What is the difference between a gambler and a speculator? Is there a readily identifiable line separating the two? If so, is it possible for us to discourage the former while encouraging the latter? These difficult questions cut across the entirety of American economic history, and theperiodic failures by regulators to differentiate between irresponsible gambling and clear-headed investing have often been the proximate causes of catastrophic economic downturns. Most recently, the blurring of speculation and gambling in U.S. real estate markets (...) fueled the 2008 global financialcrisis, but it is one in a long line of similar economic disasters going back to the nation's founding. In Speculation, author Stuart Banner provides a sweeping and story-rich history of how the murky lines separating investment, speculation, and outright gambling have shaped America from the 1790s to the present. Regulators and courts always struggled to draw a line between investment and gambling,and it is no easier now than it was two centuries ago. Advocates for risky investments have long argued that risk-taking is what defines America. Critics counter that unregulated speculation results in bubbles that always draw in the least informed investors-gamblers, essentially. Financial chaos isthe result. The debate has been a perennial feature of American history, with the pattern repeating before and after every financial downturn since the 1790s. The Panic of 1837, the speculative boom of the roaring twenties, and the real estate bubble of the early 2000s are all emblematic of thedifficulty in differentiating sober from reckless speculation. Even after the recent financial crisis, the debate continues. Some, chastened by the crash, argue that we need to prohibit certain risky transactions, but others respond by citing the benefits of loosely governed markets and the dangersof over-regulation. These episodes have generated deep ambivalence, yet Americans' faith in investment and - by extension - the stock market has always rebounded quickly after even the most savage downturns. Indeed, the speculator on the make is a central figure in the folklore of Americancapitalism. Engaging and accessible, Speculation synthesizes a suite of themes that sit at the heart of American history - the ability of courts and regulators to protect ordinary Americans from the ravages of capitalism; the periodic fallibility of the American economy; and - not least - the moral conundruminherent in valuing those who produce goods over those who speculate, and yet enjoying the fruits of speculation. Banner's history is not only invaluable for understanding the fault lines beneath the American economy today, but American identity itself. (shrink)

Before the late 19th century, natural law played an important role in the American legal system. Lawyers routinely used it in their arguments and judges often relied upon it in their opinions. Today, by contrast, natural law plays virtually no role in the legal system. When natural law was part of a lawyer's toolkit, lawyers thought of judges as finders of the law, but when natural law dropped out of the legal system, lawyers began thinking of judges as makers of (...) the law instead. The Decline of Natural Law explores the causes and consequences of this change. It discusses the ways in which lawyers used natural law and why the concept seemed reasonable to them. It examines several long-term trends in legal thought that weakened the position of natural law, including the use of written constitutions, the gradual separation of the spheres of law and religion, the rapid growth of legal publishing, and the position of natural law in some of the 19th century's most contested legal issues. It describes the profession's rejection of natural law in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. And it explores the ways in which the legal system responded to the absence of natural law. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Republicanism of Rawls's Liberalism: An Open Question Property‐Owning Democracy Justice and Stability Tocqueville on the Ills of Democratic Personality The Republican Response Some Objections Conclusion: Lessons for Republicans and Liberals References.

In this book of essays, he argues that morality cannot be defined solely by rational and universal principles; instead, a major place must be found for changing and conflicting ideals, values peculiar to specific times and cultures.

The introduction of a generous stakeholding or capital grant scheme promises to secure the material conditions of freedom for all citizens. But if citizens “blow” their initial capital grants, as seems possible, they put this freedom in jeopardy. The paper argues that such “stakeblowing” is a genuine cause of concern with the proposal and defends two responses to it: an “educational response” that combines grants with training in asset management and a “paternalist response” that limits how grants can be used. (...) The latter response provides some support for the alternative basic income proposal, for the idea of a development grant, and, perhaps most plausibly, for a hybrid of the two. (shrink)

