Socrates wrote nothing; Plato's accounts of Socrates helped to establish western politics, ethics, and metaphysics. Both have played crucial and dramatically changing roles in western culture. In the last two centuries, the triumph of democracy has led many to side with the Athenians against a Socrates whom they were right to kill. Meanwhile the Cold War gave us polar images of Plato as both a dangerous totalitarian and an escapist intellectual. And visions of Plato have proliferated at (...) the heart of postmodern critiques of the very idea of metaphysics and politics. Plato's Progeny begins with an account of modern responses to the trial of Socrates and the controversial question of Socrates' relation to Plato. At its centre are two chapters exploring the idea of Platonic origins in and for philosophy, and of Platonic foundations for philosophical politics. Exploring unfamiliar as well as familiar invocations of Plato, Melissa Lane argues that twentieth-century ideological battles have obscured the importance of Socratic individualism, the nature of Platonic ethics, and the value of Platonic politics. Succinct and clearly written, this is an ideal guide for everyone interested in the way philosophers are still writing footnotes to Plato. (shrink)

Les Socrate(s) de Platon; le Socrate de Hegel, de Kierkegaard et de Nietzsche.

This paper focuses on a neglected portion of Plato’s Gorgias from 506c to 513d during Socrates’s discussion with Callicles. I claim that Callicles adopts the view that virtue lies in self-preservation in this part of the dialogue. Such a position allows him to assert the value of rhetoric in civic life by appealing not to the goodness of acting unjustly with impunity, but to the badness of suffering unjustly without remedy. On this view, the benefits of the life of (...) rhetoric depend on the idea that virtue consists in the power to protect oneself from the predations of others. I argue that by challenging this understanding of virtue as self-preservation, Socrates both deprives Callicles of any remaining justification for the rhetorical life in the Gorgias and, at the same time, makes room for his own defense of the life of philosophy. (shrink)

The present paper discusses Grosseteste’s reception of Proclus’ Elements of Physics (EP) in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics VI. In the first section I examine the method with which Grosseteste reconstructs Aristotelian texts. The second section initiates a study of the way Grosseteste evaluates Proclus’ EP on the basis of this method. Thus, the third section brings out Grosseteste’s moderate criticism of Proclus’ treatment of certain Aristotelian conclusiones and assumptions. The fourth section extends this study to the conceptual relation between (...) contiguity, continuity and succession. Finally, Grosseteste’s evaluation of Proclus’ tendency to omit, divide and merge Aristotelian conclusiones is studied in the fifth section. I conclude that Grosseteste is a careful and moderately critical reader of Proclus. He aptly grasps the dependence of the EP on Physics VI and conceives of Proclus’ EP as a forerunner of his own method of reconstructing Aristotelian texts. (shrink)

Plato’s Protagoras is famous for Protagoras’s defense of the public practice of sophistry and his great myth, which contains his account of the origins of political life, as well as for Hippias’s rejection of the tyranny of nomos in the name of the natural kinship of the wise. What is perplexing is that Socrates makes no explicit response to these arguments. This essay argues that Socrates’s indirect response is actually contained in his otherwise unmotivated interpretation of the poem (...) of Simonides, where his description of “laconic philosophy” is in fact an indirect description of his own philosophical practice. While the sophists reject nomos without recognizing their own dependence on its stabilizing force, Socrates argues that genuine philosophers, recognizing at once the necessity as well as the defectiveness of nomos, must “unwillingly praise” convention and only present their criticisms indirectly. Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides, then, points the way to his own understanding of the tension between, but also the interdependence of, nomos and physis. (shrink)

Review of Socrates, Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues, by Gerasimos X. Santas.

