This comprehensive new book introduces the core history of phenomenology and assesses its relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. From critiques of artificial intelligence research programs to ongoing work on embodiment and enactivism, the authors trace how phenomenology has produced a valuable framework for analyzing cognition and perception, whose impact on contemporary psychological and scientific research, and philosophical debates continues to grow. The first part of _An Introduction to Phenomenology_ is an extended overview of the history (...) and development of phenomenology, looking at its key thinkers, focusing particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as its cultural and intellectual precursors. In the second half Chemero and Käufer turn their attention to the contemporary interpretations and uses of phenomenology in cognitive science, showing that phenomenology is a living source of inspiration in contemporary interdisciplinary studies of the mind. Käufer and Chemero have written a clear, jargon-free account of phenomenology, providing abundant examples and anecdotes to illustrate and to entertain. This book is an ideal introduction to phenomenology and cognitive science for the uninitiated, as well as for philosophy and psychology students keen to deepen their knowledge. (shrink)

This paper interprets Heidegger's frequently misunderstood criticisms of logic by presenting them in their historical context. To this end, it surveys the state of logic in the late 19th century and presents the main systematic conception of neo-Kantian logical idealism, noting Heidegger's own early involvement in these schools of thought. The paper goes on to present arguments from Heidegger's earliest lectures in which he develops both the phenomenology of everydayness and his criticisms of logic in an attempt to undermine the (...) neo-Kantian conception. These two approaches turn out to be inseparable in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's criticism of logic amounts to a rejection of the claim that the possibility of experiencing objects is entirely grounded in logical constitution by the spontaneous understanding. There are other, more fundamental modes of disclosing objects. Heidegger is defended against the charge or irrationalism. The paper ends by interpreting the most important logic-related claims of What is Metaphysics? and outlining a Heideggerian response to Carnap's famous criticisms. (shrink)

This essay gives an interpretation of Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?" lecture in light of passages from his other writings and lecture courses of the period. This exegetical task is important, for interpreters of "What is Metaphysics?" have been confused by puzzling phrases in the lecture without noticing that Heidegger makes the same points in clearer terms elsewhere. In particular, these interpreters ignore Heidegger's crucial distinction between entities and the being of entities. Since Heidegger's "nothing" is an aspect of being, this (...) difference is at the core of Heidegger's lecture. The present interpretation establishes a conditional conclusion: If the ontological difference makes sense, then we have a sound basis for understanding "What is Metaphysics?" and do not need to read Heidegger as an irrationalist who debunks science or rejects the principle of contradiction. This paper does not give independent justification for the ontological difference. (shrink)

Abstract In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an account of the self in terms of his existential ontology. He contrasts his view to Cartesian and Kantian accounts, and seems to reject features that we take to be fundamental for a self, such as diachronic unity and being the subject of one's experiences. His positive account is obscured by the difficult vocabulary of authenticity and temporality. This paper traces Heidegger's argument, outlines his existential conception of the self, and shows how it (...) fits the basic criteria for a self. (shrink)

. Recent efforts to analyze notions of subjectivity draw on the notions of autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory from the literature in psychology and cognitive science, and on theories of time consciousness and subjectivity from phenomenology. In doing so, leading interpreters have relied primarily on Husserl‟s theories of time consciousness. This paper outlines the significantly different approach grounded in Heidegger‟s analysis of the temporality and historicality of the self. Heidegger‟s framework proves to be fruitful for an analysis of autonoetic conciousness, (...) and challenges several fundamental presumptions of dominant psychological models of episodic memory. (shrink)

Trish Glazebrook has written an interesting book, and philosophers who care for Heidegger’s writing will do well to read it. The book is fertile and suggestive; it spans a large number of Heidegger’s writings, famous and obscure, and it presents Heidegger’s thinking on science from the same important variety of perspectives that Heidegger himself deems necessary to all philosophizing: science as a thought-system in need of theoretical grounding; science as a practice that involves an existential commitment by the practitioner; science (...) as a cultural possibility within an institutional setting; science as a body of knowledge that has a history; science as a way of comportment in which the world is disclosed. She shows that these perspectives belong together, and thus produces an interesting narrative in which Heidegger’s famous later critique of technology grows more or less directly out of his disastrous attempt at managing university politics, which in turn results from his Kant-and Aristotle-inspired thought on contemporary physics. In the end, Glazebrook can justifiably “hope to have awakened in others an interest in Heidegger’s philosophy of science.” And perhaps to have added momentum to the burgeoning literature on just this topic. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Logic in the Nineteenth Century Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Critique of Logic How to Read What Is Metaphysics? The Metaphysics of Truth 1: Assertion and Its Background The Metaphysics of Truth 2: Norms, Ground, and Inferences Conclusion.

Trish Glazebrook has written an interesting book, and philosophers who care for Heidegger’s writing will do well to read it. The book is fertile and suggestive; it spans a large number of Heidegger’s writings, famous and obscure, and it presents Heidegger’s thinking on science from the same important variety of perspectives that Heidegger himself deems necessary to all philosophizing: science as a thought-system in need of theoretical grounding; science as a practice that involves an existential commitment by the practitioner; science (...) as a cultural possibility within an institutional setting; science as a body of knowledge that has a history; science as a way of comportment in which the world is disclosed. She shows that these perspectives belong together, and thus produces an interesting narrative in which Heidegger’s famous later critique of technology grows more or less directly out of his disastrous attempt at managing university politics, which in turn results from his Kant-and Aristotle-inspired thought on contemporary physics. In the end, Glazebrook can justifiably “hope to have awakened in others an interest in Heidegger’s philosophy of science.” And perhaps to have added momentum to the burgeoning literature on just this topic. (shrink)

In his Kant interpretations of the late 1920s and in Being and Time, Heidegger develops two distinct, yet related, derivations of the possibility of judgment from temporal conditions. This paper presents each derivation, establishes the strict analogy between the two, and uses it to explain the structure and shortcoming of the interpretation of ecstatic temporality as the unitary ground of objective experience.