This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible (...) if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. (shrink)

A longstanding philosophical premise perceives simplicity as a desirable attribute of scientific theories. One of several raised justifications for this notion is that simple theories are more likely to indicate the true makeup of natural systems. Qualitatively parsimonious hypotheses and theories keep to a minimum the number of different postulated entities within a system. Formulation of such ontologically simple working hypotheses proved to be useful in the experimental probing of narrowly defined bio systems. It is less certain, however, (...) whether qualitatively parsimonious theories are effective indicators of the true nature of complex biological systems. This paper assesses the success of ontologically simple theories in envisaging the makeup of three complex systems in bacteriology, immunology, and molecular biology. Evidence shows that parsimonious theories completely misconstrued the actual ontologically complex constitutions of the three examined systems. Since evolution and selective pressures typically produce ontologically intricate rather than simple bio systems, qualitatively parsimonious theories are mostly inapt indicators of the true nature of complex biological systems. (shrink)

The notion of rigidity looms large in philosophy of language, but is beset by difficulties. This paper proposes a simple theory of rigidity, according to which an expression has a world-relative semantic property rigidly when it has that property at, or with respect to, all worlds. Just as names, and certain descriptions like The square root of 4, rigidly designate their referents, so too are necessary truths rigidly true, and so too does cat rigidly have only animals in (...) its extension. After spelling out the theory, I argue that it enables us to avoid the headaches that attend the misbegotten desire to have a simple rigid/non-rigid distinction that applies to expressions, giving us a simple solution to the problem of generalizing the notion of rigidity beyond singular terms. (shrink)

One of the criteria to a strong principle in natural sciences is simplicity. This paper claims that the Free Energy Principle (FEP), by virtue of unifying particles with mind, is the simplest. Motivated by Hilbert’s 24th problem of simplicity, the argument is made that the FEP takes a seemingly mathematical complex domain and reduces it to something simple. More specifically, it is attempted to show that every ‘thing’, from particles to mind, can be partitioned into systemic states by virtue (...) of self-organising symmetry break, i.e. self-entropy in terms of the balance between risk and ambiguity to achieve epistemic gain. By virtue of its explanatory reach, the FEP becomes the simplest principle under quantum, statistical and classical mechanics conditions. (shrink)

Philosophers like Duhem and Cartwright have argued that there is a tension between laws' abilities to explain and to represent. Abstract laws exemplify the first quality, phenomenological laws the second. This view has both metaphysical and methodological aspects: the world is too complex to be represented by simple theories; supplementing simple theories to make them represent reality blocks their confirmation. We argue that both aspects are incompatible with recent developments in nonlinear dynamics. Confirmation procedures and modelling strategies in (...) nonlinear dynamics show that there are simple, abstract theories that can be confirmed without encountering the problems pointed to by Cartwright. (shrink)

Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is taken (...) for granted by most philosophical accounts of promissory obligation.1 I agree that human beings do want such information and that they often get it by accepting promises. But I doubt that promising exists because it serves this information interest. (shrink)

The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse—Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is wrong. The correct theory is one invented by Jonathan Bennett in 1984 which he called 'The Simple Theory'. Bennett later argued himself out of that theory and went on to champion the standard account. But those arguments fail. The Simple Theory has been right all along.

The main topic of this paper is the investigation of generalized amalgamation properties for simple theories. That is, we are trying to answer the question of when a simple theory has the property of n-dimensional amalgamation, where two-dimensional amalgamation is the Independence Theorem for simple theories. We develop the notions of strong n-simplicity and n-simplicity for 1≤n≤ω, where both “1-simple” and “strongly 1-simple” are the same as “simple”. For strong n-simplicity, we present examples (...) of simple unstable theories in each subclass and prove a characteristic property of strong n-simplicity in terms of strong n-dividing, a strengthening of the dependence relation called dividing in simple theories. We prove a strong three-dimensional amalgamation property for strongly 2-simple theories, and, under an additional assumption, a strong -dimensional amalgamation property for strongly n-simple theories. In the last section of the paper we comment on why strong n-simplicity is called strong. (shrink)

This article aims to answer the aesthetic-value question.

