In this paper we present a theoretical hybrid framework for ethical decision making, drawing upon Emmanuel Levinas’ view on ethics as “first philosophy”, as an inherent infinite responsibility for the other. The pivotal concept in this framework is an appeal to a heightened sense of personal responsibility of the moral actor to provide the ethical context within which conventional approaches to applied business ethics could be engaged. Max Weber’s method of reconciling absolutism and relativism in ethical decision making is adopted (...) to provide the synergy between personal responsibility and contextual realities, forging a coherent framework. The paper concludes by discussing ways that business could make way for the flourishing of ethics of responsibility in individuals. (shrink)
Whereas a range of business and management scholars have argued that business is in an ethical crisis, Nietzsche makes it possible to see that it is ethics itself that is in crisis, and that only as the crisis in ethics is dealt with can ethics in specific areas such as business be addressed. Nihilism is the name that Nietzsche gives to the crisis in ethics. The failure to fully appreciate nihilism and its pervasiveness as the root cause of the problem, (...) as evident in the perpetual quest to obliterate nihilism through the creation of ethical frameworks and foundations, has plunged business and ethics scholarship in the field, ever deeper in the quagmire of nihilism. In response to nihilism, Nietzsche offers a re‐evaluation of all values. To re‐evaluate all values means to accept nihilism and see it as a basis for questioning taken for granted assumptions that have supported the notion of ethics or values in order to re‐imagine an ethics which is responsive to the crisis of nihilism. The paper thus proposes that rather than trying to invent new ethics or ethical foundations, or figuring out “how” to be ethical, we need to turn our attention on the “why to be” of ethics. (shrink)
In this paper I use a distinction between the "anxiety of strangers" and the "fear of enemies" to show how uncertainty and tension experienced in the face of what is other and different need not lead to a nationalist insularity, but can be the occasion for an existential philosophical education - an education in which the resolute acceptance of strangeness allows us to reflect on our taken-for-granted about the everyday.
ObjectiveViolent conflict forced millions of Syrians to flee their homes to host countries. This study examines Syrian refugee women’s experiences from the war’s outset through their journey to Jordan. It addresses the toll this journey had on their lives.MethodsTwenty-four in-depth interviews were completed with Syrian refugee women who currently reside in urban areas of Jordan. Researchers translated, transcribed, and analyzed the interviews using group narrative methodology.ResultsThe Syrian women had unique nostalgic memories of times before the war. They experienced atrocities during (...) the war that forced their decision to escape Syria. Their journey narratives testify of internal displacement, personal and collective traumatic journeys via legal and illegal routes. Almost all the women were placed in refugee camps during their transitions to host country residency. In Jordan, they faced diverse hurdles of displacement and extremely different realities compared to the ones they had in Syria. Despite how very different but difficult each of their journeys were, every single woman longed to return home to Syria.ConclusionsThis study presents a new understanding of the role and process of the journeys undertaken and highlights the concept of “return” as the defining element for Syrian refugee women. Regardless of the hardships women endured to escape their homeland to find safety, “return” marks an ending to their horror journey and the beginning of a new journey of hope for a better future. (shrink)
Edmund Husserl maintains that phenomenological thinking does not begin with the theoretical roof but with the foundations of immediate and concrete experience. Martin Heidegger claims that to begin with immediate experience is to think in moments of disruption or disturbance of the everyday. Using these positions as a starting point, this paper argues for a phenomenological approach to project management that explores the immediate and concrete experience of project managers. In doing so it attempts to address an over-emphasis on the (...) universalised and abstracted modes of theorising that currently dominate project management practice. Eugene Gendlin’s psycho-therapeutic technique of “focusing” provides a practical example of the phenomenological approach in action through a critical dialogue between researcher and practitioner, the co-authors of this paper. This paper argues that the insight derived from such an approach can do far more for a project manager in terms of their relationship to their work, the meaning they derive from it, and their effectiveness in the role, than a dedicated adherence to the strictures of traditional project management practice. (shrink)
This paper contrasts the notion of “willing” in Heidegger’s politics with the notion of “dawning” in Heidegger’s philosophy. It argues that, in the political text, the attunement of Dasein to what-is is centred in the notion of Dasein’s “willing” of what-is, while in the philosophical text it is centred in the notion of what-is “dawning” on Dasein. It maintains that the attitude to anxiety essential to a “dawning” of what-is is not reached in Heidegger’s “The Self-Assertion of the German University”. (...) It concludes by maintaining that, rather than being attuned to what-is, the will in the “The Self-Assertion of the German University” is attuned to its own relationship to what is in a narcissistic rather than a philosophical way; that is, it territorializes “dawning” as a relation to “what is”, and makes “dawning” of “what-is” its “own” in the same way as any nationalism makes a culture, a language or a geographical region its own. In contrast to the narcissism of nationalism, philosophy, as outlined by Heidegger in the essay “What Is Metaphysics?”, is the experience of allowing what-is to “dawn” on Dasein rather than a preoccupation with “willing” of “dawning” as one’s own relation to Being. (shrink)
In the context of uncertainty and anxiety regarding the role of leadership and management, this article explores the relationship between Mintzberg’s concept of the distinction between the engaged and disconnected manager, Heidegger’s notion authentic and inauthentic being and Benner and Wrubel’s distinction between two forms of professional practice attunement: an attunement to technique and an attunement to lived experience. It argues that while Mintzberg outlines the distinction between engaged and disengaged management, he does not develop an understanding of the conditions (...) which lead a manager to be either engaged or disconnected. The role of anxiety in Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic being and the role of stress and worry in Benner and Wrubel’s distinction between an attunement to technique and an attune- ment to the lived experience of professional practice provides the basis for understanding the relationship between engaged and disconnected management. After developing the theoretical perspectives of Mintzberg, Heidegger, Benner and Wrubel, two examples are presented: one of the way in which an engaged manager experiences anxiety as an opportunity for greater attune- ment to lived experience and one who experiences anxiety as a condition for disconnection and detachment from the lived experience of his leadership practice. (shrink)