For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...

According to philosopher Paul Woodruff, reverent awe is a feeling of being limited or dwarfed by something larger than the human, usually accompanied by feelings of respect for fellow human beings. Drawing from Jean-Paul Sartre’s early philosophy, this article responds positively to the title question, showing how reverent awe is in bad faith yet is similar to anguish, and unique with respect to both. Especially remarkable in reverent awe is the feeling of connectedness to humankind. In section two, building on (...) this section one framework of how Sartrean consciousness can be reverent, the article explores how being-in-itself can be an object of reverent awe. (shrink)

This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. -/- Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims (...) that when consciousness is organized it is found as already organized. -/- This is important for Gurwitsch's philosophical system because if he can establish that consciousness is always originally organized, then his famous claim that the theme, thematic-field, margin structure of consciousness is an invariant patterning impervious to the subject's whim, mood, or possible noetic training, is protected at the very start. (shrink)

This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. -/- Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims (...) that when consciousness is organized it is found as already organized. -/- This is important for Gurwitsch's philosophical system because if he can establish that consciousness is always originally organized, then his famous claim that the theme, thematic-field, margin structure of consciousness is an invariant patterning impervious to the subject's whim, mood, or possible noetic training, is protected at the very start. (shrink)

There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective attention as the standard accomplishment, and (...) the cognitive bestowal of organization on otherwise unorganized data. It is concluded that cognitive psychologists and others working on attention can benefit from Gurwitsch's work, and that a credible account of attention is crucial to the success of any comprehensive statement on the nature of consciousness. (shrink)

Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere (...) of attention, primarily as an irrelevant centering in attending. (shrink)

The term ‘consciousness’ is usually reserved only for the focus of attention. This restriction empties the phenomenology of consciousness of some of its richness. Rather than conceiving of consciousness as one-dimensional, researchers should consider that consciousness has a three-dimensional organization. Conscious presentations are structured in a focus, context and margin pattern. Inclusion of these other dimensions of consciousness as consciousness is important for an adequate relation between scientific method and phenomenology. The problem becomes especially acute when transformations in consciousness -- (...) attentional and temporal continuity -- are considered. Using Aron Gurwitsch's work, this paper presents an alternative to Galen Strawson's view of consciousness and the self, as an example of the usefulness of this fuller conception of consciousness. I argue here that there is significant attentional and temporal continuity in consciousness, and that this continuity provides for a sense of the self as a distinct, but continuous experience. (shrink)

Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way of thinking about (...) extended cognition. A key question considered is from where do cognitive processes project and disclose meanings? By thinking of location as locus—a projecting pathway of points of intentional opportunity—organization in extended cognition becomes organization in a field of consciousness. The marginal halo in the field of consciousness is articulated as this locus of intentionality, what Rowlands calls “the noneliminable intentional core”. Problems of cognitive bloat and personal character are addressed in light of the findings. In addition to situating Gurwitsch’s work within the extended mind movement for the first time, this study highlights the importance of the marginal halo, largely neglected in previous Gurwitsch scholarship. (shrink)

This essay reflects on what it means to bring together the disciplines of Husserlian philosophy and psychology in light of current thinking about interdisciplinarity. Drawing from Allen Repko’s work on the interdisciplinary research process, aspects highlighted include justifying using an interdisciplinary approach, identifying conflicts between disciplinary insights, creating common ground between concepts, and constructing a more comprehensive understanding. To focus the discussion and provide an example, I use Aron Gurwitsch’s work of extending the concepts and theories of Gestalt psychology to (...) phenomenology. Gurwitsch’s writings can be seen as an attempt to first construct common ground for conflicting insights within psychology and within phenomenology, then create common ground for conflicting insights between psychology and phenomenology. Gurwitsch’s work can be taken as a kind of case study or adaptable model of how to find convergence. The ultimate goal is to bring interdisciplinary studies into productive conversation with phenomenological psychology. (shrink)

I extend cognitive science research to phenomenological philosophy to argue that there are three distinct organizational principles coordinate with three dimensions of attention.

William James and Aron Gurwitsch form a one-two punch on disclosing the nature of the field of consciousness. James claims that it is comprised of two parts, a focus (the center of our attention) and a margin (everything else). Gurwitsch expands on James' account by noting that the margin itself is comprised of relevant data and irrelevant data. The former he calls "thematic field" and the latter he calls "margin." So Gurwitsch argues for a three-dimensional or three-part field of consciousness, (...) theme (or focus), thematic-field, and margin, and shows that James' two part field-theory is inadequate. I discuss the similarities and differences between the two theories, including how James notion of "fringe" is meant to convey some relevance for non-focal data. (shrink)

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of (...) attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl’s position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground. (shrink)