Accounts of video game play developed from an ethnomethodological and conversation analytic perspective remain relatively scarce. This study collects together an emerging, if scattered, body of research which focuses on the material, practical “work” of video game players. The study offers an example-driven explication of an EMCA perspective on video game play phenomena. The materials are arranged as a “tactical zoom.” We start very much “outside” the game, beginning with a wide view of how massive-multiplayer online games are played within (...) dedicated gaming spaces; here, we find multiple players, machines, and many different sorts of activities going on. Still remaining somewhat distanced from the play of the game itself, we then take a closer look at the players themselves by examining a notionally simpler setting involving pairs taking part in a football game at a games console. As we draw closer to the technical details of play, we narrow our focus further still to examine a player and spectator situated “at the screen” but jointly analyzing play as the player competes in an online first-person shooter. Finally, we go “inside” the game entirely and look at the conduct of avatars on-screen via screen recordings of a massively multiplayer online game. Having worked through specific examples, we provide an elaboration of a selection of core topics of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis that is used to situate some of the unstated orientations in the presentation of data fragments. In this way, recurrent issues raised in the fragments are shown as coherent, interconnected phenomena. In closing, we suggest caution regarding the way game play phenomena have been analyzed in this study, while remarking on challenges present for the development of further EMCA-oriented research on video game play. (shrink)

There are at least two fundamental questions in medical ethics: What constitutes the ethical components associated with medical practice?; and How are these components realized in daily medical practice? This dissertation is concerned with question . In particular, focus is on daily medical linguistic practices of physicians. Due to the entailment of question in question , however, a brief answer for is also provided. Specifically, it is argued that a tripartite theoretical ethical framework is associated with medical practice, consisting of (...) consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics components. Turning towards daily medical linguistic practices, two daily medical linguistic practices are examined: ways of referring to patients and referring to disease. Both are addressed as they occur in the context of physician-physician dialogues in a clinical, hospital setting. In light of a background argument concerning the theoretical connection between language, worldview, and ethical perspective, in which language is shown to play a role in defining both worldview and ethical perspective, the ethical perspective of physicians qua medical language users is addressed. It is suggested that although medical practice has the tripartite normative ethical foundation in theory, the practical influence of medical language used for diagnosis is to impose an essentially consequentialist framework within which patients are conceived. Consistent with this limited ethical framework, disease language is noted to suggest connotations of certainty. In light of the ambiguous and uncertain character of medical encounters between physicians and patients, the implication of certainty by disease language is problematic. Likewise, the limited, essentially consequentialist perspective of physicians is inappropriate. Physicians must therefore recognize the limitations of disease language and refrain from solely using the kind of medical language which conceptually reduces patients to mere disease loci. Physicians will thus be better able to account for the ethical implications of medical practice. (shrink)

We are once again back to the faculty of arts and to Siger of Brabant, and we are concerned to set forth his attitude toward the problem of the soul in Aristotle, not paraphrasing it, as was done earlier, but giving it in terms of the analytical discussion of the preceding two sections. A vitally important point must be made at the outset: Siger is not consciously attempting to accommodate Aristotle to the Faith. He is interested only in reconstructing the (...) Stagirite's own argument in a systematic and coherent manner, regardless of whether the conclusions come into conflict with Christian doctrine or not. Admittedly, he recognizes that these conclusions are sometimes at variance with Christian teachings, and he makes no attempt to blink these variations, but there is not in Siger any of the Thomist conviction that reason, properly exercised, cannot do otherwise than confirm the truths of faith. No--Siger reluctantly finds that properly employed reasoning can sometimes produce conclusions in conflict with truths of faith. His analysis of the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul, as presented in his De anima intellectiva, leads him to conclude that the rigorous application of systematic reasoning to the given premisses could have led to no other answers than the ones that Aristotle seems to reach. Bonaventure, faced with this dilemma, assumed that Aristotle's reasoning was proper and therefore concluded that his premisses must have been wrong; Aquinas agrees with Siger that the premisses were correct and therefore decides that the reasoning was faulty or perhaps merely inadequate, since the conclusions reached fail to confirm the truths of the Christian Revelation. Siger, however, finds both the premisses and the reasoning proper, and thus he is ultimately forced to the device of calling the resulting conclusions only "philosophical" and saying that they are always replaceable by the apodeictic certainties of the Faith. The recent research on Siger--Gilson, Van Steenberghen, and Nardi--has recognized that he was by no means insincere, or deliberately controverting the Faith; these commentators well understand that he is trying carefully and dispassionately to set forth the Aristotelian argument in all its consistency. When the conclusions reached appear to be contrary to Christian doctrine, he can do no more than say, as he does. (shrink)