We prove Vaught's conjecture for minimal trivial simple theories satisfying the generalized independence theorem.

We study structures equipped with generic predicates and/or automorphisms, and show that in many cases we obtain simple theories. We also show that a bounded PAC field is simple. 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments. I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the (...) class='Hi'>theory contravenes several typical desiderata of argumentation schemes such as aiding in the identification of enthymemes and keeping arguments constrained to a manageable taxonomy. So much the worse for the desiderata. Instead, I shall recommend focusing less on schemes and more on the component propositional functions. (shrink)

While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments. I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the (...) class='Hi'>theory contravenes several typical desiderata of argumentation schemes such as (i) aiding in the identification of enthymemes and (ii) keeping arguments constrained to a manageable taxonomy. So much the worse for the desiderata. Instead, I shall recommend focusing less on schemes and more on the component propositional functions. (shrink)

Tarski's indefinability theorem shows us that truth is not definable in arithmetic. The requirement to define truth for a language in a stronger language (if contradiction is to be avoided) lapses for particularly weak languages. A weaker language, however, is not necessary for that lapse. It also lapses for an adequately weak theory. It turns out that the set of G{\"o}del numbers of sentences true in arithmetic modulo $n$ is definable in arithmetic modulo $n$.

A comprehensible model is proposed aimed at an analysis of the reasons for theory change in science. According to model the origins of scientific revolutions lie not in a clash of fundamental theories with facts, but of “old” fundamental theories with each other, leading to contradictions that can only be eliminated in a more general theory. The model is illustrated with reference to physics in the early 20th century, the three “old” theories in this case being Maxwellian electrodynamics, (...) statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Modern example, referring to general relativity and quantum field theory, is considered. Key words: Popper, Kuhn, Stepin, Einstein . (shrink)

Kary (1990) defends the view that evolution by natural selection can be adequately explained in terms of a theory incorporating only a single level of selection. Here I point out some of the inherent inadequacies of such a theory.

Robert Stalnaker recently proposed a simple theory of propositions using the notion of a set of propositions being consistent, and conjectured that this theory is equivalent to the claim that propositions form a complete atomic Boolean algebra. This paper clarifies and confirms this conjecture. Stalnaker also noted that some of the principles of his theory may be given up, depending on the intended notion of proposition. This paper therefore also investigates weakened constraints on consistency and the (...) corresponding classes of Boolean algebras. (shrink)

I argue for an account of acting together that has a particular notion of joint commitment at its core. The account presented offers a compact explanation of four significant aspects of acting together as this is ordinarily understood: the parties have pertinent obligations to one another; each needs the concurrence of the rest with his or her untimely exit from the joint activity; an appropriate collective goal is sufficient to motivate the parties; and the parties may have personal goals contrary (...) to the collective goal. I argue that the simplicity of the account coupled with its explanatory power argue for it in face of concerns that it takes us beyond the concepts we need to explain what it is for an individual to act alone. Indeed, there is reason to invoke joint commitment in many contexts other than acting together in which more than one person is involved. I conclude by noting that the joint commitment account of acting together plausibly accounts for the apparently transformative nature of doing things with others, citing its connection with a sense of togetherness, solidarity, and unity, as in the phrase ‘There is no I in team’. (shrink)

There is probably no other field of study by the human race that is as full of nonsense as the subject of Political Philosophy. I believe that it would give even Religion some strong competition!. Otherwise rational people, intelligent people, even people educated to the highest level from our most prestigious universities, blindly follow some of the most ridiculous beliefs when it comes to politics. If fact, we are so confused about how to solve the problems caused by politics and (...) governing that we waste billions of dollars and an incredible amount of effort absolutely uselessly. (shrink)

This paper extends the defense of a simple theory of indicative conditionals previously proposed by the author, in which the truth conditions are material, and Grice-style assertability conditions are given to explain the paradoxes of material implication. The paper discusses various apparent counter-examples to the material account in which conditionals are not asserted, and so the original theory cannot be applied; it is argued that, nevertheless, the material theory can be defended.

