Strong negation is a well-known alternative to the standard negation in intuitionistic logic. It is defined virtually by giving falsity conditions to each of the connectives. Among these, the falsity condition for implication appears to unnecessarily deviate from the standard negation. In this paper, we introduce a slight modification to strong negation, and observe its comparative advantages over the original notion. In addition, we consider the paraconsistent variants of our modification, and study their relationship (...) with non-constructive principles and connexivity. (shrink)

We study the sequent system mentioned in the author's work as CyInFL with ‘intuitionistic’ sequents. We explore the connection between this system and symmetric constructive logic of Zaslavsky and develop an algebraic semantics for both of them. In contrast to the previous work, we prove the strong completeness theorem for CyInFL with ‘intuitionistic’ sequents and all of its basic variants, including variants with contraction. We also show how the defined classes of structures are related to cyclic involutive FL‐algebras and (...) Nelson FLew‐algebras. In particular, we prove the definitional equivalence of symmetric constructive FLewc‐algebras (algebraic models of symmetric constructive logic) and Nelson FLew‐algebras (algebras introduced by Spinks and Veroff, as the termwise equivalent definition of Nelson algebras). Because of the strong completeness theorem that covers all basic variants of CyInFL with ‘intuitionistic’ sequents, we rename this sequent system to symmetric constructive full Lambek calculus (). We verify the decidability of this system and its basic variants, as we did in the case of their distributive cousins. As a consequence we obtain that the corresponding theories of (distributive and nondistributive) symmetric constructive FL‐algebras are decidable. (shrink)

The goal of this two-part series of papers is to show that constructive logic with strong negation N is definitionally equivalent to a certain axiomatic extension NFL ew of the substructural logic FL ew . In this paper, it is shown that the equivalent variety semantics of N (namely, the variety of Nelson algebras) and the equivalent variety semantics of NFL ew (namely, a certain variety of FL ew -algebras) are term equivalent. This answers a longstanding question of (...) Nelson [30]. Extensive use is made of the automated theorem-prover Prover9 in order to establish the result. The main result of this paper is exploited in Part II of this series [40] to show that the deductive systems N and NFL ew are definitionally equivalent, and hence that constructive logic with strong negation is a substructural logic over FL ew. (shrink)

This paper is a reaction to the following remark by grzegorczyk: "the compound sentences are not a product of experiment. they arise from reasoning. this concerns also negations; we see that the lemon is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue." generally, in science the truth is ascertained as indirectly as falsehood. an example: a litmus-paper is used to verify the sentence "the solution is acid." this approach gives rise to a (very intuitionistic indeed) conservative extension of (...) the heyting logic satisfying natural duality laws. (shrink)

The goal of this two-part series of papers is to show that constructive logic with strong negation N is definitionally equivalent to a certain axiomatic extension NFL ew of the substructural logic FL ew. The main result of Part I of this series [41] shows that the equivalent variety semantics of N and the equivalent variety semantics of NFL ew are term equivalent. In this paper, the term equivalence result of Part I [41] is lifted to the setting (...) of deductive systems to establish the definitional equivalence of the logics N and NFL ew. It follows from the definitional equivalence of these systems that constructive logic with strong negation is a substructural logic. (shrink)

Motivated by the definition of semi-Nelson algebras, a propositional calculus called semi-intuitionistic logic with strong negation is introduced and proved to be complete with respect to that class of algebras. An axiomatic extension is proved to have as algebraic semantics the class of Nelson algebras.

We present a semantics for strong negation systems on the basis of the subformula property of the sequent calculus. The new models, called subformula models, are constructed as a special class of canonical Kripke models for providing the way from the cut-elimination theorem to model-theoretic results. This semantics is more intuitive than the standard Kripke semantics for strong negation systems.

This paper deals with, prepositional calculi with strong negation (N-logics) in which the Craig interpolation theorem holds. N-logics are defined to be axiomatic strengthenings of the intuitionistic calculus enriched with a unary connective called strong negation. There exists continuum of N-logics, but the Craig interpolation theorem holds only in 14 of them.

