Two decades ago, the introduction of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) sparked enthusiastic reactions. With implicit measures like the IAT, researchers hoped to finally be able to bridge the gap between self-reported attitudes on one hand and behavior on the other. Twenty years of research and several meta-analyses later, however, we have to conclude that neither the IAT nor its derivatives have fulfilled these expectations. Their predictive value for behavioral criteria is weak and their incremental validity over and above self-report (...) measures is negligible. In our review, we present an overview of explanations for these unsatisfactory findings and delineate promising ways forward. Over the years, several reasons for the IAT’s weak predictive validity have been proposed. They point to four potentially problematic features: First, the IAT is by no means a pure measure of individual differences in associations but suffers from extraneous influences like recoding. Hence, the predictive validity of IAT-scores should not be confused with the predictive validity of associations. Second, with the IAT, we usually aim to measure evaluation (“liking”) instead of motivation (“wanting”). Yet, behavior might be determined much more often by the latter than the former. Third, the IAT focuses on measuring associations instead of propositional beliefs and thus taps into a construct that might be too unspecific to account for behavior. Finally, studies on predictive validity are often characterized by a mismatch between predictor and criterion (e.g., while behavior is highly context-specific, the IAT usually takes into account neither situation nor domain). Recent research, however, also revealed advances addressing each of these problems, namely (1) procedural and analytical advances to control for recoding in the IAT, (2) measurement procedures to assess implicit wanting, (3) measurement procedures to assess implicit beliefs, and (4) approaches to increase the fit between implicit measures and behavioral criteria (e.g., by incorporating contextual information). Implicit measures like the IAT hold an enormous potential. In order to allow them to fulfill this potential, however, we have to refine our understanding of these measures, and we should incorporate recent conceptual and methodological advancements. This review provides specific recommendations on how to do so. (shrink)

A framework that brings together cultural perspectives and behavior genetics has long been needed. To be successful, however, we need sophistication in the conceptualization of culture. Here, we highlight three imperatives to this end: the need for a clear definition of cultural traits, inclusion of the role of societal power, and recognizing the distinction between traits and characteristic adaptations.

The text of Sophist 237-9 is aporetic and shares with many other dialogues this structure: A question is asked and an answer, given in a single sentence, is reached and accepted by the interlocutor. The the interlocutor is examined further and his assent undermined. I argue that the Stranger does not share Theaetetus' perplexity and holds the rejected answer. I explain the Stranger's behavior by appealing to his pedagogy.

Why do multinational corporations frequently encounter corporate social responsibility crises in leading emerging markets in the new century? Existing research about institutional impacts on MNC CSR has developed a void-based account about how the flawed institutional system allows misdeeds to happen. But the fact that such misdeeds have turned into increasing CSR crises in the new century along with institutional change is rarely taken into account. This paper combines studies of institutional voids, institutional entrepreneurship, and stakeholder theory to develop a (...) concept of institutional sophistication, which refers to both the top-down maturation of the regulatory system that standardizes firm behavior and the bottom-up diversification and intensification of grassroots initiatives that redefine stakeholder membership. Based on this concept, we developed a framework to comprehensively demonstrate how both institutional voids and sophistication drive the MNC CSR crisis in leading emerging markets. Empirically, we established an original database that includes 309 publicized CSR crises encountered by major foreign MNCs in China, India, and Russia, 2000–2011. Through a content analysis, the paper reveals six common sophistication processes that drive the MNC crisis across contexts and also specifies stakeholder strategies that make these processes happen and vary by social problems and national contexts. We also discussed the value of studying corporate social irresponsible behavior in understanding the institution–MNC relationship. (shrink)

The research reported here was the first empirical examination of strategic voting under the Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV) voting procedure, proposed by Mueller (1978). According to this procedure, a sequence of n voters must select s out of s+m alternatives (m=n=2; s>0). Hence, the number of alternatives exceeds the number of participants by one (n+1). When the ith voter casts her vote, she vetoes the alternative against which a veto has not yet been cast, and the s remaining non-vetoed (...) alternatives are elected. The SVV procedure invokes the minority principle, and it has advantages over all majoritarian procedures; this makes SVV a very desirable means for relatively small groups to make collective decisions. Felsenthal and Machover (1992) pointed out three models of voting under SVV: sincere, optimal, and canonical. The current research investigated, through laboratory experiments, which cognitive model better accounts for the voters' observed behavior and the likelihood of obtaining the optimal outcome as a function of the size of n (when s=1). The findings suggest that while voters under SVV use all three models, their choice is conditioned by group size. In the small groups (n=3), the canonical mode was a better predictor than the sincere model. In the larger groups (n=5), the sincere model was a better predictor than the canonical model. There is also evidence of players' learning during the experiment. (shrink)

