Our article attempts to provide some clarity to the debate about the proper relationship between science and public policy by drawing on the philosophical field of logic. We argue that based on an analysis of the most fundamental ways that empirical and evaluative truth claims can be used together in arguments, the tendency to conceive of this relationship either in dual terms of “pure” vs. “applied” or complex “multi-disciplinary” or “multi-cultural” systems of categorization should be rejected in favor a basic (...) four-part division. A significantly improved understanding of the connection between science and public policy can be based on an examination of the four most basic kinds of logical connection between empirical and evaluative statements. One such improvement is a better understanding of how funding should be divided between state and private interests. (shrink)

Some models of global systems predict catastrophe if certain human activities continue. Unfortunately, these models are less than certain. Despite this uncertainty, some argue for precaution on the grounds that we have an ethical obligation to avoid catastrophe, whatever the practical costs. There is much to say in favor of ethical arguments. Still, some people will remain unmoved by them. Using arguments parallel to those of Pascal and James, I will argue that there are prudential reasons for precaution that should (...) convince those not already persuaded by ethical arguments. This argument for precaution does not presuppose that we are convinced by the uncertain models that predict catastrophe. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the ethics of dealing with the dead. In particular, it examines the case of the Kennewick Man—a skeleton discovered in Washington State in 1996. This archaeological find has created a conflict between scientists, who have much to learn by the study of such bones, and some Native Americans, who believe that studying these bones is disrespectful to the dead. A law-suit was launched with the aim of preventing scientific study of the remains of Kennewick Man, (...) but this law-suit was decided in favour of the scientists. I consider three concepts of Selfhood and relate them to the case. First, I consider the concept of Self as an autonomous entity with interests that arise from individual goals. I discuss the limits of such interests after death. Second, I consider the holistic concept of Self described by Deep Ecologists and others. Third, I describe the relational self associated with some feminist philosophers and communitarians to conclude that this idea provides an argument for respecting the dead. It does this in virtue of how it solves “the problem of the nonexistent subject.” Of these threeconceptions of selfhood, only one, the social-relational view, could serve to ground any injunction to leave ancient bones undisturbed. The KennewickMan case could be described as a debate over whether Kennewick Man meets this relational definition of selfhood. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the ethics of dealing with the dead. In particular, it examines the case of the Kennewick Man—a skeleton discovered in Washington State in 1996. This archaeological find has created a conflict between scientists, who have much to learn by the study of such bones, and some Native Americans, who believe that studying these bones is disrespectful to the dead. A law-suit was launched with the aim of preventing scientific study of the remains of Kennewick Man, (...) but this law-suit was decided in favour of the scientists. I consider three concepts of Selfhood and relate them to the case. First, I consider the concept of Self as an autonomous entity with interests that arise from individual goals. I discuss the limits of such interests after death. Second, I consider the holistic concept of Self described by Deep Ecologists and others. Third, I describe the relational self associated with some feminist philosophers and communitarians to conclude that this idea provides an argument for respecting the dead. It does this in virtue of how it solves “the problem of the nonexistent subject.” Of these threeconceptions of selfhood, only one, the social-relational view, could serve to ground any injunction to leave ancient bones undisturbed. The KennewickMan case could be described as a debate over whether Kennewick Man meets this relational definition of selfhood. (shrink)

The traditional vision of the role science should play in policy making is of a two stage process of scientists first finding out the facts, and then policy makers making a decision about what to do about them. We argue that this two stage process is a fiction and that a distinction must be drawn between pure science and science in the service of public policy. When science is transferred into the policy realm, its claims to truth get undermined because (...) we must abandon the open-ended nature of scientific inquiry. When we move from the sphere of science to the sphere of policy, we pick an arbitrary point in the open-ended scientific process, and ask our experts to give us the answer. The choice of the endpoint, however, must always be arbitrary and determined by non-scientific factors. Thus, the two stages in the model of first finding the facts, and then making a decision about what to do, cannot be clearly separated. The second stage clearly affects the first. This conclusion will have implications about existing scientific policy institutions. For example, we advocate that the environmental assessment process be radically overhauled, or perhaps even let go. It will be our position that ultimately a better model for the involvement of scientists in public policy debates is that of being participants in particular interest groups, rather than as supposedly unbiased consultants to decision-makers. (shrink)