Wansing’s extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation, called WILL, is regarded as a resource-conscious refinment of Nelson’s constructive logics with strong negation. In this paper, (1) the completeness theorem with respect to phase semantics is proved for WILL using a method that simultaneously derives the cut-elimination theorem, (2) a simple correspondence between the class of Petri nets with inhibitor arcs and a fragment of WILL is obtained using a Kripke semantics, (3) a cut-free sequent calculus (...) for WILL, called twist calculus, is presented, (4) a strongly normalizable typed λ-calculus is obtained for a fragment of WILL, and (5) new applications of WILL in medical diagnosis and electric circuit theory are proposed. Strong negation in WILL is found to be expressible as a resource-conscious refutability, and is shown to correspond to inhibitor arcs in Petri net theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a Hilbert style axiomatic calculus for intutionistic logic with strong negation. This calculus is a preservative extension of intuitionistic logic, but it can express that some falsity are constructive. We show that the introduction of strong negation allows us to define a square of opposition based on quantification on possible worlds.

The Craig interpolation theorem is shown for an extended LJ with strong negation. A new simple proof of this theorem is obtained. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

We introduce modal propositional substructural logics with strong negation, and prove the completeness theorems (with respect to Kripke models) for these logics.

In this paper we will study the properties of the least extension n(Λ) of a given intermediate logic Λ by a strong negation. It is shown that the mapping from Λ to n(Λ) is a homomorphism of complete lattices, preserving and reflecting finite model property, frame-completeness, interpolation and decidability. A general characterization of those constructive logics is given which are of the form n(Λ). This summarizes results that can be found already in [13, 14] and [4]. Furthermore, we (...) determine the structure of the lattice of extensions of n(LC). (shrink)

A new logic, quantized intuitionistic linear logic, is introduced, and is closely related to the logic which corresponds to Mulvey and Pelletier's involutive quantales. Some cut-free sequent calculi with a new property quantization principle and some complete semantics such as an involutive quantale model and a quantale model are obtained for QILL. The relationship between QILL and Wansing's extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation is also observed using such syntactical and semantical frameworks.

We introduce an extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation and modality. The logic presented is a modal extension of Wansing's extended linear logic with strong negation. First, we propose three types of cut-free sequent calculi for this new logic. The first one is named a subformula calculus, which yields the subformula property. The second one is termed a dual calculus, which has positive and negative sequents. The third one is called a triple-context calculus, which is (...) regarded as a natural extension or generalization of Hodas and Miller's dual-context calculus appearing in a linear logic programming language. Second, we present a concurrent process calculus based on the logic. This calculus is an extension of Okada's process calculus. Third, we introduce a Kripke type semantics for a fragment of the logic, and show the completeness theorems with respect to the semantics. Finally, we mention a logic programming language based on the triple-context calculus. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to show that topoi are useful in the categorial analysis of the constructive logic with strong negation. In any topos ϵ we can distinguish an object Λ and its truth-arrows such that sets ϵ have a Nelson algebra structure. The object Λ is defined by the categorial counterpart of the algebraic FIDEL-VAKARELOV construction. Then it is possible to define the universal quantifier morphism which permits us to make the first order predicate calculus. (...) The completeness theorem is proved using the Kripke-type semantic defined by THOMASON. (shrink)

We introduce Kripke models for propositional substructural logics with strong negation, and show the completeness theorems for these logics using an extended Ishihara's canonical model construction method. The framework presented can deal with a broad range of substructural logics with strong negation, including a modified version of Nelson's logic N$^-$, Wansing's logic COSPL, and extended versions of Visser's basic propositional logic, positive relevant logics, Corsi's logics and M\'endez's logics.

We study axiomatic extensions of the propositional constructive logic with strong negation having the disjunction property in terms of corresponding to them varieties of Nelson algebras. Any such varietyV is characterized by the property: (PQWC) ifA,B V, thenA×B is a homomorphic image of some well-connected algebra ofV.We prove:• each varietyV of Nelson algebras with PQWC lies in the fibre –1(W) for some varietyW of Heyting algebras having PQWC, • for any varietyW of Heyting algebras with PQWC the least (...) and the greatest varieties in –1(W) have PQWC, • there exist varietiesW of Heyting algebras having PQWC such that –1(W) contains infinitely many varieties (of Nelson algebras) with PQWC. (shrink)

A sufficient condition for an extension of positive logic with strong negation to be characterized by a class of finite trees is given.

