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Stephen F. Barker [14]Stephen Francis Barker [8]Stephen Frederic Barker [1]
  1.  1
    The Elements of Logic.Stephen Francis Barker - 1965 - New York: Mcgraw-Hill.
  2.  73
    The Legacy of Logical Positivism: Studies in the Philosophy of Science.Peter Achinstein & Stephen Francis Barker (eds.) - 1969 - Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  3.  3
    Philosophy of Mathematics.Stephen Francis Barker - 1964 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
  4.  16
    Induction and Hypothesis: A Study of the Logic of Confirmation.Stephen Francis Barker - 1957 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  5. Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations.Stephen Francis Barker & Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.) - 1976 - University City Science Center.
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  6. Lewis on Implication.Stephen Francis Barker - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):10-16.
  7.  27
    Lewis on Implication.Stephen Francis Barker - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):10-16.
  8.  25
    Induction and Hypothesis: A Study of the Logic of Confirmation.Stephen Francis Barker - 1957 - Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press.
    Doubting that any version of induction could be satisfactory as the basic principle of nondemonstrative inference the author analyzes elaborately and rejects eliminative and enumerative induction in the search for a satisfactory criterion of confirmation. The basic difficulty is that induction fails to provide a means of confirming hypotheses about unobserved things. He inclines toward a method of hypothesis but rejects previous formulations in favor of one that involves systems of confirmable hypotheses that are competetively chosen as the simplest available.
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  9.  50
    What is a Profession?Stephen F. Barker - 1992 - Professional Ethics, a Multidisciplinary Journal 1 (1-2):73-99.
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  10.  21
    Scientific Inference.Stephen F. Barker - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (3):404.
  11.  92
    Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  12. Improving Your Thinking.Stephen F. Barker - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  13.  96
    How Wrong Was Kant About Geometry?Stephen F. Barker - 1984 - Topoi 3 (2):133-142.
  14.  21
    Murray Murphey's Work and C. I. Lewis's Epistemology: Problems with Realism and the Context of Logical Positivism.John Corcoran, Stephen F. Barker, Eric Dayton, John Greco, Naomi Zack, Richard S. Robin, Joel Isaac & Murray G. Murphey - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):1-77.
  15. Logical Positivism and the Philosophy of Mathematics.Stephen F. Barker - 1969 - In Peter Achinstein & Stephen Francis Barker (eds.), The Legacy of Logical Positivism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 229--257.
     
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  16.  40
    James' “The Will To Believe”.Stephen F. Barker - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:69-76.
    In “The Will to Believe,” William James affirms that we have some control over what we believe and asks how this control should be exercised. He rejects the evidentialists’ view that we ought to believe only when intellectual grounds make it quite sure that the belief is true. For him, “options” are choices among contrary beliefs. Some options are “living,” “forced,” and “momentous.” James’ thesis concerns belief-options that have these three features and where proof as to the truth is unavailable. (...)
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  17.  18
    Realism as a Philosophy of Mathematics.Stephen F. Barker - 1969 - In Kurt Gödel, Jack J. Bulloff, Thomas C. Holyoke & Samuel Wilfred Hahn (eds.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. New York: Springer. pp. 1--9.
  18.  44
    The Legacy of Logical Positivism: Studies in the Philosophy of Science.T. Greenwood, Peter Achinstein & Stephen F. Barker - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):85.
  19. The Role of Simplicity in Explanation.Stephen F. Barker - 1961 - In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (eds.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science. New York. pp. 265--274.
  20.  6
    Realism as a Philosophy of Mathematics.Stephen F. Barker, Jack J. Bulloff, Thomas C. Holyoke & S. W. Hahn - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):593-593.
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  21.  30
    Discussion: Is There a Problem of Induction?Stephen F. Barker - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):271 - 273.
  22.  10
    Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis will not be strictly true. However, intentional descriptions will always be (...)
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