Despite the obvious duality of physical and non‐physical astral forms in Doctor Strange, the film can't avoid the numerous problems with interactionism and substance dualism in general. This chapter utilizes the good Doctor Stephen Strange to look at how some philosophers attempt to answer the question: Are we simply flesh and bone, as Strange seems to think, or is there more—especially when it comes to the nature of our minds and souls. In the process, the chapter gains some deeper (...) insights about philosophy itself. Some philosophers agree with the Ancient One that the spirit is a thing unto itself and can affect and influence the body, a view called substance dualism. Interactionism is the “explanatory glue” holding Cartesian dualism together, and without it, the Cartesian dualist cannot account for our experience of a unified wholeness of our physical and mental lives. (shrink)

A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes is a popular-science book on cosmology (the study of the origin and evolution of the universe) by British physicist Stephen Hawking. It was first published in 1988. Hawking wrote the book for readers who have no prior knowledge of the universe and people who are interested in learning.

A comprehensive reassessment of the concept of mimesis in the history of ancient Greek aesthetics and philosophy of art, with particular attention to Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy, and neoplatonism. There is also a wide-ranging review of arguments pro and contra the idea of artistic mimesis from the Renaissance to modern literar theory. The book challenges standard accounts in numerous respects and builds a new dialectical model with which to make sense of the entire history of mimeticist thinking in aesthetics.

We prove that the theory of fields with a derivation of Frobenius has the model companion which is stable and admits elimination of quantifiers up to the level of the λ-functions. Along the way, we give new geometric axioms of DCFp.

Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. But it has played no real role in philosophical semantics. This is surprising; sentences have aboutness-properties if anything does. Aboutness is the first book to examine through (...) a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth-conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection--about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. Stephen Yablo maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results--directed content--is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. Written by one of today's leading philosophers, Aboutness represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

We cannot escape Indiana Jones! (Not that we would want to, of course.) Harrison Ford deserves credit for the character's popularity. His ability to subtly play up Indy's foibles while playing down the character's heroism, makes Indiana Jones relatable. Of course, Lucas and the screenwriters are also responsible, as they magnificently depict Indy battling antagonists seeking to possess mystical objects for world domination. But Indy is no mere action hero. He also struggles with unrequited love that lingers for decades, an (...) estrangement from his over-bearing father that lasts just as long, and a life-long obsession with regaining an important object unfairly taken from him. As we know, Indy doesn't always choose wisely, and if the Young Indiana Jones Chronicles are to be trusted, he made many missteps in his youth on the way to becoming the hero we know and love. Indy loses a fight as often as he wins, and when he wins, he doesn't always fight fairly. In fact, he stumbles so often, one might wonder why he persists decade after decade toward his goals. He's not getting any younger. What's the point? And, as he inexplicably trudges on, he-in the four films and various graphic novels-has many alleged encounters with the supernatural. He's not a religious person (at all), so what should he make of those? Should he take the leap of faith and become a believer? While we often see him conducting his highly unconventional fieldwork, spending an unusual amount of time in caves, he cannot completely ignore his "day job" teaching undergraduates and aiding their pursuit of knowledge. But why should archaeologists strive to put artifacts in a museum, or search for "fact," but not "truth" (and who is Dr. Tyree, anyway)? The Indiana Jones character is expressive of the human condition, vividly illuminating our struggles and issues on the big screen. True, we don't have John Williams's orchestra filling us with pride when we manage to do the right thing or play the part of the hero. Still, no one would blame you if you imagined Indy's theme blaring in the background while rising to meet a challenge! (shrink)

This is also where we begin investigating lattices of logics and varieties, rather than particular examples.

In Return to Reason, Stephen Toulmin argues that the potential for reason to improve our lives has been hampered by a serious imbalance in our pursuit of ...

There are books that debate math, science, and history; there are books that help you build walls or even pyramids; there are even books that discuss Neanderthals with tools and autotrophs that drool. This book discusses philosophy. But you don't need an IQ of 187 to enjoy it. I swear to cow! As you'll see, the philosophy is theoretical, but the fun is real.

