It has long been thought that the ancient Greeks did not take mechanics seriously as part of the workings of nature, and that therefore their natural philosophy was both primitive and marginal. In this book Sylvia Berryman challenges that assumption, arguing that the idea that the world works 'like a machine' can be found in ancient Greek thought, predating the early modern philosophy with which it is most closely associated. Her discussion ranges over topics including balancing and equilibrium, lifting water, (...) sphere-making and models of the heavens, and ancient Greek pneumatic theory, with detailed analysis of thinkers such as Aristotle, Archimedes, and Hero of Alexandria. Her book shows scholars of ancient Greek philosophy why it is necessary to pay attention to mechanics, and shows historians of science why the differences between ancient and modern reactions to mechanics are not as great as was generally thought. (shrink)

Sylvia Berryman offers a fresh understanding of Aristotle's ethical theory, challenging the common belief that he aimed to give it a biological foundation in human nature. Berryman reinterprets Aristotle's views as a 'middle way' between the metaphysical grounding offered by Platonists and sceptical or subjectivist alternatives.

In this paper I outline a role for mechanistic conceptions of organisms in ancient Greek natural philosophy, especially the study of organisms. By ‘mechanistic conceptions’ I mean the use of ideas and techniques drawn from the field of mechanics to investigate the natural world. ‘Mechanistic conceptions’ of organisms in ancient Greek philosophy, then, are those that draw on the ancient understanding of the field called ‘mechanics’ — hê mêchanikê technê—to investigate living things, rather than those bearing some perceived similarity to (...) modern notions of ‘the mechanical.’ I have argued elsewhere that evidence of mechanistic conceptions of the natural world can be found, not only among seventeenth and eighteenth century ‘mechanical philosophers,’ but also—albeit in vestigial form — in some ancient Greek texts. Unfortunately, these reports are slight, often by detractors of this approach, and offer only clues as to the motivational context for employing these mechanical conceptions. Here, my purpose is to suggest what role they might have played in the history of natural philosophy. (shrink)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, some prominent ethicists turned to the history of philosophy to challenge the prevailing trend toward subjectivism or noncognitivism. G. E. M. Anscombe offered the first of several historical narratives challenging the world picture that undergirded this prevalence, narratives in which Aristotelian ethics is presented as a possible alternative. It is striking, however, how differently these narratives characterize the ancient–modern divide and how differently Aristotle is interpreted, particularly on the issue of his appeal (...) to naturalism in ethics. The tendency to view Philippa Foot as Anscombe’s best interpreter might leave us with the unfortunate supposition that Aristotelian ethics is saddled with an implausible Archimedean naturalism. The author suggests that there is another way to read Anscombe’s message, which does not fetter it to a kind of metaphysical biology that we have no reason to accept. (shrink)

Philosophy in the period immediately after Aristotle is sometimes thought to be marked by the decline of natural philosophy and philosophical disinterest in contemporary achievements in the sciences. But in one area at least, the early third century B.C.E. was a time of productive interaction between such disparate fields as epistemology, physics and geometry. Debates between the sceptics and the dogmatic philosophical schools focus on epistemological problems about the possibility of self-evident appearances, but there is evidence from Euclid's day of (...) a quite different response. The sceptical challenge provoked the development of theories explaining error formation, showing how illusions can be studied systematically and are subject to prediction. Such theories do not legitimate claims about the nature of the underlying entities perceived, but provide justification for forming expectations about future perceptions. While it overtly focuses on purely geometrical considerations, the Euclidean model of optics nonetheless provides support for certain views about the nature of vision and the physics of light. Moreover, by offering a model in which the image received is not thought to be a perspicuous mirroring of the object seen, Euclid may have helped promote a view of perception as something reconstructed from information received, not as a mere form transferred into the eye. The ancient sceptic may indeed have fulfilled his promise to promote inquiry by focusing attention on problems that escape the attention of a hasty theorist. (shrink)

Aristotle has traditionally been cast as the arch-enemy of all things mechanistic. Given the dichotomy long thought to exist between mechanistic and teleological schools of thought, there is a satisfying irony in discovering veins of apparently ‘mechanistic’ thought within the work of the definitive teleologist. Several waves of scholarship in the past century have argued, from different angles, for mechanistic interpretations of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. The present generation is no exception: in the last decade, Jean De Groot, Monte Johnson, and (...) Tiberiu Popa have variously argued that a mechanistic vein can be found in Aristotle’s work, despite his undeniable teleological credentials. This paper explores the assumptions—some of them open to question—that accompany such advocacy. It will urge some terminological refinements, and turn a skeptical lens on some aspects of these projects. Nonetheless, it will stress that they open promising lines of inquiry, avoiding some of the limitations of earlier ventures into this territory. (shrink)

A large part of the difficulty of writing "conceptual history"—to borrow a term from Reviel Netz —is that once an illuminating new conceptual framework is articulated, it begins to seem self-evident and commonsensical to later thinkers. The historian's task of problematizing the obvious, and showing us the moves by which commonsense came to be created historically, is an arduous and challenging one, requiring resources of imagination, patience, and attention to detail. Sattler displays all those qualities in this dense and demanding (...) study, and a review needs to begin by acknowledging the sheer... (shrink)

Sylvia Berryman - The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 324-325 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Sylvia Berryman The University of British Columbia Christopher Gill. The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. xxii + 522. Cloth, $150.00. Christopher Gill's masterful treatment of the notion of the self in Hellenistic and Roman thought manages to (...) shed remarkable clarity on a complex and fascinating field, even while challenging a prevailing view of the nature of the self in post-classical ancient Greek philosophy. Leading the reader through the views of figures as subtle and difficult as Plutarch, Posidonius,.. (shrink)

It is something of a commonplace that the presence of clockwork throughout early modern Europe was a key technological factor in inspiring an approach to investigation of the natural world characte...

A discussion of Lloyd's Tarner Lectures at Trinity College. The importance of Lloyd's previous scholarship is characterized and these sweeping, erudite lectures are placed in the context of that scholarship. In the broadest terms, the lectures are a call to culturally and historically comparative study of human reasoning. At their heart is a comparative history of scientific theorizing from the ancients through to modern science. Lloyd rejects the positivist picture, and the view of modern and ancient science as discontinuous; he (...) urges scholars to undertake comparative work on the ancient sciences in different traditions. This critical notice evaluates Lloyd's view and raises several questions for further reflection. (shrink)

Sharples’s new introduction aims at providing a survey of the major Hellenistic philosophical schools to an audience with little or no background in philosophy or classics. Drawing on his experience teaching the subject to Classics undergraduates, he aims to present Hellenistic thought as a subject that might speak directly to the concerns of students. At this the book is successful. It is an ambitious task for a narrative of 133 pages: if the exposition seems at some points a bit rushed (...) it is surely from the sheer difficulty of reconciling clarity and sophistication with brevity. The result is readable and interesting at different levels. (shrink)