If ZFC is consistent, then each of the following is consistent with ZFC + 2ℵ0 = ℵ2: (1) $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is of strong measure zero iff |X| ≤ ℵ1 + there is a generalized Sierpinski set. (2) The union of ℵ1 many strong measure zero sets is a strong measure zero set + there is a strong measure zero set of size ℵ2 + there is no Cohen (...) real over L. (shrink)

We prove that $\operatorname{cons}(ZF)$ implies $\operatorname{cons}(ZF +$ Borel conjecture + there exists a Ramsey ultrafilter). We also prove some results on strong measure zero sets from the existence of generalized Luzin sets. We study the relationships between strong measure zero sets and rapid filters on ω.

We investigate the notion of strong measure zero sets in the context of the higher Cantor space $2^\kappa $ for $\kappa $ at least inaccessible. Using an iteration of perfect tree forcings, we give two proofs of the relative consistency of $$\begin{align*}|2^\kappa| = \kappa^{++} + \forall X \subseteq 2^\kappa:\ X \textrm{ is strong measure zero if and only if } |X| \leq \kappa^+. \end{align*}$$ Furthermore, we also investigate the stronger notion of stationary strong (...) measure zero and show that the equivalence of the two notions is undecidable in ZFC. (shrink)

Any finite support iteration of posets with precalibre ℵ 1 which has the length of cofinality greater than ω 1 yields a model for the dual Borel conjecture in which the real line is covered by ℵ 1 strong measure zero sets.

In a previous paper-[17]-we characterized strong measure zero sets of reals in terms of a Ramseyan partition relation on certain subspaces of the Alexandroff duplicate of the unit interval. This framework gave only indirect access to the relevant sets of real numbers. We now work more directly with the sets in question, and since it costs little in additional technicalities, we consider the more general context of metric spaces and prove: 1. If a metric space has a (...) covering property of Hurewicz and has strong measure zero, then its product with any strong measure zero metric space is a strong measure zero metric space (Theorem 1 and Lemma 3). 2. A subspace X of a σ-compact metric space Y has strong measure zero if, and only if, a certain Ramseyan partition relation holds for Y (Theorem 9). 3. A subspace X of a σ-compact metric space Y has strong measure zero in all finite powers if, and only if, a certain Ramseyan partition relation holds for Y (Theorem 12). Then 2 and 3 yield characterizations of strong measure zeroness for σ-totally bounded metric spaces in terms of Ramseyan theorems. (shrink)

In this paper we present two consistency results concerning the existence of large strong measure zero and strongly meager sets. RID=""ID="" Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 03e35 RID=""ID="" The first author was supported by Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and NSF grant DMS 95-05375. The second author was partially supported by Basic Research Fund, Israel Academy of Sciences, publication 658.

We prove the following theorems: (1) If X has strong measure zero and if Y has strong first category, then their algebraic sum has property s 0 . (2) If X has Hurewicz's covering property, then it has strong measure zero if, and only if, its algebraic sum with any first category set is a first category set. (3) If X has strong measure zero and Hurewicz's covering property then its (...) algebraic sum with any set in APC ' is a set in APC '. (APC ' is included in the class of sets always of first category, and includes the class of strong first category sets.) These results extend: Fremlin and Miller's theorem that strong measure zero sets having Hurewicz's property have Rothberger's property, Galvin and Miller's theorem that the algebraic sum of a set with the γ-property and of a first category set is a first category set, and Bartoszynski and Judah's characterization of SR M -sets. They also characterize the property (*) introduced by Gerlits and Nagy in terms of older concepts. (shrink)

We show that strong measure zero sets -totally bounded metric space) can be characterized by the nonexistence of a winning strategy in a certain infinite game. We use this characterization to give a proof of the well known fact, originally conjectured by K. Prikry, that every dense \ subset of the real line contains a translate of every strong measure zero set. We also derive a related result which answers a question of J. Fickett.