Bourdieu is an important thinker within the sociological tradition and has a philosophically sophisticated approach to theoretical knowledge and research practice. In this paper, we examine the implication of his work for nursing and the health sciences more broadly. We argue that his work is best described as a reflexive realist who provides a space for a nonpositivist approach to knowledge that does not fall into the trap of idealism or relativism. We emphasize that Bourdieu was not an abstract theorist, (...) but only utilized theories to understand and explain the social world in all its empirical complexity. Theory is emphasized over method without denying the importance of method. We then provide a brief overview of some of his key concepts: habitus, field and capital. His work is a scientifically astute practice that has an emancipatory purpose, with particular resonance to the problems of nursing as a social practice. Some have criticized Bourdieu for undermining agency and we briefly address this issue, but argue that his conceptual framework helps us to understand what endures in social practice and why change is often problematic. In short, this paper argues that Bourdieu's work is a fruitful resource for critiquing existing nursing approaches that are preoccupied with agency over structure. (shrink)

This book intends to establish, against his numerous modern critics, that the ancient philosopher Parmenides was a mystic. Instead of arriving at his conclusions by cold reason, Parmenides found the unity of Being, which he called “the Truth,” by turning to a life of meditation.

Evolutionary psychology, the self-proclaimed scientific theory of human nature, owes much of its controversial notoriety to reports in public media. In part this is because of its bold claims that human psychological characteristics are adaptations to the Pleistocene environment in which they evolved and these inherited characteristics we exhibit now constitute our human nature. Proponents maintain that evolutionary psychology is a scientific account of human nature that explains what this much abused concept means. Critics counter that some evolutionary psychological hypotheses (...) threaten to undermine other intuitive concepts of human nature and well-being, specifically, by emphasizing purported scientific evidence of natural inequalities based on sex, gender, or race. They argue that this “gene machine” view entails consequences endorsing or at least seeming to give scientific aid and comfort to politically conservative, “right-wing” social agendas. Proponents deny that the theory has such unwelcome implications. Such objections, they reply, stem from “left-wing” egalitarian ideologies that presuppose the cogency of the disputed tabula rasa concept of mind intrinsic to the standard social science model of behavior explanations. Philip Kitcher’s initial scathing analysis of sociobiology, now called evolutionary psychology, as the science of human nature went basically unchallenged. Bioethicist Janet Radcliffe Richards has given a detailed critique of Kitcher’s arguments; she finds them to be “leftward-leaning,” and wanting. Here I examine her arguments and find them wanting though not “rightward-leaning.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 46-58 [Access article in PDF] In Defense of Trimming Eugene Goodheart I In The Education of Henry Adams, Adams disparages a class of English politicians as "trimmers." They are "the political economist, the anti-slavery and doctrinaire class, the followers of Tocqueville, and of John Stuart Mill. As a class, they were timid--and with good reason--and timidity, which is high wisdom in philosophy, sicklies (...) the whole cast of thought in action." 1 Timidity in action, but high wisdom in philosophy. Adams's ambivalent characterization is, relatively speaking, kind to the trimmer, for in the prevailing view he has a reputation for cowardice, lack of integrity, unprincipled behavior. Dante did not know the word, but the "neutrals" (in Sinclair's translation) whom the poet consigns to limbo have been retroactively called trimmers. Virgil regards them as beneath contempt: "Let us not talk of them; but look thou and pass." Sinclair explains why: "These innumerable seekers of safety first, and last, who take no risk either of suffering in a good cause or of scandal in a bad one, are here manifestly, nakedly, that which they were in life, the waste and rubbish of the universe, of no account to the world, unfit for Heaven and barely admitted to Hell. They have no need to die, for they 'never were alive'. They follow still, as they have always done, a meaningless, shifting banner that never stands for anything because it never stands at all, a cause which is no cause but the changing magnet of the day. Their pains are paltry and their tears and blood mere food for worms." 2The dictionary defines trimming as the "modif[ication] of one's attitude in order to stand well with opposite parties; also to accommodate oneself to the mood of the times," and gives 1685 as the date of provenance. By the late nineteenth century trimming becomes opportunism: [End Page 46] "to modify according to expediency." So it was something of a surprise to find a defense of trimming in Macaulay's famous History of England in his eulogy of one of Charles the Second's ministers, Viscount Halifax (Charles Savile). "Halifax," we learn, "was a trimmer on principle. He was also a trimmer by the constitution of his head and his heart." Macaulay sums up Halifax's defense in his essay "The Character of a Trimmer." "Everything good, he said, trims between extremes. The temperate zone trims between the climate in which men are roasted and the climate in which they are frozen. The English Church trims between the Anabaptist madness and the Papist lethargy. The English constitution trims between Turkish despotism and Polish anarchy. Virtue is nothing but a just temper between propensities any one of which, if indulged to excess, becomes vice." Behind trimming lies Aristotle's golden mean.What of the character of the trimmer? Macaulay provides an admirable and admiring portrait of Halifax. "His understanding was keen, sceptical, inexhaustibly fertile in distinctions and objections; his taste refined, his sense of the ludicrous exquisite; his temper placid and forgiving, but fastidious, and by no means prone either to malevolence or to enthusiastic admiration." Charming and agreeable, but where is the integrity or courage, attributes that we associate with character? He had nothing in common with those who fly from extreme to extreme, and regard the party which they have deserted with an animosity far exceeding that of consistent enemies. His place was on the debatable ground between the hostile divisions of the community.... The party to which he at any moment belonged was the party which, at that moment, he liked least, because it was the party of which at that moment he had the nearest view. He was therefore always severe upon his violent associates, and was always in friendly relations with his moderate opponents. Every faction in the day of its insolent and vindictive triumph incurred his censure; and every faction, when vanquished and persecuted, found in him a protector. To his lasting honor it must be mentioned that he attempted to save those victims whose fate... (shrink)

