Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) gilt weithin als Autor des literarischen Sturm und Drang bzw. der philosophischen und theologischen Spataufklarung. Dass er jedoch auf vielen Gebieten die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie massgeblich beeinflusste, wird eher selten in den Blick genommen. Der Band untersucht dieses sowohl kritische als auch affirmative Rezeptionsverhaltnis Kants, Schellings, Schlegels, Humboldts oder Hegels zu Herder auf den Gebieten der Geschichtsphilosophie, der Metaphysik, der Ethik und Politik sowie der Asthetik und Anthropologie. - Mit Beitragen von Andreas Arndt, Manfred Baum, (...) Christoph Binkelmann, Martin Bondeli, Nigel De Souza, Stefan Greif, Andree Hahmann, Cornelia Klinger, Christian Krijnen, Stephan Nachtsheim, Angelica Nuzzo, Ludger Roth, Gideon Stiening, Violetta Stolz und Gunter Zoller. (shrink)

François Jullien’s idea of landscape in Chinese philosophy and art is taken from the refinement of highly literate writers and artists, unrelated to the techniques of location that find good sites and make places in landscape. This article is based on a study of fengshui (Chinese geomancy). It argues that fengshui is a practice of identifying not things or beings but moments and circumstances of a client. It works with an epistemology of pattern recognition, which is based on observation and (...) experience but does not test the truth of the signs that are the means of recognizing patterns. This epistemology of pattern recognition is not peculiarly Chinese but can also be found in building, urban planning, and the art of medical diagnosis. (shrink)

This paper embraces the view that we have substantial knowledge of the future and investigates how such knowledge fundamentally differs from knowledge of the past and present. I argue for a new source of context-sensitivity with respect to knowledge attributions arising from presuppositions about reliable belief-forming processes. This context sensitivity has important consequences for knowledge of the future, as well as the appropriateness of assertions about the future. I argue that not only is knowledge of future events typically brought about (...) by fundamentally different processes from those that bring about knowledge of past events, that this is the case is often presupposed in attributing knowledge. I argue that this new source of context sensitivity naturally extends to explaining the recent puzzle of `easy foreknowledge'. (shrink)

In everyday life, as well as in science, we have to deal with and act on the basis of partial (i.e. incomplete, uncertain, or even inconsistent) information. This observation is the source of a broad research activity from which a number of competing approaches have arisen. There is some disagreement concerning the way in which partial or full ignorance is and should be handled. The most successful approaches include both quantitative aspects (by means of probability theory) and qualitative aspect (by (...) means of graphical or causal models or logic). Some of these approaches have important impacts on various disciplines including philosophy, computer science, statistics, mathematics, physics, and social science. Most notably, the relation between causal and probabilistic information is a topic of interest in all of these fields. (shrink)

Call a truth complete with respect to a subject matter if it entails every truth about that subject matter. One attractive way to formulate a complete truth is to state all the relevant positive truths, and then add: and that’s it. When the subject matters under consideration are non-contingent, a non-trivial conception of completeness must invoke a hyperintensional conception of entailment, and of the completion operation denoted by ‘that’s it’. This paper develops two complementary hyperintensional conceptions of completion using the (...) framework of truthmaker semantics and determines the resulting logics of totality. (shrink)

Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...) life would’ve afforded had she continued living. This deprivation view of death’s harm (DV) derives some of its credibility from the general deprivation theory of which it is an instance: mortal harm is subject to the same kind of analysis plausibly given of other non-mortal harms. Furthermore, note that the weak formulation of HT—asserting only that death can inflict harm, not that it always or necessarily does—accommodates the intuition that instances of rational suicide and justifiable euthanasia present cases in which death fails to harm. DV is equipped to explain how in these cases the harms involved in continued existence outweigh the goods of which death deprives the subject. I agree that suicide can be rational and that euthanasia can be justifiable. Likewise I accept both HT and DV as far as they go. But they do not go far enough. Specifically, I argue here that death harms even those who die as a result of rational suicide or justifiable euthanasia; that death’s harm is neither undifferentiated nor wholly contingent, but multifaceted and partly necessary; that the necessary part of death’s harm is distinctive, inflicting a peculiar restriction on the autonomy of one who dies; and, regarding the timing and subject issues, that this restriction harm is inflicted on the antemortem subject prior to her death. (shrink)