The notion of strong measure zero is studied in the context of Polish groups and general separable metric spaces. An extension of a theorem of Galvin, Mycielski and Solovay is given, whereas the theorem is shown to fail for the Baer–Specker group Zω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\mathbb{Z}^{\omega}}}$$\end{document}. The uniformity number of the ideal of strong measure zero subsets of a separable metric space is examined, providing solutions to several problems (...) of Miller and Steprāns :52–59, 2006). (shrink)

Bartoszynski, T. and S. Shelah, Closed measure zero sets, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 93–110. We study the relationship between the σ-ideal generated by closed measure zero sets and the ideals of null and meager sets. We show that the additivity of the ideal of closed measure zero sets is not bigger than covering for category. As a consequence we get that the additivity of the ideal of closed measure zero (...) sets is equal to the additivity of the ideal of meager sets. (shrink)

We give a characterization of the cofinality of the strong measure zero ideal under the continuum hypothesis and prove that we can force it to a value less than the power of the continuum.

We investigate the cofinality of the strong measure zero ideal for κ inaccessible and show that it is independent of the size of 2κ.

A set X⊆ℝ is strongly meager if for every measure zero set H, X+H ≠ℝ. Let [Formula: see text] denote the collection of strongly meager sets. We show that assuming [Formula: see text], [Formula: see text] is not an ideal.

By the Galvin–Mycielski–Solovay theorem, a subset X of the line has Borel’s strong measure zero if and only if $M+X\neq \mathbb {R}$ for each meager set M.A set $X\subseteq \mathbb {R}$ is meager-additive if $M+X$ is meager for each meager set M. Recently a theorem on meager-additive sets that perfectly parallels the Galvin–Mycielski–Solovay theorem was proven: A set $X\subseteq \mathbb {R}$ is meager-additive if and only if it has sharp measure zero, a notion akin to (...) strong measure zero.We investigate the validity of this result in Polish groups. We prove, e.g., that a set in a locally compact Polish group admitting an invariant metric is meager-additive if and only if it has sharp measure zero. We derive some consequences and calculate some cardinal invariants. (shrink)

We prove the iteration lemmata, which are the key lemmata to show that extensions by Pmax variations satisfy absoluteness for Π2-statements in the structure 〈H , ∈, NSω 1, R 〉 for some set R of reals in L , for the following statements: The cofinality of the null ideal is ℵ1. There exists a good basis of the strong measure zero ideal.

We show that certain type of tree forcings, including Sacks forcing, increases the covering of the strong measure zero ideal \. As a consequence, in Sacks model, such covering number is equal to the size of the continuum, which indicates that this covering number is consistently larger than any other classical cardinal invariant of the continuum. Even more, Sacks forcing can be used to force that \<\mathrm {cov}<\mathrm {cof}\), which is the first consistency result where more than (...) two cardinal invariants associated with \ are pairwise different. Another consequence is that \ in ZFC where \ denotes Marczewski’s ideal. (shrink)

Abstract.In this paper we prove that it is consistent that every γ-set is countable while not every strong measure zero set is countable. We also show that it is consistent that every strong γ-set is countable while not every γ-set is countable. On the other hand we show that every strong measure zero set is countable iff every set with the Rothberger property is countable.

We investigate the cofinality of the partial order N κ of functions from a regular cardinal κ into the ideal N of Lebesgue measure zero subsets of R. We show that when add(N) = κ and the covering lemma holds with respect to an inner model of GCH, then cf(N κ ) = max {cf(κ κ ), cf([ cf(N)] κ )}. We also give an example to show that the covering assumption cannot be removed.

The authors investigate an operation * on the subsets of ${\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R})}$ . It is connected with Borel’s strong measure zero sets as well as strongly meager. The results concern the behaviour of the family of countable sets when * is applied.