This article extends Aron Gurwitsch’s ( 1964 ) central insight about the field of consciousness—that it is always organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern—to the human capacity for reverence. It offers an original phenomenology of reverent awe, inspired by Gurwitsch’s work, as an articulation of reverential index and reverential attitude. According to Paul Woodruff ( 2014 ) in Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue, reverence names those times when we become aware of something larger than human and simultaneously our (...) human limitations. By bridging the concepts of reverence from Woodruff and relevancy from Gurwitsch, this study shows that in reverent awe the emphasis in consciousness shifts to the edge of relevancy, the zones farthest removed from the theme, as the “indefinite continuation of context,” “order of existence,” or what Gurwitsch also calls an “inarticulate mass”. Reverent awe is clarified phenomenologically as an emphasis in consciousness between the theme and the order of existence as indefinite continuation of thematic context, maintaining a specific relevancy-principle (a Gestalt-connection) between the theme and the order of existence. In a reverential attitude with a reverential index we become aware more immediately of an order of existence and we become aware of our place in the order of existence. (shrink)

Aron Gurwitsch claims that the field of consciousness is invariantly organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern. However, at least two perceptual presentations, chaos and boundlessness, are not ordered in accordance with this pattern. The question this study poses then is the following: given Gurwitsch's field-theory of experiential organization, what is the structure, status, and function of chaos and boundlessness in the field of consciousness? ;Using Gurwitsch's field-theory organization as a base, the structure of thematic chaos and then of (...) thematic boundlessness is articulated: the first by contrasting the field-theories of Gurwitsch and James, the second by contrasting Gurwitsch and Kant. It is concluded that in both cases no thematic Gestalt-coherence and no thematic field as relevant context is presented. ;In terms of status and function, chaos and boundlessness are interpreted as necessary limits. These "limit cases" are not "ideal limits" since they are possible perceptual presentations. Also, limit is taken to mean a two-edged presentation, one that is both an ending and a beginning. Interpreting Gurwitsch, we conclude that both cases are epistemological endings, since they represent a necessary end to the ordinary perception of things. Interpreting James, we conclude that it is possible that thematic chaos is also a metaphysical beginning in experience, since it is that experience in which reality is presented as underived and original. Interpreting Kant, we conclude that it is possible that boundlessness is also an ethical beginning in experience, since it is that experience in which the most original feeling of our sense of humanity is presented. ;We show that chaos and boundlessness each have their own unique field-organization, that they function as two-edged limits involving epistemological concerns on the one hand and metaphysical and ethical concerns respectively on the other, and that their structure and status as limits in the field of consciousness are not contingent but necessary. (shrink)

NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...

This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work (...) of phenomenologist and Gestalt philosopher Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). As a conclusion, I discuss the nature of subjectivity in attention and attention research, and whether attention might be the same as consciousness. (shrink)

When is it morally acceptable to expose others to risk? Most moral philosophers have had very little to say in answer to that question, but here is a moral philosopher who puts it at the centre of his investigations.

An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...) the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The framework of Solomonoff prediction assigns prior probability to hypotheses inversely proportional to their Kolmogorov complexity. There are two well-known problems. First, the Solomonoff prior is relative to a choice of Universal Turing machine. Second, the Solomonoff prior is not computable. However, there are responses to both problems. Different Solomonoff priors converge with more and more data. Further, there are computable approximations to the Solomonoff prior. I argue that there is a tension between these two responses. This is because computable (...) approximations to Solomonoff prediction do not always converge. (shrink)

Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...) this method to measure the subjective probabilities of a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. (shrink)

Recent studies on neural pathways in a broad spectrum of vertebrates suggest that, in addition to migration and an increase in the number of certain select neurons, a significant aspect of neural evolution is a “parcellation” (segregation-isolation) process that involves the loss of selected connections by the new aggregates. A similar process occurs during ontogenetic development. These findings suggest that in many neuronal systems axons do not invade unknown territories during evolutionary or ontogenetic development but follow in their ancestors' paths (...) to their ancestral targets; if the connection is later lost, it reflects the specialization of the circuitry.The pattern of interspecific variability suggests (1) that overlap of circuits is a more common feature in primitive (generalized) than in specialized brain organizations and (2) that most projections, such as the retinal, thalamotelencephalic, corticotectal, and tectal efferent ones, were bilateral in the primitive condition. Specialization of these systems in some vertebrate groups has involved the selective loss of connections, resulting in greater isolation of functions. The parcellation process may also play an important role in cell diversification.The parcellation process as described here is thought to be one of several underlying mechanisms of evolutionary and ontogenetic differentiation. (shrink)

Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure (...) subjective probability for partly irrational agents. (shrink)