Abstract‘Behavioural modernity’ isn’t what it used to be. Once conceived as an integrated package of traits demarcated by a clear archaeological signal in a specific time and place, it is now disparate, archaeologically equivocal, and temporally and spatially spread. In this paper we trace behavioural modernity’s empirical and theoretical developments over the last three decades, as surprising discoveries in the material record, as well the reappraisal of old evidence, drove increasingly sophisticated demographic, social and cultural models of behavioural modernity. (...) We argue, however, that some approaches to identifying and categorizing modernity have not kept up with this new picture. This is due to what we term ‘Rubicon expectations’: classificatory and interpretive practices which look for or assume clear demarcations in behavioural and cultural processes. We develop a philosophical account of ‘investigative disintegration’ to capture how our understanding of behavioural modernity has changed, and how Rubicon-based practices have become inadequate. Disintegration, in the form we analyse, occurs when scientists’ conception of a phenomenon shifts sufficiently to reshape an investigation’s epistemic structure. For behavioural modernity, the explanatory weight which once lay on identifying ‘switch-points’ in the innate suite of hominin cognitive capacities, lies now in understanding the social and demographic environments that were capable of sustaining and nourishing more complex material cultures. Finally, we argue that the phenomenon itself has not disintegrated to the point that we are left with no interesting explanandum: for all its mosaic, disparate nature, there are still good reasons for behavioural modernity to retain its central place in investigation of our species' origins. (shrink)

Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning, metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open to ‘deflationary’ challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight precisely because they (...) offer putatively simpler explanations of equal explanatory power. This paper challenges the blanket preference for simpler explanations, and shows that once this preference is dispensed with, and the full spectrum of evidence—including evolutionary, ecological and phylogenetic data—is accorded its proper weight, an argument in support of the prevailing assumption that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognitive mechanisms may begin to take shape. An adaptive model of cognitive-behavioural evolution is proposed, according to which the existence of convergent trait–environment clusters in phylogenetically disparate lineages may serve as evidence for the same trait–environment clusters in other lineages. This, in turn, could permit inferences of cognitive complexity in cases of experimental underdetermination, thereby placing the common view that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognition on firmer grounds. (shrink)

euroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior brings together, for the first time, the experiments and theories that have created the new science of rules. Rules are central to human behavior, but until now the field of neuroscience lacked a synthetic approach to understanding them. How are rules learned, retrieved from memory, maintained in consciousness and implemented? How are they used to solve problems and select among actions and activities? How are the various levels of rules represented in the brain, ranging from simple (...) conditional ones if a traffic light turns red, then stop to rules and strategies of such sophistication that they defy description? And how do brain regions interact to produce rule-guided behavior? These are among the most fundamental questions facing neuroscience, but until recently there was relatively little progress in answering them. It was difficult to probe brain mechanisms in humans, and expert opinion held that animals lacked the capacity for such high-level behavior. However, rapid progress in neuroimaging technology has allowed investigators to explore brain mechanisms in humans, while increasingly sophisticated behavioral methods have revealed that animals can and do use high-level rules to control their behavior. The resulting explosion of information has led to a new science of rules, but it has also produced a plethora of overlapping ideas and terminology and a field sorely in need of synthesis. In this book, Silvia Bunge and Jonathan Wallis bring together the worlds leading cognitive and systems neuroscientists to explain the most recent research on rule-guided behavior. Their work covers a wide range of disciplines and methods, including neuropsychology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, neurophysiology, electroencephalography, neuropharmacology, near-infrared spectroscopy, and transcranial magnetic stimulation. This unprecedented synthesis is a must-read for anyone interested in how complex behavior is controlled and organized by the brain. (shrink)

Fifth-century authors often invoke the idea that human beings are by nature savage, and that the civilized state of human societies is imposed on them by law and custom. A possible consequence of this idea is a pessimistic anthropological account, according to which pleonexia or greed is a natural characteristic of human beings, and therefore a justified drive of human behaviour. Scholars often attribute this pessimistic account of human nature to the sophists, whose views are considered to be reflected (...) in the speeches of Plato’s characters Glaucon and Callicles. Taking into account the genres and the contexts in which the original sophistic arguments concerning savage humanity appear, as well as the practices for which such arguments were implemented, this paper argues that the pessimistc view of human nature is not a product of sophistic thought, but is rather developed by authors such as Thucydides, who uses it in order to explain the atrocities committed in the course of the Peloponnesian war, and Plato, who uses it as a foil to his arguments concerning the superiority of human nature. (shrink)

Readily conjured images of “grotesque” behavior—such as, say, vomiting on one’s plate during dinner or fornicating in public—are hard to envisage as acts of “sophistication.” In fact it seems that the grotesque constitutes the exact opposite of sophistication. For whereas the grotesque is loud and insistent, “characteristically [evoking] a sudden shock,” sophistication is characterized by that which is subdued and refined.1 Unlike the grotesque, which is to some extent defined by spectacle, sophistication is at its finest when it remains unnoticed. (...) Similarly, where the grotesque mixes categories, placing objects in frames in which they do not belong, sophistication is constantly at work to uphold categories so as.. (shrink)

The communicative behavior of chimpanzees has been cited in support of the hypothesis that language evolved from gesture. In this commentary, I compare gestural and vocal communication in wild chimpanzees. Because the use of gesture in wild chimpanzees is limited, whereas their vocal behavior is relatively complex, I argue that wild chimpanzee behavior fails to support the gestural origins hypothesis.