A central object of study in the field of algorithmic randomness are notions of randomness for sequences, i.e., infinite sequences of zeros and ones. These notions are usually defined with respect to the uniform measure on the set of all sequences, but extend canonically to other computable probability measures. This way each notion of randomness induces an equivalence relation on the computable probability measures where two measures are equivalent if they have the same set of random sequences. In what (...) follows, we study the equivalence relations induced by Martin-Löf randomness, computable randomness, Schnorr randomness and Kurtz randomness, together with the relations of equivalence and consistency from probability theory. We show that all these relations coincide when restricted to the class of computable strongly positive generalized Bernoulli measures. For the case of arbitrary computable measures, we obtain a complete and somewhat surprising picture of the implications between these relations that hold in general. (shrink)

We provide a solution to the well-known “Shooting-Room” paradox, developed by John Leslie in connection with his Doomsday Argument. In the “Shooting-Room” paradox, the death of an individual is contingent upon an event that has a 1/36 chance of occurring, yet the relative frequency of death in the relevant population is 0.9. There are two intuitively plausible arguments, one concluding that the appropriate subjective probability of death is 1/36, the other that this probability is 0.9. How are these two values (...) to be reconciled? We show that only the first argument is valid for a standard, countably additive probability distribution. However, both lines of reasoning are legitimate if probabilities are non-standard. The subjective probability of death rises from 1/36 to 0.9 by conditionalizing on an event that is not measurable, or whose probability is zero. Thus we can sometimes meaningfully ascribe conditional probabilities even when the event conditionalized upon is not of positive finite (or even infinitesimal) measure. (shrink)

Summary In this paper we examine the reaction of the Leiden low-temperature laboratory of Heike Kamerlingh Onnes to new ideas in quantum theory. Especially the contributions of Albert Einstein (1906) and Peter Debye (1912) to the theory of specific heat, and the concept of zero-point energy formulated by Max Planck in 1911, gave a boost to solid state research to test these theories. In the case of specific heat measurements, Kamerlingh Onnes's laboratory faced stiff competition from Walter Nernst's Institute (...) of Physical Chemistry in Berlin. In fact, Berlin got the better of it because Leiden lacked focus. After the liquefaction of helium in 1908, Kamerlingh Onnes transformed his laboratory into an international facility for low temperature research, and for this reason it was impossible to make headway with the specific heat measurements. In the case of zero-point energy, Leiden developed a magnetic research programme to test the concept. Initially the balance of evidence seemed to be tipping in favour of zero-point energy. After 1914, however, Leiden would desert the theory in fovour, of a concept from calssical physics. A curious move that illustrates Kamerlingh Onnes's discomfort with the new quantum theory. (shrink)

Graphical models are a powerful tool for causal model specification. Besides allowing for a hierarchical representation of variable interactions, they do not require any a priori specification of the functional dependence between variables. The construction of such graphs hence often relies on the mere testing of whether or not model variables are marginally or conditionally independent. The identification of causal relationships then solely requires some general assumptions on the relation between stochastic and causal independence, such as the Causal Markov Condition (...) and the Faithfulness Condition (Spirtes et al. 2000; Pearl 2000). However, a procedure would require further assumptions to hold. Namely those the independence tests themselves are based on. In continuous settings, Spirtes et al. (2000) suggest causal inference based on a very restrictive formulation of independence, that is, vanishing partial correlations. Such a measure does, however, limit the applicability of causal inference to linear systems. This constitutes a serious drawback especially for the social sciences where an a priori specification of the functional form proves difficult or at odds with linearity. In short: graphical models theoretically reduce specification uncertainty regarding functional dependence, but their implementation in practice deprives them of this virtue. In this paper we investigate how causal structures in continuous settings can be identified when both functional forms and probability distributions of the variables remain unspecified. We focus on tests exploiting the fact that if X and Y are conditionally independent given a set of variables Z, the two conditional densities f (X|Y, Z) and f (X|Z) must coincide. We start by estimating the conditional densities f(X|Y, Z) and f(X|Z) via nonparametric techniques (kernel methods). We proceed by testing if some metric expressing the distance between these very conditional densities is sufficiently close to zero. Out of several metrics available in the literature to express such distance we choose two, the Euclidean, and the Hellinger distance. We investigate in a Monte Carlo study how different tests involving either measure are able to detect statistical independence, conditioned on a small set of variables. One limitation may result from nonparametric density estimation being subject to the curse of dimensionality. As the number of variables increases, the estimated empirical density converges at a slower rate to its population value. To compensate this drawback we use a local bootstrap procedure which consists of resampling the data for each test. While local bootstrap strongly increases the computational time of the test, it succeeds in counterbalancing the curse of dimensionality. (shrink)