This is an ambitious and substantial study of metaphysics: its nature and inescapability. Professor Körner's method may be described as 'philosophical anthropology', and aims to arrive at a characterisation of the metaphysical beliefs with which we (have to) operate. Professor Körner begins by describing how the categorical framework of a person's metaphysical beliefs may be embedded in more ordinary beliefs and practical attitudes to the world. He illustrates the variety of such frameworks and describes their role, going on to explain (...) how they may be modified by argument and reflection. This is an independent inquiry, but also the culmination of a series of Professor Körner's earlier works. The writing is extremely clear and the material sensitively controlled, revealing great learning and many suggestive insights and comparisons. It presents overall a comprehensive and carefully thought-out account of metaphysics. (shrink)

Causal queries about singular cases, which inquire whether specific events were causally connected, are prevalent in daily life and important in professional disciplines such as the law, medicine, or engineering. Because causal links cannot be directly observed, singular causation judgments require an assessment of whether a co‐occurrence of two events c and e was causal or simply coincidental. How can this decision be made? Building on previous work by Cheng and Novick (2005) and Stephan and Waldmann (2018), we propose (...) a computational model that combines information about the causal strengths of the potential causes with information about their temporal relations to derive answers to singular causation queries. The relative causal strengths of the potential cause factors are relevant because weak causes are more likely to fail to generate effects than strong causes. But even a strong cause factor does not necessarily need to be causal in a singular case because it could have been preempted by an alternative cause. We here show how information about causal strength and about two different temporal parameters, the potential causes' onset times and their causal latencies, can be formalized and integrated into a computational account of singular causation. Four experiments are presented in which we tested the validity of the model. The results showed that people integrate the different types of information as predicted by the new model. (shrink)

The authors challenge the reigning “causal power framework” as an explanation for whether a particular outcome was actually caused by a specific potential cause. They test a new measure of causal attribution in two experiments by embedding the measure within the Structure Induction model of Singular Causation (SISC, Stephan & Waldmann, 2016).

Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the representation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to represent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science. For this, we will (...) develop the notion of a theory frame and distinguish between theory frames for qualitative theories in which scientific measurement is based on nominal scales and theory frames for quantitative theories in which measurement is based on ratio scales. In three case studies, we will apply frames to a psychological, a linguistic, and a physical theory, thereby showing that the frame model is a powerful and intuitively accessible instrument to analyze the laws of scientific theories, the determination of theoretical concepts, the explanatory role of theoretical concepts, the abductive introduction of a new theoretical concept, the distinction between the core and the periphery of a theory, the diachronic development of a theory, and the distinction between qualitative and quantitative scientific concepts. Finally, we will provide a comparison to the structuralist view of theories, one of the most elaborated and applied models of theory representation. (shrink)

We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.

In "Ramseyan Humility," David Lewis argues that we cannot know what the fundamental properties in our world are. His arguments invoke the possibility of permutations and replacements of fundamental properties. Most responses focus on Lewis’s view on the relationship between properties and roles, and on the assumptions about knowledge that he makes. I argue that no matter how the debates about knowledge and about the metaphysics of properties turn out, Lewis’s arguments are unconvincing since they rely on a highly implausible (...) assumption about the expressive power of our language. (shrink)

Als Philosoph steht Schleiermacher noch immer im Schatten seiner Zeitgenossen und auch seiner theologischen Werke. Das Buch will seinen eigenständigen Beitrag zur Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie sichtbar machen. Gefragt wird, worin das philosophische Gravitationszentrum der einschlägigen Texte, Entwürfe und Vorlesungen Schleiermachers besteht, mit welchen theoretischen Mitteln er dabei operiert und welche Stellung er in der philosophischen Bewegung seiner Zeit einnimmt. Als zentral erweist sich der Individualitätsgedanke, der aus einer eigenständigen, kritischen Aneignung Kants und Spinozas resultiert. Mit dieser Konzeption begegnet Schleiermacher Friedrich (...) Schlegel auf Augenhöhe und leistet einen eigenständigen Beitrag zur frühromantischen Philosophie, deren grundlegende Positionen er in seinen philosophischen Vorlesungen in Halle (1804-1806) und Berlin (seit 1808) kritisch durcharbeitet und systematisiert. Dies bringt Schleiermacher, wie schon den frühen Friedrich Schlegel, trotz aller gravierenden Unterschiede vielfach in die Nähe Hegels, so dass sich sein Verhältnis zu den philosophischen Zeitgenossen höchst komplex gestaltet. Schleiermacher erweist sich als eigenständiger Denker auf dem gemeinsamen Boden der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie. (shrink)