Dividing chains have been used as conditions to isolate adequate subclasses of simple theories. In the first part of this paper we present an introduction to the area. We give an overview on fundamental notions and present proofs of some of the basic and well-known facts related to dividing chains in simple theories. In the second part we discuss various characterizations of the subclass of low theories. Our main theorem generalizes and slightly extends a well-known fact about the (...) connection between dividing chains and Morley sequences (in our case: independent sequences). Moreover, we are able to give a proof that is shorter than the original one. This result motivates us to introduce a special property of formulas concerning independent dividing chains: For any dividing chain there exists an independent dividing chain of the same length. We study this property in the context of low, short and ω -categorical simple theories, outline some examples and define subclasses of low and short theories, which imply this property. The results give rise to further studies of the relationships between some subclasses of simple theories. (shrink)

We identify complete fragments of the simple theory of types with infinity and Quine’s new foundations set theory. We show that TSTI decides every sentence ϕ in the language of type theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s1⋯∃ylslθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables, s1>⋯>sl, and θ is quantifier-free, ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s⋯∃ylsθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables and θ is quantifier-free. This shows that NF decides every stratified sentence (...) ϕ in the language of set theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns distinct values to all of the variables y1,…,yl, ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns the same value to all of the variables y1,…,yl. (shrink)

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

We study hyperdefinable groups, the most general kind of groups interpretable in a simple theory. After developing their basic theory, we prove the appropriate versions of Hrushovski's group quotient theorem and the Weil–Hrushovski group chunk theorem. We also study locally modular hyperdefinable groups and prove that they are bounded-by-Abelian-by-bounded. Finally, we analyze hyperdefinable groups in supersimple theories.

We show that a Kueker simple theory eliminates Ǝ∞ and densely interprets weakly minimal formulas. As part of the proof we generalize Hrushovski's dichotomy for almost complete formulas to simple theories. We conclude that in a unidimensional simple theory an almost-complete formula is either weakly minimal or trivially-almost-complete. We also observe that a small unidimensional simple theory is supersimple of finite SU-rank.

Let T1 and T2 be two simple complete theories in disjoint languages. We prove that there is a simple complete theory which extends T1 ∪ T2 if T2 has a certain condition.

In the present paper we shall prove that countable ω-categorical simple CM-trivial theories and countable ω-categorical simple theories with strong stable forking are low. In addition, we observe that simple theories of bounded finite weight are low.

We examine the conditions under which we can keep simplicity or categoricity after adding a Skolem function to the theory.

In recent work, the authors have established the group configuration theorem for simple theories, as well as some of its main applications from geometric stability theory, such as the binding group theorem, or in the $\omega$-categorical case, the characterization of the forking geometry of a finitely based non-trivial locally modular regular type as projective geometry over a finite field and the equivalence of pseudolinearity and local modularity. The proof necessitated an extension of the model-theoretic framework to include almost (...) hyperimaginaries, and the study of polygroups. (shrink)

1. We show that if p is a real type which is internal in a set $\sigma$ of partial types in a simple theory, then there is a type p' interbounded with p, which is finitely generated over $\sigma$ , and possesses a fundamental system of solutions relative to $\sigma$ . 2. If p is a possibly hyperimaginary Lascar strong type, almost \sigma-internal$ , but almost orthogonal to $\sigma^{\omega}$ , then there is a canonical non-trivial almost hyperdefinable polygroup (...) which multi-acts on p while fixing $\sigma$ generically. In case p is $\sigma-internal$ and T is stable, this is the binding group of p over \sigma$. (shrink)