In this paper we ask the question: to what extent do basic set theoretic properties of Loeb measure depend on the nonstandard universe and on properties of the model of set theory in which it lies? We show that, assuming Martin's axiom and κ-saturation, the smallest cover by Loeb measure zero sets must have cardinality less than κ. In contrast to this we show that the additivity of Loeb measure cannot be greater than ω 1 . (...) Define $\operatorname{cof}(H)$ as the smallest cardinality of a family of Loeb measure zero sets which cover every other Loeb measure zero set. We show that $\operatorname{card}(\lfloor\log_2(H)\rfloor) \leq \operatorname{cof}(H) \leq \operatorname{card}(2^H)$ , where card is the external cardinality. We answer a question of Paris and Mills concerning cuts in nonstandard models of number theory. We also present a pair of nonstandard universes $M \preccurlyeq N$ and hyperfinite integer H ∈ M such that H is not enlarged by N, 2 H contains new elements, but every new subset of H has Loeb measure zero. We show that it is consistent that there exists a Sierpiński set in the reals but no Loeb-Sierpiński set in any nonstandard universe. We also show that it is consistent with the failure of the continuum hypothesis that Loeb-Sierpiński sets can exist in some nonstandard universes and even in an ultrapower of a standard universe. (shrink)

Although there are important moral arguments against cloning human beings, it has been suggested that there might be exceptional cases in which cloning humans would be ethically permissible. One type of supposed exceptional case involves infertile couples who want to have children by cloning. This paper explores whether cloning would be ethically permissible in infertility cases and the separate question of whether we should have a policy allowing cloning in such cases. One caveat should be stated at the beginning, however. (...) After the cloning of a sheep in Scotland, scientists pointed out that using the same technique to clone humans would, at present, involve substantial risks of producing children with birth defects. This concern over safety gives compelling support to the view that it would be wrong to attempt human cloning now. Thus, we do not reach the debate about exceptional cases unless the issue of safety can be set aside. I ask the reader to consider the possibility that in the future humans could be cloned without a significantly elevated risk of birth defects from the cloning process itself. The remainder of this paper assumes, for sake of argument, that cloning technology has advanced to that point. Given this assumption, would cloning in the infertility cases be ethically permissible, and should it be legally permitted? (shrink)

