Everyone knows what it is to feel a conflict between a ‘non-rational’ desire and reason, as e.g., when we want a second dish of ice cream but think it would be unwise to take it. In such cases we commonly think of our desires as unreasonable: they prompt us to perform some action contrary to our deliberations. Nevertheless, most of us assume that reason can move us: that simply recognizing an act as the most reasonable thing to do gives us (...) a motive to do it — even if in fact we do not perform that action. If we do not eat the second dish of ice cream we are disposed to think that we did not because we judged it unwise. If, on the other hand, we do eat the second dish, we are disposed to think we did because we were more strongly inclined toward eating than not eating, even though we were inclined toward refraining because we judged eating unwise. This is the position of the man on the street. It is the commonsensical notion of reason, motivation, and their relationship. (shrink)

TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF HUME HAVE MISCONSTRUED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF PLEASURE, AND HOW PLEASURE IS DEPLOYED IN HIS VALUE THEORY. I RECTIFY THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS BY EXPLICATING THE ROLE WHICH PLEASURE PLAYS IN JUDGMENTS OF VALUE ON THE HUMEAN ANALYSIS. IT IS SHOWN THAT PLEASURE HAS ALL THE FEATURES THAT MAKE IT RELEVANT TO VALUE THEORY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, THAT HUME'S UNDERSTANDING OF PLEASURE IS MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN HAS BEEN GENERALLY REALIZED, AND THAT HUME'S CONCEPTION OF (...) PLEASURE IS WELL-INTEGRATED WITH HIS VALUE THEORY. (shrink)

Ethics and politics are inseparable sciences. Understanding them requires that we understand human nature and right reason.