Natural basis of the Sophistic conception of man — an outline. Following the tradition of the philosophy of nature, influenced by hippocratic medicine, Sophists claim that human-being is a biological creature, a part of the world of nature, subject to its rules and rights. Convinced that human-being is a composition of physical and spiritual elements and interested in the relation between the two, the Sophists examine the impact of psychological and physical stimuli on human behaviour. They take under scrutiny (...) various human states (pathe) such as sleep, wakefulness, sickness, madness, love, hatred. They emphasize the uniqueness and "private" character of individual perceptions and states which are dependent on the particular situation of a given subject. For these reasons, as they maintain, the nature of human cognition must be "private", fragmentary and limited. (shrink)

The paper aims at reconstructing the fundamentals of the sophistic anthropology. Contrary to the recognized view of the humanistic shift which took place in the sophistic thought, there is evidence that the sophists were continuously concerned with the problems of philosophy of nature. The difference between the sophists and their Presocratic predecessors was that their criticism of the philosophical tradition and the transformative answers given to the old questions were the basis and the starting point of the " ethical " (...) and " rhetorical " part of their intellectual activity. This natu-ralistic perspective is reflected in their research in the field of medicine and biology, in the discussion about " the human nature " , and in their interest in the individual physiological and mental conditions, which determine the state of the human body and the behaviour of a man. The sophists pioneered in linguistic, rhetorical, and philological studies. To enhance the power of persuasion, they investigated how various mental conditions influenced cognitive processes and physiological reactions. Thus they started a thorough examination of the human psyche, initiating the field of psychology. (shrink)

When discussing AI alignment, we usually refer to the problem of teaching or training advanced autonomous AI systems to make decisions that are aligned with human values or preferences. Proponents of this approach believe it can be employed as means to stay in control over sophisticated intelligent systems, thus avoiding certain existential risks. We identify three general obstacles on the path to implementation of value alignment: a technological/technical obstacle, a normative obstacle, and a calibration problem. Presupposing, for the purposes (...) of this discussion, that the technical and normative problems are solved, we focus on the problem of how to calibrate a system, for a specific value, to be on a specific location within a spectrum stretching between righteous and normal or average human behavior. Calibration, or more specifically mis-calibration, also raises the issue of trustworthiness. If we cannot trust AI systems to perform tasks the way we intended, we would not use them on our roads and at our homes. In an era where we strive to construct autonomous machines endowed with common sense, reasoning abilities and a connection to the world, so they would be able to act in alignment with human values, such mis-calibrations can make the difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy systems. (shrink)

Shors and Matzel's evaluation of approaches to the behavioural function of LTP is welcome, and should encourage a widening of conceptual approaches to this problem. In addition to their call for increased sophistication in thinking about LTP, there needs to be a parallel increase in sophistication in the study of behaviour. Changes in emotional state or tone may be a better function for LTP than attention mechanisms.

Strategic interactions have been studied extensively in the area of judgment and decision-making. However, so far no specific measure of a decision-maker's ability to be successful in strategic interactions has been proposed and tested. Our contribution is the development of a measure of strategic ability that borrows from both game theory and psychology. Such measure is aimed at providing an estimation of the likelihood of success in many social activities that involve strategic interaction among multiple decision-makers. To construct a reliable (...) measure of strategic ability, that we propose to call ``Strategic Quotient'' (SQ), we designed a test where each item is a game and where, therefore, the individual score obtained depends on the distribution of choices of other decision-makers taking the test. The test is designed to provide information on the abilities related to two dimensions, mentalization and rationality, that we argue are crucial to strategic success, with each dimension being characterized by two main factors. Principal component analysis on preliminary data shows that indeed four factors (two for rationality, two for mentalization) account for strategic success in most of the strategically simpler games of the test. Moreover, two more strategically sophisticated games are inserted in the test and are used to investigate if and to what extent the four factors obtained by simpler games can predict strategic success in more sophisticated strategic interactions. Overall, the collected empirical evidence points to the possibility of building a SQ measure using only simple games designed to capture information about the four identified factors. (shrink)

– We present a new paradigm extending the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma to multiple players. Our model is unique in granting players information about past interactions between all pairs of players – allowing for much more sophisticated social behaviour. We provide an overview of preliminary results and discuss the implications in terms of the evolutionary dynamics of strategies.