This paper presents an integrative, descriptive model of ethical decision making, with special attention given to issues of measurement. After building the model, hypotheses are developed from a portion of it. These hypotheses are tested in an exploratory analysis to determine if further research and testing of this model and the measurement instruments it employs are warranted.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Barrow and Newton E. W. STRONG As E. A. Buxrr HAS ADDUCED,Isaac Barrow (1630-1677) in his philosophy of space, time, and mathematical method strongly influenced the thinking of Newton: The recent publication of an early paper written by Newton (his De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum)2 affords evidence not known to Burtt of Newton's indebtedness in philosophy to Barrow, his teacher. Prior to its publication in 1962, this paper (...) was utilized by Alexandre Koyrd in his essay, "Newton and Descartes," 3 a study based on the third Horblit Lecture in the History of Science which he gave at Harvard University, March 8, 1961. Koyr8 maintains that there is a radical opposition in Newton's Principia not only to Descartes' purely scientific theories but also to the Cartesian philosophy. Yet, as he remarks, "we do not find in the Principia an open criticism of the philosophy of Descartes.... " He attributes this fact principally "to the very structure of the Principia: it is essentially a book on rational mechanics, which provides principles for physics and astronomy. In such a book there is a normal place for the discussion of Cartesian optics, but not of the conception of the relations of mind and body, and other such things." Koyrd asserts, nonetheless, that the criticism is not absent. It lurks in Newton's carefully worded definitions of fundamental concepts--those of space, time, motion, and matter--and becomes more apparent in the Optice of 1706 and in the second odition of the Principia. In support of this argument, he makes much of young Newton's unfini.~hed paper. He holds that this essay is of exceptional value "as it enables us to get some insight into the formation of Newton's thought, and to recognize that preoccupation with philosophic problems was not an external additatmentum but an integral dement of his thinking." 4 As concerns "young Newton's conception of space in its being and in its relation to God and time," Koyrd remarks that we learn from this essay The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (New York, 1927), p. 144. A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1962), Introduction, pp. 75-88; Latin text, pp. 90-121; English translation, pp. 121156. " Newtonian Studies (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 53-114. " Newtonian Studies, pp. 82-83. In his De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum, Newton is indeed engrossed with philosophic problems. With regard, however, to the announced purpose of his paper, namely, "to treat of the science of gravity and solid bodies in fluids by two methods," does Newton represent kis metaphysical "explanation of the nature of body" as an element of his science essential to its completeness7 He does not do so. At the end of his explanation he remarks: "I have already digressed enough; let us return to the main theme." He proceeds to set forth fifteen more definitions and then turns to the demonstration of two "Propositions on Non-Elastic Fluids." [155] 156 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY "that space is necessary, eternal, immutz~ble, and unmovable, that though we can imagine that there is nothing in space we cannot think space is not.., and that if there is no space, God would be nowhere. We learn also that all points of space are simultaneous and that, therefore, the divine omnipresence does not introduce composition in God.... " What we here learn from Newton about space in confutation of Descartes is to be found in Barrow's tenth mathematical lecture, "'Of Space, and Impenetrability." 5 In this lecture, Barrow opposes both Descartes and Hobbes. He objects, as does Newton, to the position taken by Descartes in his Principia Philosophiae, namely, "it is necessary.forMatter to be infinitely extended." He proceeds, as does Newton, to show how "very much Cartesius's great Subtility has failed him in this Case" to conclude that there is space empty of matter and distinct from magnitude from which an infinity of matter cannot be deduced. The correspondence of arguments tendered by Barrow and Newton indicates that the tenth lecture constituted a source from which Newton gleaned principal objections to Descartes' Principia Philosophiae. Although Koyr~ makes reference to Burtt's... (shrink)

Blood supplies have become indexes of national security and the public good. While blood shortages can provoke anxiety, controversies continue to erupt in many countries over proper donor screening, especially with reference to HIV. This article sketches these dynamics in several global settings, focusing especially on activist efforts by gay men to reform exclusionary blood donor guidelines. The contours of the debate recall familiar conflicts between the putative demands of public health and the rights of individuals in the era of (...) AIDS. However, if gay activists marshal a discourse of individual rights vis-a-vis forms of institutional exclusion, they also seek a broader shift in social and cultural understandings of gay identity. To capture this complex interplay of citizenship and sociality, risk and responsibility, the article introduces the notion of `vital publics' to refer to the peculiar associational form represented by blood supplies. Vital publics are kinds of embodied association elicited through the generalized exchange of body — in this case, blood. Hailed to `give life' by the jargon of the pervasive social marketing of varied blood service systems, activists seek to contribute to the life of the `vital public' that transfusion medicine calls into being. (shrink)

Ecology is composed of a remarkably diverse set of scientific disciplines. There are many different sub-fields in ecology—physiological, behavioral, evolutionary, population, community, ecosystem, and landscape ecology. Clearly, no summary will do them all justice. However, for the present context, ecology as a science can be divided into three basic areas—population, community, and ecosystem ecology. This entry will introduce some of the fundamental philosophical issues raised by these three disciplines. The first order of business is to ask what is the science (...) of ecology, and more importantly, what is it not (see Brennan 1988). Sometimes the term ‘ecology’ is treated as synonymous or coextensive with three different concepts or sets of concepts: • The science of ecology: the study of organisms and groups of them and their relation to their environment. (shrink)

