The “scaling-up” problem concerns radical embodied cognition’s (REC) supposed inability to extend its explanatory reach beyond simple cognitive phenomena. This paper questions the problem’s main assumption, that is, the possibility of sorting phenomena according to their inherent cognitive complexity or representation-hunger. To do so, I focus on a class of phenomena whose degree of representation-hunger has been much debated: social phenomena (and their cognitive correlates). Some, like Clark and Toribio (1994), consider social phenomena (...) the absolute top of representation-hunger, while others, like radical enactivists, conceive of sociality as a non-representational resource; two opposite views which demonstrate how hard it is to place sociality somewhere in a representational hierarchy. An exploration into two social disciplines provides reasons to question the tenability of the scaling-up problem in the case of social phenomena and hence in general. The long debate in social psychology over dual-process models of cognition suggests distinguishing between the complexity of a task and its putative cognitive requirements, therefore rejecting that form of cognitive-task essentialism inherent in the idea of representation-hunger. The recent encounter of radical enactivism with social theory provides, on the other hand, a non-representational explanation of institutional phenomena. In the end, the paper suggests that one of the following must hold: either the scaling-up problem is untenable in its traditional (hierarchical) understanding or radical enactivism has already scaled up to social phenomena, understood as the pinnacle of representation-hunger. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have devoted volumes to the question of explanation; I've devoted some pages to it myself. In this highly contracted essay I shall offer no more than a comment on the problem of explanation, some vagrant but critical assessments of the dominant approaches to it, and a caution lest we take comfort in some of the recent "success"—or alleged success—in Psychology. I begin with this question: What does it mean to explain an occurrence? And then: What is it (...) about any explanation that makes it good or bad? 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Discussions in sociological theory often focus on ontological questions on the nature of social reality. Against the underlying epistemological realism, I argue for a constructivist notion of theory: Theories are webs of concepts that we use to guide empirical observations and to make sense of them. We cannot know the real features of the social world, only what our theoretical perspectives make us see. Theories therefore represent social phenomena by highlighting certain features and relating them in (...) a logical system. In this system, theoretical sentences can be considered true if they meet two conditions: They are consistent with the theory at hand and adequately map empirically observable relations between objects denoted by theoretical constructs. Truth is therefore relative to a perspective; it is not objectively determinable. Theories should be assessed not for their ontologies but for what they allow us to see and how they connect to empirical observations. (shrink)

As a result of being measured, individuals sometimes alter their behavior and attitudes to such extent that subsequent measurement results are affected. This ‘reactivity’ to measurement problematizes prediction and explanation, but some reactivity is nevertheless legitimate. Using the example of the measurement of race in the US Census, this article demonstrates that some forms of reactivity do not affect the accuracy of research. The article argues that legitimacy of reactivity depends on the metaphysical status of the phenomenon being measured. It (...) is argued that reactivity’s legitimacy is affected by the arbitrariness of a measure and the voluntariness of measurement results. (shrink)

Formidable difficulties face anyone trying to model social phenomena using a formal system, such as a computer program. The differences between formal systems and complex, multi-facetted and meaning-laden social systems are so fundamental that many will criticise any attempt to bridge this gap. Despite this, there are those who are so bullish about the project of social simulation that they appear to believe that simple computer models, that are also useful and reliable indicators of how aspects (...) of society works, are not only possible but within our grasp. This paper seeks to pour water on such optimism but, on the other hand, show that useful computational models might be ‘evolved’ In this way it is disagreeing with both naive positivist and relativistic post-modernist positions. However this will require a greater ‘selective pressure’ against models that are not grounded in evidence, ‘floating models’, and will result in a plethora of complex and context-specific models. (shrink)

There are two approaches that dominate contemporary opera performances. The first may be characterised as producing a subtle, aesthetic and stylistic means of expression. The second runs up visual, interpretation and content means to their maximum expressivity and the audience is exposed to violence, sex and experience disgust. This paper analyses specific productions by renowned European theatre and opera directors, in order to shed light on the way in which opera directors cope with the threat of terrorism, sexual violence, and (...) the impact of the mass media upon the moral belief system of modern man. Within the context of the bold productions of European theatre-makers Slovak opera theatre seems conservative, gravitating towards the aesthetic aspect of opera. (shrink)

