Results for 'Sydney S. Shoemaker'

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  1. Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
  2. Personal identity and memory.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (October):868-902.
  3. Personal Identity: Great Debates in Philosophy.Sydney Shoemaker & S. Swinburne - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.
    What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
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  4. Self and body.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - The Philosophers' Magazine 8 (8):29-29.
    [Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in (...)
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  5.  33
    The Unconscious.The Concept of Motivation.Sydney Shoemaker, A. C. MacIntyre & R. S. Peters - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (3):403.
  6.  28
    I_– _Sydney Shoemaker: Self, Body, and Coincidence.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287-306.
    [Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by (...)
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  7. I_– _Sydney Shoemaker: Self, Body, and Coincidence.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287-306.
    A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by (...)
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  8. Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.
    What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
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  9. Self and body: Sydney Shoemaker.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
    [Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in (...)
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  10. Realization and mental causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  11. Some varieties of functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  12.  87
    Realization and Mental Causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  13. Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
  14. Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind?Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement):109-131.
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  15. On knowing one’s own mind.Sydney Shoemaker - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.
  16. Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):35-51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense that (...)
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  17.  71
    Rationality and Self-Consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 1991 - In Keith Lehrer & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Opened Curtain: A U.S. Soviet Philosophy Summit. Westview Press.
  18. Introspection and phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
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  19. Phenomenal Character Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
    I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience—especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.
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  20.  17
    Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philiosophical Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    This is an expanded edition of Sydney Shoemaker's seminal collection of his work on interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Reproducing all of the original papers, many of which are now regarded as classics, and including four papers published since the first edition appeared in 1984, Identity, Cause, and Mind's reappearance will be warmly welcomed by philosophers and students alike.
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  21. On What We Are.Sydney Shoemaker - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article evaluates whether personal identity should be sought only in the biological or embodied existence of the person or exclusively in psychological existence. It suggests that whatever the answer turns out to be, it would involve causality. It argues against the animalist view of personal identity and defends the classical neo-Lockean view by arguing that the thick properties of person are psychological or mental ones. The author's answer to the question of what we are is in part that we (...)
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  22. Properties, causation and projectability.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Laurence Jonathan Cohen & Mary Brenda Hesse (eds.), Applications of inductive logic: proceedings of a conference at the Queen's College, Oxford 21-24, August 1978. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 291-312.
  23.  22
    David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465-472.
    One does not have to agree with the main conclusions of David Chalmers’s book in order to find it stimulating, instructive, and frequently brilliant. If Chalmers’s arguments succeed, his achievement will of course be enormous; he will have overthrown the materialist orthodoxy that has reigned in philosophy of mind and cognitive science for the last half century. If, as I think, they fail, his achievement is nevertheless considerable. For his arguments draw on, and give forceful and eloquent expression to, widely (...)
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  24. Brown-Brownson Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):573-593.
    The case of Brown and Brownson can be thought of as an updated version of John Locke’s prince-cobbler example, one that replaces a soul transfer with a brain transplant. Briefly, Brown and Robinson are operated on for the removal of brain tumors by a procedure that involves the temporary removal of the brain from the skull, and by a surgical blunder Brown’s brain ends up in Robinson’s skull; the resulting person, Brownson, has Brown’s brain and Robinson’s body, and his psychological (...)
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  25. Ziff's other minds.Sydney Shoemaker - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (October):587-89.
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  26. Unger's psychological continuity theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):139-143.
  27.  3
    Commentary on Shoemaker.Sydney Shoemaker - 2005 - In Kim Atkins (ed.), Self and Subjectivity. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 153–162.
    This chapter contains section titled: “Personal Identity: a Materialist's Account”.
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  28. Color, subjective reactions, and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. pp. 55-66.
    Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color is experienced (...)
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  29.  18
    Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):139-143.
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  30.  30
    Self-Consciousness and Synthesis.Sydney Shoemaker - 1983 - In Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy.
  31. Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy.Sydney Shoemaker - 1983
     
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  32.  39
    Reply to Leeds.Sydney Shoemaker - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):130-136.
  33.  32
    Reply to Cynthia MacDonald.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):739-745.
    What is introspective know ledge of one’s own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker’s (...)
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  34.  5
    Reply to Cynthia Macdonald.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):739-745.
    What is introspective know ledge of one’s own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker’s (...)
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  35. Content, Character, and Color Ii: A Better Kind of Representationalism.Sydney Shoemaker - unknown
    From now on I will assume that it is possible in principle for there to be cases of spectrum inversion in which the invertees are equally good perceivers of the colors. What I want to show next is that while allowing this possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism, it requires acceptance of a different version of representationalism. Consider the standard way of describing a case of spectrum inversion. Returning to Jack and Jill, we say that red things look to Jack (...)
     