In recent years, several cases about the legal personhood of nonhuman animals garnered global attention, e.g. the recognition of ‘basic rights’ for the Argentinian great apes Sandra and Cecilia. Legal scholars have embraced the animal turn, blurring the once sovereign boundaries between persons and objects, recognising nonhuman beings as legal subjects. The zoonotic origins of the Covid-19 pandemic stress the urgency of establishing ‘global animal law’ and deconstructing anthropocentrism. To this end, it is vital to also consider the extensive premodern (...) legal history that humans share with other animals. Over 200 so-called animal trials have been documented in premodern Europe. In these proceedings, certain nonhuman animals—particularly domestic pigs—were prosecuted, often resulting in their capital punishment or anathema. This paper takes a history of ideas approach to these historical instances where Western philosophy of law and philosophical anthropology intersect, problematising the notion that such trials constitute wholesome precedents of the kind of legal personhood presently debated in jurisprudence. My counter-hegemonic analysis of the legal prosecution and execution of several pigs in fifteenth-century France demonstrates that late mediaeval notions of criminality transcended the alleged human-nonhuman divide whilst reaffirming and reifying human distinctiveness. I propose that pig trials were local laboratories where Christian communities reflected upon the natural hierarchy of God’s creation. Ensuing the apparent breach of the prescribed boundaries of nature, these communities renegotiated and re-naturalised everyday interspecies sociability by utilising the offending animals to exemplify particular norms about what it means to be human, generally to the animals’ detriment. (shrink)

Triangular externalism is the view that a subject's thought content is determined by the communication the subject has with others about objects or events in the shared public environment. The process of triangulation is said to constitute thought content. Section 1 characterizes triangular externalism and sets it apart from other forms of content externalism. Section 2 is concerned with the tensions within Davidson's views: the tension between historical externalism and interpretationism, as well as the tension between triangular externalism and holism. (...) Section 3 explicates Davidson's criticisms of two rival forms of externalism: Putnam's physical externalism and Burge's anti‐individualism. Sections 4 and 5 contain a critical discussion of Davidson's arguments for triangular externalism: the argument from content determination and the argument from objectivity. (shrink)

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons (...) to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. Mein Ziel ist es zu erklären, wie Reinhold der Meinung sein konnte, seine Sprachphilosophie stelle, ebenso wie seine Elementarphilosophie, den Versuch dar, Kants Kritische Philosophie zu fundieren. Außerdem möchte ich zeigen, worin die philosophische Bedeutung von Reinholds Ansatz gegenüber den Sprachphilosophien seiner Zeitgenossen besteht.

Wie frei sind wir? Ist der freie Wille eine Illusion? Mit dem Disput zwischen Philosophie und empirischen Wissenschaften um unsere Freiheit greift dieser Band eine Debatte auf, die in jüngster Zeit nicht nur akademisch mit Vehemenz geführt wurde, sondern auch auf breite öffentliche Resonanz gestoßen ist. Der Autor kritisiert den empirischen Angriff auf unseren freien Willen, stellt aber zugleich die abstrakte philosophische Freiheitsdebatte auf eine solide empirische Basis und deckt so nicht nur die Grenzen, sondern auch die Perspektiven einer empirischen (...) Annäherung an die philosophische Frage Wie frei sind wir? auf. (shrink)

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable (...) non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states. (shrink)

In order to reduce the death toll of road traffic it is necessary to focus on how vehicles and roads can be improved. Like other dangerous machines, motor vehicles should be equipped with safety devices that prevent mistakes by the operator from leading to serious consequences. Speed limiters that prevent driving at illegal speeds would save many lives, and so would alcohol interlocks. Meshi Ori's proposal that most cars should be replaced by motorcycles would not lead to the moral improvement (...) that he hopes for. We need motor vehicles with better, not worse, protection of the driver and passengers than the cars presently in use. (shrink)

This book pursues the very first use of the term “psychology”, which is traced back to 1520. The appearance of the term was not as a part of philosophy. Thus, the main hypothesis of this book is that psychology from the very beginning was a stranger to philosophy. It demonstrates that even Aristotle used his thesis on the soul to delineate philosophy from psychological aspects. It is therefore suggested that psychological wisdom and knowledge has been retained and in popular culture (...) as long as humans have reflected upon themselves. There were, however, several reasons for why psychology appeared as a part of philosophy at around the year 1600. One important factor was Humanism, which among other things had challenged Aristotelian logic. Another important movement was Protestantism. Luther’s emphasis on the need to confess one’s sin, led to a certain interest to explore the human nature. His slogan, “the scripture alone” represented an attack on the close relationship that had existed between theology and philosophy. Yet when philosophy was thrown out of theology, it was left without the basic theological tenets that had guided philosophical speculations for centuries in Europe. Hence, this book pursues how philosophy gradually adopts and includes psychological aspects to rebuild the foundation for philosophy. This culminates partly with the British empiricists. Yet they did not apply the term psychology. It was the German and partly ignored philosopher Christian Wolff, who opened up modern understanding of psychology with the publication of Psychologia empirica in 1732. This publication had a tremendous impact on the enlightenment in the modern Europe. (shrink)

Hegel, Snellman och språket -- Snellman och Lagus -- Ur Israel Hwassers politiska idévärld -- En finländsk motsvarighet till striden mellan Thibaut och Savigny -- Hans Järta och J.J. Nordström -- "Thomas Frisk," ett inlägg i 1860-talets svenska reformdebatt -- Axel Liljenstrand -- C.G. Estlander, "kultursvensk" och gammalliberal -- Robert Hermanson och nationalitetsbegreppet -- K.J. Ståhlberg och Finlands statsskick.

Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind‐body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ‘in the head’ and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument (...) rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self‐knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self‐knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments. (shrink)