This article takes up, but in a different key, an argument of postmodernists that the over-rationalized conception of society tends to ignore important phenomena such as those belonging to the symbolic domain. It is suggested that the emerging programme of symbolic sociology may contribute toward a new synthetic and interdisciplinary thinking in social sciences. The concept of symbolism as a social phenomenon rather than as an autonomous linguistic or semiotic system is presented; and the argument is made (...) that if social knowledge is constitutive of society, similarly collective sentiments, temporality and collective memory are also symbolically produced. They are created from and create discursive symbolism, symbolic objects and symbolic behaviours. Finally, the article focuses on collective actions where the sociology of symbolic processes is most promising. (shrink)

Abstract: Situations that social scientists and others explain by using concepts like "custom" and "norm" often tend to be situations in which many other kinds of explanations (for example, biological, psychological, economic, historical) seem plausible as well. Do these other explanations compete with the custom or norm explanations, or do they complement them? We need to consider this question carefully and not just assume that various accounts are all permissible at different levels of analysis. In this article I describe (...) two families of noncompeting accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts that seem to differ but are really different parts or versions of the same underlying explanation. I argue that while many types of apparent competitors don't really compete with norms, there are usually some that do. These competing accounts will usually undermine the norm account. (shrink)

The paper presents state of art in the area of emotion studies. It is stressed that emotions are multicomponent processes including neural, expression, subjective and social elements. We have tried to show that synchronization and coordination of these elements from elementary through intermediate to the most complex level may be understood in terms of emergent processes. Manifestations of emergence may be observed both in social aspects of emotions, as well as subjective and expression ones. Although the idea of (...) emergent processes was not explicitly used by contributors of this volume, the traces of it are present in their papers. (shrink)

In this article, we present the positional logic that is suitable for the formalization of reasoning about social phenomena. It is the effect of extending the Minimal Realisation (MR) logic with new expressions. These expressions allow, inter alia, to consider different points of view of social entities (humanistic coefficient). In the article, we perform a metalogical analysis of this logic. Finally, we present some simple examples of its application.

Pragmatism has recently gained ground as a theoretical perspective in sociology. The approach is not without its critics, however. One common charge is that pragmatism is oriented toward the micro and not well suited for the explanation of meso- or macro-level events, processes, or outcomes. In this paper—a review essay—I consider whether the charge has merit. I examine four studies that draw heavily on pragmatism and give some indication of its explanatory potential. Taken together, these studies suggest that pragmatism has (...) much to offer analysts of large-scale social phenomena. At the same time, key issues remain to be worked out. (shrink)

This paper outlines the methodological and empirical limitations of analysing the potential relationship between complex social phenomena such as democracy and inequality. It shows that the means to assess how they may be related is much more limited than recognised in the existing literature that is laden with contradictory hypotheses and findings. Better understanding our scientific limitations in studying this potential relationship is important for research and policy because many leading economists and other social scientists such as (...) Acemoglu and Robinson mistakenly claim to identify causal linkages between inequality and democracy but at times still inform policy. In contrast to the existing literature, the paper argues that ‘structural’ or ‘causal’ mechanisms that may potentially link the distribution of economic wealth and different political regimes will remain unknown given reasons such as their highly complex and idiosyncratic characteristics, fundamental econometric constraints and analysis at the macro-level. Neither new data sources, different analysed time periods nor new data analysis techniques can resolve this question and provide robust, general conclusions about this potential relationship across countries. Researchers are thus restricted to exploring rough correlations over specific time periods and geographic contexts with imperfect data that are very limited for cross-country comparisons. (shrink)

Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in (...) the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of the correlative personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman. (shrink)

This paper discusses partial results of an ongoing project focused on analysing the current usefulness and implications of developing research on agent-based social simulation models beyond academic, hobbyist or educational purposes. Design, development and testing phases of such modelling are discussed along with common issues evidence-driven modellers often face whilst collecting, analysing and modelling quantitative and qualitative data into social simulations. It also includes a discussion on the evidence gathered in published literature and structured interviews with researchers that (...) have lead mid- to long-term (3–5 years) projects on social simulation in Europe and the United States. Finally, good-practice recommendations are put forward by presenting a development methodology fully guided by evidence. (shrink)

Mingzu University is a common name for educational institutions for ethnic minorities established in China in 1950. By establishing such kind of higher education institutions, PR China as a state pursued several goals. In one hand, they started the opportunity for minor ethnic groups` representatives enter a higher education institution and thereby enlist their support for the state government. In the other hand, China saves the originality and the identity of small nationalities` cultures at the state level by studying and (...) promoting it. Today such educational institutions also serve to train leading cadres from ethnic minorities’ representatives, loyal to the state system and the political and social course of modern China as they are brought up in the spirit of modern Chinese social and pedagogical guidelines. The article aims to represent different social functions of Minzu Universities as a social phenomena common for China as well as cultural and social strategy of the PR China state in the field of ethnic minorities, an important part of which is implemented through them. Using the research methods typical for scientific studies of this kind the article proves the idea that Mingzu Universities in China play a great not only the educational, but also social role in the country to form an ideologically homogeneous society and respect for human rights in the country. (shrink)

Although Burt clearly explains how modern genomic techniques work, and describes their limitations, her conclusion that they are therefore not valuable additions to understanding social outcomes is unwarranted. Understanding the causes of complex social outcomes depends on understanding how social, individual, and genetic factors complexly interact with each other. None can be understood without reference to the others.