We construct models for the level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness in which for κ the least supercompact cardinal and δ ≤ κ any cardinal which is either a strong cardinal or a measurable limit of strong cardinals, 2δ > δ+ and δ is < 2δ supercompact. In these models, the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals can be arbitrary, and the size of the power set of κ can essentially be made as (...) large as desired. This extends and generalizes [5, Theorem 2] and [4, Theorem 4]. We also sketch how our techniques can be used to establish a weak indestructibility result. (shrink)

The validity of assessment programs is increasingly important in higher education. Existing approaches to assessment are problematic because they eitherfail to provide timely feedback or have suspect measurement issues. We propose a feed-forward assessment model to help overcome these two limitations oftraditional assessment approaches.

The Uniformly Reflexive Structure was introduced by E. G. Wagner who showed that the theory of such structures generalized much of recursive function theory. In this paper Uniformly Reflexive Structures are constructed as factor algebras of Free nonassociative algebras. Wagner's question about the existence of a model with no computable splinter ("successor set") is answered in the affirmative by the construction of a model whose only computable sets are the finite sets and their complements. Finally, for each countable Boolean algebra (...) R of subsets of a countable set which contains the finite subsets, a model is constructed with R as its family of computable sets. (shrink)

The Buddha’s final illness, brought on by his last meal prior to his death, was traditionally seen as one of a set of ailments suffered by him at various points during his lifetime. This paper looks at different Buddhist explications of the causes of these ailments and applies them to the episode of the Buddha’s final illness. In both instances, three explanatory strategies are detected: the first stresses the causative importance of the Buddha’s own negative karmic deeds in past lives; (...) the second looks to the negative deeds and karma of others than the Buddha; the third offers non-karmic explanations. The first two engendered two rather different kinds of j?taka stories; the last did not involve any j?takas but highlighted various kinds of ‘natural’ explanations. (shrink)

In research involving pregnant women and fetuses, a number of questions arise concerning the balancing of risks and benefits. In research that holds out a prospect of direct benefit for the woman, how much risk to the fetus is permissible? How should the principle of minimizing risks be applied when there are two subjects—pregnant woman and fetus? Should risks for each of them be minimized? What if minimizing risks for one increases risks for the other? These and other questions are (...) not addressed in the current federal regulations for the protection of human subjects. This paper reviews the current regulations, attempts to identify issues that need to be addressed, considers alternative viewpoints concerning those issues, and argues for particular views. It concludes with a set of proposed guidelines for balancing risks and benefits in research involving pregnant women and fetuses. (shrink)

We show that if a real x2ω is strongly Hausdorff -random, where h is a dimension function corresponding to a convex order, then it is also random for a continuous probability measure μ such that the μ-measure of the basic open cylinders shrinks according to h. The proof uses a new method to construct measures, based on effective continuous transformations and a basis theorem for -classes applied to closed sets of probability measures. We use the main result to (...) derive a collapse of randomness notions for Hausdorff measures, and to provide a characterization of effective Hausdorff dimension similar to Frostman’s Theorem. (shrink)

The theatrical device of the bed-trick occurs fifty-two times in forty-four plays during the English Renaissance.1 Just as in the first two plays employing it, Alphonsus, Emperor of Germany and Grim the Collier of Croyden, male characters arrange 60 percent of the bed-tricks used in gaining control over women. Shakespeare's heroines in All's Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure, then, appear to mark a decisive break from the bed-trick's evolutionary pattern. Helen and Mariana, respectively, persevere in (...) their endeavors in spite of a male-dominant hierarchy. Yet, upon closer inspection, men are the ones who create the circumstances that prompt the necessity of using the device. They impose such... (shrink)