Their general theme might be taken as, "What is the way which man ought to choose for himself?" The debate they encourage by these stimulating and frank contributions will be welcomed by those of all faiths and traditions interested in the quality of our society.

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.

In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, When considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, While at the same time stopping to (...) explain why it is a thesis which tempts those who confuse epistemological distinctions with logical distinctions. (staff). (shrink)

Exegesis, with text, of the classical treatise expounding the philosophy of Chaitanya school in Vaishnavism.

As an explanation for order and long range correlations in living systems, Fröhlich (1968; 1970; 1975) proposed certain biomolecules pumped by metabolic processes could exhibit coherent phonon dynamics, perhaps even macroscopic quantum coherence akin to Bose Einstein condensation or lasers. The biomolecular requirements, according to Fröhlich, were: 1) a geometric array or lattice of dipoles constrained in a common voltage gradient, and 2) ample, non coherent biochemical energy. Eligible proposed candidates included membrane proteins, nucleic acids and cytoskeletal microtubules.

Dynamical activities within living eukaryotic cells are organized by microtubules, main structural components of the cytoskeleton and cylindrical polymers of the protein tubulin. Evidence and theoretical models suggest that states of tubulin may play the role of “bits” in classical microtubule computational automata. The advent of quantum information devices, key roles played by quantum processes in protein dynamics, and coherent ordering in the cell cytoplasm further suggest that microtubules may function as quantum computational devices, and that mesoscopic and macroscopic quantum (...) states are characteristic of living systems. In this paper new results from molecular dynamics simulation based on recently obtained atomic structure of tubulin are presented which provide support for classical and quantum modes of microtubule information processing. (shrink)

Conference Report on ASSC 11, Las Vegas 2007.

Most philosophical debate over mental causation has been concerned with reconciling commonsense intuitions that there are causal interactions between the mental and the physical with philosophical theories of the nature of the mental that seem to suggest otherwise. My concern is with a different and more practical problem. We often confront some cognitive, affective, or bodily phenomenon, and wonder about its source – its etiology or its underlying causal basis. For instance, you might wonder whether your queasiness due to something (...) you ate, or whether it is just nervousness, or whether your aunt’s memory loss is a neurological problem or a psychological response to trauma. Such questions attempt to localize the causes of a phenomenon at some level in the complex multi-level systems that we human animals are. In this paper I will attempt to tease out the sense of level implicit in such questions, and to show how it is related to current mechanistic accounts of levels. I will argue that the explanation of our practices of level attribution is deeply pragmatic. Such attributions are often attempts to locate the causes of problems, and to identify interventions that could solve those problems. (shrink)

_Wittgenstein’s Intentions_, first published in 1993, presents a series of essays dedicated to the great Wittgenstein exegete John Hunter. The problematic topics discussed are identified not only by Wittgenstein’s own philosophical writings, but also by contemporary scholarship: areas of ambiguity, perhaps even confusion, as well as issues which the father of analytic philosophy did not himself address. The difficulties involved in speaking cogently about religious belief, suspicion, consciousness, the nature of the will, the coincidence of our thoughts with reality, and (...) transfinite numbers are all investigated, as well as a variety of other intriguing questions: why can’t a baby pretend to smile? How do I know what I was going to say? Wittgenstein’s Intentions is an invaluable resource for students of Wittgenstein as well as scholars, and opens up a wide horizon of philosophical questioning for those as yet unfamiliar with this style of reasoning. (shrink)