Ludwig Feuerbachs Das Wesen des Christentums, zuerst erschienen 1841, gilt nicht nur als Klassiker der Religionskritik, sondern auch der junghegelianischen Hegel-Kritik. Der hier vorgelegte Kommentar erstreckt sich auf alle Textabschnitte des Buches sowie die Kontexte der Entstehungs- und Wirkungsgeschichte. Er wurde von 13 Forscherinnen und Forschern der Fachrichtungen Philosophie und Theologie aus Deutschland, Italien, Portugal, Österreich und den USA verfasst. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Feuerbach weniger eine Religionskritik als eine Kritik der Theologie im Auge hat und dabei weitgehend auf Hegels (...) Religionsphilosophie zurückgreift. Es handelt sich hier um eine umfassende Biographie und um den ersten vollständigen Kommentar zu Feuerbachs grundlegendem Werk, mit Einbeziehung der zeitgenössischen Kontexte sowie der Entstehungs- und Wirkungsgeschichte. Feuerbachs Verhältnis zur Religion und zu Hegel wird differenziert dargestellt, wodurch die Kontinuität zur Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie sichtbar wird. Damit richtet sich der Titel besonders an Lehrende und Studierende in den Fächern Philosophie, Theologie und Religionswissenschaften. (shrink)

In Nothing to Come, Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz provide a sophisticated, compelling, and thoroughly defended account of the growing block theory. This note critically evaluates two aspects of this account. First, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s attempt at providing a grounding principle for future truths and argues that this principle fails to make progress in explaining why future truths are true. Second, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s construal of the open future arguing that the asymmetry in openness with respect (...) to the past and future is not plausibly understood in terms of determinism and indeterminism, and in the final section, it evaluates their claim that a growing block theorist is able to maintain that the future is open in a stronger sense than the block theorist. (shrink)

Does the global supervenience of one class on another entail reductionism, in the sense that any property in the former class is definable from properties in the latter class? This question appears to be at the same time formally tractable and philosophically significant. It seems formally tractable because the concepts involved are susceptible to rigorous definition. It is philosophically significant because in a number of debates about inter-level relationships, there are prima facie plausible positions that presuppose that there is no (...) such entailment: standard versions of non-reductive physicalism and of normative non-naturalism accept global supervenience while rejecting reductionism. I identify a gap in an influential argument for the entailment, due to Frank Jackson and Robert Stalnaker, and draw on the model theory of infinitary languages to argue that some globally supervening properties are not reducible. (shrink)

Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected. Its failure, on my view, does not require failures of logical omniscience on the part of the agent, but results from a view of the update as _mighty_: as encoding what the agent learns might be the case, as well as what must be. (...) The view is motivated by consideration of a puzzle case, obtained by transposing into the context of belief revision a kind of scenario that Kit Fine has used to argue against intensionalism about counterfactuals. Employing the framework of truthmaker semantics, I go on to develop a novel account of belief revision, based on a conception of the update as mighty, which validates natural hyperintensional counterparts of the usual AGM postulates. (shrink)

Archival research can be described as preoccupied with the ontology of data formation and collection in relation to the speaking and writing subject. From its outset, it can be located in the humanistic tradition, which the archival and historical discipline has inherited. Thus, archival research can be described as preoccupied with the ontology of data formation and collection in relation to the speaking and writing subject. At the same time, the archival researcher—the human subject—is produced as the sole source of (...) subjective experiences, consciousness and feelings, and has become the central player in this tradition, embedded in debates over the concept of human autonomy in archival research. Archival researchers—human subjects—should be continually challenged by their own discipline, and by such arguably scientific methods, which often espouse rejecting their ethical commitments to idiosyncrasy, entanglements and the blurring of subject–object binaries. An approach that re-elevates these comm... (shrink)

