic and immediate object. What is more, the generative structure of signs helps us to deal with the "gmissing (...) shade of blue" problem. (shrink)

Freedom of contract and corrective justice are considered to be the basic principles governing contract law. However, many contemporary legal orders implement various policy goals into private law. The regulatory private law of the European Union is the most striking example of such a trend. This article aims at reconciling the corrective justice theory of private law and the principle of freedom of contract with the regulatory dimension of the EU law. The main argument is that the meaning of the (...) concept of harm, one that is crucial to the principle of corrective justice, should be understood broadly so that it can transform the corrective justice theory from a monistic one into a pluralistic one. (shrink)

Faces of liberalism: formation of a Christian liberal community in Krakow: The aim of the essay is to show the birth of the Kraków liberal community in the years 1977–1980. An attempt is made to reconstruct the main ideological assumptions of the liberal entourage in the context of the opposition activities of Robert Kaczmarek and Mirosław Dzielski. The author refers to the main events occurring in this period, such as the establishment of the Prywatna Inicjatywa Krakowska and the magazine Merkuryusz (...) Krakowski i Światowy, as well as paying special attention to the program texts that were published in it. The article also contains a reconstruction of the debate aimed at classifying the views presented by Mirosław Dzielski. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present two arguments against the dialectical interpretation of Nagarjuna's philosophy. This interpretation understands Nagarjuna's philosophy as a method of deconstruction, abstracting from Nagarjuna's own standpoint. The first argument refers to the metaphysical presuppositions of this method. The second argument refers to the positive statements asserted by Nagarjuna and focuses mainly on those concerning Buddhist practice. Furthermore, the conception of 'skillful means' and 'the two truths' will be discussed. The conclusion of this paper is (...) that Nagarjuna's philosophy is based upon determining the conditions of the possibility of the Buddhist practice rather than on a dialectic without any metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present two natural deduction systems for Intuitionistic Sentential Calculus with Identity ; a syntactically motivated \ and a semantically motivated \. The formulation of \ is based on the axiomatic formulation of ISCI. Its rules cannot be straightforwardly classified as introduction or elimination rules; ISCI-specific rules are based on axioms characterizing the identity connective. The system does not enjoy the standard subformula property, but due to the normalization procedure non-subformulas can label only leaves (...) of proofs. In \, we propose only two general identity-related rules, in reference to the treatment of the identity connective in First-Order Logic. (shrink)