We propose that human self-domestication favored the emergence of a less aggressive phenotype in our species, more precisely phenotype prone to replace (reactive) physical aggression with verbal aggression. In turn, the (gradual) transition to verbal aggression and to more sophisticated forms of verbal behavior favored self-domestication, with the two processes engaged in a reinforcing feedback loop, considering that verbal behavior entails not only less violence and better survival, but also more opportunities to interact longer and socialize with more conspecifics, (...) ultimately enabling the emergence of more complex forms of language. Whereas in the case of self-domestication sexual selection has been proposed to work against physical aggression traits, in the case of verbal insult the selection has been proposed to work in favor of verbal aggression. The tension between these two seemingly opposing forces gets resolved/alleviated by a tendency to replace physical aggression with verbal aggression, and with verbal behavior more generally. This also helps solve the paradox of the Self Domestication Hypothesis regarding aggression, more precisely why aggression in humans has been reduced only when it comes to reactive aggression, but not when it comes to proactive aggression, the latter exhibiting an increase with the advent of modern language. We postulate that this feedback loop was particularly important during the time period before 50 kya, arguably between 200 kya and 50 kya, when humans were not fully modern, neither in terms of their skull/brain morphology and their behavior/culture, nor in terms of their self-domestication. The novelty of our approach lies (i) in giving an active role to early forms of language in interacting with self-domestication processes; (ii) in providing specific linguistic details and functions of this early stage of grammar (including insult and humor); (iii) in supplying neurobiological, ontogenetic, and clinical evidence of a link between (reactive) aggression and (reactive) verbal behavior; (iv) in identifying a variety of proxies of the earlier stages in evolution among cognitive disorders; and (v) in identifying specific points of contact and mutual reinforcement between these two processes (self-domestication and early language evolution), including reduction in physical aggression and stress/tension, as well as sexual selection. (shrink)

Distinguishing intentional behavior from accidental behavior is a crucial component of social cognition and a major developmental achievement. It has often been assumed that developmental changes in intentional reasoning result from a gradual sophistication in the ability to discern intentions in action. We take issue with this notion, demonstrating that data from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology are more consistent with the hypothesis that it is instead a gradual sophistication in the ability to understand accidents that drives developmental change.

The fifteen essays in this volume are taken from a symposium held in July 2008 at the University of Bologna, with contributions coming from ethology, evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology, and with some sophisticated psychology of religion. The essays are of such high caliber and so free of wooden materialism that they are well positioned to invoke or provoke ongoing query.If one simply grows weary of the creationism vs. neo-Darwinian battles, it comes as a liberating moment when you can (...) cast your Darwin-friendly eyes "downward" into the realms where evolutionary traits are observable in a roughly delineated way. Yes, and you can get predictions too. Peirceans will note that these scientists are .. (shrink)

Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated (...) social rewards. We also argue in favor of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right but also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g., fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications of the social motivation hypothesis on existing modeling practice. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. Defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior. Simulations of a computer-controlled, nonliving autonomous robot cannot carry the same psychological meaning as animate behavior. Being a living creature is an essential link between genuinely expressive behavior and justified psychological ascriptions.

Biosemiotics deals with the processes of signs in all dimensions of nature. Semiosis is the primary form of intelligence. Intelligent behaviour becomes immediately understandable in this approach because semiosis combines causality with the triadic structure of the semiotic sign. Intelligence is a process created in a given context. In the course of evolution organisms have learned to create increasingly sophisticated internal representations of external state. Semiosis is the precursor of the emergence of a feature we consider intelligence. Biosemiotics (...) also draws attention to the distributed intelligence, which relies on external semiotic scaffoldings as much as on the subject’s abilities and knowledge. (shrink)

We investigate partner effects on spatial perspective taking behavior in listeners, comparing behavior with a human versus a computer partner (Experiments 1 and 2), and with computer partners of different perceived capabilities (Experiment 3). Participants responded to spoken instructions from their partner which could be interpreted egocentrically (from their own perspective) or othercentrically (from their partner's perspective). In contrast to earlier work, we found that participants were more egocentric with a computer than a human partner. Participants were also more egocentric (...) with a computer partner that appeared more modern and capable, compared to one that appeared outdated and limited in ability. Our results show that perspective taking behavior is sensitive to information about one's partner; in particular, listeners consider their partner's potential ability to collaborate, adjusting their egocentric tendencies accordingly. Moreover, we highlight what appears to be a shift in listeners' expectations regarding computers' collaborative capabilities, leading to greater willingness to push the burden of perspective taking onto a computer partner. (shrink)

In his attempt to find cognitive traits that set humans apart from nonhuman primates with respect to tool use, Vaesen overlooks the primacy of the environment toward the use of which behavior evolves. The occurrence of a particular behavior is a result of how that behavior has evolved in a complex and changing environment selected by a unique population.