Stephen Hetherington's prominent career within epistemology has been a series of distinctive, bold, varied and provocative arguments and ideas. Bringing together Hetherington's unique body of writing for the first time, this collection features previously published as well as new material that link his approaches to key issues including knowledge, justification, fallibility, scepticism and the Gettier Problem. Advancing our understanding of the systemic nature of Hetherington's thinking, Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology presents his distinctive perspective on some of philosophy's central (...) questions about knowledge - an inviting blend of forensic detail and 'big picture' proposals. (shrink)

In "Variations on a theme of Curry," Humberstone conjectured that a certain logic, intermediate between BCI and BCK, is none other than monothetic BCI—the smallest extension of BCI in which all theorems are provably equivalent. In this note, we present a proof of this conjecture.

Defenders of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology (or what I call practicalism) need to address two main problems. First, the view seems to imply, absurdly, that knowledge can come and go quite easily—in particular, that it might come and go along with our variable practical interests. We can call this the stability problem. Second, there seems to be no fully satisfying way of explaining whose practical interests matter. We can call this the “whose stakes?” problem. I argue that both problems can (...) be addressed in roughly the same terms. More exactly, I argue that by first clarifying the whose stakes? problem an answer to the stability problem naturally falls out. (shrink)

This chapter revisits some favorite moments in The Good Place to understand Janet's character. Philosophers distinguish between three types of knowledge: competence knowledge, acquaintance knowledge, and propositional knowledge. There are three generally accepted conditions that must be met for someone to have propositional knowledge: belief, truth, and justification. Some contemporary philosophers attempt to specify what kind of justification is required for knowledge. This contemporary debate arises as a result of conflicting interpretations of Plato's classic statement about how one's beliefs must (...) be “tied down” to the truth “by giving an account”. Perceptual knowledge is invariably interpreted via externalism. One need not be able to explain exactly how vision works and how it consequently plays a role in forming perceptual beliefs. Janet is merely a tool, and tools don't know anything because they cannot offer good reasons for how they behave. (shrink)

Interpreting Kuzco's character arc in The Emperor's New Groove through Mencius's ideas about human nature sheds light on Kuzco's move away from selfishness and toward compassion. The Emperor's New Groove reminds people that too much wealth can also be detrimental to one's proper moral growth. The early scenes of the film depict a very pampered Kuzco. By interpreting The Emperor's New Groove through Mencius, it seems clear that it is not always a bad thing that people change their groove. Mencius (...) would no doubt concur that the film serves as a kind of extended thought‐experiment with a moral: It might seem like one has everything, but if he/she has not cultivated his/her inherent goodness properly, he/she has nothing truly worth having. The film implicitly encourages people to reconsider their own efforts at moral self‐cultivation. (shrink)

In Black Panther, T'Challa and Erik "Killmonger" Stevens experience audiences with their departed fathers. Careful analysis of the second and especially the third Ancestral Plane visits downplays the metaphysical, leading toward a metaphor for better understanding one's place in the world. M'Baku fights gallantly, but T'Challa prevails, and bolsters his worthiness for the throne by sparing M'Baku's life. T'Challa rises from the ground, not in the entombed Hall of Kings, but in what appears to be an African savanna where the (...) sky is rippled in majestic blues and purples, giving off a twilight ambiance. Ingesting it increases one's strength, speed, agility, and stamina. It is akin to Captain America's super soldier serum, which reminds us of that awesome footrace between T'Challa and Steve in Avengers: Infinity War. The Heart Shaped Herb potion, then, helps T'Challa and Killmonger achieve greater focus on each man's past and allows a better perspective on who each one. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe famously argued that "modern moral philosophy" centrally involved unsupported notions of obligation and culpability. Modern Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to Kant exhibits, for the first time, resources that modern moral philosophers had to respond to Anscombe's challenge, also enhancing our own philosophical grasp of morality and its foundations.