In the philosophy of science, the frame model is used in order to represent and analyze scientific concepts and conceptual change. However, the potential of the frame model is far from being fully exploited: Up to now, the frame model is only applied to a rather small set of different kinds of concepts and important advantages of the frame model for reconstructing and analyzing concepts have been neglected. In this article, we will essentially extend the frame model in the following (...) way: We will develop a frame-based approach for representing a comprehensive class of different kinds of concepts including conjunctively and disjunctively defined concepts, family resemblance concepts, prototype concepts, operationalized concepts, dual concepts integrating two different ways of concept determination, and theoretical concepts. In order to do so, we will define different kinds of frames with respect to the logical structure of the kind of concept that is represented by a particular frame. We will exemplify our approach by means of ten frames applied to standard cases of conceptual analyses in philosophy and cognitive science as well as to scientific concepts of political science, psychology, linguistics and physics. (shrink)

What happens when competing assertions of validity collide? This question stands at the center of 22 projects being undertaken in various fields as part of the interdisciplinary research project "Transcendence and Shared Meaning." Drawing on empirical examples, the contributions show how transcendence is founded or, alternatively, challenged.

When Carl Friedrich Gethmann announced Poiesis & Praxis in 2001—“A new journal is launched”— this notification came along with high expectations of the addressees with respect to meaning and quality of the content of the newborn journal. The initiative for an “International Journal of Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment” followed the supposed demand for a periodic forum for the rational reflection of the consequences of scientific and technological advance for the individual and social life of the human and its (...) environment—also beyond national perspectives. In the meantime, this broad spectrum was indeed covered with mostly professional articles, which reflected upon the quite different methods of technology assessment and scientific policy advice.Eleven years, nine volumes, and 36 issues later, the world has changed and with it the journal as well: It came up with new topics and challenges of the scientific-technological civilization but also with new perception modes and read. (shrink)

The use of expert evidence in courts has been problematic for many years and a focus on the ethics of witnesses has given rise to the widespread introduction of rules governing how experts may behave. But, in additions to the ethics of witnesses, the ethics of expert evidence also encompasses the ethics of lawyers; the financial and other costs of using experts; the use, or misuse, of science; the way claims to truth are made; and the impact on the law (...) itself. In short, despite recent clarification of rules for witnesses, there remain significant issues with how the legal system makes use of expert testimony. This article explores some of those issues. (shrink)

This paper argues that specific individual informed consent and other forms of consent predicated on a right to autonomy may not in all circumstances be appropriate for the establishment and use of large data sets of health information. We suggest that there are inherent failings in such an approach, shortcomings that we analyse below. We argue that individuals share an obligation to contribute their data, as doing so is cost-free and benefits accrue to the population as a whole. Large health (...) data sets can be considered public goods – goods that are non-rival in consumption and in some cases non-exclusive in use – and contributing to these goods may be an obligation, the meeting of which allows citizens to invest in knowledge infrastructure. The approach argued for here is a variation of a communitarian ethic in which people have an obligation to contribute their data but have no correlative right to expect or receive an individual benefit. (shrink)

Diese Sittlichkeit wird jedoch gleichermassen vom politischen wie religiosen Fanatismus bedroht. Das Verhaltnis des modernen Staates zur Religion ist bis heute spannungsreich geblieben.

Since Foucault introduced the notion of biopolitics, it has been fiercely debated—usually in highly generalized terms—how to interpret and use this concept. This article argues that these discussions need to be situated, as biopolitics have features that do not travel from one site to the next. This becomes apparent if we attend to an aspect of biopolitics that has only received scant attention so far: the knowledge practices required to constitute populations as intelligible objects of government. To illustrate this point, (...) the article focuses on processes of biopolitical bordering: the delineation of the target population that is to be known via statistical practices. Drawing on the example of Estonia I show that methodological decisions involved in this work have important biopolitical implications as they affect the size and composition of the population, thus shaping the design of programmes of government aiming at its regulation. (shrink)