Since Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the quest for just and lasting peace has been a fountainhead of debate, negotiation, and violent friction. Souad Dajani traces the Palestinians' struggle and argues for a strategy of nonviolent civilian resistance based on deterrence and defense. This strategy would defeat Israel's political will to maintain their occupation and prepare Palestinians for a time beyond the interim period of self-rule agreed upon by Israel and the PLO in September (...) 19932. Dajani's formulation of nonviolent civilian resistance is examined against a backdrop of early developments in Mandate Palestine, the impact of Zionist ideology, and the realities of life for Palestinians under occupation. Her assessment of the role of the PLO, objectives of the Palestinian National Movement, developments since the Gulf War, and other factors crucial to an effective strategy raises critical questions surrounding the operation of nonviolent techniques for the Palestinian community, Israeli politics, and international actors, most prominently the United States. (shrink)

The Oslo “peace process” launched in 1993 can be seen as the latest in a long line of attempts to circumvent the national rights of the Palestinians. In this article, Souad Dajani argues that, contrary to popular opinion, the Al-Aqsa Intifada was not due to non-compliance with Oslo but sterns from flaws built into Oslo since its inception. Essentially, Oslo failed to incorporate the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to national self-determination and return to their homeland. Dajani examines the (...) main provisions of the Oslo agreements signed since 1993 to explain the context for the eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada. (shrink)

The Oslo “peace process” launched in 1993 can be seen as the latest in a long line of attempts to circumvent the national rights of the Palestinians. In this article, Souad Dajani argues that, contrary to popular opinion, the Al-Aqsa Intifada was not due to non-compliance with Oslo but sterns from flaws built into Oslo since its inception. Essentially, Oslo failed to incorporate the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to national self-determination and return to their homeland. Dajani examines the (...) main provisions of the Oslo agreements signed since 1993 to explain the context for the eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada. (shrink)