In this paper I elucidate various ways in which understanding can be seen as an excellence of the mind or intellectual virtue. Along the way, I take up the neglected issue of what it might mean to be an “understanding person”—by which I mean not a person who understands a number of things about the natural world, but a person who steers clear of things like judgmentalism in her evaluation of other people, and thus is better able to take up (...) different perspectives and view them with a sympathetic eye. Being an understanding person in this sense seems to be a character-level virtue that interestingly combines moral and epistemic elements; it also seems to be a virtue particularly needed in our age of deep political division, where it is commonly said that failures of mutual understanding are partly to blame for this problem. (shrink)

Keith Augustine’s critical evaluation of the essay contest sponsored by the Bigelow Institute of Consciousness Studies (BICS) is an interesting but problematic review. It mixes reasonable and detailed criticisms of the contest and many of the winning essays with a disappointing reliance on some of the most trite and superficial criticisms of parapsychological research. Ironically, Augustine criticizes the winning essays for using straw-man arguments and cherry-picked evidence even though many of his own arguments commit these same errors.

Can hybridism about moral claims be made to work? I argue it can if we accept the conventional implicature approach developed in Barker (Analysis 2000). However, this kind of hybrid expressivism is only acceptable if we can make sense of conventional implicature, the kind of meaning carried by operators like ‘even’, ‘but’, etc. Conventional implictures are a form of pragmatic presupposition, which involves an unsaid mode of delivery of content. I argue that we can make sense of conventional implicatures, but (...) doing so requires we embrace a form of pure, non-hybrid expressivism. This is a cognitivist expressivism I have developed elsewhere. We need cognitivist expressivism to make sense of how we evaluate—judge as correct or incorrect—implicature-bearing sentences. Once we embraced the possibility of this pure expressivism, we might as well be pure expressivists about normative discourse too. I show how we can do that. The motivations for a specifically hybrid theory are dialectically undercut. (shrink)

Many experimental philosophers are philosophers by training and professional affiliation, but some best work in experimental philosophy has been done by people who do not have advanced degrees in philosophy and do not teach in philosophy departments. This chapter explains that the experimental philosophy is the empirical investigation of philosophical intuitions, the factors that affect them, and the psychological and neurological mechanisms that underlie them. It explores what are philosophical intuitions, and why do experimental philosophers want to study them using (...) the methods of empirical science. The positive program in experimental philosophy shares the goal of the substantial part of traditional philosophy that is concerned with the analysis of important philosophical concepts. The negative program has implications for philosophical projects whose goal is conceptual analysis. There have been a number of responses to the challenge posed by experimental philosophy's negative program. The chapter also focuses on the expertise defense. (shrink)

Alan Robinson This set of essays pays tribute to Bob Kowalski on his 60th birthday, an anniversary which gives his friends and colleagues an excuse to celebrate his career as an original thinker, a charismatic communicator, and a forceful intellectual leader. The logic programming community hereby and herein conveys its respect and thanks to him for his pivotal role in creating and fostering the conceptual paradigm which is its raison d’Œtre. The diversity of interests covered here reflects the variety (...) of Bob’s concerns. Read on. It is an intellectual feast. Before you begin, permit me to send him a brief personal, but public, message: Bob, how right you were, and how wrong I was. I should explain. When Bob arrived in Edinburgh in 1967 resolution was as yet fairly new, having taken several years to become at all widely known. Research groups to investigate various aspects of resolution sprang up at several institutions, the one organized by Bernard Meltzer at Edinburgh University being among the first. For the half-dozen years that Bob was a leading member of Bernard’s group, I was a frequent visitor to it, and I saw a lot of him. We had many discussions about logic, computation, and language. (shrink)

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions (...) of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4. (shrink)

According to Clarke and Beck (C&B), the approximate number system (ANS) represents numbers. We argue that the ANS represents pure magnitudes. Considerations of explanatory economy favor the pure magnitudes hypothesis. The considerations C&B direct against the pure magnitudes hypothesis do not have force.