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  36.  53
    Logical Atomism and Language.Sydney Shoemaker - 1959 - Analysis 20 (3):49 - 52.
    The author addresses remarks he considers fallacious made by panayot butchvarov concerning russell's views on the nature of language ("on denoting"). Butchvarov thought that russell and wittgenstein were advancing purely empirical theories. The author claims that this is patently false in the case of wittgenstein and only partially true of russell. Russell "did "not" hold, But emphatically denied, That every word in a significant sentence must correspond to an element in reality." the author holds that russell's principle about constituents "applies (...)
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  37.  57
    Self-Intimation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):315-327.
    The sense in which having the available belief that P gives one a reason for believing that one believes that P is just that if one has that available belief one is thereby justified, or warranted, in believing that one has it. In explaining why it is so it helps to bring in the notion of rationality. We noted earlier that it is a requirement of full human rationality that one regularly revise one’s belief system in the direction of greater (...)
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  38. Phenomenal character and physicalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. MIT Press.
     
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  39. On David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):439-444.
    One does not have to agree with the main conclusions of David Chalmers’s book in order to find it stimulating, instructive, and frequently brilliant. If Chalmers’s arguments succeed, his achievement will of course be enormous; he will have overthrown the materialist orthodoxy that has reigned in philosophy of mind and cognitive science for the last half century. If, as I think, they fail, his achievement is nevertheless considerable. For his arguments draw on, and give forceful and eloquent expression to, widely (...)
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  40.  50
    On David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):439 - 444.
    One does not have to agree with the main conclusions of David Chalmers’s book in order to find it stimulating, instructive, and frequently brilliant. If Chalmers’s arguments succeed, his achievement will of course be enormous; he will have overthrown the materialist orthodoxy that has reigned in philosophy of mind and cognitive science for the last half century. If, as I think, they fail, his achievement is nevertheless considerable. For his arguments draw on, and give forceful and eloquent expression to, widely (...)
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  41. Bertram kienzle/helmut Pape (hg.): Dimensionen Des selbst. Selbstbewußt-sein, reflexivität und die bedingungen Von kommunikation, suhrkamp verlag, Frank-furt A. M. 1991, 453 S. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1992 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 40 (7):833.
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  42.  17
    Book Review. Self-Concern by Raymond Martin. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):718-20.
    In recent decades the focus of discussions on personal identity has shifted, largely due to the work of Derek Parfit, from the metaphysical question of what constitutes the identity of persons over time to the question of the nature of the special concern that persons have for their own future well being, including the question of whether “what matters” is identity itself, or something else, perhaps psychological continuity and connectedness, that normally goes with identity but can be present without it. (...)
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  43.  18
    Self-Concern. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):718-720.
    In recent decades the focus of discussions on personal identity has shifted, largely due to the work of Derek Parfit, from the metaphysical question of what constitutes the identity of persons over time to the question of the nature of the special concern that persons have for their own future well being, including the question of whether “what matters” is identity itself, or something else, perhaps psychological continuity and connectedness, that normally goes with identity but can be present without it. (...)
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  44. Review: Sydney Shoemaker: Physical Realization. [REVIEW]S. C. Gibb - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):207-211.
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  45. Time without change.Sydney Shoemaker - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (12):363-381.
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  46. On the Way Things Appear.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 461--480.
  47. Identity, Properties, and Causality.Sydney Shoemaker - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):321-342.
  48.  91
    Embodiment and Behavior.Sydney Shoemaker - 1976 - In A. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. Berkeley University Press.
  49.  4
    Analytical Philosophy: Second Series.Sydney Shoemaker - 1967 - Philosophical Quarterly 17 (67):176-179.
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  50. Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these (...)
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