Experiential evidence shows that pain is associated with common meanings. These include a meaning of threat or danger, which is experienced as immediately distressing or unpleasant; cognitive meanings, which are focused on the long-term consequences of having chronic pain; and existential meanings such as hopelessness, which are more about the person with chronic pain than the pain itself. This interdisciplinary book - the second in the three-volume Meanings of Pain series edited by Dr Simon van Rysewyk - aims to better (...) understand pain by describing experiences of pain and the meanings these experiences hold for the people living through them. The lived experiences of pain described here involve various types of chronic pain, including spinal pain, labour pain, rheumatic pain, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, endometriosis-associated pain, and cancer-related pain. Two chapters provide narrative descriptions of pain, recounted and interpreted by people with pain. Language is important to understanding the meaning of pain since it is the primary tool human beings use to manipulate meaning. As discussed in the book, linguistic meaning may hold clues to understanding some pain-related experiences, including the stigmatisation of people with pain, the dynamics of patient-clinician communication, and other issues, such as relationships between pain, public policy and the law, and attempts to develop a taxonomy of pain that is meaningful for patients. Clinical implications are described in each chapter. This book is intended for people with pain, their family members or caregivers, clinicians, researchers, advocates, and policy makers. (shrink)

Manipulationism holds that information about the results of interventions is of utmost importance for scientific practices such as causal assessment or explanation. Specifically, manipulation provides information about the stability, or invariance, of the relationship between X and Y: were we to wiggle the cause X, the effect Y would accordingly wiggle and, additionally, the relation between the two will not be disrupted. This sort of relationship between variables are called 'invariant empirical generalisations'. The paper focuses on questions about causal assessment (...) and analyses the status of manipulation. It is argued that manipulationism is trapped in a dilemma. If manipulationism is read as providing a conceptual analysis of causation, then it fails to provide a story about the methods for causal assessment. If, instead, manipulationism is read as providing a method for causal assessment, then it is at an impasse concerning causal assessment in areas where manipulations are not performed. Empirical generalisations are then reassessed, in such a way that manipulation is not taken as methodologically fundamental. The paper concludes that manipulation is the appropriate tool for some scientific contexts, but not for all. (shrink)

Questo libro suggerisce d'inserire il nome di Arthur Schopenhauer nella tradizione della filosofia come stile di vita. Sulla scia dei pioneristici lavori di Paul Rabbow, Michel Foucault e soprattutto Pierre Hadot, si argomenta come anche nei libri di Schopenhauer questa tradizione sia viva. In particolare, è negli "Aforismi sulla saggezza della vita", contenuti nei "Parerga e paralipomena", che è possibile trovare traccia di quelle pratiche che Hadot ha proposto di chiamare esercizi spirituali. Ciò che ne emerge è un "altro" Schopenhauer. (...) Non più, non tanto, non solo il grande campione del pessimismo, il negatore della volontà di vita, il filosofo del dolore e della noia. Ma un prezioso suggeritore su come sia possibile vivere una vita se non proprio più felice, certamente il meno infelice possibile. (shrink)

This bestselling dictionary is written by one of the leading philosophers of our time, and it is widely recognized as the best dictionary of its kind. Comprehensive and authoritative, it covers every aspect of philosophy from Aristotle to Zen. With clear and concise definitions, it provides lively and accessible coverage of not only Western philosophical traditions, but also themes from Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Jewish philosophy. New entries on philosophy of economics, social theory, neuroscience, philosophy of the mind, and moral (...) conceptions, bring this authoritative third edition up to date. It is the ideal introduction to philosophy for anyone with an interest in the subject, and it is an indispensable work of reference for students and teachers. (shrink)

Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence don’t entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. Further, (...) I shall argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation. (shrink)

Simon Critchley's first book, The Ethics of Deconstruction, was originally published to great acclaim in 1992. This edition contains three new appendices and a new preface where Critchley reflects upon the origins, motivation and reception of The Ethics of Deconstruction.

C’è prima la persona o prima la società? Per non cadere in una risposta dualistica, bisogna risalire alle radici antropologiche della vita sociale, che stanno alla base delle diverse forme che essa storicamente può assumere. Questo saggio esamina il rapporto tra le tendenze socializzanti innate e le virtù relazionali, alla luce di un’antropologia integrale, nella quale la persona umana è considerata nella sua globalità somatico-psichico-spirituale. Vengono qui esaminati il tessuto di legami in cui è inserita la nostra esistenza e la (...) responsabilità che compete a ognuno nei confronti del cosiddetto capitale sociale. (shrink)