Analytical jurisprudence often proceeds with two key assumptions: that all law is either contained in or traceable back to an authorizing law-state, and that states are stable and in full control of the borders of their legal systems. What would a general theory of law be like and do if these long-standing presumptions were loosened? The Unsteady State aims to assess the possibilities by enacting a relational approach to explanation of law, exploring law's relations to the environment, security, and technology. (...) The account provided here offers a rich and renewed perspective on the preconditions and continuity of legal order in systemic and non-systemic forms, and further supports the view that the state remains prominent yet is now less dominant in the normative lives of norm-subjects and as an object of legal theory. (shrink)

Today, the linguistic approach offers us an irreplaceable method for the direct study of the constitutive processes of social phenomena (A. Delobelle, 1981). In fact, each social phenomenon is basically inhabited or interpreted by language. It is language processes that give its ramifications to the social and form disstinct sub-groups in it. This is why, when these processes are observed in their formal dynamics, outside their vehiculated “contents,” it is as though we find ourselves faced with (...) the very functioning of the social: as though we have in it a typically experimental terrain for the direct study of social phenomena. (shrink)

How are core social phenomena to be understood as modes of being? This book offers an alternative approach to social ontology. Recent interest in social ontology on the part of mainstream philosophy and the social sciences presupposes from the outset that the human being can be cast as a conscious subject whose intentionality can be collective. By contrast, the present study insistently poses the crucial question of who the human being is and how they sociate (...) as whos. Such whoness is a clean-cut departure from the venerable tradition of questioning whatness in philosophical thinking. Casting human being hermeneutically as whoness opens up new insights into how human beings sociate in interplays of mutual estimation that are simultaneously social power plays. Hitherto, the ontology of social power in all its various guises, has only ever been implicit. This book makes it explicit. The kind of social power prevalent in capitalist societies is that of the reified value embodied in commodities, money, capital, & co. Reified value itself is constituted through an interplay of mutual estimation among things that reflects back on the power interplay among whos. In this way a new critique of capitalism becomes possible. (shrink)

The articles comprising this dissertation concern classification and concept formation in the social and behavioral sciences. In particular, the emphasis in the study is on the philosophical analysis of interdisciplinary settings created by the recent intellectual developments on the interfaces between the social sciences, psychology, and neuroscience. The need for a systematic examination of the problems of conceptual coordination and integration across disciplinary boundaries is illustrated by focusing on phenomena whose satisfactory explanation requires drawing together the theoretical (...) resources from a variety of disciplines. In philosophy, questions regarding the nature of scientific concepts have often been framed in terms of theories of natural kinds. For this reason, analysis of the notion of natural kind as well as examination of how theories of natural kinds should be connected to recent philosophical accounts of scientific explanation and mechanisms form the core of the study. Building on contemporary discussions on these topics in the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of cognitive science, and the philosophy of the social sciences, the articles develop a mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the social and behavioral sciences, and scrutinize its applicability and usefulness as a theory of conceptual change in interdisciplinary settings. The study suggests that, although the mechanistic theory cannot account for the functioning of the whole range of scientific concepts, interweaving biological, cognitive, and social mechanisms in the manner suggested by the mechanistic theory offers a naturalistic and non-reductionist basis for conceptualizing epistemic coordination across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

Baumeister and colleagues argue for the indispensability of groups in human life. Yet, in positing individual differentiation as the key to effective group functioning, they adopt a Western-centric view of the relationship of the individual to the group and overlook an alternativesocialidentity account in which depersonalisation, not individuation, is central to understanding many group phenomena.

