This essay argues against routine dissection exercises on animals under three headings. First, attaining goals of general scientific education does not require dissection. The training of specialists, in whose vocations dissection skills are essential, could then be accomplished without killing animals specifically for the purpose of acquiring those skills. Second, killing and dissecting animals for unnecessary exercises teaches students bad attitudes toward animal life. Third, moral principles cannot justify killing and dissecting animals but not humans; consequently, such treatment of animals (...) is prejudiced exploitation of the weak by the strong. (shrink)

Subjective Morals breaks with tradition to provide a careful analysis of moral values and the goods and evils they produce. Sapontzis explores the subjective and objective bases of moral values and analyzes the concepts and categories that structure our moral practice.

Among the four propositions considered in this paper, we have found two which can contribute to a holistic environmental ethic: individuals acquire some of their value through participating in communities, including biotic communities, and wholes, including biotic communities, can have values which are not the sum of the values of the individuals composing them. However, accepting these propositions does not represent a revolutionary break distinguishing holism from traditional value theories or ethics. On the other hand, the holistic propositions we considered (...) which would clearly differentiate holism from (at least some) traditional value theories and ethics are unacceptable. Consequently, if the propositions we have discussed fairly represent what goes under the name of “holism,” then rather than being a new kind of ethic, a viable ethical holism will make its contribution by emphasizing the communal elements of traditional ethics which have sometimes been neglected in glorifications of the individual. This would not be an inconsiderable contribution, philosophically, socially, or environmentally. (shrink)

Several philosophers opposed to animal rights have recently sought to justify their opposition by arguing that the epistemic differences between human and animal interests (often referred to as “taking an interest” vs. “having an interest”) constitute a morally significant difference. In this paper, I first detail the various forms ofhaving an interest and oftaking an interest. I then evaluate the moral significance of these differences from both utilitarian and deontological viewpoints. The conclusion of this analysis is that the epistemic differences (...) between human and animal interests are not morally significant. (shrink)

During the past four decades, four questions have shaped the debate over eating meat: (1) What hurts the most? (2) Are animal lovers nature haters? (3) Are vegetarians bigots? (4) Do animals have rights? The following conclusions are advocated: (1) Where general welfare is the issue, numbers count, and they will always count against a small minority profiting by repeatedly exploiting the majority. However, how most effectively to respond to this injustice is not obvious. (2) Despite disagreements about the relationship (...) between biology and morals, vegetarians and environmentalists agree that factory farming is immoral because of what it does either to suffering animals or to the natural order. (3) Whether humans using animals for food can be a respectful relation-especially when we humans make all the decisions-is the real question here. So far, this extension of fairness beyond our own species is one for which we have shown little capacity. (4) Whether or not animals have "rights," morally concerned Westerners should not partake of factory-farmed products and should work for the abolition of such farms. (shrink)

This article criticizes the thesis, Suggested by wittgenstein and elaborated and defended by malcolm and others, That the concepts of numerical identity and difference do not apply to pains, Afterimages, Sudden thoughts, And other contents of consciousness. I argue that the arguments offered in support of this thesis cannot account for much of our common practice and language concerning these contents while acknowledging that these categories apply to these contents can account for these practices and language as well as for (...) the examples malcolm emphasizes. On the basis of this analysis I draw some conclusions about the relation of ordinary language to common sense. (shrink)

Several philosophers opposed to animal rights have recently sought to justify their opposition by arguing that the epistemic differences between human and animal interests constitute a morally significant difference. In this paper, I first detail the various forms ofhaving an interest and oftaking an interest. I then evaluate the moral significance of these differences from both utilitarian and deontological viewpoints. The conclusion of this analysis is that the epistemic differences between human and animal interests are not morally significant.

This article critiques the contentions a) that human life is more valuable than animal life because it has a quality lacking in animal life due to the greater richness of human life and b) that because it is inferior, animal life may be sacrificed to benefit humans. Conclusions: value of life does not depend solely on quality; quality of life does not depend solely on richness; comparisons of richness are arbitrary; we lack sufficient evidence to comparatively value the quality of (...) human and animal lives; and superior value of life does not entail that inferiors may be sacrificed for it. (shrink)