Stosunek polskiej filozofii katolickiej do Augusta Cieszkowskiego był ambiwalentny. Z jednej strony, uważano go za wybitnego filozofa polskiego, żarliwie religijnego i inspirowanego tradycją chrześcijańską, z drugiej strony, jego myśl budziła liczne zastrzeżenia doktrynalne (ewolucyjna perspektywa religii, możliwość realizacji Królestwa Bożego na ziemi, wątki panteizujące, ograniczanie wolnej woli, uzurpowanie sobie prawa do absolutyzmu poznawczego, jeśli chodzi o "Boże plany", uznanie Boga przed stworzeniem świata za nierozwiniętą jeszcze Możność, "elitarna" koncepcja nieśmiertelności jednostkowej za zasługi). Z dzisiejszej perspektywy filozofia Cieszkowskiego budzi opór ze (...) względu na próbę "totalizacji" rzeczywistości i eksponowanie utopijnego modelu ustroju teokratycznego. (shrink)

Polish conservative thinker Władysław Leopold Jaworski developed an interest for the theories of Austrian philosopher Othmar Spann. Both accepted universalism, both also believed that universalism was inspired by romantic tradition, although Spann sought its roots much further back in history, even as far as Aristotle. Both authors staunchly criticized modern-day individualism and liberalism, which they considered fatal. In their opinion individualism and liberalism upset the primacy of totality in social thought, which led to multiple pathologies. Despite their accentuation of totality, (...) both philosophers displayed very decided anti-totalitarian convictions typical for many conservatives. (shrink)

Feliks Młynarski ciągle jeszcze nie należy do kanonu lektur z polskiej myśli filozoficznej, chociaż coś takiego zasugerował już Władysław Tatarkiewicz w swojej Historii filozofii. Łączył go tam, jeśli chodzi o orientację, z Florianem Znanieckim, tj. przede wszystkim z jego wczesną, filozoficzną właśnie, twórczością. Obaj autorzy, Znaniecki i Młynarski, budowali swój filozoficzny światopogląd na przekonaniu o wielkiej roli swoistości świata społecznego, często ignorowanego przez profesjonalnych, akademickich filozofów. Zwięzła charakterystyka Tatarkiewicza jest jak gdyby wyciągiem z autoprezentacji samego Młynarskiego, napisanej w r. 1949, (...) w której nasz autor podkreślał takie momenty, jak konieczność odróżniania rzeczywistości społecznej od przyrodniczej, w szczególności w kwestii innej realności tworów społecznych opartych na powtarzalności „aktów obcowania”, a także w fundamentalnej kwestii „uznania cudzej świadomości”. Poza tym zwracał uwagę na rolę mowy w tworzeniu tradycji, a także na radykalny pomysł, aby z metafizyki odrzucić wszystkie pojęcia pochodzące z praktyki społecznej i dostrzec jej istotę wyrażalną w języku matematycznym. […]. (shrink)

Democracy - hope or illusion? Blooming, failing or declining? Our doubts and hesitation make part of unbending efforts to endorse and explain democracy. Who is right - the custodians of promise or the prophets of decline? The book concentrates on doubts. The author tries to explore «the other side of the moon», emphasizing the role of critical thinking, opposing a main-current optimism. Defending democracy we want to generate hope, but hoping may be a dangerous craft. Protecting our hope we are (...) prone to believe that democracy - even if it is not a full success story - is justified in its nature and out of question. How much do we have to forget to sanction this view? This is, in fact, the main question the book raises. It gives voice to those who never, in their writing on democracy, used a flattering tone. Starting with Greek giants - Plato and Aristotle - up to modern and most recent times, going through a broad field of revealing criticism, leaving us with an unsettling feeling that democracy is rather something to be explained than something to be celebrated. Living in democracy, lamenting its underperformances, we must not overlook a fundamental question - in what part do our disappointments reflect the «art of forgetting», allowing us to cast into oblivion all serious doubts originating in a critical discourse on modernity and democracy? (shrink)

The book by professor Stanisław Kowalczyk, renowned scholar in the field of social philosophy, is, without doubt, one of the most important studies on the idea of freedom. The concept of freedom is as old as mankind. It has many meanings and has been interpreted in many different ways. For instance, we also have the word „liberty," which means „freedom or right" and is synonymous with the word freedom, which means „the condition of being free." The author indicates that in (...) our times the notion of freedom is most frequently used; however, it is often misused or deceptive. Mass media and people of all walks of life talk of liberty; everyone talks of freedom and, for many, it is the highest value. Longing for freedom is rooted in the heart of every human being, for freedom is an existential correlate and the fulfilment of the rational human being. The semantic confusion about the notion of freedom leads to many misuses of the concept. Personalism, as a philosophical concept in which a person stands in the centre of all discussion, serves as a framework for the author's delineation on the concept of freedom. He further states that the appropriate understanding of this value is possible in the context of the personalistic interpretation of a human being. This is the focus of this informative and insightful book. (shrink)

The purpose of the essay is to critically analyze the influence of J. Derrida’s deconstruction on David J. Gunkel’s book Deconstruction (MIT Press 2021). Gunkel’s handbook is aimed at making deconstruction a tool of critical thinking accessible to non-professionals. It turns out that accomplishing this task comes at the expense of precisely the critical potential of deconstruction itself. Gunkel is well aware that his arguments are sometimes superficial and overlook deeper problems that should be addressed. Such a failure takes the (...) form of a fetishistic denial, which in psychoanalysis is summarized by the formula “I know well, but all the same.” In turn, deconstruction itself, insofar as it is separated from Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hegel’s dialectics, becomes an academic ideology. Restoring its proper subversive potential can only be done by returning to a philosophy of reflection, in which the thinker himself must ultimately consider his own position as an author and bring it under criticism. This is the path that Gunkel avoids, because he could then no longer be the author of a handbook on deconstruction, rather than someone who practices deconstruction. -------------------------- Received: 4/11/2022. Reviewed: 13/12/2022. Accepted: 20/12/2022. (shrink)

Demokracja i erozja tradycji Oświecenia -- Mit, polityka, popkultura -- Przyjaźń i mizantropia : czego uczy nas liberalizm?