This article examines some of the ways in which the trope of coldness appears in the social theory of Theodor W. Adorno. In the first section, I show how and why Adorno repeatedly criticizes a certain brand of coldness, namely, ‘bourgeois coldness’, which is understood as enacting and encouraging formal abstraction and indifference to sensuous particularity. In this sense, coldness is seen to function as a precondition for severe forms of violence (both symbolic and material). However, in the second section, (...) I argue that stopping short at this one-sided ‘critique of coldness’ remains incomplete and undialectical, and does not do justice to Adorno’s more complicated engagement with the topic. In light of this, I invert the focus of analysis to the ‘coldness of critique’, claiming that there are examples of other forms, internalizations and uses of coldness in Adorno’s work, serving to indefatigably expand the utopian horizons of his social theory above and beyond piecemeal reformism, local pedagogy or pragmatic micro-politics. The aim is not simply to promote ostensibly ‘positive’ alternatives or remedies to the ‘negative’ symptom of coldness, but rather to tarry with the negative, to recognize the coldness within ourselves the better to break through and sublate it. For Adorno, there is no way around coldness; the only way is to go through it. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a reconsideration of the complex concept of mimesis, as it is deployed in the critical theory of Theodor W. Adorno, which, I argue, provides some interesting and original avenues through which we may interpret some of the infinitely engaging if enigmatic films of Andrei Tarkovsky. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I explore Adorno's development and usage of the concept of mimesis, as well as the latter's fall into disfavour since Habermas's (...) influential 'communicative turn'. In the second part, I undertake to read some of Tarkovsky's work in an Adornian vein, with the hope of reconfiguring mimesis as a valuable and fruitful concept in understanding the somatic and extra-discursive elements within communication. What I call Tarkovsky's 'mimetic method' can be seen to follow Adorno's epistemological principle of the 'preponderance of the object', while testifying to the mimetic potential of non-discursive communication. In so doing, Tarkovsky's filmic work - with Adorno's critical theory - refutes the purely linguistic/discursive grounds of Habermasian communication. This implicit refutation works on two levels. It enacts forms of mimetic construction, at the first level, and calls forth acts of interpretation and mimetic reception, at the second. I argue that these features are in need of greater attention and elaboration. The works of Adorno and Tarkovsky, in my view, provide useful grounds for challenging and enhancing existing understandings of aesthetic and philosophic communication, by more fully appreciating their interconnectedness and complementarity. (shrink)