In making sense of the world, we typically cooperate, join forces, and draw on one another’s competence and expertise. A group or community in which there is a well-functioning division of cognitive-epistemic labor can achieve levels of understanding that a single agent who relies exclusively on her own capacities would probably never achieve. However, is understanding also collective? I.e., is understanding something that can be possessed by a group or community rather than by individuals? In this paper, I develop an (...) account of understanding phenomena according to which understanding a phenomenon requires reasonably endorsing an adequate and intelligible epistemic mediator that accounts for this phenomenon. I then show that understanding, conceived along these lines, can be attributed to collective entities. An important result of my arguments will be that a collective entity’s understanding cannot (always) be reduced to the sum of the understandings of the individuals belonging to it. This is because a collective entity can sometimes be rightfully claimed to understand a phenomenon while none of its individual members understands it. (shrink)

In lectures and writings in the decades following the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology [1967], Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, developed what he called a “misreading” of the phenomenological writings of Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. Garfinkel’s “misreading” included a selective and creative treatment of themes that Gurwitsch drew from Gestalt psychology, such as figure-ground, Gestalt contexture, and the phenomenal field. Rather than identifying these themes with visual perception demonstrated with picture-puzzles (for example, of animals hidden in foliage) (...) and line drawings of reversible figures, Garfinkel used them to demonstrate praxeological and interactional phenomena: organizations of embodied activity that constitute fields of collective action. Phenomenal fields, for Garfinkel, are formed through embodied work performed in concert with the actions of others. Although Harvey Sacks, the founder of Conversation Analysis, did not explicitly mention Gurwitsch, phenomenology or Gestalt psychology in his writings and transcribed lectures, some of his writings on the sequential organization of conversation seem informed, if only indirectly through his relationship with Garfinkel, by Gurwitsch’s treatment of visual and auditory phenomena. Both Garfinkel and Sacks devised innovative ways to transpose Gestalt phenomena from perceptual psychology to social formations. (shrink)

In Phenomena of Power, one of the leading figures of postwar German sociology reflects on the nature, and many forms of, power. For Heinrich Popitz, power is rooted in the human condition and is therefore part of all social relations. Drawing on philosophical anthropology, he identifies the elementary forms of power to provide detailed insight into how individuals gain and perpetuate control over others. Instead of striving for a power-free society, Popitz argues, humanity should try to impose limits (...) on power where possible and establish counterpower where necessary. Phenomena of Power delves into the sociohistorical manifestations of power and breaks through to its general structures. Popitz distinguishes the forms of the enforcement of power as well as of its stabilization and institutionalization, clearly articulating how the mechanisms of power work and how to track them in the social world. Philosophically trained, historically informed, and endowed with keen observation, Popitz uses examples ranging from the way passengers on a ship organize deck chairs to how prisoners of war share property to illustrate his theory. Long influential in German sociology, Phenomena of Power offers a challenging reworking of one of the essential concepts of the social sciences. (shrink)

mechanism" is frequently encountered in the social science literature, but there is considerable confusion about the exact meaning of the term. The article begins by addressing the main conceptual issues. Use of this term is the hallmark of an approach that is critical of the explanatory deficits of correlational analysis and of the covering-law model, advocating instead the causal reconstruction of the processes that account for given macro-phenomena. The term "social mechanisms" should be used to refer to (...) recurrent processes generating a specific kind of outcome. Explanation of social macro-phenomena by mechanisms typically involves causal regression to lower-level elements, as stipulated by methodological individualism. While there exist a good many mechanism models to explain emergent effects of collective behavior, we lack a similarly systematic treatment of generative mechanisms in which institutions and specific kinds of structural configurations play the decisive role. Key Words: causal regression • correlational analysis • emergent effects • micro-macro processes • social mechanisms • structural determinants. (shrink)

We comment on the limits of relying on prior literature when constructing the design space for an integrative experiment; the adaptive nature of social and behavioral phenomena and the implications for the use of theory and modeling when constructing the design space; and on the challenges of measuring random errors and lab-related biases in measurement without replication.

Some issues and varieties of computational and other approaches to understanding socially embedded phenomena are discussed. It is argued that of all the approaches currently available, only agent-based simulation holds out the prospect for adequately representing and understanding phenomena such as social norms.

In the previous issue of Analyse & Kritik (2020, vol. 42, issue 1) Alexander Vostroknutov (3-39) aims at a ‘synthesis’ of economics with ‘psychology, sociology, and evolutionary human biology.’ This paper argues that his approach needs to be complemented at least by work from sociologists and social psychologists. Starting with problems of defining and measuring norms it is then claimed that a theory of norms should address the origin, change and effects of norms and model micromacro processes. This should (...) also be the goal of a theory of institutions (which are defined here as sets of norms-norms in the sense of accepting oughtness statements). We show how the social psychological value expectancy theory can be applied to model the variety of incentives that could play a role in explaining the effects of norms. Regarding the origin Coleman’s theory of norms is applied to show how Vostroknutov’s dissatisfaction-norms hypothesis can be improved. (shrink)

The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural subjecthood, the (...) thesis that social groups are plural subjects, and the relation of these ideas to Rousseau's and Hobbes 's, are briefly explored. (shrink)

This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.