The basic Bayesian model of credence states, where each individual’s belief state is represented by a single probability measure, has been criticized as psychologically implausible, unable to represent the intuitive distinction between precise and imprecise probabilities, and normatively unjustifiable due to a need to adopt arbitrary, unmotivated priors. These arguments are often used to motivate a model on which imprecise credal states are represented by sets of probability measures. I connect this debate with recent work in Bayesian cognitive science, (...) where probabilistic models are typically provided with explicit hierarchical structure. Hierarchical Bayesian models are immune to many classic arguments against single-measure models. They represent grades of imprecision in probability assignments automatically, have strong psychological motivation, and can be normatively justified even when certain arbitrary decisions are required. In addition, hierarchical models show much more plausible learning behavior than flat representations in terms of sets of measures, which—on standard assumptions about update—rule out simple cases of learning from a starting point of total ignorance. (shrink)

Can we use technology in the pursuit of a good life, or are we doomed to having our lives organized and our priorities set by the demands of machines and systems? How can philosophy help us to make technology a servant rather than a master? Technology and the Good Life? uses a careful collective analysis of Albert Borgmann's controversial and influential ideas as a jumping-off point from which to address questions such as these about the role and significance of technology (...) in our lives. Contributors both sympathetic and critical examine Borgmann's work, especially his "device paradigm" apply his theories to new areas such as film, agriculture, design, and ecological restoration and consider the place of his thought within philosophy and technology studies more generally. Because this collection carefully investigates the issues at the heart of how we can take charge of life with technology, it will be a landmark work not just for philosophers of technology but for students and scholars in the many disciplines concerned with science and technology studies. (shrink)

American discourse in business ethics is steeped in the traditional ethical theories of Western philosophies, specifically the Greek classics, Kant, and the British Utilitarians. These theories may be largely uninterpretable or unacceptable to non-Western populations owing to different traditions, religious beliefs, or cultural histories. As economic boundaries collapse and markets become more global in scope, traditional Western ethical thought may lead to clashes among Western organizations and companies from differing cultural settings. Such clashes could lead to alienation of foreign customers, (...) firms and governments and resultant competitive disadvantage, or to an abandonment of ethical considerations altogether in the struggle to compete internationally. This paper puts forward two general alternatives to Western ethical philosophies as useful frameworks for the analysis of international ethical dilemmas. The first alternative uses new organizational economics, while the second emphasizes role relationships and organizational citizenship. (shrink)

We improve results of Marczewski, Frankiewicz, Brown, and others comparing the σ-ideals of measure zero, meager, Marczewski measure zero, and completely Ramsey null sets; in particular, we remove CH from the hypothesis of many of Brown's constructions of sets lying in some of these ideals but not in others. We improve upon work of Marczewski by constructing, without CH, a nonmeasurable Marczewski measure zero set lacking the property of Baire. We extend our analysis of (...) σ-ideals to include the completely Ramsey null sets relative to a Ramsey ultrafilter and obtain all 32 possible examples of sets in some ideals and not others, some under the assumption of MA, but most in ZFC alone. We also improve upon the known constructions of a Marczewski measure zero set which is not Ramsey by using a set theoretic hypothesis which is weaker than those used by other authors. We give several consistency proofs: one concerning the relative sizes of the covering numbers for the meager sets and the completely Ramsey null sets; another concerning the size of non(CRU 0); and a third concerning the size of add(CRU 0). We also study those classes of perfect sets which are bases for the class of always first category sets. (shrink)

We develop arithmetical measure theory along the lines of Lutz [10]. This yields the same notion of measure 0 set as considered before by Martin-Löf, Schnorr, and others. We prove that the class of sets constructible by r.e.-constructors, a direct analogue of the classes Lutz devised his resource bounded measures for in [10], is not equal to RE, the class of r.e. sets, and we locate this class exactly in terms of the common recursion-theoretic reducibilities below K. We (...) note that the class of sets that bounded truth-table reduce to K has r.e.-measure 0, and show that this cannot be improved to truth-table. For Δ2-measure the borderline between measure zero and measure nonzero lies between weak truth-table reducibility and Turing reducibility to K. It follows that there exists a Martin-Löf random set that is tt-reducible to K, and that no such set is btt-reducible to K. In fact, by a result of Kautz, a much more general result holds. (shrink)