Professor Apter has written a valuable book. His work, a non-technical introduction to the most important aspect of the use of computers in psychology, is simple, readable, yet surprisingly concentrated and provocative. His first two chapters contain an unusually clear, concise examination of the extent to which minds and machines can be compared. Although brief it successfully collates the work of famous scientists and scholars of varied disciplines into a coherent cybernetic theory. Chapter three is a simplified explanation of the (...) way a digital computer works. This serves as a handy reference for the layman during more difficult discussions in ensuing chapters. Chapters four through nine recount the progress of many researchers in copying human behavior by means of machines. Here Apter examines data that have been part of the literature of computer simulation for some time, such as the Turing test, the General Problem Solver, experiments in Pattern Recognition, etc. But he also treats new or heretofore unnoticed research which undoubtedly will become elements in future philosophical controversy. One of these new cases is a program written by J. C. Loehlin called "Aldous". Aldous is the name given individually to a number of programs which interact emotionally. Loehlin so far has programmed anAldous, Decisive and Hesitant Aldouses, and, finally, Radical and Conservative Aldouses. Although the Aldous programs may sound more amusing than sober research in this area should, the details of the programming are both fascinating and philosophically significant. Loehlin, for instance, is forced to define "emotion" strictly in terms of environmental cues and elementary behavioral parameters. However, his Aldouses achieve from this a quite impressive and sophisticated repertoire of emotional responses accounting for learning, consistent emotional responses to unknown objects, mixed emotions, moods, frustration, satisfaction. Indeed, an "experienced" Aldous will exhibit behavior as unpredictable as any human. However, one still hesitates to call these reactions "emotion." Besides the obvious lack of physiological responses Aldous has no control over his environment and a merely marginal control over his emotions. Apter sees this difficulty clearly: "In particular one would like to see added the possibility of Aldous planning rather than reacting to the current situation and also the possibility of... changing not only his attitudes but also the parameters which govern the acquisition and change of attitudes." This criticism also may be levelled against other better known "personality" programs based on individual personality theories such as Heider’s or Homan’s. Apter clearly perceives theoretical difficulties in computer simulation such as these. Always, he faces them and gauges their relevance for the explanation of human behavior. The one serious shortcoming of Apter’s book is its brevity. Especially when he struggles with the theoretical implications of a particular experiment one gets the impression that he is needlessly condensing his analysis. This is particularly noticeable in the last chapter where he presents in barely-fleshed outline his position on the problem of consciousness. Despite this difficulty, however, Apter has fulfilled quite ably a promise he made in his preface that: "... this book about computers will be of interest to students of psychology and philosophy, the general reader and... perhaps also one day to computers."—J. F. (shrink)

The detection of a human’s intended behavior is one of the most important skills that a social robot should have in order to become acceptable as a part of human society, because humans are used to understand the actions of other humans in a goal-directed manner and they will expect the social robot to behave similarly. A breakthrough in this area can advance several research branches related to social intelligence such as learning by imitation and mutual adaptation. To achieve this (...) goal the robot needs to integrate all possible evidence of intention and neglect the unintended behavior, and a complete solution should use low-level signal processing and high-level reasoning. This work explores the low-level signal processing part of the solution by proposing an interactive adaptive perception scheme that uses four important features of human behavior to amplify the signals originating from intended behavior with respect to signals originating from unintended behavior and other noise sources such as instrumental noise. This work follows the vision that intelligence is not only a function of a centralized sophisticated artificial brain, but can be presented in different forms in the entire robot including its perception and motion systems (the mind is not contained in the brain, but distributed in every cell in the body). A simple example of using the proposed scheme was implemented and the results of two experiments with it are also presented. (shrink)

Basic quantitative genetic models of human behavioral variation have made clear that individual differences in behavior cannot be understood without acknowledging the importance of genetic influences. Yet these basic models estimate average, population-level genetic and environmental influences, obscuring differences that might exist within the population and masking systematic transactions between specific genetic and environmental influences. This article discusses a newer, more sophisticated and powerful quantitative genetic model that articulates these transactions. Results from this model highlight the ways in which (...) the gene- environment interaction and correlation are intertwined. They can be used to integrate findings from quantitative and molecular genetic studies and to understand the roles of genetic influences and social forces in manifested behaviors, even when DNA sequence variation is not relevant. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Sex is a fundamentally important biological variable. Recent years have seen significant progress in the integration of sex in many aspects of basic and clinical research, including analyses of sex differences in brain function. Significant advances in the technology available for studying the endocrine and nervous systems are now coupled with a more sophisticated awareness of the interconnections of these two communication systems of the body. A thorough understanding of the current knowledge, conceptual approaches, methodological capabilities, and challenges is (...) a prerequisite to continued progress in research and therapeutics in this interdisciplinary area. Sex Differences in the Brain provides scientists with the basic tools for investigating sex differences in brain and behavior and insight into areas where important progress in understanding physiologically relevant sex differences has already been made. This book was edited and co-authored by members of the Isis Fund Network on Sex, Gender, Drugs and the Brain, sponsored by the Society for Womens Health Research. The book is arranged in three parts. The first part of the book introduces the study of sex differences in the brain, with an overview of how the brain, stress systems, and pharmacogenetics differ in males and females and how this information is important for the study of behavior and neurobiology of both genders. The second part presents examples of sex differences in neurobiology and behavior from both basic and clinical research perspectives, covering both humans and nonhuman animals. The final part discusses sex differences in the neurobiology of disease and neurological disorders. For interested individuals as well as those who are considering conducting research at the intersections of endocrinology, neuroscience, and other areas of biomedicine, the study of sex differences offers exciting and challenging questions and perspectives. This book is intended as a guide and resource for clinicians, scientists, and students. (shrink)