An extension of intuitionism to empirical discourse, a project most seriously taken up by Dummett and Tennant, requires an empirical negation whose strength lies somewhere between classical negation (‘It is unwarranted that. . . ’) and intuitionistic negation (‘It is refutable that. . . ’). I put forward one plausible candidate that compares favorably to some others that have been propounded in the literature. A tableau calculus is presented and shown to be strongly complete.

Here is an account of recent investigations into the two main concepts of negation developed in the constructive logic: the negation as reduction to absurdity, and the strong negation. These concepts are studied in the setting of paraconsistent logic.

ABSTRACT A new algebraic construction -called rotation- is introduced in this paper which from any left-continuous triangular norm which has no zero divisors produces a left-continuous but not continuous triangular norm with strong induced negation. An infinite number of new families of such triangular norms can be constructed in this way which provides a huge spectrum of choice for e.g. logical and set theoretical connectives in non-classical logic and in fuzzy theory. On the other hand, the introduced construction (...) brings us closer to the understanding the structure of these connectives and the corresponding logics. From the application point of view, results of this paper can be especially useful in the field of non-classical logic, fuzzy sets, and fuzzy preference modeling. (shrink)

This paper is the continuation of [11] where the rotation construction of left-continuous triangular norms was presented. Here the class of triangular subnorms and a second construction, called rotation-annihilation, are introduced: Let T1 be a left-continuous triangular norm. If T1 has no zero divisors then let T2 be a left-continuous rotation invariant t-subnorm. If T1 has zero divisors then let T2 be a left-continuous rotation invariant triangular norm. From each such pair the rotation-annihilation construction produces a left-continuous triangular norm with (...) strong induced negation. An infinite number of new families of such triangular norms can be constructed in this way, and this further extends our spectrum of choice for the proper triangular norm e.g. in probabilistic metric spaces, or for logical and set theoretical connectives in non-classical logic, or e.g. in fuzzy sets theory and its applications. On the other hand, the introduced construction brings us closer to the understanding of the structure of these operations. (shrink)

The paper consists of two parts. In the first one I present some general remarks regarding the history of negation and attempt to answer the philosophical question concerning the essence of negation. In the second part I resume the theological teaching on the degrees of certainty and point to five forms of negation – known from other areas of research -- as applied in the framework of theological investigations.

In game-theoretical semantics, perfectlyclassical rules yield a strong negation thatviolates tertium non datur when informationalindependence is allowed. Contradictorynegation can be introduced only by a metalogicalstipulation, not by game rules. Accordingly, it mayoccur (without further stipulations) onlysentence-initially. The resulting logic (extendedindependence-friendly logic) explains several regularitiesin natural languages, e.g., why contradictory negation is abarrier to anaphase. In natural language, contradictory negationsometimes occurs nevertheless witin the scope of aquantifier. Such sentences require a secondary interpretationresembling the so-called substitutionalinterpretation of quantifiers.This interpretation (...) is sometimes impossible,and it means a step beyond thenormal first-order semantics, not an alternative to it. (shrink)

Many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Mares showed, however, that E is a notable exception. Mares’ proof is by and large a rather involved model-theoretic one. This paper presents a much easier proof-theoretic proof which not only covers E but also generalizes so as to also cover relevant logics with a primitive modal operator added. It is shown that from even very weak relevant logics augmented by a weak K-ish modal operator, and up to the (...) strong relevant logic R with a S5 modal operator, all fail to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. The proof, therefore, also covers Meyer and Mares’ proof that NR—R with a primitive S4-modality added—also fails to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. (shrink)

Let MK3 I and MK3 II be Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix with only one and two designated values, respectively. Next, let MK3 G be defined exactly as MK3 I, except th...

The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of (...) 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP, Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity, indeterminacy or some other semantic value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well. (shrink)

A version of strong negation is introduced into Categorial Grammar. The resulting syntactic calculi turn out to be systems of connexive logic.

According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response (...) on behalf of DeRose appears to be equally available to his primary rival (viz., the sensitivity theorist). (shrink)