THE PASSAGE CITED IN THE TITLE IS commonly said to deal with puzzles or paradoxes about size and other measurable attributes of bodies. Nearly all recent commentators seek to interpret this portion of the dialogue as supporting or otherwise cohering with the Protagorean position Socrates expounds in the Theaetetus. On the present analysis, however, the support or harmony is mere appearance. The puzzles Socrates brings up are indeed associated with entities rejected by Protagoras. Socrates certainly uses the (...) puzzles to foster Theaetetus's trust in Protagorean doctrine. All the same, Socrates' procedure should not be taken at face value. The passage, which is an important digression, is fundamentally quite critical of the Protagorean position. (shrink)

Introduction: Socratic divagation/divination -- The holy -- On the sign of Socrates -- Divine madness -- Banishing the poets -- Conclusion: the multiplicity of voices.

The debate over Socrates’s claim in the Apology to have practiced philosophy as a divinely ordained mission is almost as old as this claim itself. Yet scholars remain divided over the issue because of the extraordinary difficulty of understanding how Socrates interpreted the negative proclamation of the oracle as providing a positive prescription for a way of life. Finding this difficultly insurmountable, many authors have denied the coherence of Socrates’s account. In this essay, I argue that the (...) debate can be resolved by revisiting the interpretation of human wisdom offered in the Apology. Demonstrating that Socrates understands human wisdom to be structurally incompatible with the claim to possess it, I show that he is thereby prevented from ever simply affirming the truth of the oracle and that this, in turn, establishes his philosophical practice as a lifelong mission. (shrink)

In Philosophical Fragments the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus explored the question: What is required in order to go beyond Socratic recollection of eternal ideas already possessed by the learner? Written as an afterword to this work, Concluding Unscientific Postscript is on one level a philosophical jest, yet on another it is Climacus's characterization of the subjective thinker's relation to the truth of Christianity. At once ironic, humorous, and polemical, this work takes on the "unscientific" form of a mimical-pathetical-dialectical compilation of (...) ideas. Whereas the movement in the earlier pseudonymous writings is away from the aesthetic, the movement in Postscript is away from speculative thought. Kierkegaard intended Postscript to be his concluding work as an author. The subsequent "second authorship" after The Corsair Affair made Postscript the turning point in the entire authorship. Part One of the text volume examines the truth of Christianity as an objective issue, Part Two the subjective issue of what is involved for the individual in becoming a Christian, and the volume ends with an addendum in which Kierkegaard acknowledges and explains his relation to the pseudonymous authors and their writings. The second volume contains the scholarly apparatus, including a key to references and selected entries from Kierkegaard's journals and papers. (shrink)

Although John Black Grant (1890-1962) is well known among historians of public health and an older generation of public health practitioners, he has not received the wider recognition that he deserves, especially as the solutions that he proposed to public health problems some 70 to 80 years ago still apply. Several factors inhibited Grant from being recognized as a public health leader. To begin with, the general policy of the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Division (IHD), where he worked for more (...) than 40 years (1917-62), was that its employees should keep a low profile and not advertise their accomplishments. More importantly, the Foundation itself was unsure of Grant's place in their history, as .. (shrink)