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions (...) of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4. (shrink)

In November 2022, OpenAI released ChatGPT, an incredibly sophisticated chatbot. Its capability is astonishing: as well as conversing with human interlocutors, it can answer questions about history, explain almost anything you might think to ask it, and write poetry. This level of achievement has provoked interest in questions about whether a chatbot might have something similar to human intelligence or even consciousness. Given that the function of a chatbot is to process linguistic input and produce linguistic output, we consider the (...) question whether a sophisticated chatbot might have inner speech. That is: Might it talk to itself, internally? We explored this via a conversation with ‘Playground’, a chatbot which is very similar to ChatGPT but more flexible in certain respects. We asked it questions which, plausibly, can only be answered if one first produces some inner speech. Here, we present our findings and discuss their philosophical significance. (shrink)

Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? This question often serves as a debating tactic used by theists to attack naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question—couched in such stark, general terms—as too profound for natural science to answer. It is unanswerable by science, I argue, not because it’s profound or because science is superficial but because the question, as it stands, is ill-posed and hence has no answer in the first place. In any form in which it (...) is well-posed, it has an answer that naturalism can in principle provide. The question therefore gives the foes of naturalism none of the ammunition that many on both sides of the debate think it does. (shrink)

Quasi-MV algebras are generalisations of MV algebras arising in quantum computational logic. Although a reasonably complete description of the lattice of subvarieties of quasi-MV algebras has already been provided, the problem of extending this description to the setting of quasivarieties has so far remained open. Given its apparent logical repercussions, we tackle the issue in the present paper. We especially focus on quasivarieties whose generators either are subalgebras of the standard square quasi-MV algebra S , or can be obtained therefrom (...) through the addition of some fixpoints for the inverse. (shrink)

Niniejszy tekst podejmuje kwestię bogów i bohaterów mitów greckich, odnosząc ją do obecnej w psychologii głębi koncepcji archetypów i nieświadomości zbiorowej. Główny cel badań sprowadza się tym samym do bacznego przyjrzenia się potencjalnej korelacji pomiędzy zewnętrznymi w rozumieniu starożytnego Greka postaciami bogów i bogiń, a wewnętrznymi przejawami nieświadomości zbiorowej, które mogą stanowić – według Carla Gustava Junga – istotę antycznych bóstw. Ponadto został poddany namysłowi problem wpływu „wewnętrznych bogów” na sposób myślenia, odczuwania i działania jednostki, wpływu zarówno pozytywnego, jak i (...) negatywnego. Wynikająca z przeprowadzonych badań konkluzja zwraca uwagę na wartość sfery irracjonalnej – źródła pochodzenia zapomnianych, politeistycznych bogów, zamieszkujących psychikę współczesnego człowieka. ---------------------- Zgłoszono: 14/04/2022. Zrecenzowano: 11/05/2022. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 30/05/2022. (shrink)

Tracing the history of American sociology since the Civil War, the authors of this important volume explain the field′s diversity, its lack of unifying paradigms, its broad, eclectic research agenda and its general weakness as an institutional force in either academia or the policy arena. They highlight the equivocal and often contradictory missions that sociologists prescribe for themselves and the variable nature of human, financial and intellectual resources available to the profession.

Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized (...) from without by the desire to promote the general welfare. I argue to the contrary that if ?reactive attitudes? like resentment and moral blame are understood as Strawson analyzed them, as essentially ?interpersonal? or ?second personal?, they have a different content and function. They implicitly demand respect in a way that also expresses respect for the victimizer as a member of mutually accountable community of moral equals. Some implications of this idea are discussed for the ?expressive theory of punishment? and ?civil recourse? theories of torts. (shrink)

From 1876, this influential work in the history of ideas focuses on the eighteenth-century deist controversy and its effects.

A controversial life -- School life -- Family life -- Public life/private life -- Love life -- Writing life -- Pirate life -- An armed and neutral life -- A life concluded -- A life continued -- Afterword -- Overviews of the works of Søren Kierkegaard.