Abstract.Legal philosophy must consider the way in which laws function as reasons for action. “Simple positivism” considers laws as merely reasons in the balance of reasons. Joseph Raz, as a representative of “sophisticated positivism,” argues that laws are exclusionary reasons for action, not merely reasons in the balance of reasons. This paper discusses Raz's arguments for his view. The Functional Argument provides no more reason for positivism than against it. The Phenomenological Argument is best supported by an account of (...) how character traits function in explaining behaviour. But then the distinction between exclusionary reasons and expressive reasons is obliterated. Legal positivism cannot absorb laws as expressive reasons for action. Raz's positivism implies the correctness of an anti‐positivistic legal theory. (shrink)

Have Sober and Wilson salvaged a sophisticated and sound perspective for group selection from the rhetorical overkill of the selfish-gene’s-eye gang, or have they merely reinvented Hamilton’s and Maynard Smith’s alternative to group selection models, models that can do justice to all the observed and even imagined phenomena of cooperation in the biosphere? One of the main lessons I have learned in thinking about the issues raised by Unto Others over the last two years is that they are, at (...) least for me, mind-twistingly elusive and slippery. The appeal of the competing metaphors is such that there is unwitting sleight of hand in every direction, as the perspectives shift back and forth. One stern admonition might then be: eschew the metaphors, stick to the math! The problem is that the math doesn’t distinguish between the perspectives Sober and Wilson champion and those they oppose. By their own account, the mathematical models are equivalent in what they can predict—and hence equivalent in what they can, in one important sense, explain. But that is not the end of it: “When one theory achieves an insight by virtue of its perspective, the same insight can usually be explained in retrospect by the other theories. As long as the relationships among the theories are clearly understood, this kind of pluralism is a healthy part of science.”. Good point. Patrick Suppes used to delight in challenging cognitive psychologists to point to any “cognitive” phenomenon that he couldn’t model, retrospectively, in strict behaviorist terms. The wise response was to deflect the challenge. His behaviorist models were parasitic: they would never have been devised—the phenomena in question were all but invisible to the behaviorists—without the inspiration of the cognitive model they translated into behaviorese. And what Sober and Wilson say here echoes what one of their chief opponents, Richard Dawkins, had already claimed for his perspective: “The extended phenotype may not constitute a testable hypothesis in itself, but it so far changes the way we see animals and plants that it may cause us to think of testable hypotheses that we would otherwise never have dreamed of.” So what’s all the fuss about? If each side is just saying “Here’s a good way of thinking of things, a prolific generator of hypotheses to test!” they could both be right, with their different perspectives having rather different utilities in different circumstances. (shrink)

If artificial neural networks are ever to form the foundation for higher level cognitive behaviors in machines or to realize their full potential as explanatory devices for human cognition, they must show signs of autonomy, multifunction operation, and intersystem integration that are absent in most existing models. This model begins to address these issues by integrating predictive learning, sequence interleaving, and sequence creation components to simulate a spectrum of higher-order cognitive behaviors which have eluded the grasp of simpler systems. Its (...) capabilities are described based on simulations calling for increasing levels of functionality and are used to show how the model can progress from fundamental sequence learning and recall tasks to sophisticated behaviors such as an ability to solve simple mathematical expressions and a creative capacity for the formation and application of inductive rules. (shrink)

This edition collects all the surviving evidence for the fifth-century BCE Athenian sophist Antiphon and presents it together with a translation and a full commentary, which assesses its reliability and significance. Although Antiphon is not as familiar a figure as sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias, substantial fragments have survived from his major works, On Truth and On Concord, including extensive remains preserved on papyrus. In addition, information about his doctrines is preserved by ancient writers ranging in time from Aristotle (...) to Simplicius and beyond. The introduction provides a brief sketch of Antiphon, his works, and his place in the fifth-century BCE sophistic movement, including his important contribution to the contemporary debate over the relation of law and nature. It also deals with the controversial question of the identity of Antiphon the sophist in relation to Antiphon of Rhamnus and other men of the same name. (shrink)