Julián Marías (1914-2005) è un pensatore ancora poco conosciuto al lettore italiano, spesso oscurato dall’ombra del suo celebre maestro, José Ortega y Gasset. Filosofo indipendente e coraggioso, offre una proposta più coerente rispetto a Ortega sul tema essenziale comune a entrambi: il poter “dare ragione” della vita evitando gli opposti scogli del razionalismo e del vitalismo. “Dare ragione” della vita significa comprenderla nella sua “condizione morale” che trova espressione nel desiderio di felicità, nell’esigenza di amore e di amicizia, nei differenti (...) vissuti di ciascuna età. Significa riconoscerne la dimensione elettiva: vivere è preferire, saper fornire ragioni per l’opzione di qualcosa rispetto a qualcos’altro. Per questo motivo, più che alla categoria del bene, l’attenzione è rivolta a quella del meglio, fondamentale per comprendere il senso pieno delle proprie scelte e dell’intera trama della propria biografia. (shrink)

Medical practitioners have always been expected to abide by certain standards of conduct and uphold certain values, more or less throughout the world. In this book, besides discussing specific ethical issues, the author ponders questions such as the right to life and the integrity of the human person. Ethics in medicine takes account of the principles that underlie the best decisions, particularly in unusual circumstances – such as a pandemic. Many of these are enshrouded in the oaths most doctors take (...) – the Hippocratic Oath is perhaps the best known, and has influenced numerous others over the centuries. However, these principles and the resulting conduct have taken different directions at various moments in history and in different parts of the globe, though always primarily oriented to the protection of human health. The author compares some interesting similarities and differences, tracing the main social, legal and religious attitudes, in what has come to be known as "medical ethics", with all its benefits to Mankind. Alongside basic human dignity, four main values have been pivotal in medical ethics: Caring for sick people, putting their well-being at the center of concern, and doing good. Not causing harm: never making a patient take risks, and never prescribing a doubtful treatment. Fairness: treating all patients in accordance with their health needs, never favoring or neglecting anyone on the basis of background, occupation, etc. Self-determination: the patient can be informed about treatments and, when possible, should approve the prescriptions. The doctor must show empathy, respect for confidentiality, and responsibility. Briefly, this overview of the medical profession’s ethics focuses on experience, principles, aims, virtues and above all the basic rules which in various places through the centuries have governed the tortuous paths of Mankind. Written by an acclaimed expert in the field, this book is of value for all those working in healthcare, and people interested in its ethics. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to propose an ethical model for digital solidarity. On the one hand, it emphasises the importance of adopting a solidarity model to escape the logic of surveillance capitalism and the race for profits typical of the digital giants’ business model. On the other, it is intended to point out that a model of solidarity embodied in the digital network may instead offer a more universalistic alternative to the types of solidarity that have often imposed themselves (...) in our contemporary political landscape, namely solidarity limited to groups in opposition to others. In order to show what economic and political characteristics this model should respect, two case studies will be examined, namely Wikipedia and Occupy Wall Street. (shrink)

Sentido ontológico de la paz. -- Sé lo que eres. -- Univresidad, humanidades, humanismo. -- Luces de Heráclito el oscuro. -- Bergson : psicología, moral, religión. -- Tolstoi, un hombre humanizado. -- Porras : el hombre venicó al ministro.

The burden of proof (BOP) fallacy is an informal fallacy involving the failure to recognize or properly assign the BOP in a persuasive reasoned dialogue, that is, an interchange between two or more parties whose aim is to prove or defend a position and, in doing so, persuade the other side of its truth or plausibility. In some such dialogues, the amount or strength of evidence required in order to accomplish this goal reasonably may differ for one of the parties (...) involved. The BOP fallacy can occur in two ways. The first is when one side of the dialogue fails to recognize that its opponent incurs the BOP. The second way the BOP fallacy can occur is when one side of the dialogue assigns the BOP incorrectly. There are still some factors that play a role in determining which side of a dialogue incurs the BOP and this chapter discusses these factors. (shrink)

This book offers an up-to-date insight into the early philosophical debate on Einsteinian relativity. The essays explore the reception and interpretation of Einstein’s ideas by some of the most important philosophical schools of the time, such as logical positivism (Reichenbach), neo-Kantianism (Cassirer, Natorp), critical realism (Sellars), and radical empiricism (Mach). The book is aimed at physicists and historians of science researching the epistemological implications of the theory of relativity, as well as to scholars in philosophy interested in understanding how leading (...) philosophical figures of the early twentieth century reacted to the relativistic revolution. (shrink)

The book is devoted to the study of the sign-object relation in the semiotics of Charles Peirce. It puts this issue in the context of Peirce's philosophy of knowledge and of reality and individuates the final causality as the foundation of the semiotic relation, which gains its gnoseological reliableness from its underlying teleological tendencies.

I intend to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility. To put it another way, it is not always possible to be both a good friend and a diligent believer.

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare’s (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their inter-relationships. Most (...) importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts. (shrink)

How should probabilities be interpreted in causal models in the social and health sciences? In this paper we take a step towards answering this question by investigating the case of cancer in epidemiology and arguing that the objective Bayesian interpretation is most appropriate in this domain.

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and (...) the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful. (shrink)