Emphasizing imaginaries as an essential tool in deep understanding of social phenomena, the essays in this volume address socio-anthropological environments; collective dynamics of social integration; mass media metamorphosis; politics legitimation processes; symbolic dimension of economics and material culture; and representation of otherness.

We use the system of p-adic numbers for the description of information processes. Basic objects of our models are so-called transformers of information, basic processes are information processes and statistics are information statistics (thus we present a model of information reality). The classical and quantum mechanical formalisms on information p-adic spaces are developed. It seems that classical and quantum mechanical models on p-adic information spaces can be applied for the investigation of flows of information in cognitive and social systems, (...) since a p-adic metric gives a quite natural description of the ability to form associations. (shrink)

Social ontology is the study of the nature and basic structure of social reality. It is a rapidly growing field at the intersection of philosophy and social science that has the potential to greatly assist social researchers of all kinds. One of the longest running projects in social ontology has developed over the better part of the last four decades through the work of Tony Lawson and the Cambridge Social Ontology Group. Cambridge social (...) ontology has its origins in an assessment that the widespread explanatory failure of modern mainstream economics, as well as in the social sciences more generally, is due to sustained ontological neglect and the resulting use of research methods that are inappropriate given the nature of social material. The Cambridge project's aim has been to rectify this neglect through conducting explicit and sustained inquiry into the nature of social material with a view to elaborating an explanatorily power conception of social ontology. The result is social positioning theory. This book is an introduction to the key features of social positioning theory, provides context as to the theory's development, and illustrates how social positioning theory can clarify the natures of phenomena such as gender and the corporation. Cambridge Social Ontology is for social scientists, philosophers and all readers interested in gaining a better understanding of the nature of social phenomena. (shrink)

Dixon et al. suggest that the psychological literature on intergroup relations should shift from theorizing to A focus on social change exposes the importance of psychological theories involving collective phenomena like social norms and institutions. Individuals' attitudes and emotions may follow, rather than cause, changes in social norms and institutional arrangements.

“[A] groundbreaking study combining psychoanalytical and anthropological methods to analyse the impact of industrialization on ‘peasants.’” —Booknews The renowned psychoanalyst Erich Fromm analyzed more than just general society and societal processes. Together with Michael Maccoby, he completed a study of Mexican villagers to empirically illustrate how historical, economic, and social requirements determine behavior. Social Character in a Mexican Village does much more than introduce a new approach to the analysis of social phenomena. It throws new light (...) on one of the world’s most pressing problems, the impact of the industrialized world on the traditional character of the laboring class. Unanimously, the book is an outstanding introduction to Fromm’s concept of social character. “Fromm and Maccoby have written a study of crucial importance.” —Richard J. Barnet, Institute for Policy Studies. (shrink)

This chapter examines some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how, focusing on work on the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating one's knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. I show how a conception of knowing-how as a form of 'downstream knowledge' can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I also consider how these ideas might connect with issues concerning wisdom, moral knowledge, and moral testimony.

In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, regarding the very constitution of the social space of interaction. I concentrate on the question of whether certain aspects of the theory of recognition can be translated into the terms of a socio-ontological paradigm: to do so, I make reference to some conceptual tools derived from John Searle's social ontology and Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics. My strategy consists in showing that recognitive phenomena cannot (...) be isolated at the level of human interaction, and are, rather, in part proper to animal interaction as well. Furthermore, it is argued that recognitive powers are constitutive powers more basic than deontic ones and play a role much broader than the one they in fact assume in Searle and in Brandom. (shrink)

A small consortium of philosophers has begun work on the implications of epistemic networks (Zollman 2008 and forthcoming; Grim 2006, 2007; Weisberg and Muldoon forthcoming), building on theoretical work in economics, computer science, and engineering (Bala and Goyal 1998, Kleinberg 2001; Amaral et. al., 2004) and on some experimental work in social psychology (Mason, Jones, and Goldstone, 2008). This paper outlines core philosophical results and extends those results to the specific question of thresholds. Epistemic maximization of certain types does (...) show clear threshold effects. Intriguingly, however, those effects appear to be importantly independent from more familiar threshold effects in networks. (shrink)