This book well deserves the 1965 Century Psychology Series Award. The author displays a remarkable grasp of the history of philosophy, contemporary philosophy of science, probability theory, and behavioral psychology. The first part consists of a review of the empiricist tradition including informative and judicious accounts of rationalists, empiricists, Kant, logical atomism, positivism, and recent trends in logical empiricism. The second part deals directly with psychology and the philosophy of science. It culminates in a detailed and sophisticated discussion of (...) the problems concerning reductionism. The third part treats recent contributions to probability theory and induction. Although Turner covers a great deal of material, he does so with skill and imagination. One will find here one of the best philosophic defenses available of the viability of behaviorism in psychology which directly meets many of the challenges recently raised by skeptical philosophers.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Neuroscience has illuminated the neural basis of decision-making, providing evidence that supports specific models of decision-processes. These models typically are quite mechanical, the realization of abstract mathematical “diffusion to bound” models. While effective decision-making seems to be essential for sophisticated behavior, central to an account of freedom, and a necessary characteristic of self-governing systems, it is not clear how the simple models neuroscience inspires can underlie the notion of self-governance. Drawing from both philosophy and neuroscience I explore ways in (...) which the proposed decision-making architectures can play a role in systems that can reasonably be thought of as “self-governing”. (shrink)

Many have interpreted symbolic material culture in the deep past as evidencing the origins sophisticated, modern cognition. Scholars from across the behavioural and cognitive sciences, including linguists, psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists, primatologists, archaeologists and paleoanthropologists have used such artefacts to assess the capacities of extinct human species, and to set benchmarks, milestones or otherwise chart the course of human cognitive evolution. To better calibrate our expectations, the present paper instead explores the material culture of three contemporary African forager groups. Results (...) show that, while these groups are unequivocally behaviourally modern, they would leave scant long-lasting evidence of symbolic behaviour. Artefact-sets are typically small, perhaps as consequence of residential mobility. When excluding traded materials, few artefacts have components with moderate-strong taphonomic signatures. Present analyses show that artefact function influences preservation probability, such that utilitarian tools for the processing of materials and the preparation of food are disproportionately likely to contain archaeologically traceable components. There are substantial differences in material-use between populations, which create important population-level variation preservation probability independent of cognitive differences. I discuss the factors — cultural, ecological and practical — that influence material choice. In so doing, I highlight the difficulties of using past material culture as an evolutionary or cognitive yardstick. (shrink)

The broad aim of this inquiry is to use a close reading of the text to explore Herodotus' interest in "human nature", in other words to measure him by the standard offered by the contemporary Sophistic movement and by Thucydides, who shares the same preoccupation. "Human nature" is taken to include human psychology at all levels from individuals to city states, nations and empires. The focus is on Herodotus' sensitivity to the psychological complexities of individuals, in particular to the contradictions (...) and paradoxes in their behaviour; his interest in the mechanisms of social and political life; and his examination of the phenomenon of empire and how he shares with Thucydides a concern with its psychological motivation, with particular attention to his foreshadowing of Athenian empire. The study concludes by placing Herodotus firmly within the Sophistic (and Hippocratic) intellectual milieu and identifying him as an active participant in the major debates of the late 5thc. Central to the inquiry is the detailed analysis of extended contexts, exploring how large sections of text are put together, with consideration not merely of the structure and literary presentation but also Herodotus' use of his sources and the intentionality of the narrative. The fundamental hypothesis is that Herodotus is a complex and sophisticated writer with a developed critical acumen in his use of sources, such that he uses his material much more than his material uses him. (shrink)

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of (...) speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness. (shrink)

Social machines are systems formed by technical and human elements interacting in a structured manner. The use of digital platforms as mediators allows large numbers of human participants to join such mechanisms, creating systems where interconnected digital and human components operate as a single machine capable of highly sophisticated behaviour. Under certain conditions, such systems can be described as autonomous and goal-driven agents. Many examples of modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be regarded as instances of this class of (...) mechanisms. We argue that this type of autonomous social machines has provided a new paradigm for the design of intelligent systems marking a new phase in the field of AI. The consequences of this observation range from methodological, philosophical to ethical. On the one side, it emphasises the role of Human-Computer Interaction in the design of intelligent systems, while on the other side it draws attention to both the risks for a human being and those for a society relying on mechanisms that are not necessarily controllable. The difficulty by companies in regulating the spread of misinformation, as well as those by authorities to protect task-workers managed by a software infrastructure, could be just some of the effects of this technological paradigm. (shrink)

Social machines are systems formed by material and human elements interacting in a structured way. The use of digital platforms as mediators allows large numbers of humans to participate in such machines, which have interconnected AI and human components operating as a single system capable of highly sophisticated behavior. Under certain conditions, such systems can be understood as autonomous goal-driven agents. Many popular online platforms can be regarded as instances of this class of agent. We argue that autonomous social (...) machines provide a new paradigm for the design of intelligent systems, marking a new phase in AI. After describing the characteristics of goal-driven social machines, we discuss the consequences of their adoption, for the practice of artificial intelligence as well as for its regulation. (shrink)