Before we take up the arguments directly, there is one general point about Socrates' position that he considered essential to everything he said in the Crito. Also, he thought that this point was easily missed. He calls it his "starting point." It is that "we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us." And Socrates warns Crito not to accept this position too quickly or (...) without full consideration, "for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this". Yet this moral principle is so essential to his arguments that "those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another". This position, never to harm others in any circumstance, is "the starting point of our discussion...". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 166-169 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues, by John Beversluis; xii & 416 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, $69.95. This book is more than a cross-examination of Socrates: it is a carefully wrought indictment. Beversluis, unlike Socrates' (...) historical adversaries Anytus and Meletus, brings philosophically serious charges against Socrates by offering a rigorous defense of the interlocutors in Plato's early dialogues, the so-called Socratic dialogues. In so doing, he charts new territory in the vast area of recent analytic scholarship on Plato.According to traditional readings, Socrates deploys his elenchus to defeat his interlocutors, leaving them "either to retreat in anger or to submit to his power." Allegedly, Plato, guided by his Socratic intellectualism, draws them as distinctive, complex characters, though intellectually and thus ethically flawed. Beversluis argues against this standard view, providing sympathetic reassessment of Socrates' interlocutors. Although some previous scholars have defended some of the interlocutors, Beversluis widens the scope of the argument, leveling a scathing attack on Socratic intellectualism and its correlative method of moral education.He deals not only with Socrates' interlocutors and their logical defeats, but also with the idea of an interlocutor, and in so doing casts light on the philosophical dialogue as a genre. This emerges in the first and perhaps most original chapter, entitled "The Socratic Interlocutor," which may be of value to readers interested in philosophical writing or the philosophy of literature more generally. Here he illuminates Plato's use of the interlocutor, in part, by contrasting it with that of other philosophers who wrote in dialogue form, such as Augustine, Anselm, Hume, and Berkeley. The Socratic interlocutors are not, he says, "embodiments of error." Socrates, unlike the protagonists drawn by these other authors, does not subject them to his scrutiny in order to make them accept his beliefs, but rather to reject theirs. Beversluis claims that Plato's portrayal expresses his Socratic belief in the good life as one of bewilderment and uncertainty, a view, Beversluis rightly says, Plato will come to repudiate in his middle dialogues. Beversluis is clearly aware of the disparity between the [End Page 166] discomfort Socrates visits on his interlocutors and that which he is willing to endure himself.While many interpreters forgive Socrates' lapses of logic, Beversluis is unsparing. There is no reason, he thinks, to judge Socrates' arguments by any other criterion than their logical merits, and he therefore rejects the idea that Socrates' most fallacious arguments are valuable for psychological illumination. He also rejects Vlastos's view that only those of Socrates' arguments that are offered "seriously" should be criticized seriously. If they appear to be logical arguments, Beversluis contends, they must be assessed on their logical merits, not their rhetorical or therapeutic virtues. Some might find this approach rather arid until they see that Beversluis is warning the reader not to be dazzled by Socrates as the interlocutors are.It is widely believed that the aim of Socratic elenchus is to uncover the structure of a person's beliefs and to show that it is either internally inconsistent or at best unreflectively constructed. Beversluis's account, however, portrays Socrates as a Svengali who makes people assent to claims they would not otherwise accept. If this is right, Socrates is not actually elucidating the interlocutor's real beliefs. Beversluis challenges the notion of sincere assent, both as an interpretative guide to the early dialogues and as an epistemic concept. He points out that sincere belief is not simply an occurrent interior state accompanying, and indicated by, a verbal act of assent; rather, it emerges from the totality of a person's lived character, from the relation between word and act.Some readers will object to his axiom that a character in a literary work, and thus in a Platonic dialogue, has a life subject to scrutiny outside of the literary work. In his brief... (shrink)

In The Religion of Socrates, Mark McPherran offers an extended discussion of selected evidence about Socrates’s philosophy of religion. Relevant passages from Plato’s Euthyphro and Apology are taken to be authentic reports of Socrates’s own thinking, and are commented on at considerable length. The interpretation that emerges is supplemented by evidence from other works by Plato and from Xenophon’s Memorabilia. The ten-page bibliography is useful, and the index of passages is especially valuable. But McPherran’s evidence is tendentiously (...) selected, and so his depiction cannot be trusted as a portrayal of Socrates himself. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s encounter with Socrates is examined in all of the relevant passages in the former’s writings. Dannhauser depicts this encounter as a quarrel between a modern and an ancient that runs through all the stages of Nietzsche’s intellectual development. The ambiguous, not to say ambivalent, nature of Nietzsche’s "view" of Socrates as a man and thinker is carefully shown even though it does not appear that any depth interpretation of this issue actually emerges. It is pointed out that, (...) for the most part, Nietzsche sees Socrates as a turning-point in Western history, as the arch-rationalist, the dialectician who advocates the supremacy of morality over all else, a decadent personality, and the enemy of instinctive life. (shrink)

