The title of this paper proclaims its central interest—the relationship which holds between the concept of integrity and the concept of the identity of the self, or, for short, self-identity. Unreflective speech often suggests a close relationship between the two, but in the latter half of this century, notwithstanding one or two notable exceptions, they have been discussed with minimum cross-reference as if they belonged to two rather different philosophical menus which tended not to be available at the same restaurant (...) on the same night. My intention is to argue that our account of the one carried implications for the other and that this relationship is reflexive. My argument will proceed by stating and criticizing a common account of the relationship between each of these concepts which tends to offer mutual support for the implied account of each. Thereafter an alternative account will be outlined. (shrink)

My argument will be that our understanding of human beings, which is what I take the Christian doctrine of man to be concerned with, will benefit considerably from an examination of two different but related clusters of human attitudes which can be found respectively under the headings ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’. There are many pitfalls in the way of such an enterprise, and occasionally some prejudices to be overcome. For example L. E. Loemker in the relevant articles in the Encyclopedia of (...) Philosophy concludes a fairly lengthy discussion with the rather terminal judgement. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to examine three different accounts of what it means to talk of God as eternal. Probably the most generally understood sense in which God is believed to be eternal is that of timelessness, as expounded for example by Boethius and Aquinas. An alternative view on the matter is to be found in Nelson Pike's God and Timelessness and in Richard Swinburne's The Coherence of Theism. Swinburne argues explicitly, and Pike implicitly, that talk of the eternity (...) of God is better understood as talk of the everlastingness (or, as others prefer it, the sempiternity) of God. My argument is that difficulties arise in the published presentations of both of these accounts of the eternity of God. The final section of the paper will outline a third possible account of this belief which, if intelligible, will preserve some at least of the content of what the belief is often taken to be, but which will certainly exclude many of the claims regarded as true by Aquinas, as well as most of those whose mutual coherence is defended by Swinburne. (shrink)

The title of this paper proclaims its central interest—the relationship which holds between the concept of integrity and the concept of the identity of the self, or, for short, self-identity. Unreflective speech often suggests a close relationship between the two, but in the latter half of this century, notwithstanding one or two notable exceptions, they have been discussed with minimum cross-reference as if they belonged to two rather different philosophical menus which tended not to be available at the same restaurant (...) on the same night. My intention is to argue that our account of the one carried implications for the other and that this relationship is reflexive. My argument will proceed by stating and criticizing a common account of the relationship between each of these concepts which tends to offer mutual support for the implied account of each. Thereafter an alternative account will be outlined. (shrink)

This book discusses five philosophers and writers, Hume, Kierkegaar, Camus, Simone Weil and Dostoevsky, who represents different strands of our cultural inheritance which are all theologically and religiously alive today. What they have in common is willingness to explore the borderlands between belief and unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief an (...) unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief and unbelief are two homogeneous wholes which have nothing to say to each other and no ground for common discussion other that that of agnosticism. Equally, however, they disdain the implications that the only possibility of dialogue is a marshmallow middle ground where the only rule is that you avoid saying what you really think. Theologians and believers have often stood back from exploration on this middle ground. Encounters with secular philosophies or systems of belief are risky and dangerous. On the other hand, a theology which avoids such encounters is a much impoverished theology. Professor Sutherland's discussion considers the nature and extent of the risk, and the title of his book indicates where the believers who live close to the boundaries often share more with neighbourly unbelievers than they do with fellow believers who view the pastures of unbelief as far distant and dangerou lands from which they will for ever remain separated. (shrink)

It is of course true that the articulation of religious and theological views depends upon and often masks philosophical presuppositions. For example, those who quote with approval Anselm's ‘credo ut intelligam’, ‘I believe so that I may understand’, seldom follow the good example set by Anselm, and make explicit, as Anselm does in the following sentence, the fact that this principle rests upon a further principle: ‘For I believe this also, that “unless I believe, I shall not understand”’ . This (...) paper is an attempt to track down and expose one very pervasive set of views about the nature of experience which is implicit in a wide range of religious and theological claims. (shrink)

Recent writing on the idea of a form of life has tended to be critical of the use made of this notion by writers such as Peter Winch, D. Z. Phillips and Norman Malcolm. Rightly or wrongly these writers have been regarded as meaning by ‘a form of life’, something like ‘a way or style of life’, and recent explicatory work on the notion has largely tended to discount this as a plausible interpretation of what Wittgenstein meant in his use (...) of the expression. The intention of this paper is not that of direct intervention in this particular dispute, though the conclusions drawn, if correct, would have some bearing on it. The intention is rather to develop, in order to make use of it, the idea of a form of life within the context of a number of philosophical difficulties. I should certainly claim to be drawing upon the remarks made by Wittgenstein in his own use of the expression: but I should not claim to be expounding Wittgenstein. Hence I do not wish to enter into the disputes referred to above about what precisely Wittgenstein meant by the expression, though again, what I say, if not wholly misguided, should have some bearing on these disputes. (shrink)

This distinguished collection of essays has been produced to honour Donald McKinnon, who retired from the Norris-Hulse Professorship of Divinity in the ...

In the last ten years or so there has been some lively discussion of the questions of immortality and resurrection. Within the Christian tradition there has been debate at theological and exegetical level over the relative merits of belief in the immortality of the soul, and belief in the resurrection of the dead as an account of life after death. Further to this, however, there has been the suggestion that there may be good philosophical reasons for preferring the latter to (...) the former. It is just this contention which I propose to discuss. (shrink)

Stewart R. Sutherland; VII*—God, Time and Eternity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 103–122, https://doi.org/10.