In a dynamic (sequential) framework, departures from the independence axiom (IND) are reputed to induce violations of dynamic consistency (DC), which may in turn have undesirable normative consequences. This result thus questions the normative acceptability of non expected-utility (non-EU) models, which precisely relax IND. This paper pursues a twofold objective. The main one is to discuss the normative conclusion: usual arguments linking violations of DC to departures from IND are shown to be actually based on specific (but usually remaining implicit) (...) assumptions which may rightfully be released, so that it is actually possible for a non-EU maximizer to be dynamically consistent and thus avoid normative difficulties. The second objective is to introduce a kind of `reality principle' (through two other evaluation criteria) in order to mitigate the normative requirement when examining adequate moods for non-EU decision making. (shrink)

We present a novel, sophisticated intention‐based control system for a mobile robot built from an extremely inexpensive webcam and radio‐controlled toy vehicle. The system visually observes humans participating in various playground games and infers their goals and intentions through analyzing their spatiotemporal activity in relation to itself and each other, and then builds a coherent narrative out of the succession of these intentional states. Starting from zero information about the room, the rules of the games, or even which vehicle (...) it controls, it learns rich relationships between players, their goals and intentions, probing uncertain situations with its own behavior. The robot is able to watch people playing various playground games, learn the roles and rules that apply to specific games, and participate in the play. The narratives it constructs capture essential information about the observed social roles and types of activity. After watching play for a short while, the system is able to participate appropriately in the games. We demonstrate how the system acts appropriately in scenarios such as chasing, follow‐the‐leader, and variants of tag. (shrink)

Many sophisticated essays and books have been written about the topic of consciousness. My own contributions date back some twenty-five years in an essay entitled 'Problems concerning the structure of consciousness' (Pribram 1976), and five years before that in delineating the difference between brain processes that are coordinate with awareness and those that are coordinate with habitual behavior (Pribram 1971a). I have been intrigued by what has been written since and take this occasion to reassess a few of the (...) major issues that have arisen. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of the mechanisms of the emergence of structure and meaning in the biological and physical sciences. It proceeds from an examination of the concept of intentionality and proposes a model of intentional behavior on the basis of results of computer simulations of structural and functional self-organization. Current attempts to endow intuitive aspects of meaningful complexity with operational content are analyzed and the metaphor of DNA as a computer program (the `genetic program') is critically examined in (...) relation to an alternative metaphor of DNA as data. It is argued that relatively simple networks of boolean automata can classify and recognize patterns of binary strings on the basis of non-programmed, self-generated criteria, but lack a capacity for self-observation and interpretation. To overcome this problem it is necessary to clarify the relationships between the goals and underlying mechanisms of a process and between a system and its environment. It will be shown that memory devices that record the histories of interactions are essential for models of conscious and unconscious intentional behavior and that the possibility of infinitely sophisticated - and therefore unprogrammable - machines cannot be avoided. It will be argued that the notion of infinite sophistication allows the ideas of self-organization and physical determinism to be reconciled. These models will be used to suggest how the voluntary aspect of decision-making in general can emerge out of functional self-organizing processes. The conclusion will introduce the notion of `underdetermination' of theories, which imposes an intrinsic limitation on models of complex natural systems - a limitation that, at the same time, may be precisely what makes possible mutual understanding and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Current sophisticated technologies in the workplace offer inexpensive and user-friendly devices and the means to control ‘on-the-job’ behaviour. This promises high profitability, productivity and liability alleviation. Yet, it also gives rise to a socio-ethical crisis of incessant surveillance that often overrules its anticipated benefits and motives of control and care. The dilemma is twofold: First, scholarly studies undertaken on this issue from a principally administrative and legal point of view tend to lack a moral framework and so prove (...) unable to offer an integral understanding. Second, a majority of scholars tend to focus exclusively on individual rights, such as privacy, even at the risk of overlooking its social impact and consequences. This paper thus aims to unravel these forgotten moral and social concerns. It analyses the surveillance frameworks and the arguments for and against it; scrutinises critically the technological devices most often implemented in the workplace; examines both its individual effects (privacy) and social effects (categorising); and proposes an ethics of workplace surveillance in a framework of trust and transparency. It argues, in all these ways, for an alteration or modification of traditional organisational behaviour within a new frame of reference, situated within and going beyond questions of moral duty, principles and legal compliance. (shrink)

In the quest to discover the neural bases of cognition, rigorous behavioral tools are equally as important as sophisticated tools for neural intervention. This paper evaluates several episodes in the development of a novel behavioral tool for rodent cognitive testing, the rodent touchscreen operant chamber. Using conceptual tools on offer in the philosophical literature on exploratory experimentation and control, I illuminate how optimization of this behavioral tool and an understanding of the causal knowledge it may be used to generate (...) historically has involved dynamic interplay between community-driven exploratory practices operating in parallel with causal hypothesis-driven research. (shrink)