The central argument in the Euthyphro is the one Socrates advances against the definition of piety as "what all the gods love." The argument turns on establishing that a loved thing (philoumenon) is 1) a loved thing because it is loved (phileitai), not 2) loved because it is a loved thing. I suggest that this claim can be understood and found acceptable if we take "because" to be used equivocally in it. Despite the equivocation, Socrates' argument is valid, (...) showing that Euthyphro cannot offer this definition consistently with his view that the gods have as a reason for loving pious things that they are pious things. (shrink)

Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus Gail Fine. sense that they consider the issues it raises; and they argue, against its conclusion, that inquiry is possible. Like Plato and Aristotle, they also explain what makes inquiry possible; and they do ...

In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, (...) thus solving the textual puzzle and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good. (shrink)

Stern uses a very thorough analysis of Plato's Phaedo as a means of attacking the traditional understanding of the Platonic-Socratic view of both the method and the results of philosophy that is found in the middle dialogues. Stern means by "political philosophy" the study of human affairs in general, and he sees Socrates' study of human affairs as described in the Phaedo as involving a type of rationalism that does not rest on a dogmatic assertion about the existence of (...) a transcendent realm of Ideas supplying a clear and unambiguous explanation of things. On the contrary, Socratic rationalism is grounded in an awareness of the limits of human understanding and consists in the critical examination of human discourse as our means of discovering what can be known about the world we live in and the irreducible heterogeneity and irreconcilable conflicts that characterize it. Neither the soul nor the Ideas can be understood apart from their involvement in this world, and both are connected with logos and with heterogeneity in a critical way. (shrink)

윤리학과 종교는 각각 독자적인 방식으로 인간의 삶에 규범을 제시한다. 일반적으로 윤리학이 제시하는 규범은 이성에 토대를 두고 있고, 종교는 신앙에 토대를 둔 규범을 제시하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 그러나 도덕적 규범과 종교적 규범이 항상 일치하는 것은 아니다. 심지어 어떤 경우에는 동일한 상황에서 정반대의 규범을 제시하기도 한다. 윤리학과 종교, 이성과 신앙의 갈등 혹은 대립은 비단 윤리학자들뿐만 아니라 일반인들을 오랫동안 괴롭혀온 문제라고 할 수 있다. 소크라테스는 『에우튀프론』에서 최초로 이 문제를 검토한다. 소크라테스와 에우튀프론은 경건함이 무엇인지를 두고 열띤 논쟁을 펼친다. 에우튀프론의 경건함의 정의는 규범윤리이론으로서 신명론을 함축하고 (...) 있다. 소크라테스는 에우튀프론의 경건함의 정의를 논박함으로써 에우튀프론의 신명론의 한계를 드러낸다. 하지만 소크라테스의 반론이 신의 존재를 완전히 부정하거나 신이 도덕적 선, 정의와 무관하다는 것을 주장하는 것은 아니라는 점이 주목되어야 한다. 왜냐하면 『에우튀프론』에서 뿐만 아니라 『변론』에서도 알 수 있듯이 소크라테스는 누구보다도 신의 존재를 확신하고, 자신의 도덕적 가르침이 신의 명령에 부합한다고 믿고 있기 때문이다. 이것은 에우튀프론의 신명론과는 다른 독특한 소크라테스의 신명론의 가능성을 열어 놓게 된다. (shrink)

Mountains of books have been written about the life of the great sage Socrates, his philosophy, his condemnation by an Athenian court, and his execution. Nonetheless, one of the most erudite experts on ancient culture and philosophy, A.F. Losev, wrote: "Socrates is one of the most difficult problems in all ancient philosophy…. And it is now by no means an easy matter to discern the true Socrates" . This judgment of Losev's is all the more true in (...) view of the fact that Socrates did not write any philosophical works and we have to get all our information about his personality and philosophy from the more or less reliable reminiscences of his pupils and followers, first of all Plato and Xenophon. (shrink)