We address the classification of the possible finitely-additive probability measures on the Boolean algebra of definable subsets of M which are invariant under the natural action of $\operatorname{Aut}(M)$ . This pursuit requires a generalization of Shelah's forking formulas [8] to "essentially measure zero" sets and an application of Myer's "rank diagram" [5] of the Boolean algebra under consideration. The classification is completed for a large class of ℵ 0 -categorical structures without the independence property including those which are (...) stable. (shrink)

In this work we give a complete answer as to the possible implications between some natural properties of Lebesgue measure and the Baire property. For this we prove general preservation theorems for forcing notions. Thus we answer a decade-old problem of J. Baumgartner and answer the last three open questions of the Kunen-Miller chart about measure and category. Explicitly, in \S1: (i) We prove that if we add a Laver real, then the old reals have outer measure (...) one. (ii) We prove a preservation theorem for countable-support forcing notions, and using this theorem we prove (iii) If we add ω 2 Laver reals, then the old reals have outer measure one. From this we obtain (iv) $\operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZF}) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZFC} + \neg B(m) + \neg U(m) + U(c))$ . In \S2: (i) We prove a preservation theorem, for the finite support forcing notion, of the property " $F \subseteq ^\omega\omega$ is an unbounded family." (ii) We introduce a new forcing notion making the old reals a meager set but the old members of ω ω remain an unbounded family. Using this we prove (iii) $\operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZF}) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZFC} + U(m) + \neg B(c) + \neg U(c) + C(c))$ . In \S3: (i) We prove a preservation theorem, for the finite support forcing notion, of a property which implies "the union of the old measure zero sets is not a measure zero set," and using this theorem we prove (ii) $\operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZF}) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Cons}(\mathrm{ZFC} + \neg U(m) + C(m) + \neg C(c))$. (shrink)

This paper brings together Dana Scottʼs measure-based semantics for the propositional modal logic S4, and recent work in Dynamic Topological Logic. In a series of recent talks, Scott showed that the language of S4 can be interpreted in the Lebesgue measure algebra, M, or algebra of Borel subsets of the real interval, [0,1], modulo sets of measure zero. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted via the Boolean structure of the algebra, and we add an interior operator (...) on M that interprets the □-modality. In this paper we show how to extend this measure-based semantics to the bimodal logic S4C. S4C is interpreted in ‘dynamic topological systems,’ or topological spaces together with a continuous function acting on the space. We extend Scottʼs measure based semantics to this bimodal logic by defining a class of operators on the algebra M, which we call O-operators and which take the place of continuous functions in the topological semantics for S4C. The main result of the paper is that S4C is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra. A strengthening of this result, also proved here, is that there is a single measure-based model in which all non-theorems of S4C are refuted. (shrink)

The two theories that revolutionized physics in the twentieth century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are full of predictions that defy common sense. Recently, we used three such paradoxical ideas to prove “The Free Will Theorem” (strengthened here), which is the culmination of a series of theorems about quantum mechanics that began in the 1960s. It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if (...) the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe. Our argument combines the well-known consequence of relativity theory, that the time order of space-like separated events is not absolute, with the EPR paradox discovered by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935, and the Kochen-Specker Paradox of 1967 (See [2].) We follow Bohm in using a spin version of EPR and Peres in using his set of 33 directions, rather than the original configuration used by Kochen and Specker. More contentiously, the argument also involves the notion of free will, but we postpone further discussion of this to the last section of the article. Note that our proof does not mention “probabilities” or the “states” that determine them, which is.. (shrink)